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Socrate, tout en réprouvant l'abus que les Sophistes faisaient du droit de douter, 
était pourtant de leur école. Comme eux, il repoussait l'empire de la tradition, et croyait 
que les règles de la conduite étaient gravées dans la conscience humaine. Il ne différait 
d'eux qu'en ce qu'il étudiait cette conscience religieusement et avec le ferme désir d'y 
trouver l'onligation d'être juste et de faire le bien. Il mettait la vérité au-dessus de la 
coutume, la justice au-dessus de la loi. Il dégageait la morale de la religion ; avant lui, 
on ne concevait le devoir que comme un arrêt des anciens dieux; il montra que le 
principe du devoir est dans l'âme de l'homme. En tout cela, qu'il le voulût ou non, il 
faisait la guerre aux cultes de la cité. En vain prenait-il soin d'assister à toutes les fêtes et 
de prendre part aux sacrifices; ses croyances et ses paroles démentaient sa conduite. Il 
fondait une religion nouvelle, qui était le contraire de la religion de la cité. On l'accusa 
avec vérité « de ne pas adorer les dieux que l'État adorait ». On le fit périr pour avoir 
attaqué les coutumes et les croyances des ancêtres, ou, comme on disait, pour avoir 
corrompu la génération présente. L'impopularité de Socrate et les violentes colères de 
ses concitoyens s'expliquent, si l'on songe aux habitudes religieuses de cette société 
athénienne, où il y avait tant de prêtres, et où ils étaient si puissants. Mais la révolution 
que les Sophistes avaient commencée, et que Socrate avait reprise avec plus de mesure, 
ne fut pas arrêtée par la mort d'un vieillard. La société grecque s'affranchit de jour en 
jour davantage de l'empire des vieilles croyances et des vieilles institutions. 
 
--Fustel de Coulanges, La Cité Antique V.1 
 
 
Hoc tamen solo delectabar in illa exhortatione, quod non illam aut illam sectam, sed 
ipsam quaecumque esset sapientiam ut diligerem et quaererem et assequerer et tenerem 
atque amplexarem fortiter. 
--Augustinus, Confessionum III 4.8 
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PREFACE 
SHAFTESBURY, PHILOSOPHY, AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
While contemporary scholars disagree about the extent to which Locke was a 
sincere Christian,
1
 his former pupil Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, seems to have considered him one.  Shaftesbury's papers contain an odd 
letter addressed "to a friend" describing his reaction to Locke's sentiments about dying.
2
  
His reaction, it must be said, is scornful. 
Shortly before his death in October of 1704, John Locke writes a letter to be 
delivered to his friend Anthony Collins upon his decease.  Locke writes, 
may you live long and happy in the enjoyment of health, freedom, content, and all 
those blessings which providence has bestowed on you, and your virtue entitles 
you to. I know you loved me living, and will preserve my memory now I am 
dead. All the use to be made of it is, that this life is a scene of vanity, that soon 
passes away; and affords no solid satisfaction, but in the consciousness of doing 
well, and in the hopes of another life. This is what I can say upon experience; and 
                                                 
1
  John Dunn, for example, argues that Locke was religious theorist, while Richard Ashcraft presents him as 
Nonconformist.  John Marshall thinks Locke was tempted toward Unitarianism. John Dunn, The Political 
Thought of John Locke : An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government', 1st 
paperback ed. (Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary 
Politics & Locke's Two Treatises of Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). John 
Marshall, John Locke : Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern 
British History. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Michael Zuckert, on the 
other hand, denies that Locke was a believer at all.  Michael P. Zuckert, Launching Liberalism : On 
Lockean Political Philosophy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002). 
2
 Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of 
Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, ed. Benjamin Rand (London, New York: S. Sonnenschein & Company, The 
Macmillan Company, 1900), 344-47. 
  
 
viii 
 
what you will find to be true, when you come to make up the account. Adieu; I 
leave my best wishes with you.
3
 
 
It is difficult to know what to make of a parting letter.  Locke speaks of the 
transience of this life and the hopes of a life to come.  Perhaps he intends to console his 
friend; perhaps he consoles himself.  Shaftesbury himself finds no consolation in Locke's 
account of beatitude.  He writes, 
the piece of a letter you sent me savours of the good and Christian. It puts me in 
mind of one of those dying speeches which come out under the title of a Christian 
warning piece. I should never have guessed it to have been of a dying 
philosopher. Consciousness is, indeed, a high term, but those who can be 
conscious of doing no good, but what they are frighted or bribed into, can make 
but a sorry account of it, as I imagine. Now it being my turn to say something in a 
dying way (for so, indeed, I am looked upon), I take upon me to send you, as my 
disciple, this counter charge.
4
 
 
Shaftesbury's letter contrasts the life of the Christian with the life of the 
philosopher.  "Consciousness," is indeed something to be sought, although he has a 
different understanding of it than does Locke; it is more common to find Shaftesbury 
speaking of self-knowledge. The remark about consciousness intimates Shaftesbury's own 
understanding of philosophy.  For Shaftesbury, Socrates is the model of excellence, and 
for Socrates, knowledge is virtue. 
Shaftesbury's counter-charge takes Locke point by point.  Shaftesbury extends his 
good wishes but denies he is offering a compliment.  Instead he offers the simple 
acknowledgement of virtue owed to a noble friend:  "the use I would have you make of it 
                                                 
3
 August 23, 1704. "For Anthony Collins, Esq."  John Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, 8 vols., 
The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke (Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press, 1989), 418-19. 
4
 Shaftesbury, Philosophical Regimen, 345. 
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is, that our life, thank heaven, has been a scene of friendship of long duration, with much 
and solid satisfaction, founded on the consciousness of doing good for the sake of the 
good, without any farther regards, nothing being truly pleasing or satisfactory but what is 
thus acted disinterestedly, generously, and freely."  Such a legacy is its own reward, 
"leaving no terrible account to be made up, nor terrible idea of those who are to account 
with."  For Shaftesbury, belief in an afterlife is a serious impediment to the practice of 
genuine virtue.  According to Shaftesbury, genuine virtue is pursued for its own sake; it is 
never the result of fear of punishment or the hope for reward.  Shaftesbury is not overly 
attached to life but not, apparently, because he thinks it is tragic: 
life is vain ('tis true) to those that make it so. And let those cry vanity, for they 
have reason. For my own part, who never could be in love with riches or the 
world, nor ever made any great matter of life, so as to love it for its own sake, I 
have therefore no falling out with it, now at last when I can no longer keep it; so 
without calling names or giving hard words, I can part freely with and give it a 
good testimony.
5
 
 
 He ridicules the notion that practicing virtue is miserable without an afterlife.  
"Hard, hard duties, if nothing be to follow! Sad conditions at the best, but such as must be 
complied with for fear of what is worse."  Shaftesbury is disappointed that such a view 
might be attributed to a "dying philosopher" and can only think that Philosophy herself has 
been slandered: 
O Philosophy! Philosophy!ŕI have heard, indeed, of other philosophy heretofore, 
but the philosophers of our days are hugely given to wealth and bugbears; and 
philosophy seems at present to be the study of making virtue burdensome and 
death uneasy. Much good may do those improvers of misery and diminishers of 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., 346. 
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all that is good in life. I am contented that they should cry, Vanity! For our part, 
let us, on the contrary, make the most of life and least of death.
6
 
 
Shaftesbury ends with a confession of sorts.  He is unable, it seems, to hold a view 
contrary to his understanding of virtue: 
This is my best advice; and what I leave with you, as that which I have lived and 
shall die by. Let every one answer for their own experience, and speak of 
happiness and good as they find it. Thank heaven I can do good and find heaven 
in it. I know nothing else that is heavenly. And if this disposition fits me not for 
heaven, I desire never to be fitted for it, nor come into the place. I ask no reward 
from heaven for that which is reward itself. Let my being be continued or 
discontinued, as in the main is best. The author of it best knows, and I trust Him 
with it. To me it is indifferent, and always shall be so.
7 
 
 
 
Shaftesbury's letter to a friend strikes me as more of a personal meditation on the 
nature of happiness than the words of a philosopher to a disciple.  I believe that this brief 
piece reveals much about the worldview of Shaftesbury.  In it we encounter in the 
strongest language his dismissal of an afterlife and his contempt for Christianity; his 
fondness for ridicule and soaring rhetoric; his emphasis on virtue and praise of friendship; 
and his rejection of modern philosophy as debasing (and with modern philosophy, his 
former tutor, John Locke).  Also present, however subtly, is Shaftesbury's understanding 
of true philosophy.  Just what that understand is I hope to make clear through a careful 
reading of his great work, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc.
8
  
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 344-45. 
7
 Ibid., 347. 
8
 Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 1732 ed., 3 
vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001). 
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The project was undertaken in the belief that Shaftesbury's Characteristicks had 
yet to be studied adequately.  I mean by this that no scholar had yet to read Shaftesbury as 
he himself recommends.  While I hold sympathetic reading to be a sound principle of 
hermeneutics, at least on first encountering a text, it seems especially wise in the case of 
Shaftesbury.  One must attend to the manner of presentation in the Characteristicks 
because presentation is itself a major theme of the work.  The book is not concerned with 
presentation as an end in itself, however.  Shaftesbury's mode of writing is in the service 
of an ambitious philosophical project.  Shaftesbury moves beyond the political 
circumstances of his day to address more fundamental questions. He leads us from the 
question of the relationship between religion and politics to questions of psychology and 
moral anthropology, and ultimately to the question what is man?  Such questions were of 
course au currant among the thinkers of his age; Shaftesbury stands out, however, as an 
early dissenter from the general Enlightenment project as it came to be understood in the 
eighteenth century.  In brief, my claim is that scholars have failed to understand 
Shaftesbury as he understood himself, that is, as a classical political philosopher in the 
Socratic tradition.  A defense of this claim, I hope, is sustained in the following chapters.  
This work makes the following arguments.  Shaftesbury's Characteristicks marks 
an important dissent from the general trend of early modern philosophy.  The book 
undertakes nothing less than the restoration of the classical understanding of philosophy in 
contradistinction to the understanding presented by the writings of Descartes, Hobbes, 
Locke, and other modern thinkers.  Shaftesbury's primary concern seems to be the 
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preservation of the distinctly human things as understood by the ancients.  This concern is 
behind his defense of the noble or the beautiful, which can be seen most conspicuously in 
his account of moral virtue and perhaps more subtly in his account of art and in his 
cosmological hymns to nature.  In pursuit of this end, Shaftesbury reintroduces the 
classical notion of the soul by reasserting the distinction between reason and the passions, 
which had been challenged by the moral theories of Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke. 
Essential to his project is a critique of Christianity.  Shaftesbury shares the critique 
of Christianity offered by Hobbes and Locke but he departs their company by his 
response.  As Shaftesbury presents the matter, modern philosophy had declared war on 
Christianity in the name of humanity, which it believed had been degraded morally, 
politically, and philosophically by the reign of Christendom.  According to Shaftesbury, 
modern philosophy introduces a sweeping method of radical skepticism in order to combat 
Christianity.  Yet according to Shaftesbury, this radical skepticism turns out to be at least 
as corrosive to natural human life as the worldview it hopes to undermine.  Shaftesbury 
proposes as an alternative the restoration of the classical critique of religion.  The classical 
critique made possible the coexistence of philosophy and religion and was accompanied 
by the political toleration of a variety of religious practices.  The reassertion of the 
classical view is accompanied by an attempt to save a notion of "enthusiasm," which had 
come under attack by the Enlightenment as coextensive with zealous and sectarian 
Christianity.  Shaftesbury tries to distinguish a noble form of enthusiasm, which according 
to his account is the source of all higher human aspirations, including Socratic philosophy.  
As a companion to his critique of Christianity, Shaftesbury advances an attack on modern 
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philosophy's political teaching as presented by Hobbes and Locke.  He tries to restore the 
classical view by showing that man is social by nature. 
In order to accomplish this project, Shaftesbury attempts to revive the Socratic 
method of dialogue in the form of what he calls "soliloquy."  This method is accompanied 
by the use of raillery, which I believe is Shaftsbury's way of presenting Socratic irony.  
For Shaftesbury, the aim of philosophy is self-knowledge, understood from the point of 
view of the individual soul as well as the point of view of human nature.  Both of these 
presuppose a defense of common sense, which according to the Socratic philosophy 
advanced by Shaftesbury, is the only possible beginning place for philosophical inquiry. 
 Finally, the dissertation suggests that Shaftesbury's reputation as a theistic proto-
romantic is misguided.  The culmination of the Characteristicks, a dialogue entitled The 
Moralists, seems to many scholars to advance a teleological cosmology.  Scholars have 
largely assumed that the philosophical hero of this dialogue is one Theocles; they have 
also assumed that Theocles is the spokesman for Shaftesbury's own opinions.  This 
interpretation, however, ignores the importance of the dialogue form as presented by 
Shaftesbury under the method of "soliloquy."  I believe that Shaftesbury's opinions only 
emerge by reading The Moralists precisely as a dialogue as opposed to a series of 
speeches presented in the garb preferred by the "polite" audience of his day.  My reading 
of the dialogue consequently attends to its well-planned structure while also placing it 
within the interpretive framework of the Characteristicks as a whole. 
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 I conclude that Shaftesbury's understanding of philosophy is ultimately zetetic 
regarding metaphysical questions.  This is to say that Shaftesbury himself provides the 
tools for raising questions about each of the hypotheses presented by the characters as the 
most probable account of the nature of the cosmos.  This suggests that Philocles rather 
than Theocles is the true hero of the dialogue insofar as the reader is left with more 
questions than answers.  The aim of this moderate form of skepticism is Socratic as well; 
it is an attempt to an foster appreciation for the knowledge of ignorance.  It is, therefore, 
unclear whether Shaftesbury believes the world is orderly and reflective of an organizing 
mind or merely chaotic.  For Shaftesbury, the questions and their plausible answers--what 
he calls "hypotheses"--remain more apparent than any evidence for preferring one claim 
over another. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PLAN 
OF SHAFTESBURYřS CHARACTERISTICKS 
A Neglected Work 
There is little question as to the historical importance of the Characteristicks.  As 
Stanley Grean observed forty years ago, "if the influence of Locke can be gauged by the 
nineteen editions that his Essay Concerning Human Understanding went through in the 
eighteenth century, the somewhat less but still great influence of Shaftesbury can be seen 
in the thirteen editions of his Characteristics between 1711 and 1790."
1
 
While this measure is impressive in itself, it can be added that the 
Characteristicks was read (and praised or attacked) by many of the leading minds of the 
eighteenth century.  A partial list would include Bernard Mandeville,
2
 Jonathan Swift,
3
 
                                                 
1
 Stanley Grean, Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics; a Study in Enthusiasm ([Athens]: Ohio 
University Press, 1967), ix. 
2
 E.g., Bernard Mandeville, Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness (London: T. 
Jauncy & J. Roberts, 1700), p. 239, where Shaftesbury is quoted at length and favorably; and unfavorably 
in The Fable of the Bees, or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, 1924, edited by  F.B. Kaye (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Classics, 1988), Remark T., p. 233. 
3
 Swift denies having written or even read Shaftesburyřs Letter concerning Enthusiasm in his ŖAn 
Apologyŗ for Tale of the Tub; but as A.O. Aldridge has pointed out, there is considerable reason to doubt 
Swiftřs candor here.  See Alfred Owen Aldridge, "Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto," Transactions of 
the American Philosophical Society (Philadelphia), New Series 41, no. 2 (1951), pp. 371-372. 
 2 
 
 
 
Francis Hutcheson,
4
 George Berkeley,
5
 and David Hume;
6
 Pierre Bayle,
7
 Jean Le Clerc,
8
 
Denis Diderot,
9
 and Rousseau;
10
 Wieland,
11
 Lessing,
12
 Mendelssohn,
13
 Herder,
14
 and 
                                                 
4
 Hutchesonřs first book is a defense of Shaftesbury.  See, for example An Inquiry Into the Original of Our 
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue: In Two Treatises, edited by Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
2004), ŖPreface,ŗ pp. 7 ff. 
5
 Berkelelyřs dialogue ŖAlciphron, or the Minute Philosopherŗ contains an extended response to 
Shaftesbury.  George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, 1901, Volume II:  Philosophical Works, 
1732-33, edited by  A.C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
6
  Hume mentions Shaftesbury in numerous places, including the Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals, 
and the Essays. 
7
 Bayle was a frequent correspondent of Shaftesburyřs and apparently a good friend.  D. B. Schlegel, 
Shaftesbury and the French Deists (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956). 
8
 Le Clerc reviewed Letter concerning Enthusiasm in 1709 and approved of the An Inquiry concerning 
Morals; Thomas Fowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. P. Putnamřs Sons: New York, 1883), pp. 135 ff. 
9
 In a peculiar passage, Diderot writes that: 
 
there are very few errors in Locke, and too few truths in milord Shaftesbury:  the former is only a man of 
vast intellect, penetrating and exact, while the latter is a genius of the first order.  Locke has seen; 
Shaftesbury has created, constructed, and edified.  To Locke we owe some great truths coldly preserved, 
methodically developed, and dryly presented; and to Shaftesbury, some brilliant schemes often poorly 
grounded, though full of sublime truths.  Even in his moments of error he pleases and persuades by the 
charm of his eloquence. 
 
"Génie," (Philosophie & Littér.), L’Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des 
Métiers.  Vol. VII, p. 583; Diderot, Denis, Oeuvres Esthétiques.  Paris, Editions Garnier freres [c1965]. 
10
 Jean-Jaques Rousseau, Émile; Éducation, Morale, Botanique, Lettres Morales, Bibliothèque de la 
Pléiade, OEuvres Complètes, vol. IV, p. 1091. 
11
 See Charles Elson, Wieland and Shaftesbury (New York: Columbia University Press, 1913). 
12
 I think a case could be made for the influence of Shaftesburyřs Second Characters on Lessingřs Laocoön.  
See  Laokoön [sic.]:  Lessing, Herder, Goethe, 1910, edited by William Guild Howard (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company), p. lxxviii footnote. 
13
 Mendelssohn was first loaned Shaftesburyřs works by Lessing.  He later undertook a project to translate 
Shaftesbury into German.  Alexander Altman, Moses Mendelssohn, A Biographical Study. (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press), p. 109.  See also David Dowdeyřs review of Moses Mendelssohn und die 
Auklarungsasthetik im 18. Jahrhundert by Klaus-Werner Segreff in The German Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 4 
(Autumn, 1985), pp. 606-608. 
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Kant;
15
 the neo-classical poets James Thompson and Mark Aikenside,
16
 Alexander 
Pope,
17
 and the novelist Henry Fielding.
18
  The catalogue alone of contemporary 
Anglican Divines, who praised or attacked (and perhaps even read) Shaftesbury, is itself 
quite extensive.
19
 
The philosophical importance of the Characteristicks can be seen in the ideas 
taken up by the aforementioned thinkers, but I will single out remarks by Montesquieu 
and Leibniz for brief consideration.  Montesquieu calls Shaftesbury one of the four great 
poets of the West, along with Plato, Montaigne, and Malebranche.
20
  While this statement 
                                                                                                                                                 
14
 ŖBut why do you mention only two people and forget a third name, my dear philosopher, one whose 
human wisdom and social temper are just as great?  The friend of our old Leibniz, who owes so much to 
him and whom he loved to read Ŕ the philosophical scoffer whose laughter contains more truth than do 
other peopleřs coughs and spittle Ŕ in short, Lord Shaftesburi [sic.].ŗ  Letter to Kant from Johann Gottfried 
Herder, November 1768.  15 [41] (39).  (Incidentally, Rousseau spells it Shaftesburi too.) 
15
 ŖFor the time being, I shall lecture on universal practical philosophy and the doctrine of virtue. . .The 
attempts of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, although incomplete and defective, have nonetheless 
penetrated furthest in the search for the fundamental principles of all morality.ŗ  Immanuel Kant, 
Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, edited and translated by David Waldorf, Cambridge Edition of the 
Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 298. 
16
 Robert Harrison Marsh, Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1965). 
17
 If perhaps indirectly through Bolingbroke, who is thought by some to have failed in recognizing his own 
debt to Shaftesbury.  See Cecil A. Moore, Backgrounds of English Literature, 1700-1760 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1953), pp. 32 ff. 
18
 Consider the famous conversation between the Rev. Mr. Thwakum and Ŗthe philosopherŗ Mr. Square in 
Tom Jones, book 3 chapter 2:  
Square said, "It was a mere abuse of words to call those things evils, in which there was no moral unfitness: 
that pain, which was the worst consequence of such accidents, was the most contemptible thing in the 
world"; with more of the like sentences, extracted out of the second book of Tully's Tusculan questions, 
and from the great Lord Shaftesbury. 
19
 Aldridge 1951, pp. 371 ff. 
20
 "Platon fait partie des quatre grands « poètes » aux côtés de Montaigne, Malebranche et Shaftesbury."  
Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, Oeuvres Completes, Publiees Sous La Direction De Andre 
Masson, ed. Andre Masson, 3 vols. (Paris :: Nagel, 1950), 2.490, n° 1092  
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would require careful attention (instantly one wonders about Homer, Vergil, Dante, and a 
couple others) it is nevertheless striking.  Certainly the company of Plato is one that 
Shaftesbury himself would be proud to own (although given Shaftesburyřs alleged 
disapproval of the modern essay, the relationship to Montaigne might be more troubling 
to him).  In placing him in this company, I believe that Montesquieu is calling attention to 
the inseparability of Shaftesburyřs thought and his mode of presentation.  For 
Shaftesbury, poetry and philosophy are ultimately inseparable. 
The praise by Leibniz is easier to grasp and can be found in an extended review of 
Shaftesburyřs work written at the request of Pierre Coste.  Leibniz writes of the fifth part 
of the Characteristicks, entitled The Moralists, A Philosophical Rhapsody, that "it lacks 
almost nothing but my pre-established harmony, my elimination of death, and my 
reduction of matter or of plurality to unities or simple substances.  I had expected merely 
to find a philosophy like Mr. Lockeřs but was led beyond Plato and Descartes.  If I had 
seen this work before my Theodicy was published, I should have profited as I ought and 
should have borrowed its great passages."
21
  Shaftesbury indeed looks back to Plato (and 
Montaigne) but also forward to Leibniz, Rousseau, Hume, and other dissenters from the 
more radical aspects of the Enlightenment project.  His interest in authorship and modes 
of writing may even be said to anticipate certain Ŗpostmodernŗ trends as well.22  As we 
                                                 
21
 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Remarks on the Three Volumes Entitled Characteristics of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times [1712:  G., III, 423-31]," in Philosophical Papers and Letters, Vol. II, ed. Leroy E. 
Loemker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 1022-32. 
22
 I have a number of things in mind, but for one example consider Hans Georg Gademerřs Truth and 
Method, which explicitly mentions Shaftesbury as a predecessor. Truth and Method. 1975. tr. Joel 
Weisenheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2d ed. (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 10-39. 
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shall see, Shaftesbury intends to lead his reader beyond Descartes, and insofar as he must 
encounter the claims of revelation as presented in the Bible, perhaps beyond Plato as 
well.
23
 
Yet despite the extraordinary enthusiasm which surrounded Shaftesburyřs 
Characteristics in the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century saw a steep decline in 
his direct influence.  By 1902, Sir Leslie Stephen could write that Ŗthe Lord Shaftesbury 
is one of the writers whose reputation is scarcely commensurate with the influence which 
he once exerted.ŗ24  Insofar as he is remembered by philosophers, Shaftesbury is known 
primarily as the progenitor of the Ŗmoral senseŗ doctrine of ethics, as an early expositor 
whose work has been developed and improved over time.  According to the influential 
work of Henry Sidgwick, for example, Shaftesbury initiated an important turn in ethics 
Ŗfrom presenting the principle of social duty as an abstract reasonŗ to the attempt to 
demonstrate a natural harmony between social affections and manřs Ŗreflective self-
regard.ŗ25  Sidgwick rightly worries that a Ŗsenseŗ doctrine of morality quickly yields to 
the view that morality is a matter of individual taste; that the Ŗfundamental questions 
ŘWhat is rightř and ŘWhyřŗ drop too far into the background; and that the mere existence 
                                                 
23
 It is a real question in my mind whether Shaftesbury distinguishes between myth as understood by Plato 
and revelation as it comes to light in the Bible.  I hope to have something useful to say about this in Chapter 
two. 
24
 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 2. (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1963), p. 15. 
25
 Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers, Third Ed. (London: Macmillan 
and Company, 1896), p. 184. 
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of a moral sentiment is insufficient reason to obey it.
26
  According to the analytic 
tradition, philosophy has continued to wrestle with this last concern especially by trying 
to articulate a thesis of Ŗinternalismŗ adequate to the task of making men into authentic 
moral agents.
27
  Alternative interpretations of Shaftesbury trace his thought to his 
philosophic predecessors, be they the Stoics,
28
 neo-Platonists,
29
 or Cambridge 
Platonists.
30
  While none of these views is wholly wrong, I hope to show that they are 
inadequate. 
Not surprisingly, the field of literary criticism has been more attentive to the 
conspicuous role style plays in the Characteristicks.
31
  Yet here the scholarship, while 
very good, is insufficiently attentive to the main philosophic themes of the 
Characteristicks.  So too with the field of the history of aesthetics. 
Historians of thought have also addressed Shaftesbury, but these scholars have 
neglected the substance of his concerns by emphasizing the cultural or political 
                                                 
26
 Sidgwick 1896, p 233. 
27
 See Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 1874, Sixth (London, New York: Macmillan and Company, 
1901), chapter 9.  For a more recent account, see Stephen L. Darwall, The British Moralists and the 
Internal "Ought," 1640-1740 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
28
 Ester A. Tiffany, "Shaftesbury as Stoic," Publications of the Modern Languages Association of America 
37 (1923): 642-84. 
29
 Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, translated by James P. Pettigrove (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1953). 
30
 John A. Passmore, Ralph Cudworth, An Interpretation (Cambridge University Press, 1951). 
31
 For examples see Charles Lambřs ŖThe Genteel Style,ŗ in The Works of Charles Lamb; in Two Volumes, 
edited by Sir Thomas Noon Talford (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1875); William E. Alderman, "The 
Style of Shaftesbury," Modern Language Notes 38, no. 4 (Apr. 1923): 209-15; R. L. Brett, The Third Earl 
of Shaftesbury; a Study in Eighteenth-Century Literary Theory (London, New York, Hutchinsonřs 
University Library [1951]); Robert Harrison Marsh, Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965). 
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environment in which he wrote.  While many of these works are indeed excellent,
32
 none 
has yet to construe Shaftesburyřs project accurately in its philosophic context.  The recent 
and very subtle study by Lawrence E. Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness, 
takes Shaftesbury to have a serious project, but one too immediately Whiggish to do 
justice to the concerns of the Characteristicks.  Once again, the historical scholarship is 
good and correct as far as it goes.  Still it is insufficient. 
Most importantly, perhaps, the decline of his influence might be attributed to 
success:  on the one hand, to the successful assimilation of many of his ideas by his 
progeny; and on the other, the apparent success of the Enlightenment project he resisted.  
There is some question as to whether the philosophic approach of Descartes, Spinoza, 
Hobbes, and Locke, and later, of Rousseau and Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger, have 
provided an adequate reply to the challenge presented to philosophy by revelation.  
Modern philosophy might have been naïve in its belief that it could refute the claims of 
revelation through its critique of miracles (Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Kant) and through 
the production of charitable works (stable political life, economic prosperity, and the 
conquest of nature through technology).  The apparently antique philosophy of 
Shaftesbury may well present an alternative to this modern approach; at the very least, it 
presents an attractive alternative perspective from which one might examine the 
successes and failures of modern philosophy.  Shaftesburyřs philosophy seeks a solution 
                                                 
32
 The work of Isabel Rivers, which considers his influence on the Scottish Enlightenment, is especially 
impressive.  Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics 
in England, 1660-1780 (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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to the challenges which political life and religion present philosophy that does not 
alienate human beings from nature.  In his view, both Christianity and modern 
philosophy do this, and by doing this, present new obstacles to the real task of 
philosophy, self-knowledge. 
What follows in this chapter is a sketch of the Characteristicks.  I first explore the 
way in which Shaftesbury hoped he would be read. The treatment is necessarily brief but, 
I hope, sufficient to prepare the way for the sustained project of the dissertation.  Next, I 
offer an overview of each of the compositions which make up the Characteristicks.  This 
overview points us toward what I take to be the central concern of his work, namely, the 
relationship among religion, politics, and philosophy.  I will conclude with an overview 
of the remainder of the dissertation. 
 
Reading Shaftesbury’s Characterist icks  
At first glance, Shaftesburyřs Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 
etc.
33
 might seem to be nothing more than a collection of occasional pieces.  It is well 
known, for example, that of the six treatises which make up the Characteristicks, the first 
five appeared separately, at different times, and in various forms.  Indeed, each piece 
seems to confess as much since they bear their original publication dates on separate title 
                                                 
33
  Shaftesbury, Characteristicks. There are two other recent scholarly editions of the Characteristicks.  The 
new Cambridge Text edition has valuable notes and a very helpful general introduction by Lawrence Klein.  
I prefer the Liberty Fund edition because it restores the structure and illustrations designed by Shaftesbury 
himself.  Oxford University Press recently released an edition as well.  Anthony Ashley Cooper 
Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Philip J. Ayres, 2 vols. (Oxford; New 
York: Clarendon Press; published in the United States by Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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pages.  Yet Shaftesbury claims in the sixth treatise of the Characteristicks that the pieces 
were designed to fit together as a unified whole.  This sixth treatise, entitled 
Miscellaneous Reflections on the preceding Treatises, and other Critical Subjects, takes 
the form of five essays or "miscellanies," with one miscellany devoted to each of the 
previous five treatises.  As the author of the Miscellaneous Reflections, Shaftesbury 
speaks of the author of the other treatises in the third person while he keeps an ironic 
distance from the work as a whole.  In order to distinguish between the authorial voices 
of these works, I will refer to the author of the Miscellaneous Reflections as "the Critic," 
while calling Shaftesbury the author of the work as a whole.
34
  As we shall soon see, the 
Critic offers an interpretation of the first five treatises, and claims to discover a 
complicated rhetorical strategy at work in Shaftesburyřs Characteristicks. 
We begin with a few observations about the architectural features of the text.  
Shaftesbury placed footnotes throughout the Characteristicks and also prepared a 
peculiar index for his book.  While the footnotes sometimes serve the conventional 
scholarly purpose of citing other works, they frequently direct the readerřs attention to 
other places in the Characteristicks itself.  This complex lattice of footnotes has generally 
been ignored or dismissed by scholars of Shaftesbury as an afterthought on his part.  For 
example, Robert B. Voitle, author of a thorough biography of Shaftesbury, remarks that 
the author developed "a huge index and an elaborate system of cross-references."
35
  
                                                 
34
 The Critic does not himself call Shaftesbury the author of the Characteristicks, but refers to him only as 
"our author." 
35
 Robert Voitle, "Shaftesbury's Moral Sense," Studies in Philology 52, no. 1 (1955): 18. 
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Nevertheless, Voitle claims that "a study of Shaftesbury's methods of indexing and 
footnoting reveals that a principal object of these devices in Characteristics is to give 
heterogeneous material a semblance of unity.  For Shaftesbury, even the most tenuous of 
relationships is sufficient excuse for a cross-reference in the footnotes or a joint entry in 
the index."
36
 
Yet contrary to Voitle, these cross-references indicate, if not a unified plan, a 
certain consistency of themes addressed by Shaftesbury.  The footnotes are also replete 
with references to classical authors, particularly to the Roman satirists and to various 
stoics.  Careful attention to the structure and content of the footnotes will assist us in 
uncovering what I will argue is in fact a consistent and unified plan for the 
Characteristicks. 
The book as originally published was organized into three volumes.  Volume I 
contains treatises one, two, and three; volume II contains treatises four and five; volume 
III contains treatise six.  We will see that the first volume serves as a preparation for 
reading the second volume, just as the last volume, with its Miscellaneous Reflections, 
serves as a commentary on the first two volumes.  This seems to suggest that the heart of 
the Characteristicks is volume II; but let us leave this question aside for now.  Here, then, 
is a table of contents for the Characteristicks as originally published: 
 
                                                 
36
 Ibid. This opinion is shared by more recent scholars as well.  Lawrence E. Klein somewhat more 
generously remarks that "Characteristicks was an expedient reassembling of previously published writings 
with a unifying gloss."  Lawrence Eliot Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness : Moral Discourse 
and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge [England] ; New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 111. 
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Volume I:  
Treatise 1)    A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm to my Lord Sommers 
Treatise 2)    Sensus Communis: an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor 
Treatise 3)    Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author 
  
Volume II:  
Treatise 4)    An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit 
Treatise 5)    The Moralists, A Philosophical Rhapsody 
  
Volume III:  
Treatise 6)    Miscellaneous Reflections on the Preceding Treatises, etc. 
 
We can see from the table of contents the remarkable variety of literary forms 
which the Characteristicks employs:  a letter, an essay, something Shaftesbury calls a 
soliloquy, a treatise proper, a dialogue Shaftesbury calls a rhapsody, and the 
aforementioned miscellany or common essay.  This variety invariably complicates any 
attempt to offer an account of the work as a unified whole.  And yet this is exactly what 
Shaftesbury suggests we should do in the Preface to the book, where he calls this 
collection "unified Tracts."
37
 
The Critic who writes the Miscellaneous Reflections seems to agree with this 
judgment.  This opinion emerges gradually through the five chapters of the sixth treatise 
as the Critic discusses a large variety of subjects.  The Critic begins his reflections as a 
whole by discussing the character of the miscellany as a literary form; we will see that 
this character will stand in stark contrast to the method of the Characteristicks as the 
Critic explains it.  We first learn that the miscellany is a recently invented form of 
                                                 
37
 "Preface," Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1.xxi. 
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writing, and, according to the Critic, a happy one "for the harvest of Wit."
38
  In the past, 
"Regularity and Order were thought essential in a Treatise."  Strict rules of composition 
once imposed "a Yoke" which modern writers have thrown off.  Literary efforts now 
come into the world without "the invidious Distinctions of Bastardy and Legitimacy," and 
consequently, a work is received without much "examination of the Kind, or censure of 
the Form."  As a result of the introduction of the form of miscellany, which is in effect a 
loosening of the strict rules of composition observed in the past, more people have 
proven willing to try their hand at literary efforts.  According to the old rules of 
composition, a work was esteemed graceful and beautiful when it betrayed a unified 
"Plan of Workmanship."  The miscellany, on the other hand, has made a virtue of the 
want of a clear plan; it is more likely to celebrate the "Odd and Pretty over the Graceful 
and Beautiful."
39
  In the old manner, the unity of the work was effected by an intimate 
connection between form and content.  What is lost, according to the Critic, by 
abandoning the painful constraint of "Justness and Accuracy of Thought" is compensated 
by "the agreeable and more easy Commerce of Gallantry and modern Wit."  The Critic 
attributes this profitable trade to the turning of the miscellany writer from models of form 
offered in nature to some other source of inspiration.  He writes that "where there is 
nothing like Nature, there is no room for the troublesome part of Thought or 
Contemplation. . .A Coherence, a Design, a Meaning, is against their purpose, and 
                                                 
38
 Miscellaneous Reflections:  Miscellany I, 3.4.  
39
 Ibid., 3.6. 
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destroys the very Spirit and Genius of their Workmanship."
40
  It should be clear already 
that the Critic is not without an ironic attitude about his own activity.  One of the many 
things to be considered eventually is the ambiguous relationship borne by the Critic 
toward the miscellany as a literary form.  However this may be, the Critic wholeheartedly 
embraces the "Title of a Miscellaneous Writer" throughout the Miscellaneous 
Reflections.
41
  We, on the other hand, will have to attend to the particular form of each 
treatise presented by Shaftesbury. 
The Critic tells us in the first "Miscellany" that "my chief Intention in the 
following Sheets is to descant cursorily upon some late Pieces of a British Author."  He 
intends to take full advantage of the "miscellaneous Taste" of his age.  "According to this 
Method," he writes, "whilst I serve as Critick or Interpreter to this new Writer, I may the 
better correct his Flegm, and give him more of the fashionable Air and Manner of the 
World; especially in what relates to the Subject and Manner of his two last Pieces, which 
are containřd in his second Volume."42  This said, he will not feel confined by the content 
of these treatises, but follow ideas as he sees fit (hence the full title of this treatise, 
Miscellaneous Reflections on the preceding Treatises, and other Critical Subjects).  The 
Critic has reserved for himself the right "to use Order or lay it aside."
43
  This is not, 
however, the procedure followed by Shaftesbury in the Characteristicks as a whole.  Our 
                                                 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid., 3.7. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Miscellaneous Reflections:  Miscellany III, 3.82. 
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critic tells us in his "Miscellany III," which among other things offers an interpretation of 
the Soliloquy, that while the first two treatises of the Characteristicks are very skeptical in 
tone, when examined with care they reveal Shaftesbury as a "real Dogmatist, as strong as 
any Devotee or Religionist of Řem all."44  In other words, although Shaftesburyřs first two 
treatises are largely critical or skeptical of other peopleřs "schemes," he nevertheless 
"holds a certain Plan or System peculiar to him-self, or such at least, in which he has at 
present but few Companions or Followers."
45
  The Critic compares Shaftesbury to an 
ambitious architect, "who being callřd perhaps to prop a Roof, redress a leaning Wall, or 
add to some particular apartment, is not contented with this small Specimen of his 
Mastership:  but pretending to demonstrate the Unserviceableness and Inconvenience of 
the old Fabrick, forms the Design of a new Building, and longs to shew his Skill in the 
principal Parts of Architecture and Mechanicks."
46
  It is far easier to tear down an old 
structure than it is to build a new one; and Shaftesbury has thus far "kept up his sapping 
Method and unravelling Humour," while offering only "very slender hints" of his 
"pretence to a real architect-capacity."  The Critic tells us in a footnote where to look for 
these hints, and we will look for them presently. 
                                                 
44
 Ibid.  
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid., 3.82-83.  [This image invites comparison to and eventual contrast with Descartesř project as 
explained in Discours, e.g., "Ainsi voit-on que les bâtiments qu'un seul architecte a entrepris et achevés ont 
coutume d'être plus beaux et mieux ordonnés que ceux que plusieurs ont tâché de raccommoder, en faisant 
servir de vieilles murailles qui avoient été bâties à d'autres fins."] 
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According to the Critic, the third treatise, the Soliloquy, bears the same "sceptical 
mein [sic]" as the first two, but whispers to anyone who is attentive of a larger, positive 
project contained in the Characteristicks.  "What he [that is, our Author] offers by way of 
Project or Hypothesis is very faint, hardly spoken aloud; but mutterřd to himself in a kind 
of . . . feignřd Soliloquy."47  A few pages later the Critic tells us that, more than hints 
now, Shaftesburyřs "philosophy itself. . .lies concealed in this treatise."48  The Soliloquy 
contains an introduction to Shaftesburyřs philosophy proper, but what he reveals of his 
"Form and Method" is presented with the "random Miscellaneous Air" and may be 
mistaken for mere raillery.  One might remark in passing that the Soliloquy is itself the 
central treatise of the five attributed by the Critic to our Author.  It certainly will be 
central in teaching us how to bring the positive project of Shaftesbury to light as it indeed 
contains an introduction to Shaftesburyřs manner of philosophizing. 
The Critic claims that Shaftesbury comes out of hiding for An Inquiry concerning 
Virtue or Merit, the fourth treatise of the Characteristicks.  There, "he discovers himself 
openly, as a plain Dogmatist, a Formalist, and Man of Method; with his Hypotheses 
tackřd to him, and his Opinions so close-sticking, as wouřd force one to call to mind the 
Figure of some precise and strait-lacřd Professor in a University."49  We must ask 
ourselves why Shaftesbury would bother to conceal his philosophy in the first three 
treatises, only to reveal it outright in the fourth.  We are also free to wonder whether the 
                                                 
47
 Ibid., 3.83-84. 
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 Ibid. 
49
 Ibid., 3.84.   
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Critic is himself fully candid; he may put things too simply here.  We should also note that 
the Critic has not done all the work for us; we still must work to discover just what this 
philosophy of Shaftesbury is.  Part of this work will be deciding for ourselves what to 
make of the alleged "plain dogmatism" of the Inquiry.  We will be in a better position to 
speculate when we have a better understanding of the plan of the Characteristicks as a 
whole. 
The Critic reveals more of this plan in the beginning of "Miscellany IV," which is 
itself devoted to the Inquiry.  Here the Critic tells us that although the five treatises first 
appeared separately and at different times, they were designed to fit together as a whole.  
He writes that "it will appear therefore in this Joint-Edition of our Authorřs Five 
Treatises, that the Three former are preparatory to the Fourth, on which we are now 
enterřd; and the Fifth (with which he concludes) a kind of Apology for this revivřd 
Treatise concerning Virtue and Religion."
50
  According to the Critic, the division of the 
Characteristicks into three volumes is more than a publisherřs convenience.  Each volume 
serves its purpose in the design of the whole work:  the first as an introduction to the 
second, and the third as an interpretation of the first two.  The first and third volumes point 
to the central importance of the second volume, containing An Inquiry and The Moralists.  
What sort of preparation does one need to read the Inquiry?  And why does it need an 
apology in the form of The Moralists?  In what way are these treatises central to 
Shaftesburyřs plan?  In short, why does Shaftesbury present his philosophy in such a 
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complicated manner?  An answer to this question will emerge only from a careful reading 
of the Characteristicks, with the assistance of the Critic, of course, but also with the good 
sense to investigate for ourselves.  The remainder of this study will attempt to do precisely 
this.  In order to see the continuous thread that we will follow throughout the course of our 
discussion, however, we need to look briefly at the treatises of "our Author" as they 
present themselves. 
 
The first treatise of the Characteristicks is entitled A Letter Concerning 
Enthusiasm, to My Lord Sommers.  It is, as we have seen, the first of three treatises 
contained in Volume I.  First published in 1708, A Letter concerning Enthusiasm had as 
its occasion the appearance in England of a controversial sect of French Huguenots who 
claimed to have personal revelations through the power of the Holy Spirit.
 51
  The Letter 
is only marginally concerned with this sect, however, taking as its real goal the 
distinction between a true and false species of enthusiasm.  Generally used as a pejorative 
by early Enlightenment philosophers, enthusiasm was widely regarded as a presumption 
to revelation born only by "laying by reason" and out of the psychological illness of 
"melancholy."
52
  While he is not the first to identify a positive species of enthusiasm,
53
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Shaftesbury undertakes a radical transformation of the concept and places it at the heart 
of his philosophy.  In the words of the Critic, "so far is [our Author] from degrading 
Enthusiasm, or disclaiming it in himself; that he looks on this Passion, simply considerřd, 
as the most natural and its Object as the justest in the World.  Even VIRTUE it-self he 
takes to be no other than a noble Enthusiasm justly directed, and regulated by that high 
Standard which he supposes in the Nature of Things."
54
  Shaftesbury thinks that it is 
essential to preserve the part of the soul where the passion called enthusiasm dwells.  This 
is essential because of enthusiasmřs connection to all the higher aspirations of human 
beings.  In short, I believe that enthusiasm occupies for Shaftesbury the central place held 
by eros in Platonic philosophy.  It is this passion which, when corrected by reason, raises 
men above themselves to the contemplation of the apparent "Numbers, Harmony, 
Proportion, and Beauty," found naturally in the cosmos.
55
  So important to Shaftesbury is 
enthusiasm rightly understood that he identifies it with the sense of wonder which is the 
beginning of genuine philosophic inquiry.
56
 
A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm caused considerable controversy in England, 
especially among Anglican divines, who took the piece to be an attack upon Christianity.  
While later scholars have often been more likely to allow Shaftesbury the name of 
Christian (albeit of the latitudinarian variety) there is good reason to think that 
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Shaftesburyřs contemporaries were more perspicacious in this regard. 57  Indeed, a 
thoughtful reading of the second treatise of the Characteristicks will reveal that 
Shaftesbury largely shares the Enlightenment critique of the political effects of 
Christianity found in such thinkers as Hobbes and Locke. 
Sensus Communis is in part a defense of the "Freedom of Wit and Humor," that is, 
raillery or satire, especially as it is applied to religion.  Shaftesbury is also wary, 
however, of what he takes to be an overreaction by modern philosophy to the political 
influence of Christianity.  Throughout the second treatise, and indeed throughout the 
Characteristicks as a whole, Shaftesbury is at pains to teach his reader moderation, 
which, like Aristotle, he presents as a mean between extremes.  Shaftesbury undertakes in 
Sensus Communis a defense of common sense not only from what he identifies as the 
false enthusiasms of certain understandings of Christianity, but also from the radical 
skepticism of modern philosophy.  He recommends a return to an earlier mode of 
philosophy, which he thinks is more than adequate for a response to religious fanaticism 
and avoids what he presents as the vices of modern philosophy, radical skepticism and 
reductionism of the human soul to simplistic and low passions. 
It is the task of Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author to offer an alternative to this 
reductionism.  This third and final treatise in Volume I undertakes nothing less than the 
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revival of the distinction between reason and the passions which Shaftesbury believes to 
have been collapsed by modern philosophy.  There he recommends the establishment of 
an "Inspector or Auditor" to take account of the opinions and fancies of the soul.  
Shaftesbury rejects the new understanding of the passions introduced by Bacon, 
Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke, in favor of this older understanding which he identifies 
with the philosophy of Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Cicero.  As Shaftesbury once 
explained to his former tutor Locke, "what I count true learning, and all we can profitt by, 
is to know ourselves."  Toward this end, "there is no labour, no studdy, no learning that I 
would not undertake."
58
  It begins to emerge in Soliloquy that the Characteristicks was 
written in large part to reawaken the notion that true learning and the genuine end of 
philosophy is self-knowledge in the classical sense. 
As we have already seen, the three treatises of Volume I are intended to be 
preparatory to the fourth, that is, An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit.  It is this treatise 
that is best known to contemporary academic philosophers, probably because it is more 
recognizable to them as philosophy rather than literature.  The Inquiry is clearly 
presented in the form of a "proper" philosophic treatise.  Yet itřs difficult to know exactly 
what to make of this supposedly straightforward treatise in light of the Criticřs remarks 
that Shaftesbury discloses himself as a "plain dogmatist" in it.
59
  This is presumably not 
meant as praise, nor is the description of the treatise as "dry PHILOSOPHY" and the 
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manner as "grave" and "rigid."  The Critic goes so far as to invite the "more humorous 
Reader" to skip a chapter or two of the Miscellany as he proceeds, promising to return to 
more entertaining topics soon enough!   
In fact, An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit seems to be a continuation of "that 
moral Speculation or INQUIRY, which we call the Study of our-selves."
60
  The centrality 
of this concern for Shaftesbury cannot be exaggerated.  As the Critic remarks, "that all 
Knowledg whatsoever depends upon this previous-one:  'And that we can in reality be 
assurřd of nothing, till we are first assurřd of What we are Our-selves.'  For by this alone 
can we know what Certainty and Assurance is."
61
 
 
 The Inquiry has a broader scope than the Soliloquy in that it examines human 
nature apart from the internal reflection of the individual.  A large part of this treatise is 
devoted to demonstrative argument against the individualist anthropology of Hobbes and 
Locke.  Yet if the Inquiry were merely this, it would hardly be in need of an apology in the 
form of the fifth treatise, as we have seen the Critic claim.  The Inquiry is also an 
extensive consideration of the difference between natural virtue and religion; it explicitly 
raises the question of whether religion necessarily entails virtue and whether an atheist can 
be virtuous.  We will see that while Shaftesbury takes pains to identify himself as "a 
Theist" in the Inquiry, there is reason to expect that his positions will not be well received 
by the more orthodox members of the British clergy.  That Shaftesbury himself has this 
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concern emerges in a remark by the Critic.  The Apology in the form of The Moralists is, 
we learn, particularly concerned to address "what relates to reveal’d Religion, and a World 
to come."
62
  This remark of the Critic is illuminating.  It calls attention to the fact that 
while the Inquiry embraces a peculiar form of natural religion, it is mostly silent on the 
importance of revelation.  Shaftesbury seems to have been quite alive to the touchiness of 
his argument, which we can see from the publication history of this treatise.  The Inquiry 
seems to have been published first in 1699, but apparently without Shaftesburyřs 
permission.  In his "Sketch of the Life of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury," Shaftesburyřs 
son, the Fourth Earl, reports that "during my fatherřs stay in Holland, an imperfect edition 
of his Inquiry after Virtue was printed, surreptitiously taken from a rough draft, sketched 
when he was but twenty years of age.  He was greatly chagrined at this, and immediately 
bought up the whole impression before many of the books were sold, and set about 
completing the Treatise which he published himself not long after."
63
  Some later scholars 
have challenged this account, but if the Fourth Earl is correct, it seems that Shaftesbury 
did not want the Inquiry to appear outside of the context provided by the Characteristicks 
as a whole. 
In the "Fifth Miscellany," we receive an interesting suggestion about the 
complexity of Shaftesburyřs presentation in The Moralists, which I must quote at 
length.
64
  The Critic remarks there that our author 
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dares not, in his own Model and Principal performance [namely, The Moralists], 
attempt to unite his Philosophy in one solid and uniform Body, nor carry on his 
Argument in one continuřd Chain or Thred.  Here our Authorřs Timorousness is 
visible.  In the very Plan or Model of his Work, he is apparently put to a hard 
shift, to contrive how or with what probability he might introduce Men of any 
Note or Fashion, reasoning expressly and purposely, without play or trifling, for 
two or three hours together, on mere PHILOSOPHY and MORALS.  He finds 
these Subjects (as he confesses) so wide of common Conversation, and, by long 
Custom, so appropriated to the School, the University-Chair, or Pulpit, that he 
thinks it hardly safe or practicable to treat of them elsewhere, or in a different 
tone.  He is forcřd therefore to raise particular Machines, and constrain his 
principal Characters, in order to carry a better Face, and bear himself out, against 
the appearance of Pedantry.
65
 
 
Shaftesbury is aware that the characteristics of manners and opinions, and 
consequently of men themselves, have changed with modernity.  He therefore adapts his 
rhetoric to be more practicable, to appeal more to the common conversation of his day by 
mixing men of note and fashion, at play and trifling, into his considerations of philosophy 
and morals.  What is more important to note here, however, is that these subjects are 
considered by most of his contemporaries to be the proper domain of the Pulpit and the 
University (itself of course still largely subject to the Church).  For this reason, the Critic 
tells us, "[the Authorřs] Gentleman-Philosopher THEOCLES, before he enters into his 
real Character, becomes a feignřd Preacher.  And even when his real Character comes 
on, he hardly dares stand it out; but to deal the better with his Sceptick-Friend, he falls 
again to personating, and takes up the Humour of the Poet and Enthusiast."
66
  Here we 
see here another hint about the two antagonists of  Shaftesburyřs Characteristicks:  
Christianity and modern philosophy.  In this, his "Model and Principal performance," 
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Shaftesburyřs modern Socratic figure Theocles feigns being a preacher and an enthusiast.  
I suspect that the preaching counters the charge of atheism while his enthusiasm resists the 
temptation to radical skepticism. 
In summary, the Characteristicks hopes to restore a classical worldview to 
philosophy.  This is the burden of Chapter 2.  We will see in Chapter 3 that Shaftesbury 
maintains that Christianity introduced a new political challenge to the life of philosophy.  
He is an early dissenter, however, from the ambitious project of the Enlightenment to 
remake philosophy in the face of this challenge.  We examine this concern in Chapter 4.  
Shaftesburyřs project ultimately attempts to keep the classical notion of philosophy as 
self-knowledge alive in the face of both Christianity and the radical skepticism of modern 
philosophy.  Shaftesbury writes his dialogue The Moralists as a model of the proper 
mode of philosophic inquiry, combining therein each of the concerns we encounter in the 
earlier treatises.  We will examine this dialogue in Chapter 5.  Throughout the 
dissertation we turn for guidance to the Critic, Shaftesbury's own critical voice leading 
readers through the complicated trail of Characteristicks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AN "AUDITOR ESTABLISH'D WITHIN":   
REASON, PASSION, AND RESOLUTION OF CHARACTER 
General Introduction:  Common Opinion and Philos ophy 
It is characteristic of modern philosophy to disparage traditional philosophy for its 
uncertainty.  In the words of that famous skeptic Descartes, "philosophy has been 
cultivated over several centuries by the most excellent minds who have ever lived 
and...nevertheless, there is nothing about which there is not some dispute--and thus 
nothing which is not doubtful."
1
  The judgment of man is weakened by the prejudice he 
has been taught through common opinion, and more fundamentally, by the defects of his 
own body.  Descartes introduces his famous radical doubt of all received opinion as an 
attempt to clear the ground of this faulty "pre-scientific" understanding.  As he remarks in 
the Meditations on First Philosophy, "several years have now passed since I first realized 
how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken to be true, and thus 
how doubtful were all those that I had subsequently built upon them.  And thus I realized 
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that once in my life I had to raze everything down to the ground and begin again from the 
original foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences."
2
 
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, is an early dissenter from 
this project of modern philosophy.  Shaftesbury rejects this new understanding of 
philosophy, along with its practical intention of raising new inventions, in favor of an 
older understanding.  As he explains in a letter to Locke, "what I count true learning, and 
all we can profitt by, is to know ourselves." Toward this end, "there is no labour, no 
studdy, no learning that I would not undertake."
3
 
Shaftsbury's Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc.  was written 
to reawaken the notion that true learning is to know ourselves.
4
 In the course of this 
undertaking, Shaftesbury finds it necessary to confront the radical skepticism advanced by 
modern philosophy, a skepticism that would reject all received opinion in favor of 
scientifically derived knowledge.  This tendency toward radical skepticism and 
Shaftesbury's response to it will be examined more closely in Chapter 4.
5
  In this chapter 
we will consider Shaftesbury's own approach to common opinion, which I hope to show 
is primarily indebted to the classical understanding of the relationship the between 
philosophy and common life. 
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Classical philosophy agrees with modern philosophy that opinion is not the same 
thing as knowledge.  Socrates, for example, formulates the distinction this way:  "opinion 
is dependent on one thing and knowledge on another, each according to its own power."
6
  
But rather than regarding received opinion as the chief obstacle to knowledge, classical 
philosophy takes opinion as the best starting point for obtaining knowledge.  While 
opinion is not knowledge, it is not complete ignorance either; it is, rather, again in the 
words of Socrates, somehow "between the two."
7
  Classical philosophy starts from 
opinions--namely, those opinions "which are accepted by all, or by the majority, or by the 
most notable and reputable of them"--and proceeds dialectically, by comparing contrary 
opinions and criticizing them in turn.
8
  This dialectical way of inquiry would test 
unexamined opinions for the elements of the truth they contain, and try to draw them 
upward toward a better understanding.
9
 In the words of Shaftesbury, it is a chief goal of 
philosophy "rectify opinion, on which all depends."
10
 
Shaftesbury's classical philosophy proves unwilling to assume from the beginning 
that all common opinion is the product of "chance" and is held only "according to the 
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reign of fashion, and the ascendant power of education."
11
 The Characteristicks as a 
whole encourages men "to trust [their] eyes, and take for real the whole creation, and the 
fair forms which lie before us."
12
 
Shaftesbury seems to believe that a naïve trust is the necessary presupposition for 
any understanding of the world by human beings, although it need not be--indeed, cannot 
be--philosophy's final word.  By attacking all pre-scientific understandings as defective, 
radical skepticism of the sort introduced by modern philosophy unsettles the natural grasp 
men have of the world.  As we shall see, Shaftesbury believes that philosophy can change 
or disrupt opinions as well as improve them.  Shaftesbury undertakes his defense partly to 
edify the moral opinions he would like to see flourish;  yet he has a theoretical motive as 
well, for reputable opinions are the best beginning point for serious contemplation of the 
world. 
We begin our consideration of Shaftesbury's philosophic project with the third 
treatise of the Characteristicks, entitled Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author.
13
 By 
investigating the advice Shaftesbury will offer to writers, we hope to find important clues 
as to how we should read Shaftesbury himself.  As we proceed we will take into 
consideration what might cautiously be regarded as the definitive commentator on 
Shaftesbury, namely the "Critic" responsible for the Miscellaneous Reflections which 
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comprise Volume III.  The Critic will claim that the subjects taken up in the third treatise, 
that is, "reflections upon Authors in general, and the Rise and Progress of Arts," actually 
"make the Inlet or Introduction to his Philosophy"
14
 
General Overview of Shaftesbury's Soliloquy,  or Advice to an 
Author  
The Critic begins his account of Shaftesbury's third treatise in his own 
ŖMiscellany III.ŗ15  After a brief reminder that this treatise must be understood as part of 
Shaftesbury's larger project in the Characteristicks, the Critic tells us that the first two 
pieces of our author (namely, A Letter concerning Enthusiasm and Sensus Communis) 
"kept up his sapping Method, and unraveling Humor, with tolerable good Grace."
16
 
While this "skeptical Mein" [sic] continues into the Soliloquy, whispers of Shaftesbury's 
overall project can be overheard as if the author "mutter'd to himself, in a kind of dubious 
Whisper, or feign'd Soliloquy."
17
 The Soliloquy is feigned in part, of course, because the 
author is aware that he has an audience.  By the end of ŖMiscellany IIIŗ the critic will be 
even clearer.  According to the Critic, "[Shaftesbury's] pretence has been to advise 
Authors, and polish Styles; but his Aim has been to correct Manners, and regulate Lives.  
He has affected Soliloquy, as pretending only to censure Himself; but he has taken 
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occasion to bring others into his Company, and make bold with Personages and 
Characters of no inferior Rank."
18
  As we shall see in this chapter, Shaftesbury "holds a 
certain Plan or System peculiar to him-self, or such, at least, in which he has a present but 
few Companions or Followers."
19
 As an author, Shaftesbury has as one of his ambitions to 
create an audience capable of following him in his plan.  After we bring the plan of 
Soliloquy to light we will be in a better position to see what the critic means when he 
writes that the treatises of Volume I (that is, A Letter concerning Enthusiasm, Sensus 
Communis, and Soliloquy) are "preparatory to the Fourth" treatise (An Inquiry concerning 
Virtue and Merit). 
Soliloquy is the most symmetrical of the treatises in its structure.  The treatise is 
divided into three parts, and each part is in turn divided into three sections.  The general 
discussion of the treatise unfolds as follows.  Part I introduces the reader to the theme of 
dialogue through the literary conceit of the soliloquy.
20
 The first section raises the 
question of how one can offer advice effectively when men seldom think of themselves 
as unwise.  Shaftesbury recommends the method of soliloquy as a way to counterbalance 
the defects of human temperament, especially when made worse by modern thought. 
Through the soliloquy a man divides himself into two persons, "preceptor and 
pupil." The dialogue which emerges when this regimen is applied to private use 
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inculcates a habit of self-examination.  Section two connects the practice of soliloquy to 
the Delphic injunction for men to know themselves.  In this section Shaftesbury shows 
the reader that soliloquy is no simple practice when pursued properly; there are, it seems, 
pretenders to the practice that hardly deserve the name.  We also learn that the practice of 
soliloquy will allow Shaftesbury to distinguish reason from the passions, which have 
been conflated by modern projectors to the detriment of philosophic reflection.  Reason, 
Shaftesbury will argue, is necessary for a well-ordered soul and manifests itself in what 
he will describe as "resolution of will."  The third section connects what we must now 
call the art of soliloquy to liberal education, primarily as represented by its great 
progenitor Socrates.  This section will also show the way in which the ancient manner of 
the Socratic dialogue as a literary form is the natural companion to the self-examination 
Shaftesbury is recommending.  We will discuss the style and substance of self-
examination below, but we will also need to consider the lessons of dialogue as they 
relate more broadly to Shaftesbury's writing as a whole. 
Part II examines several possible obstacles and helpmates to self-examination.  
Section one discusses "grandees" and the way magistrates and patrons can help and 
hinder the progress of arts and letters.
21
  Section two takes up the topic of "the critic," a 
category of author that includes what we would generally consider critics today (sophists, 
say, or intellectuals) but at its highest involves those engaged in genuine philosophic 
reflection.  In this section--the middle section of the middle part--Shaftesbury offers a 
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natural cycle of the rise and progress of the arts; he indicates that this cycle unfolds only 
in free societies.  The third section of Part II considers the proper relationship between an 
author and his public and it argues that authors ought to improve the taste of their 
audience rather than pander to their fancies.  We will discuss this relationship of the 
author to the culture. 
Part III undertakes a preliminary consideration of what a "better Self" would look 
like.
22
  In section one, Shaftesbury recalls his reader to the classical notion of philosophy, 
namely, that "řtis the known Province of Philosophy to teach us ourselves, keep us the 
self-same Persons, and so regulate our governing Fancys, Passions, and Humours, as to 
make us comprehensible to our selves, and knowable by other Features than those of a 
bare Countenance.  For řtis not certainly by virtue of our Face merely, that we are 
ourselves."
23
  In filling out his portrait of self-knowledge, Shaftesbury begins to identify 
the philosophic missteps he thinks Descartes, Locke, and other modern projectors have 
made.  He indicates that these "Counter-Philosophers" neglect the most important job of 
philosophy--the examination of opinions.  In the third and final section of Part III, 
Shaftesbury connects the art of the soliloquy to the development of noble sentiments and a 
love for the truth. 
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Advice to an Author ,  Part I:  The Method of Soliloquy  
  Part  I ,  §  1:   The Regimen of  Self -Practice 
A closer examination of Soliloquy: Or, Advice to an Author will help us 
understand the way in which matters of literary style inform Shaftesbury's overall project 
in the Characteristicks.  In advising authors Shaftesbury will offer important clues to us 
as readers of his book as well.  After working through his advice, we should then be 
better prepared to undertake an examination of his critiques of religion and modern 
philosophy. 
The engraved frontispiece of Soliloquy displays a triptych.  In the center panel we 
see through a balconied window a desk with a book and quill and ink.  On the wall in 
front of the desk is what appears to be a large mirror, angled so that an author might 
glance up and see himself.  On either side of the central panel are panels each containing 
a standing figure holding a looking-glass.  In the panel on the left, the figure examines 
himself in the looking-glass.  Three birds fly freely overhead.  In the right-hand panel, the 
figure is distracted by three monstrous creatures, one of whom wears a crown or miter.  
The figure is frowning and does not look at himself in his looking-glass.  Above the 
central panel, two bas-relief faces--perhaps Socrates and Plato--look off toward the left, 
in the direction of the self-examining figure.  As we will soon see, the frontispiece offers 
a glimpse into the deepest concerns of the treatise, how one is to obtain self-knowledge. 
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Shaftesbury opens the treatise with a reflection on the common maxim "that, as to 
what related to private Conduct, No-one was ever the better for Advice."
24
 This is not 
surprising given the fact that advice-givers generally want to show their own wisdom at 
the expense of another's defects.  This is especially true in questions relating to the 
conduct of our own lives.  Men "can bear a Master in Mathematicks, in Musick, or in any 
other Science; but not in Understanding and Good Sense "
25
  This puts authors in a 
difficult position, for they are generally the "profess'd Masters of Understanding to the 
Age."  At one time, poets were considered sages, and it was their custom to disguise their 
didactic intention.  While ancient authors "profess only to please, they secretly advise and 
give Instruction." 
Shaftesbury's challenge is all the more serious because he hopes to prescribe to 
these professed masters, authors themselves.  He is excused, he maintains, because his 
pretension is not so much to give Advice, as to consider of the Way and Manner 
of advising.  My Science, if it be any, is no better than that of a Language-Master, 
or a Logician.  For I have taken it strongly into my head, that there is a certain 
Knack or Legerdemain in Argument, by which we may safely proceed to the 
dangerous part of advising, and make sure of the good fortune to have our Advice 
accepted, if it be any thing worth.
26 
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We can expect at the very least, then, to learn about a style of discourse which, through 
its artfulness, makes a reader receptive to hearing advice.  Since men cannot bear taking a 
master when it comes to matters of understanding and good sense, Shaftesbury will 
prepare his reader to take advice from himself.  He will introduce us to the art of 
soliloquy. 
Shaftesbury likens his practice to surgery.  Where is one to learn the art of his sort 
of surgery, he wonders.  We are fortunate to have hospitals to train surgeons of the body 
and also "meek patients who wou'd bear any Incisions, and be prob'd or tented at our 
pleasure."  Over time, a surgeon of the body might develop the requisite "tenderness of 
hand" and be able to combine it with the "greatest Resolution and Boldness."
27
 In the case 
of Shaftesbury's art there are no such hospitals; and while at first one might wonder 
where to find a meek patient for practice, in fact one need not seek far: "we have each of 
us Our Selves to practice on."
28
 
At first this seems paradoxical, for after all, how is a man to be two men at once, 
serving as physician and patient at the same time? To remedy this difficulty, Shaftesbury 
borrows from the poets a literary device of self-conversation called the soliloquy.  
Through this device, a character "becomes two distinct Persons.  He is Pupil and 
Preceptor." Unlike the stage device of soliloquy, however, Shaftesbury recommends that 
when we speak aloud to ourselves, we do it without an audience present, and it is here 
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that we get our first glimpse of the aim of this self-surgery:  "company is an extreme 
Provocative to Fancy; and, like a hot Bed in Gardening, is apt to make our Imaginations 
sprout too fast.  But by this anticipating Remedy of Soliloquy, we may effectually 
provide against the Inconvenience."
29 
Soliloquy, we will see, will serve the salutary purpose of pruning the imagination.  
This is not its only purpose, however.  Shaftesbury relates a story about a whole nation 
that adopted soliloquy as "their Custom...their Religion, and their Law," with the 
intention of being identical to themselves whether they were alone or in the company of 
others.  He speculates that it was introduced by a wise legislator to cure "the Leprosy of 
Eloquence" suffered by that people.
30
 
Shaftesbury has no hopes that "our present Manners" would allow such a drastic 
measure, but he does hope to show how soliloquy can be applied to private use, 
"especially in the case of Authors."
31
 All truly great wits, according to Shaftesbury, have 
considered themselves laughable in public "for their great Loquacity by themselves, and 
their profound Taciturnity in Company."  Whether they are poets, orators, or 
philosophers, great wits are generally said to be either "composing or raving," and men of 
the world cannot seem to distinguish the two.  Shaftesbury calls this odd manner--this 
"Method of Evacuation"--somehow natural to them.  For the more worldly, however, 
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their meditations are "obstructed by the fear of a nonconforming Mein [sic] in 
Conversation."
32
 Modern "writers of Memoirs and Essays" are especially guilty of this 
vice.  While such authors pretend to be practicing the art of soliloquy, they are of course 
keenly aware of their audience.  This sort of public soliloquy is indecent, and is no 
different than a man "taking his Physick in Public." Because they do not practice the art 
of soliloquy in the proper way, these authors are able to bring nothing of value to the 
public.  Shaftesbury remarks that "tho they are often retir'd, they are never by 
themselves."
33
  Also guilty are many "sanctify'd" authors who pretend they practice 
soliloquy when in fact "they can allow nothing to lie conceal'd, which passes in this 
religious Commerce and way of Dialogue between them and their Soul." The sanctified 
soliloquizer is even worse because of his scorn for "Rules of Criticism and profane 
Learning."  As we will see when we consider Part II of Soliloquy, the rules of criticism 
must take a central role in this didactic art. 
In short, Shaftesbury claims that unless a person has examined himself, he will 
always be vulnerable to the criticisms of others.  Before an author ventures out to an 
audience he had better be sure that his writing and his ideas are sound.  "řTis  the hardest 
thing in the world to be a good Thinker," he cautions, "without being a strong Self-
Examiner, and thorow-pac'd Dialogist, in this solitary way."
34
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  Part  I ,  §  2:   The Daemonic Companion,  or the Better Self  
Becoming a good thinker is taken up again in section 2 of Part I, and this is 
connected by Shaftesbury to moving the conversation more directly to the topic of 
morals.  Shaftesbury begins his discussion by reviving a literary conceit from the 
ancients, offering us a hint of what his model of good thinking will most resemble.  "I 
might perhaps very justifiably take occasion here to enter into a spacious Field of 
Learning, to shew the Antiquity of that Opinion, 'That we have each of us a Daemon, 
Genius, Angel, or Guardian-Spirit, to whom we were strictly join'd, and committed, from 
our earliest Dawn of Reason, or Moment of our Birth."
35
  While Shaftesbury denies that 
this notion was taken as literally true by ancient authors, it served as a useful purpose.  It is 
no slight thing to compare a human faculty to a divine guest in our soul:  by elevating the 
origin of this companion our reverence is increased; on the other hand, ignoring one's 
daemon would be an act of sacrilege.  If, as Shaftesbury has suggested, it is possible to 
find a patient or pupil in ourselves, it may also be possible to locate an appropriate 
preceptor.  The duplicity of soul recommended by the art of soliloquy follows this long-
established conceit of the ancients.  According to this ancient practice of private retreat, 
as this Recess was deep and intimate, and the Dual Number practically form'd in 
Us, we were suppos'd to advance in Morals and true Wisdom.  This, they thought, 
was the only way of composing Matters in our Breast, and establishing that 
Subordinacy, which alone cou'd make Us agree with our-selves, and be of a-piece 
within.  They esteem'd this a more religious Work than any Prayers, or other Duty 
in the Temple.  And this they advis'd Us to carry thither, as the best Offering 
which cou'd be made.
36 
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The practice was a way of following the famous inscription over the temple of Delphi: 
"Recognize Your-self which was as much as to say, Divide yourself, or Be Two.  For if 
the Division were rightly made, all within wou'd of course, they thought, be rightly 
understood, and prudently manag'd."
37
  This is not only good advice; it is a divine 
injunction. 
But how are we to make this division in the right way?  Shaftesbury indicates that 
it is no easy matter.  Only philosophers and wise men practice this art in its fullest sense.  
Knaves and fools are never truly alone, regardless of their pretense.  Shaftesbury does not 
mean by this that they are troubled by their conscience whenever they have time for 
reflection.  The problem is rather that they fail to make the proper division and cannot 
raise "a Companion; who being fairly admitted into Partnership, wou'd quickly mend his 
Partner, and set his Affairs on a right foot." There are many pretenders to this art of 
soliloquy.  In fact, Shaftesbury suspects that the reader will think the profound Lover to 
be "no stranger to our propos'd Method of Practice."
38
  Yet even when retiring to the 
woods, the impassioned lover imagines himself to be with his mistress.  So too with the 
Mystic, who "instead of looking narrowly into his own Nature and Mind, that he may be 
no longer a Mystery to himself…is taken up with the Contemplation of other mysterious 
Natures, which he can never explain or comprehend."
39
 The false practitioner is not 
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sincerely seeking self-knowledge, which Shaftesbury identifies with carefully scrutinizing 
his own "Nature and Mind." 
How is it that man is a mystery to himself?  At first glance it might seem a small 
thing to know our own minds; people generally think that they do.  Who better than each 
for himself to say "what our main Scope was; what we plainly drove at, and what we 
propos'd to our-selves, as our End, in every Occurrence of our Lives?" Yet this 
commonplace opinion fails to see the extent to which our very thoughts are formed by the 
world around us.  Shaftesbury writes, "our Thoughts have generally such an obscure 
implicit Language, that řtis the hardest thing in the world to make 'em speak out 
distinctly."
40
  The goal of philosophy is to make these obscured thoughts of men come 
more clearly into view.  Philosophy would have us hold a "vocal Looking-Glass" up so 
that we can see ourselves honestly or "in the plainest manner."
41
  The true practitioner of 
soliloquy will have at his disposal a method that lays bare his deepest opinions.  It is easy 
for a man to deceive himself and appear foolish when he is in the company of others; it is 
more difficult, however, to appear a fool to one's truest self.  When practicing honestly, 
the soliloquizer will, it is hoped, come to abhor the lie of the soul, "for so true a 
Reverence has every-one for himself, when he comes clearly to appear before his close 
Companion, that he had rather profess the vilest things of himself in open Company, than 
                                                 
40
 Ibid., 1.107. 
41
 Ibid., 1.108. 
  41 
 
 
 
 
hear his Character privately from his own Mouth."
42
  As we shall see, Shaftesbury is 
perfectly aware that men generally lack self-knowledge, and what is more, that they often 
go to great lengths to avoid having it.  In public especially, men are encouraged to consult 
their "interests" above the better aspects of their character.  Part of Shaftesbury's intention 
in Advice to an Author is to make the prospect of a better self attractive again. 
Shaftesbury shares a story to caution the reader that it is no easy thing to know 
oneself.  The story involves "A VIRTUOUS young Prince of a heroick Soul, capable of 
Love and Friendship" and a young nobleman, who was a favorite of the Prince.  Once 
upon a time the Prince made war on a hateful tyrant, and through his "clemency and 
bounty" as much as his martial virtues, the Prince won to his side many of the tyrant's 
former subjects.  It came to pass, however, that the castle of a potentate still loyal to the 
tyrant fell to the forces of the virtuous Prince.  The young nobleman discovered in this 
castle the new bride of the vanquished potentate, and taking her captive he quickly sought 
out his friend the Prince.  The youth praised the beauty and manner of the captive as 
beyond his ability to describe and urged the prince to see this wonder.  Much to the 
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surprise of the youth the Prince declines to meet her.  The Prince does not want her 
beauty to distract him from more urgent business. 
"Wou'd you, Sir! persuade me then," said the young Nobleman, smiling, "that a 
fair Face can have such Power as to force the Will it-self, and constrain a Man in 
any respect to act contrary to what he thinks becoming him? Are we to hearken to 
the Poets in what they tell us of that Incendiary Love, and his irresistible Flames? 
A real Flame, we see, burns all alike.  But that imaginary one of Beauty hurts only 
those who are consenting.  It affects no otherwise, than as we ourselves are 
pleas'd to allow it.  In many Cases we absolutely command it: as where Relation 
and Consanguinity are in the nearest degree.  Authority and Law, we see, can 
master it.  But 'twou'd be vain as well as unjust, for any Law to intermeddle or 
prescribe, were not the Case voluntary, and our Will entirely free."
43 
 
In this speech, the youth shows how little he understands about human psychology.  Our 
freedom of will can be constrained by our passions, which seem to have their own 
necessity at times.  Don't men fall in love and lose their liberty, wonders the Prince? The 
youth replies that this is true only for wretches.  Such men use "irresistible Necessity" as 
an excuse to commit many offenses.  Only the debauched become victims of beauty and 
love: "they who are honest and just, can admire and love whatever is beautiful; without 
offering at anything beyond what is allow'd." The youth observes that he has spoken with 
this beauty and "yet am my-self still." With this, the Prince makes the beautiful captive a 
ward of the noble youth, requesting that he "be ever the same Man: and look to your 
Charge carefully, as becomes you."
44
 
Of course the noble youth by degrees becomes more familiar with his ward and 
eventually falls hopelessly in love; he then sinks into a deep melancholia.  It is in this 
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shameful condition that the Prince finds him.  The Prince assumes responsibility for the 
youth's condition, for he should have known better than to match him against "that 
unequal Adversary" Love.
45
  As a remedy for the youth's ailment, the Prince asks him to 
"retire only for a while." In his absence the youth learns to study himself more carefully 
and upon his return the youth announces that: 
"well am I now satisfy'd, that I have in reality within me two distinct separate 
Souls.  This Lesson of Philosophy I have learnt from that villanous Sophister 
Love.  For řtis impossible to believe, that having one and the same Soul, it shou'd 
be actually both Good and Bad, passionate for Virtue and Vice, desirous of 
Contrarys.  No.  There must of necessity be Two: and when the Good prevails, řtis 
then we act handsomly; when the Ill, then basely and villanously.  Such was my 
Case.  For lately the Ill Soul was wholly Master.  But now the Good prevails, by 
your assistance; and I am plainly a new Creature, with quite another 
Apprehension, another Reason, another Will."
46 
 
Thus the noble youth learns the philosophic "doctrine of Two Persons in one 
individual self," although not, it should be noted, without help from the Prince.  Without 
assistance he was not able "to form this Distinction justly and according to Art." 
Shaftesbury will emphasize the role of art in the pursuit of self-knowledge in the next 
section. 
Shaftesbury draws the following lesson from the story: "Let Will be ever so free, 
Humour and Fancy, we see, govern it."
47
 As long as we are subject to shifting fancies, we 
will never enjoy firmness of will, for our fancies will move us without our consent or 
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understanding.  Yet it may be that we are not entirely powerless in their face.  
Shaftesbury writes, 
and by what I can observe of the World, Fancy and Opinion stand pretty much 
upon the same bottom.  So that if there be no certain Inspector or Auditor 
establish'd within us, to take account of these Opinions and Fancys in due form, 
and minutely to animadvert upon their several Growths and Habits, we are as little 
like to continue a Day in the same Will, as a Tree, during a Summer, in the same 
Shape, without the Gard'ner's Assistance, and the vigorous Application of the 
Sheers and Pruning-Knife.
42 
 
With the help of an internal inspector or auditor, our opinions and fancies can be examined 
and known for what they really are.
48
  Only by knowing the opinions which inform our 
character can we can develop resolution or a firmness of will.  Solid character is in this 
sense the result of deliberate pruning.  While we will investigate the response of 
Shaftesbury to Hobbes at length in Chapter 4, we should note in passing that Shaftesbury's 
concern for developing a resolute will stands as a challenge to the definition of will 
offered by Hobbes.  According to Hobbes, the will is merely the last relevant moment of 
deliberation before a man acts.  "In Deliberation," he writes, "the last Appetite, or 
Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action or omission, thereof, is that wee call the 
WILL; the ACT, (not the faculty,) of Willing."
49
  Shaftesbury's better self--a second soul--
works to restore the common-sense notion that the will is indeed a faculty, free to 
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deliberate.  It is not merely the pre-determined moment at the end of a sequence of cause 
and effect. 
Without the assistance of the Prince, the young nobleman found that he could not 
govern his passions.  The Prince understood this because he understood better the true 
nature of mankind.  According to Shaftesbury, appetite and reason are brothers, but 
appetite is older of the two.  It should come as no surprise that appetite, being naturally 
older and stronger than reason, will have the advantage in any contest.  Shaftesbury 
compares the struggle to control the will to a contested "top or foot-ball."  The brothers 
are poorly matched until "the youngest, instead of now and then a Kick or Lash bestow'd 
to little purpose, forsakes the Ball or Top it-self, and begins to lay about his elder 
Brother."
50
 Only after such harsh treatment will the older brother, like a coward, grow 
civil and play fair.  It is here that Shaftesbury's method of soliloquy must be deployed: 
when by a certain powerful Figure of inward Rhetorick, the Mind apostrophizes 
its own Fancys, raises 'em in their proper Shapes and Personages, and addresses 
'em familiarly, without the least Ceremony or Respect.  By this means it will soon 
happen, that Two form'd Partys will erect themselves within.  For the 
Imaginations or Fancys being thus roundly treated, are forc'd to declare 
themselves, and take party.  Those on the side of the elder Brother Appetite, are 
strangely subtle and insinuating.  They have always the Faculty to speak by Nods 
and Winks.  By this practice they conceal half their meaning, and, like modern 
Politicians, pass for deeply wise, and adorn themselves with the finest Pretext and 
most specious Glosses imaginable; till being confronted with their Fellows of a 
plainer Language and Expression, they are forc'd to quit their mysterious Manner, 
and discover themselves mere Sophisters and Impostors, who have not the least to 
do with the Party of Reason and good Sense.
51
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The method of soliloquy compels our fancies and opinions to show themselves as they are.  
We will have to see if Shaftesbury is able to trace opinions back to something more solid 
than mere convention.  He will indicate how we might begin to do this in the third part of 
this treatise. 
If the company of others is an "extreme Provocative to Fancy" akin to a "hot Bed" 
or greenhouse, the art of soliloquy is a tool for the careful gardener.  One of Shaftesbury's 
aims in Soliloquy is to encourage the reader to undertake the regimen necessary to 
develop such a gardener within, whom he calls an inspector or auditor.  He confesses "we 
hope also that our Patient (for such we naturally suppose our Reader) will consider duly 
with himself, that what he endures in this Operation is for no inconsiderable end, since 
řtis to gain him a Will, and insure him a certain Resolution; by which he shall know 
where to find himself."
52
  Through a "Legerdemain in Argument" which he had alerted us 
to expect, Shaftesbury has assumed the role of Prince to his noble reader.  Men in general 
will benefit from this advice, but the prospective author must without question undertake 
the exercise Shaftesbury recommends.  "He who deals in Characters, must of necessity 
know his own; or he will know nothing."
53
 
  Part  I ,  §  3:   The Art  of  the Dialogue  
We remarked that the young nobleman was unable to begin the hard work of 
scrutinizing his fancies without the assistance of the Prince.  While Shaftesbury 
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encourages his reader to honor reason as a daemon, genius, or angel, he recognizes that 
good sense does not spring forth fully-formed.  In section 3 of Part I he begins to address 
the role of art in shaping human nature. He begins by considering the "Action and Grace" 
of a person who has been taught by "Nature only" to one who has benefited from 
"Reflection, and the assistance of Art."
54  
Shaftesbury concedes that there are individuals 
whose nature is so extraordinary that they are able to achieve some measure of "Grace 
and Comeliness" despite having received the rudest of educations.  There are also 
individuals who, while receiving the best of educations, fail to achieve any measure of 
gracefulness.  Nevertheless, "řtis undeniable however, that the Perfection of Grace and 
Comeliness in Action and Behaviour, can be found only among the People of a liberal 
Education.  And even among the graceful of this kind, those still are found the 
gracefullest, who early in their Youth have learnt their Exercises, and form'd their 
Motions under the best Masters."
55
  Education can make a tremendous difference in the 
development of a gentleman.  Since the ostensible concern of Shaftesbury in this treatise is 
to advise authors, however, he must speak not of a gentleman's tutors but of 
"Philosophers, and Philosophy." 
Just as a gentleman must practice in private before performing "exercises of the 
genteeler kind" in public, so the writer must master the "several Motions, Counterpoises 
and Balances of the Mind and Passions." According to Shaftesbury, there are no better 
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masters for this than Socrates and his disciples.  He quotes Horace's Ars Poetica to 
illustrate the point: 
Sound knowledge is the first requisite for writing well;  
The books of Socrates' school will yield you the matter.
56 
 
Ordinary gentlemen or writers, those who have no ambition to write for the age or 
posterity, need not penetrate the "vast Depths into Learning or Philosophy." But should 
writers aspire to produce excellent work and "of a nature to intitle 'em to hold the Rank of 
Authors," serious study and practice are necessary.  Even a fraud can acquire the 
equipment of an artist without mastering an art: 
the Horse alone can never make the Horseman; nor Limbs the Wrestler or the 
Dancer.  No more can a Genius alone make a Poet; or good Parts a Writer, in any 
considerable kind.  The Skill and Grace of Writing is founded, as our wise Poet 
tells us, in Knowledg and good Sense: and not barely in that Knowledg, which is 
to be learnt from common Authors, or the general Conversation of the World; but 
from those particular Rules of Art, which Philosophy alone exhibits.
57 
 
Nowhere are the rules of this art better exhibited than in the classical form of the Socratic 
dialogue, which for Shaftesbury forms the core of a liberal education.  As a literary form, 
the dialogue works to school a reader in the method of soliloquy.  Dialogues educate a 
person in soliloquy through their attention to "Characters and Manners."  Shaftesbury 
seems to disagree with those modern scholars (largely of the analytic school) who would 
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distinguish a "philosopher Plato" from a "literary Plato."
58
 In the account of Soliloquy, 
Shaftesbury explains his own approach to reading dialogues. 
According to Shaftesbury, it is essential to the dialogic form that: 
they were either real Dialogues, or Recitals of such personated Discourses; where 
the Persons themselves had their Characters preserv'd thro'out; their Manners, 
Humours, and distinct Turns of Temper and Understanding maintain'd, according 
to the most exact poetical Truth.  řTwas not enough that these Pieces treated 
fundamentally of Morals, and in consequence pointed out real Characters and 
Manners: They exhibited 'em alive, and set the Countenances and Complexions 
of Men plainly in view.  And by this means they not only taught Us to know 
Others; but, what was principal and of highest virtue in 'em, they taught us to 
know Our-selves.
59 
 
The action and temperament of the characters in a dialogue are more than a way of 
making abstruse arguments agreeable to a reader.  Poetical truth fuses "action and 
imitation" to the treatment of the subject.  The characters of the dialogue acted and 
behaved in such a way that their very "countenances and complexions" were part of the 
philosophic argument advanced.  It is only by considering character that we can discern 
the full lesson of a dialogue; only then will they teach us "to know Our-selves"
60 
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But just how does this work? Everyone knows that the dialogical poems of 
antiquity had a "Philosophical Hero...whose Name they carry'd both in their Body and 
Front, and whose Genius and Manner they were made to represent, was in himself a 
perfect Character."  It is no accident that we speak of a "Socratic Method" and "The 
Socratic Dialogue."
61
  Yet understanding this philosophical hero is not a straightforward 
matter; Socrates is notoriously ironical.  Shaftesbury observes that while Socrates might 
seem easy to reckon in the dialogues, he actually appeared "in some respects, so veil'd, 
and in a Cloud, that to the unattentive Surveyor he seem'd often to be very different from 
what he really was: and this chiefly by reason of a certain exquisite and refin'd Raillery 
which belong'd to his Manner, and by virtue of which he cou'd treat the highest Subjects, 
and those of the commonest Capacity both together, and render 'em explanatory of each 
other."
62
  The philosophic hero of the dialogue remains somewhat mysterious because the 
dialogue manages to combine "the heroick and the simple, the tragick, and the comick 
Vein." It is, however, the secondary characters who hold the most interest for Shaftesbury 
here.  These "second Characters shew'd human Nature more distinctly, and to the Life" 
than Socrates because we recognize ourselves in them immediately.  The secondary 
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characters invite us to the hard work of self-knowledge.  Shaftesbury writes, "we might 
here, therefore, as in a Looking-Glass, discover our-selves, and see our minutest Features 
nicely delineated, and suted to our own Apprehension and Cognizance.  No-one who was 
ever so little a-while an Inspector, cou'd fail of becoming acquainted with his own 
Heart."
63
  Through a long acquaintance with this form of self-scrutiny, a person acquires a 
"peculiar speculative Habit such that they have a "Pocket-Mirrour" always at their 
disposal.  Having internalized the habit of inspection, they are able to see both persons of 
their single self when they gaze into the mirror, "One of them, like the commanding 
Genius, the Leader and Chief above-mention'd; the other like that rude, undisciplin'd and 
headstrong Creature, whom we ourselves in our natural Capacity most exactly 
resembled."
64
  Socratic dialogues teach attentive men the proper relationship between 
reason and the passions not simply through so-called Platonic doctrines but through the 
very form of writing. 
Shaftesbury traces the origin of the dialogue to early poets who wrote "Mimes" 
and observes that "poetry it-self was defin'd an Imitation chiefly of Men and Manners: 
and was that in an exalted and noble degree, which in a low one we call Mimickry." For 
Shaftesbury, Homer, "Father and Prince of Poets," showed the world that poetry could 
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mirror reality in a way that provoked contemplation.  His descriptions of character and 
event are so compelling that they serve as their own interpreter.  Homer: 
describes no Qualitys or Virtues; censures no Manners: makes no Encomiums, 
nor gives Characters himself; but brings his Actors still in view.  řTis  they who 
shew themselves.  řTis  they who speak in such a manner, as distinguishes 'em in 
all things from all others, and makes 'em ever like themselves.  Their different 
Compositions and Allays so justly made, and equally carry'd on, thro' every 
particle of the Action, give more Instruction than all the Comments or Glosses in 
the world.
65 
 
Similarly, dialogues are so self-contained that the reader is brought into direct contact with 
the character as thinker. 
As a literary mode, dialogue works to put the reader directly into the 
conversation.  Shaftesbury observes that, "here the Author is annihilated; and the Reader 
being no way apply'd to, stands for Nobody."
66
 Both author and reader recede into the 
background and the reader, should he choose, is presented with the characters and their 
arguments directly.  Yet in a dialogue it is not simply the soundness of the argument that 
is in question.  Arguments are presented by a certain character and embedded in a 
particular conversation.  The reader of a dialogue must survey the drama as well as the 
argument and consider the motives, the background, the education, and the moral and 
intellectual faculties of the characters.  "The understanding here must have its Mark, its 
characteristick Note, by which it may be distinguish'd.  It must be such and such an 
Understanding; as when we say, for instance, such or such a face: since Nature has 
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characteriz'd Tempers and Minds as peculiarly as Faces."
67
  Unlike mathematical treatises 
and prayers, dialogues are both ab homine and ad hominem. 
It should not be thought that lending the flavor of a particular place and time to a 
work is sufficient to make a dialogue, however.  Shaftesbury briefly recounts a dialogue, 
"fram'd, after the manner of our antient Authours." In his parody, the characters have 
affected archaic speech: "You are going then...to pay your Devotions yonder at the 
temple?"
68
  As he borrows this sketch from Plato's Euthyphro, Shaftesbury anticipates "a 
thousand Ridicules arising from the Manner, the Circumstances and Action it-self, 
compar'd with modern Breeding and Civility." He proposes introducing modern clothing 
and accents, and modern mores as well:  "bows, and simpering Faces...Preludes, Excuses, 
Compliments," and other affectations of "Ceremony."
69
 
This remedy proves inadequate.  Much as he deplores the fact, Shaftesbury fears 
that the "Coquetry of a modern Author" somehow suits the manners and mores of the 
modern "fashionable world." Should an author hold the mirror of dialogue up to a 
modern face, modern man would recoil at his own ugliness.  "If we avoid Ceremony, we 
are unnatural: if we use it, and appear as we naturally are, as we salute, and meet, and treat 
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one another, we hate the Sight." Sadly, one might have to conclude that the art of 
"dialogue is at an end."
70
   
The Ancients could bear the honest tool of dialogue but moderns apparently 
cannot: "Ugly Instrument!  And for this reason to be hated." Yet modern authors still 
have the written works of antiquity, "those Philosophical Sea-Cards, by which the 
adventurous Genius's of the Times were wont to steer their Courses, and govern their 
impetuous Muse."
71
  To find one's better self, Shaftesbury recommends taking ancient 
masters: 
and thus Poetry and the Writer's Art, as in many respects it resembles the 
Statuary's and the Painter's, so in this more particularly, that it has its original 
Draughts and Models for Study and Practice; not for Ostentation, to be shown 
abroad, or copy'd for publick view.  These are the antient Busts; the Trunks of 
Statues; the Pieces of Anatomy; the masterly rough Drawings which are kept 
within; as the secret Learning, the Mystery, and fundamental Knowledg of the 
Art.
72 
 
Since the writer deals immediately with matters of the soul, Shaftesbury maintains that by 
submitting to "real masters" writers will inevitably improve and be amended "in their 
better Part." 
Shaftesbury does not call on authors to become mere antiquarians, however.  
Having obtained a truer notion of writing, and consequently of soulcraft, through the study 
of dialogue, Shaftesbury hopes that authors will come to "deserve the Name of Poet." A 
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true poet "can describe both Men and Manners, and give to an Action its just Body and 
proportions." Such is the art of the poet, but according to Shaftesbury this activity is 
inevitably moral in its compass: 
such a Poet is indeed a second Maker; a just Prometheus, under Jove.  Like that 
Sovereign Artist or universal Plastick Nature, he forms a Whole, coherent and 
proportion'd in it-self, with due Subjection and Subordinacy of constituent Parts.  
He notes the Boundarys of the Passions, and knows their exact Tones and 
Measures; by which he justly represents them, marks the Sublime of Sentiments 
and Action, and distinguishes the Beautiful from the Deform 'd, the Amiable from 
the Odious.  The moral Artist, who can thus imitate the Creator, and is thus 
knowing in the inward Form and Structure of his Fellow-Creature, will hardly, I 
presume, be found unknowing in Himself or at a loss in those Numbers which 
make the Harmony of a Mind.  For Knavery is mere Dissonance and 
Disproportion.  And tho Villains may have strong Tones and natural Capacitys of 
Action; řtis impossible that true Judgment and Ingenuity shou'd reside, where 
Harmony and Honesty have no being.
73 
 
The true poet "forms a Whole" in imitation of the Creator.  But what exactly is the poet to 
take as his model for imitation?  It is defensible to argue that poetry has an inevitable 
moral effect, but is it equally defensible to claim that the effect is salutary?  Shaftesbury 
himself argues that modern poets fail to improve men.  How then are we to know what the 
true model for man is, apart from the "coquetry" we find around us?  What evidence is 
there that "řtis impossible that true Judgment and Ingenuity shou'd reside, where Harmony 
and Honesty have no being?"  We will have to see whether Shaftesbury, beyond leading 
men to a certain aporia, is also able to make them moral, and whether he is able to offer us 
a naturally defensible model of the good.  It is a question we must return to in our 
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consideration of Part III.  (Even a tentative answer to that question will have to await 
Chapter 5.) 
Advice to an Author ,  Part II:  the Rise and Progress of the Arts  
Having introduced the reader to the "Discipline, and qualifying Method of Self-
Examination," Shaftesbury interrupts his account of "this Mystery" to consider other 
important matters.  Part II, to which we now turn our attention, calls us from looking 
inward to look outward: now "we shou'd consider the Advantages or Disadvantages our 
Authors may possibly meet with, from abroad: and how far their Genius may be 
depress'd or rais'd by any external Causes, arising from the Humour or Judgment of the 
World."
74
 In Part II, Shaftesbury presents a complicated analysis of morals and manners 
and their relationship to the arts.  The first section considers the way political 
arrangements shape the culture by setting the conditions for the rise and progress of the 
arts.  This analysis continues in the second section, where Shaftesbury presents an 
account of this progress in more detail and with an eye toward poetic craftsmanship.  I 
will show that Shaftsbury is especially interested in the "serious play" of the comic style, 
which enables the philosopher to examine the solemn and grave opinions of his age with 
greater freedom.  We will take that opportunity to consider the role humor plays in 
Shaftesbury's own work by casting a glance at the account of "raillery" Shaftesbury offers 
in the treatise Sensus Communis.  This will allow us to understand better the way Volume 
I works to prepare the reader for the treatises of Volume II.  The last part of section two 
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draws parallels between the poetical styles he has discussed and the development of 
philosophy.  Finally, we will turn to the last section of Part II, which invites 
contemporary authors to take the lead in polishing the tastes of the public. 
  Part  II ,  §  1:   Grandees and the Importance Of  Liberty  
While Shaftesbury takes Socrates as his literary and philosophic model, he is not 
as likely as Socrates to be "overwhelmed with ridicule" on account of his political 
schemes.
75
 Unlike Plato's Socrates, who seems to have proposed a regime where 
philosophers ruled, Shaftesbury proposes the opposite.  Shaftesbury does not hope for 
another Solomon who will be an "Author-Sovereign." He writes that "however it be, I 
wou'd not willingly take upon me to recommend this Author-Character to our future 
Princes.  Whatever Crowns or Laurels their renown'd Predecessors may have gather'd in 
this Field of Honour; I shou'd think that for the future, the speculative Province might 
more properly be committed to private Heads."
76
  Shaftesbury's advice is based in part on 
his doubt that absolute monarchs are likely to practice the art of soliloquy.  "Single and 
absolute Persons in Government, I'm sensible, can hardly be consider'd as any other than 
single and absolute in Morals.  They have no Inmate-Controuler to cavil with 'em, or 
dispute their Pleasure."  They are unlikely to have an occasion to call themselves into 
question.  "Inclination and Will in such as these, admit as little Restraint or Check in 
private Meditation as in publick Company.  The World, which serves as a Tutor to 
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Persons of an inferior rank, is submissive to these Royal Pupils; who from their earliest 
days are us'd to see even their Instructors bend before 'em, and hear every thing applauded 
which they themselves perform."
77
 
This passage might come as a surprise given the general tenor of Part I.  It is not 
so surprising that magistrates will seldom find compelling reasons to doubt their own 
opinions; but in what way are we to see "the World" as a tutor, given Shaftesbury's 
concern that company inflames and confuses the imagination? 
The reader is offered a clue in the Critic's "Third Miscellany."  The Critic 
observes there that the scope of "our Author" extends beyond the reform of the literary 
style of individual writers.  His "design is to advance something new, or at least 
something different from what is commonly current in Philosophy and Morals."
78
  While 
Shaftesbury begins close to home with the method of soliloquy, this art of "self-
discourse" is not self-sufficient.  The method itself is to be learned at the hand of ancient 
masters; but the content of the self is to be drawn from the world around us; and the 
practice is to be undertaken by individuals for themselves.  While reflection requires a 
habit of solitary contemplation, the world provides the opinions to be considered.  The 
Critic writes, 
this Correspondence, according to his Computation, is wholly impracticable, 
without a previous Commerce with the World: And the larger this Commerce is, 
the more practicable and improving the other, he thinks, is likely to prove.  The 
Sources of this improving Art of Self-correspondence he derives from the highest 
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Politeness and Elegance of antient Dialogue, and Debate, in matters of Wit, 
Knowledg, and Ingenuity.
79 
 
While Shaftesbury has shown disdain for modern fashions and mores and while he will 
prove critical of the sophisticated opinions of his day, his philosophy is meant to be a 
living activity.  Just as dialectic begins by considering opinions "which are accepted by 
all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them," Shaftesbury will 
address the most prominent opinions of his day.  In Chapter 3 ("A Storm of Devotion and 
Zeal") we will consider his treatment of Christianity and political life.  In Chapter 4 ("The 
Œconomy of the Passions") we take up the prominent opinions of modern philosophy.  
Throughout the Characteristicks Shaftesbury will show particular interest in morally 
serious gentlemen, those "gentlemen of fashion…to whom a natural good genius, or force 
of good education, has given a sense of what is naturally graceful or becoming."
80
  We'll 
see that it is such gentlemen who are the most receptive to "the fair forms," are most likely 
to "call the universe an order but not a disorder," and are most likely to follow 
Shaftesbury's lead in seeking self-knowledge.
81
  As the Critic observes, 
nothing, according to our Author, can so well revive this self-corresponding 
Practice, as the same Search and Study of the highest Politeness in modern 
Conversation.  For this, we must necessarily be at the pains of going further 
abroad than the Province we call Home.  And, by this Account, it appears that our 
Author has little hopes of being either relish'd or comprehended by any other of 
his Country-men, than those who delight in the open and free Commerce of the 
World, and are rejoic'd to gather Views, and receive Light from every Quarter; in 
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order to judg the best of what is perfect, and according to a just Standard, and true 
Taste in every kind.
82 
 
Not willing to leave matters to chance, however, the Characteristicks as a whole will be 
working to help such views make their way in the world.
83
  In section two, we will see that 
he is concerned with cultivating such conversation among his countrymen as well. 
Toward this end, Shaftesbury has turned his attention to the ways authors receive 
advantages and disadvantages from "Grandees and Men in Power." We have already 
remarked Shaftesbury's preference that the Sovereign abstain from writing books.  This 
concern will reappear in his policy recommendations to the magistrate regarding 
Christianity, and is connected to his desires to see greater liberty for authors and 
thinkers.
84
  Shaftesbury's Whiggery is apparent in this concern: 
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řtis scarce a quarter of an Age since such a happy Balance of Power was settled 
between our Prince and People, as has firmly secur'd our hitherto precarious 
Libertys, and remov'd from us the Fear of civil Commotions, Wars and Violence, 
either on account of Religion and Worship, the Property of the Subject, or the 
contending Titles of the Crown.  But as the greatest Advantages of this World are 
not to be bought at easy Prices; we are still at this moment expending both our 
Blood and Treasure, to secure to our-selves this inestimable Purchase of our Free 
Government and National Constitution.
85 
 
In Soliloquy, however, he is most concerned about tilling to make the soil better for 
authors.  Shaftesbury traces the rise and progress of the arts to the existence of free 
government: poetic liberty correlates with political liberty.  The Critic emphasizes that 
Shaftesbury's reflections on authors combined with "the Rise and Progress of Arts" 
provides "the Inlet or Introduction to his Philosophy."  As we will see in our discussion 
of the central section of Part II, "Philosophy it-self, as a Science and known Profession 
worthy of that name, cannot with any probability be suppos'd to have risen (as our Author 
shews) till other Arts had been rais'd, and, in a certain proportion, advanc'd before it."
86
  
According to the Critic, Shaftesbury has noticed in his study of the ancients "the real 
Lineage and Succession of Wit." This lineage is "plainly founded in Nature: as our Author 
has endeavour'd to make appear both from History and Fact."
87
  While many early 
nations seemed to have discovered useful arts (the Critic mentions the Egyptians and 
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others), it is only in "the Greek Nation" that the polite arts and sciences developed.  The 
Critic traces this fact to the "fortunate Constitution of that People." He writes, 
for tho compos'd of different Nations, distinct in Laws and Governments, divided 
by Seas and Continents, dispers'd in distant Islands; yet being originally of the 
same Extract, united by one single Language, and animated by that social, publick 
and free Spirit, which notwithstanding the Animosity of their several warring 
States, induc'd them to erect such heroick Congresses and Powers as those which 
constituted the Amphictonian Councils, the Olympick, Isthmian, and other 
Games; they cou'd not but naturally polish and refine each other.
88 
 
The Critic denies that the Greeks imported their arts from other nations.  "The 
utmost which cou'd be nam'd, wou'd amount to no more than raw Materials, of a rude and 
barbarous form.  And thus the Nation was evidently Original in Art." This is a very 
important distinction, for in it we see that for Shaftesbury the progress of the arts is 
connected to nature more than what will come to be called the spirit of history.  His model 
appeals to the way human beings naturally respond to a confluence of circumstances.  
With the Greeks, the arts were "self-form 'd, wrought out of Nature, and drawn from the 
necessary Operation and Course of things, working, as it were, of their own accord, and 
proper inclination."
89
  Having said this, however, it seems reasonable to see the roots of 
historical thinking in this account, especially as it comes to light in Shaftesbury's 
descendants in the Scottish Enlightenment. 
Be that as it may, Shaftesbury connects the flourishing of the arts to free 
government.  For this reason, he is hopeful that England is ripe for a revival and advance 
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of the arts and sciences.  "We are now in an Age when Liberty is once again in its 
Ascendant.  And we are our-selves the happy Nation, who not only enjoy it at home, but 
by our Greatness and Power give Life and Vigour to it abroad; and are the Head and 
Chief of the European League, founded on this Common Cause."
90
 On account of this, 
Shaftesbury suggests that only a respite from war would be needed for the "arts and 
studys" to enjoy great improvement. 
Shaftesbury encourages the grandees to maintain a "generous and impartial regard 
to Merit in the arts," for "wherever the Author-Practice and Liberty of the Pen has in the 
least prevail'd, the Governors of the State must be either considerable Gainers, or 
Sufferers by its means." Still, he exhorts them to patronize the arts generously while 
leaving the making of art to the true poets. 
  Part  II ,  §  2:  Crit icks and the Importance of  Craf tsmanship 
In section one of Part II, Shaftesbury introduced the reader to the importance of 
liberty for the "the Rise and Progress of Arts."  He continues this theme into section two, 
where he will offer a natural pattern for that progress as a corrective to the modern view 
of poetry and philosophy.  According to Shaftesbury, the modern understanding of poetic 
creation holds "that by his Genius alone, and a natural Rapidity of Style and Thought, 
[the poet] is able to carry all before him; that he plays with his Business, does things in 
passing, at a venture, and in the quickest period of Time."
91 
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The model is one of inspiration, emphasizing the role of the divine and 
minimizing the role of craftsmanship in the making of poetry.  What is more, the modern 
style encourages boasting in the form of "prefaces, dedications, and introductions."  This 
is the opposite of the spirit responsible for the greatness of antiquity.  Shaftesbury 
recommends an "Attick Elegance" which hides the labor of the writer under a demeanor 
of carelessness: 
when [ancient poets] had so polish'd their piece, and render'd it so natural and 
easy, that it seem'd only a lucky flight, a hit of thought, or flowing vein of humour; 
they were then chiefly concern'd lest it should in reality pass for such, and their 
artifice remain undiscover'd.  They were willing it shou'd be known how serious 
their play was; and how elaborate their freedom and facility.
92 
 
While Shaftesbury's style is always playful, it is always in the service of a serious purpose.  
(We discuss Shaftesbury's use of serious play when we turn to his treatment of "raillery," 
below.) 
Excellent craftsmanship requires judgment honed by what Shaftesbury calls 
Criticism.  He writes, "accuracy of Workmanship requires a Critick's Eye.  řTis  lost upon 
a vulgar Judgment.  Nothing grieves a real Artist more than that indifference of the 
Publick, which suffers Work to pass uncriticiz'd."  A man's genius alone is insufficient, 
which at best accomplishes an outward show serving to "to turn the Eye from a direct and 
steddy Survey of his Piece."
93
  For this reason, Shaftesbury resists the tendency of his age 
to complain about "criticks."  Far from being the enemy of the "Commonwealth of Wit 
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and Letters," he argues that "they are the Props and Pillars of this Building; and that 
without the Encouragement and Propagation of such a Race, we shou'd remain as 
Gothick Architects as ever." 
According to Shaftesbury, the faculty of language in human beings is open to 
extensive refinement.  The highest achievements of such refinement come about, 
however, as the result of deliberate advancing of the art of poetry by men.  One is 
unlikely to find mastery of language when men are in a rude state; language would at best 
facilitate mutual understanding for the sake of providing for necessities: 
their expos'd and indigent State cou'd not be presum'd to afford 'em either that full 
Leisure, or easy Disposition which was requisite to raise 'em to any Curiosity of 
Speculation.  They who were neither safe from Violence, nor secure of Plenty, 
were unlikely to engage in unnecessary Arts.  Nor cou'd it be expected they shou'd 
turn their Attention towards the Numbers of their Language, and the harmonious 
Sounds which they accidentally emitted.
94
 
 
As society came to rest on a more solid foundation, however, and matters of public 
importance had to be debated and decided, men soon learned the value of persuasion.  
Shaftesbury suggests that "the Goddess Persuasion must have been in a manner the 
Mother of Poetry, Rhetorick, Musick, and the other kindred Arts."  Those men who were 
able to form not only the best arguments but those who could speak most beautifully 
came to the fore in a polity; such men used speech "to charm the Publick Ear, and to 
incline the Heart, by the Agreeableness of Expression."
95
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Shaftesbury points out that the most ancient traditions suggest that the founders of 
great cities were musicians and poets.  Such men were students of "the Numbers of 
Speech," and through their "proportionable Improvements in the Study of mere Sounds 
and natural Harmony" they contributed to the softening of the manners of their newly 
formed nation.  Because persuasion is unnecessary where public affairs are decided by 
force, it is only the free society, "made by Consent and voluntary Association," that acts 
as a nursery for the arts.  Because free societies esteem elocution, public men undertake 
the study of rhetoric.  The softer manners and temperament of free people made them 
"more treatable in a way of Reason and Understanding, and more subject to be led by 
Men of Science and Erudition." In turn, "they who rose by Science, and Politeness in the 
higher Arts, cou'd not fail to promote that Taste and Relish to which they ow'd their 
personal Distinction and Pre-eminence."
96
 
While the advance of the "persuasive Arts" would attract the "forward Wits and 
aspiring Genius's of the Times," they would also give encouragement to those interested 
in the arts as ends in themselves.  Those interested in "Contemplation" alone would arise.  
Such men, identified by Shaftesbury as "Criticks," would make extensive contributions 
to the refinement of the arts themselves and also raise the standards of taste in society: 
for to all Musick there must be an Ear proportionable.  There must be an Art of 
Hearing found, ere the performing Arts can have their due effect, or any thing 
exquisite in the kind be felt or comprehended.  The just Performers therefore in 
each Art wou'd naturally be the most desirous of improving and refining the 
publick Ear; which they cou'd no way so well effect as by the help of those latter 
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Genius's, who were in a manner their Interpreters to the People; and who by their 
Example taught the Publick to discover what was just and excellent in each 
Performance.
97 
 
Those critics who sought a public reputation were called Sophists, which did not begin as 
a pejorative title.  Even the "gravest Philosophers, who were Censors of Manners, and 
Criticks of a higher degree"--perhaps especially these moral philosophers--attended to "the 
power of Argument and Persuasion." 
Drawing on accounts found in Aristotle's Poetics, Horace's Ars Poetica, and 
Longinus's On the Sublime, Shaftesbury presents a genealogy of styles as they grew up in 
the poetic arts.  He imagines that the earliest style "was the Miraculous, the Pompous, or 
what we generally call the SUBLIME."
98
  The sublime style works on the passion of 
"astonishment," and is most prevalent among children and rude peoples who are still in 
their infancy as nations.  Barbarians, he says, make music filled with "hideous and 
astonishing Sounds" and are attracted to enormous figures of odd colors.  The sublime 
appears in poetry in the form of metaphors and images.  This manner of expression is the 
most distant from "ordinary Use." As we saw earlier, Homer the "Father-Poet" was the 
first to purge poetry of the most extravagant elements of the sublime: "he retain'd only 
what was decent of the figurative or metaphorick Style, introduc'd the natural and simple; 
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and turn'd his thoughts towards the real Beauty of Composition, the Unity of Design, the 
Truth of Characters, and the just Imitation of Nature in each particular."
99
 
Homer was also the first poet of repute to show a model of both tragedy and 
comedy.  According to Shaftesbury (who follows Aristotle here), tragedy naturally 
reaches perfection as an art before comedy.  The art of comedy is more subtle than that of 
tragedy, and while the elements of comedy arise early, it is only with the art of criticism 
that it reaches its true form.  Prior to just criticism, comic poetry lacked "Truth of 
Characters, the Beauty of Order, and the simple Imitation of Nature."
100
 
Although comedy reached a perfection only late in the development of the arts, it 
served a supremely important purpose from the beginning.  Comedy "řtwas of admirable 
use to explode the false Sublime of early Poets, and such as in its own Age were on every 
occasion ready to relapse into that vicious Manner.  The good Tragedians themselves 
cou'd hardly escape its Lashes.  The pompous Orators were its never-failing Subjects.  
Every thing which might be imposing, by a false Gravity or Solemnity, was forc'd to 
endure the Trial of this Touchstone."
101
 Shaftesbury suggests that there is something 
natural in the order of this development.  The bombast of early sublime poetry gives way 
to more measured tragic presentations, which in turn invite comic parodies.  He compares 
this development to the way a natural body works to preserve itself: 
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for in healthy Bodys, Nature dictates Remedys of her own, and provides for the 
Cure of what has happen'd amiss in the Growth and Progress of a Constitution.  
The Affairs of this free People being in the Increase; and their Ability and 
Judgment every day improving, as Letters and Arts advanc'd; they wou'd of 
course find in themselves a Strength of Nature, which by the help of good 
Ferments, and a wholesom opposition of Humours, wou'd correct in one way 
whatever was excessive, or peccant (as Physicians say) in another.  Thus the 
florid and over-sanguine Humour of the high Style was allay'd by something of a 
contrary nature.  The Comick Genius was apply'd, as a kind of Caustick, to those 
Exuberances and Fungus's of the swoln Dialect, and magnificent manner of 
Speech.  But after a-while, even this Remedy it-self was found to turn into a 
Disease: as Medicines, we know, grow corrosive, when the fouler Matters on 
which they wrought are sufficiently purg'd, and the Obstructions remov'd.
102
 
 
These two passages offer us important clues to the proper relationship between 
nature and the arts according to Shaftesbury.  Art is not presented here as an alternative to 
nature but as a complement arising from the natural social activity of men.  Shaftesbury's 
own rhetorical style seems to arise from the understanding of comedy he presents here.  
For Shaftesbury, comedy can act to dispel the power of "false Sublime;" it can also run to 
excess.  While we will consider Shaftesbury's treatment of the opinions of his age more 
directly in the next two chapters, we should note here that Shaftesbury uses a similar 
strategy in dealing with both Christianity and modern philosophy.  It is, therefore, 
appropriate to digress from our consideration of progress in the arts to examine 
Shaftesbury's own use of comedy, which he calls "raillery."  
 
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As I mentioned earlier, the Critic claims that the "skeptical Mein" [sic] of the 
treatises in Volume I is accompanied by a "sapping Method, and unraveling Humor."
103
  
In the comic style of antiquity, "Manners and Characters, as well as Speech and Writings, 
were discuss'd with the greatest freedom." It is this model, especially as exemplified by 
the classical satire of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, that Shaftesbury adopts for the first 
Volume of the Characteristicks.  The second treatise, which has as its primary task the 
defense of raillery,
 
takes up this theme explicitly.
104
 
Sensus Communis employs aspects of the art of the dialogue, for allows the reader 
to listen in on a conversation between a wise friend and his decent companion.  As 
readers we must reconstruct the action of this dialogue because its narration is concealed 
under the conceit of a letter written from one friend to another.  The epistolary form in 
the context of the Characteristicks is to be read neither as private correspondence nor as a 
straightforward formal treatise or essay.
105
  According to the Critic, Sensus Communis is 
indeed to be approached as a real letter rather than a "treatise, design'd for publick view." 
Shaftesbury intends it as part of the artifice that the reader imagines the particular person 
to whom (or the character to which) the fictional letter was written.  The Critic indicates 
that in this Shaftesbury follows the classical tradition of philosophical letter-writing as 
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practiced by Cicero and Horace.  He explains that the thoughtful reader of Horace's 
epistles "will comprehend that the concealment of order and method, in this manner of 
writing, makes the chief beauty of the work."
106
  As one might expect from the account of 
dialogue we have considered--and, for that matter, from a book whose very title is 
Characteristicks of Men, etc.--Shaftesbury the author creates a friend we can recognize as 
one of the fine gentlemen with whom Shaftesbury the moralist is particularly concerned. 
We learn that Shaftesbury writes his letter in response to a friend's surprise that he 
had recently spoken in "commendation of Raillery." The friend seems to understand by 
raillery an unjust form of conversation in which a speaker ridicules any opinion which 
disagrees with his own.  Shaftesbury explains that his friend's caution would have been 
proper had Shaftesbury left his own opinions aside as too "grave or solemn" for ridicule.  
He asks "whether it be not just and reasonable, to make as free with our own opinions, as 
with those of other people," and agrees that to spare one's own opinions would be 
considered "a piece of selfishness."
107
  (One might go farther in light of Soliloquy and call 
it a piece of folly as well.) In the opinion of some people such hypocrisy would betray a 
blind adherence to unexamined opinions.  Shaftesbury describes this accusation in 
language reminiscent of Bacon's New Organon: 
we may be charg'd perhaps with willful Ignorance and blind Idolatry, for having 
taken opinions upon trust, and consecrated in our-selves certain Idol-Notions, 
which we will never suffer to be unveil'd, or seen in open light.  They may perhaps 
be monsters and not divinities, or sacred truths, which are kept thus choicely, in 
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some dark corner of our minds: the specters may impose on us, whilst we refuse 
to turn 'em every way, and view their shapes and complexions in every light.
108 
 
Shaftesbury knows that there may be some received opinions which would wither under 
the attack of raillery; and we will see that some of the opinions considered most solemn 
and grave may actually be "Deform'd" and "Odious."
109
 But the defenders of raillery hold 
that the truth has nothing to fear from this style of conversation.  He writes that "truth, řtis 
supposed, may bear all lights; and one of those principle lights or natural mediums, by 
which things are to be view'd, in order to a thorow recognition, is ridicule it-self."
110
 
This is not the impression of Shaftesbury's friend, however, who had recently 
observed a free conversation between Shaftesbury and his friends which left him 
unsettled.  The friend is of the opinion that Shaftesbury ought to have condemned the 
group with "great gravity" for their speech.  The friend seems to have been upset in part 
by the skeptical manner of the conversation, which ending abruptly and in "a sort of 
Confusion...almost brought to nothing whatever had been advanc'd in the discourse 
before."
111
  Regarding the substance of the conversation Shaftesbury provides few details 
because "some particulars of this conversation may not perhaps be so proper to commit to 
paper." We learn a few pages later, however, that the conversation had a very serious 
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subject indeed, namely "morality and religion."
112
 The aporia of the conversation must 
have been especially disturbing to his upright friend given its topics.  Shaftesbury 
concedes that "a great many fine schemes...were destroy'd; many grave reasonings 
overturn'd," but observes that the conversation was conducted "without offense to the 
partys concern'd."
113
 
Surely this is not correct, for the friend was sufficiently indignant to wonder why 
Shaftesbury had not condemned the free conversationalists.  Yet Shaftesbury understands 
that people do not like to see their moral and religious opinions ridiculed, and he 
condemns the callous mockery of men's opinions as an unjust form of speech.  
Shaftesbury remarks that a certain style of raillery has become the fashion of the age.  
Men of business, politicians, and authors, have all become practiced at banter, buffoonery, 
and burlesque.
114
  Even the most solemn Divines attempt to lend their "grim aspect" a 
playful mien when entering into controversies.  They find they must "be jocose and 
pleasant with an adversary, whom they wou'd chuse to treat in a very different manner" if 
they could.
115
 
Shaftesbury blames the spread of this vulgar raillery on the fierceness of religious 
persecution in his day.  Buffoonery is a natural reaction against zealotry which brooks no 
disagreement.  Persecution has raised a "bantering" spirit which "strains the just measure 
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of what we call urbanity."
116
  This excessive raillery grows worse with the increase of 
persecution: "the higher the slavery," he writes, "the more exquisite the buffoonery."
117
  It 
has the consequence of leading the railleur himself to acquire the habit of 
"inconsiderateness."
118
  A "gross sort of raillery" indulges in ridicule for its own sake; its 
temper, "all air and humour," takes nothing seriously.
119
  So while buffoonery has the ill 
effect of offending the decent opinions of gentlemen, it also is a symptom of enfeebled 
reason.  He writes, 
nor is it a wonder that men are generally such faint reasoners, and care to argue 
strictly on any trivial subject in company; when they dare so little exert their 
reason in greater matters, and are forc'd to argue lamely, where they have need of 
the greatest activity and strength.  The same thing therefore happens here as in 
strong and healthy bodys, which are debar'd their natural exercise, and confin'd to 
narrow space.  They have a sort of action, and move still, tho with the worst grace 
imaginable.
120 
 
Buffoonery, a vice which attends the exercise of raillery, openly ridicules received 
opinions.  This leads some gentleman (such as Shaftesbury's friend) to condemn all 
raillery as a threat to decency.  Buffoonery itself discredits reason and encourages 
gentlemen to prefer foolish diversion to thinking about serious matters.
121
  Shaftesbury 
holds that there is a just form of raillery, however. 
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Just raillery arises from the climate of persecution because the zealot opposes not 
only the ridicule of received opinions but the very questioning of them.  "When [zealots] 
hear principles examin'd, sciences and arts inquir'd into, and matters of importance 
treated with this frankness of humour, they imagine presently that all professions must 
fall to the ground, all establishments come to ruin, and nothing orderly or decent be left 
standing in the world."
122
 
 
They oppose all liberty of thought and speech, even when it is 
privately and prudently managed.  As a result of this fact, serious men turn to a just form 
of raillery, also known as irony.  "If men are forbid to speak their minds seriously on 
certain subjects, they will do it ironically.  If they are forbid to speak at all upon such 
subjects, or if they find it really dangerous to do so; they will then redouble their disguise, 
involve themselves in mysteriousness, and talk so as hardly to be understood, or at least 
not plainly interpreted, by those who are dispos'd to do 'em a mischief."
123 
Shaftesbury explains that there is a kind of "defensive raillery" which might be 
employed "when the spirit of curiosity wou'd force a discovery of more truth than can 
conveniently be told."
124
  This defensive raillery protects the truth--not to mention the 
truth-teller--by disguising it, because "we can never do more injury to truth, than by 
discovering too much of it on some occasions."  We have yet to see whether Shaftesbury 
agrees that the truth itself may bear all lights, but he clearly does not think human beings 
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are equally suited to see the truth.  '"Tis the same with understandings as with eyes: to 
such a certain size and make just so much light is necessary, and no more.  Whatever is 
beyond brings darkness and confusion."
125
 For this reason it is "real humanity and 
kindness, to hide strong truths from tender eyes." 
Shaftesbury identifies Socrates as the supreme practitioner of this humane art.  
This observation helps us understand better what Shaftesbury meant when he remarked 
that Socrates was "so veil'd, and in a Cloud, that to the unattentive surveyor he seem'd 
often to be very different from what he really was; and this chiefly by reason of a certain 
exquisite and refin'd raillery which belong'd to his manner."
126
  Through his "genius and 
manner," Socrates would "treat the highest subjects, and those of the commonest capacity 
both together, and render 'em explanatory of each other." 
Shaftesbury praises the friends who out of respect for decent opinion took their 
freedom only amongst their fellow gentlemen.  "To start questions, or manage debates, 
which offend the publick ear, is to be wanting in that respect which is due to common 
society." Delicate subjects, he writes, "shou'd either not be treated at all in publick, or in 
such a manner as to occasion no scandal or disturbance."
127
  This is surely prudent advice 
to anyone who would prefer not to experience the anger of the public, and it seems to be 
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the policy followed by Shaftesbury himself.
128
  While, as we have seen, Shaftesbury 
prefers that the magistrate foster an environment of liberty, he nevertheless relies on the 
prudence of authors not to abuse their liberty. 
While defensive raillery protects the reputation of the truth-seeker, it also protects 
the reputation of the activity of truth-seeking.  By distinguishing just raillery from unjust 
raillery, Shaftesbury tries to preserve the reputation of serious inquiry among gentlemen 
like his friend.  Shaftesbury insists that the difference between just and gross raillery is as 
real "as between fair-dealing and hypocrisy; or between the genteelest wit and the most 
scurrilous buffoonery."
129
 
 
Just raillery is distinguished by its genuine concern for the 
truth.  As Shaftesbury want to discourage thoughtless raillery which takes nothing 
seriously, he also denounces dishonest raillery which sets out "industriously to confound 
men, in a mysterious manner, and to make advantage or draw pleasure from that 
perplexity they are thrown into, by such uncertain talk."
130
 
 
It is a foolish sort of wit that 
amuses all but "leaves the most sensible man, and even a friend, equally in doubt, and at 
a loss to understand what one's real mind is, upon any subject."  When divorced from a 
concern for the truth, raillery is merely a tool for sophistry. 
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Yet concern for the potential free thinker is not Shaftesbury's only motivation.  He 
seems to be motivated by real humanity and kindness in his efforts not to disrupt 
common opinion.  He writes that "it belongs to men of slavish principles, to affect a 
superiority over the vulgar, and to despise the multitude.  The lovers of mankind respect 
and honor conventions and societies of men."
131
 
Shaftesbury writes to his friend that in addition to offending no one, the good-
humored style of raillery left the friends eager to continue their debate in the future.  
Indeed, Shaftesbury continues, reason gained more from the easy manner of free raillery 
than from the "usual stiff adherence to a particular opinion."
132
  Shaftesbury commends 
raillery as the style most suitable to his age.  "The Temper of the Pedagogue sutes not 
with the Age," he writes, "and the world, however it may be taught, will not be tutor'd."
133
 
The pedagogue "demands reverence and awe," but his temper serves only "to keep 
understandings at a distance, and out of reach."
134
 
 
According to Shaftesbury, it is no 
small thing that pleasure be found in the "unraveling or refuting of any argument," for 
"řtis the habit alone of reasoning, which can make the reasoner."135  Shaftesbury's notion 
of reasoning, he tells us, cannot be learned from the "written treatises of the learned" or 
                                                 
131
 Ibid., 1.49. 
132
 Ibid., 1.45. 
133
 Ibid., 1.44. 
134
 Ibid., 1.46. 
135
 Ibid., 1.45. 
  79 
 
 
 
 
from hearing long orations and declamations.  It is only the "question and reply" of a 
"free conference"--that is, dialogue--which develops the ability to reason. 
 
Having considered, then, the deeper meaning of raillery for Shaftesbury, we can 
return to Soliloquy.  We have already seen, Shaftesbury identifies his notion of reasoning 
with the art of the dialogue as practiced by the writers of antiquity.  The free give and 
take of a polite conversation or a dialogue is an image of the thinker engaged in 
soliloquy.  Under the discipline of the soliloquy as taught by our philosopher-critic, the 
rallieur's works will be more likely to discern the "truth of Characters, the Beauty of 
Order, and the simple Imitation of Nature." Corrected by the proper self-reflection, 
authors will be in a position to improve their readers in addition to pleasing them.  At the 
very least, they are likely to start thinking about the opinions that they had heretofore 
taken for granted.  This would be the beginning of a real liberal education. 
Yet Shaftesbury does not think that the authors of his age are prepared for the 
simple imitation of Nature.  The spirits of banter and buffoonery are in fashion; there is 
little taste for "real simplicity" among his contemporaries.  Because of this, a 
straightforward methodical manner will not find a suitable audience.  So too he rejects 
most of the other forms available to authors; the sublime and the didactic forms are 
unsuitable.  This leaves only one option to be recommended: 
the only Manner left, in which Criticism can have its just Force amongst us, is the 
antient Comick; of which kind were the first Roman Miscellanys, or Satirick 
Pieces: a sort of original Writing of their own, refin'd afterwards by the best 
Genius, and politest Poet of that Nation; who, notwithstanding, owns the Manner 
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to have been taken from the Greek Comedy above-mention'd.  And if our Home-
Wits wou'd refine upon this Pattern, they might perhaps meet with considerable 
Success.
136 
 
As we have seen, this is precisely what Shaftesbury himself strives to do in the 
Characteristicks.  He closes the section of Part II devoted to critics by reminding his 
readers that in modern times as well as ancient, the interests of the critic is the same as 
"that of Wit, Learning, and Good Sense." 
  Part  II ,  §  3:   The Publick 
Having considered the mixed influence of the "grandees," and the salutary 
influence of true criticism on authors, Shaftesbury turns to consider the mutual influence 
of author and audience.  Shaftesbury playfully professes surprise that modern authors are 
so insipid when even the common artisan strives to produce works of integrity.  He writes 
that "when one considers this Zeal and Honesty of inferiour Artists, one wou'd wonder to 
see those who pretend to Skill and Science in a higher kind, have so little regard to Truth, 
and the Perfection of their Art.  One wou'd expect it of our Writers, that if they had real 
Ability, they shou'd draw the World to them; and not meanly sute themselves to the 
World, in its weak State."
137 
Again, Shaftesbury makes an unfavorable comparison with the poets of antiquity.  
Those poets did not always expect to receive applause for their work; had they done so, 
"they had not done their Countrymen such Service, nor themselves such Honour as we 
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find they did, by conforming to Truth and Nature.  The generous Spirits who first essay'd 
the Way, had not always the World on their side: but soon drew after 'em the best 
Judgments; and soon afterwards the World itself."
125
 As we can see from the account of 
raillery, Shaftesbury does not advocate treating the public with open contempt.  Modern 
authors will have to write with an understanding of the fancies and opinion of their times.  
Yet, as authors, Shaftesbury hopes that they will look to form their work with the advice 
of a better self.  With the proper use of their "geniuses," authors would command their 
audience rather than the reverse, and the public would learn "good taste" from moderns 
too. 
"And thus," he writes, "we are return'd to our old Article of Advice; that main 
Preliminary of Self-study and inward Converse, which we have found so much wanting in 
the Authors of our Time." It is for this reason that "the Poet must necessarily borrow of 
the Philosopher."
138
  We have yet to see, however, what constitutes good taste for 
Shaftesbury.  For an understanding of this question we have to consider Part III. 
Advice to an Author ,  Part III:   Truth and the Love of the 
Beautiful  
  Part  III ,  §  1:   Counterfeit  Philosophers  
Shaftesbury opens Part III with a reflection on the moral character of the self, 
observing that men take great pleasure in being complimented on their character.  This 
suggestion, which is rooted in our common sense of the matter, he connects with a bold 
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claim: that human beings are naturally able to recognize moral beauty.  He does not mean 
by this that men have good "Taste or Judgment" fully formed by nature, of course.  As 
the Critic explains, 
whatever Principles or Materials of this kind we may possibly bring with us; 
whatever good Facultys, Senses, or anticipating Sensations, and Imaginations, 
may be of Nature's Growth, and arise properly, of themselves, without our Art, 
Promotion, or Assistance; the general Idea which is form'd of all this 
Management, and the clear Notion we attain of what is preferable and principal in 
all these Subjects of Choice and Estimation, will not, as I imagine, by any Person, 
be taken for innate.
139 
 
As we have already seen, and as the Critic confirms, "Use, Practice and Culture 
must precede the Understanding and Wit of such an advanc'd Size and Growth as this.  A 
legitimate and just Taste can neither be begotten, made, conceiv'd, or produc'd, without 
the antecedent Labour and Pains of Criticism."
140
  Shaftesbury has suggested as a prelude 
to his philosophy that men adopt the practice of soliloquy.  Through soliloquy they will 
gain a distance from themselves.  From the perspective of their nurtured daemon, they 
will be able to view themselves dispassionately, that is, they will view their fancies and 
opinions as objects rather than as inescapable truths.  He has also suggested that this 
practice is connected to the art of the dialogue, an art which itself must be practiced and 
developed with great effort and that presupposes a certain level of cultural sophistication.  
Shaftesbury is now ready to give us a better look at what he means by "the Reality of a 
better Self" and the standard by which it is judged:  taste.  A full understanding of taste, 
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however, will require that we undertake the labor of Criticism, which at its highest is a 
sort of contemplation by the philosopher.  This happens most powerfully in The 
Moralists, which will occupy our attention in our final chapter. 
Shaftesbury first reminds us that there are rivals to his classical philosophy which 
have their own notions of self.  "The misfortune is, we are seldom taught to comprehend 
this Self, by placing it in a distinct View from its Representative or Counterfeit."
141
  The 
chief obstacle to our natural self is religion.  Shaftesbury writes, "in our holy Religion, 
which for the greatest part is adapted to the very meanest Capacitys, řtis not to be 
expected that a Speculation of this kind shou'd be openly advanc'd."
142
  The other rival is 
the false philosophy of those "noted Headpieces," the modern projectors, who have 
introduced a radical skepticism which cuts men off from common opinion and establishes 
abstruse theoretical systems in their place.  He writes, 
for the Philosopher, who pretends to be wholly taken up in considering his higher 
Facultys, and examining the Powers and Principles of his Understanding; if in 
reality his Philosophy be foreign to the Matter profess'd; if it goes beside the 
mark, and reaches nothing we can truly call our Interest or Concern; it must be 
somewhat worse than mere Ignorance or Idiotism.  The most ingenious way of 
becoming foolish, is by a System.  And the surest Method to prevent good Sense, 
is to set up something in the room of it.  The liker any thing is to Wisdom, if it be 
not plainly the thing it-self, the more directly it becomes its opposite.
143
 
 
We will deal with these rivals and Shaftesbury's response in the next two chapters. 
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Shaftesbury's vision of true philosophy is Socratic and it is especially indebted to 
Xenophon's Socrates.  Shaftesbury praises that "noble Disciple" of Socrates, who 
managed to combine a life of action with the life of contemplation.  Xenophon "join'd 
what was deepest and most solid in Philosophy, with what was easiest and most refin'd in 
Breeding, and in the Character and Manner of a Gentleman."
144
  According to the Critic, 
it is to Xenophon that "we owe an original System of Works, the politest, wisest, 
usefullest, and (to those who can understand the Divineness of a just Simplicity) the most 
amiable, and even the most elevating and exalting of all un-inspir'd and merely human 
Authors."
145
  Socratic philosophy teaches us to know ourselves, and consequently allows 
us to maintain consistency of character through the examination of fancy.  Like 
Xenophon and other Socratics, Shaftesbury will only call free that man whose passions 
are ordered by reason. 
It is here that Shaftesbury must begin the work of challenging modern philosophy 
since its account of the will contradicts the Socratic distinction between reason and the 
passions.  According to Shaftesbury, modern philosophy has fallen into a neo-scholastic 
mode which seeks "a method to confound Reason, and degrade the Understanding of 
Mankind; they could not perhaps succeeded better, than by the Establishment of such a 
mock-science."
146
  To illustrate the sort of method he means, Shaftesbury tells the story 
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of an imprisoned thinker who, given the amount of time he had on his hands, might well 
have benefited from soliloquy.  This prisoner "was one of those whom in this Age we 
usually call Philosophers, a Successor of Paracelsus, and a Master in the occult 
Sciences."
147
  As we shall see from the description of his activities, the prisoner is a more 
a methodical natural scientist than an alchemist (although in truth there is not much of a 
difference between the two for Shaftesbury).
148
  He tells us that while the prisoner was 
accomplished in his field, he had abandoned "moral science, or any thing relating to Self-
converse" and consequently had to apply a different method.  The prisoner was not 
practiced in music but he was accomplished at making a variety of distinct sounds with 
his voice by manipulating his mouth and throat in a variety of ways, and he undertakes an 
important experimental study, "and thus bellowing, roaring, snarling, and otherwise 
variously exerting his Organs of Sound, he endeavour'd to discover what Letters of the 
Alphabet cou'd best design each Species, or what new Letters were to be invented, to 
mark the undiscover'd Modifications."
149
  Having used his time well in "profound 
Speculation and long Exercise," the prisoner is able to compose a "philosophical treatise" 
when he is released.  Shaftesbury offers us the following assessment of his scholarship:  
"he esteem'd himself the only Master of Voice and Language on the account of this his 
radical Science, and fundamental Knowledg of Sounds.  But whoever had taken him to 
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improve their Voice, or teach 'em an agreeable or just manner of Accent or Delivery, 
wou'd, I believe, have found themselves considerably deluded."
150
  Having endeavored 
through his "radical science" to break the human voice into its component sounds, the 
imprisoned philosopher becomes an expert in exactly that: sounds.  Shaftesbury forces his 
reader to ask about the purpose of such a science.  He is quick to say that he "wou'd not 
condemn as useless this speculative Science of Articulation." It may belong with other 
subordinate concerns such as grammar.  He doubts, however, that it will lead men "in the 
Discovery of [their] own Natures."
151
  Shaftesbury is profoundly interested in human 
speech, as our reflections on his account of dialogue suggests; but he is interested not in 
the sounds of speech but its meaning to human beings.  By looking into the "machine of 
this world and their own frame" through a physiological and radical science, philosophers 
learn little about moral life or the frame of their own passions.  In fact, Shaftesbury fears 
that such a science undermines our willingness to look into moral questions.  "I know not 
to what purpose such a Philosophy can serve, except only to shut the door against better 
Knowledg, and introduce Impertinence and Conceit with the best Countenance of 
Authority."
152
 
 
Shaftesbury offers the method of soliloquy to serve as a corrective to the 
new scholasticism he sees around him.  He writes, "a small Help from our familiar 
Method of Soliloquy may serve turn: and we may perhaps decide this matter in a more 
                                                 
150
 Ibid., 1.179. 
151
 Ibid. 
152
 Ibid., 1.180. 
  87 
 
 
 
 
diverting way; by confronting this super-speculative Philosophy with a more practical 
sort, which relates chiefly to our Acquaintance, Friendship, and good Correspondence 
with our-selves."
153
  For Shaftesbury, a true science of human nature cannot be separated 
from questions of purpose as they arise in common life.  He offers the reader the analogy 
of a watch.  If we were to wonder about an object in the window of a watchmaker's shop 
is, would we try identifying its sounds, metal, colors and parts without asking "what the 
real Use was of such an Instrument?"  He asks which method is most likely to reveal "the 
real Nature of the Instrument."  So too, one cannot identify man to himself without an 
analogous concern: 
shou'd a Philosopher, after the same manner, employing himself in the Study of 
human Nature, discover only, what Effects each Passion wrought upon the Body; 
what change of Aspect or Feature they produc'd; and in what different manner 
they affected the Limbs and Muscles; this might possibly qualify him to give 
Advice to an Anatomist or a Limner, but not to Mankind or to Himself: Since 
according to this Survey he consider'd not the real Operation or Energy of his 
Subject, nor contemplated the Man, as real Man, and as a human Agent; but as a 
Watch or common Machine.
154
 
 
Here Shaftesbury refers to Descartes, whose account of the passion of fear is known first 
through the mechanism of the body.  While Shaftesbury concedes that he grits his teeth 
when afraid, he denies that he knows fear and courage better because of this.  As a man he 
is not able to connect the mechanism to his practical concerns.  He remarks, "I may 
depend upon it, that by the most refin'd Speculation of this kind, I shall neither learn to 
diminish my Fears, or raise my Courage.  This, however, I may be assur'd of, that řtis the 
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Nature of Fear, as well as of other Passions, to have its Increase and Decrease, as it is fed 
by Opinion, and influenc'd by Custom and Practice."
155
  According to Shaftesbury, a 
moral science must approach the passions first through opinion, and opinion first comes to 
light as "influenc'd by Custom and Practice." It is on this point that Shaftesbury is most 
clearly a student of Xenophon.  The Socrates of Xenophon's Memorabilia seems to have 
had a similar suspicion about natural science and its desire to create novelties: 
[Socrates] did not even discuss that topic so favoured by other talkers, "the Nature 
of the Universe": and avoided speculation on the so-called "Cosmos" of the 
Professors, how it works, and on the laws that govern the phenomena of the 
heavens: indeed he would argue that to trouble one's mind with such problems is 
sheer folly…Students of human nature, he said, think that they will apply their 
knowledge in due course for the good of themselves and any others they choose.  
Do those who pry into heavenly phenomena imagine that, once they have 
discovered the laws by which these are produced, they will create at their will 
winds, waters, seasons and such things to their need? Or have they no such 
expectation, and are they satisfied with knowing the causes of these various 
phenomena?
156 
 
Like Shaftesbury, Xenophon's Socrates was more interested in humane moral questions: 
his own conversation was ever of human things.  The problems he discussed 
were, What is godly, what is ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, 
what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is 
cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is government, and what is a 
governor;--these and others like them, of which the knowledge made a 
"gentleman," in his estimation, while ignorance should involve the reproach of 
"slavishness."
157 
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According to Shaftesbury, moral philosophy is most properly the queen of all the sciences.  
First philosophy is for him, as it was for Xenophon, the study of human beings in a way 
that leads to self-knowledge: 
and thus Philosophy, which judges both of her-self, and of every thing besides; 
discovers her own Province, and chief Command; teaches me to distinguish 
between her Person and her Likeness; and shews me her immediate and real self, 
by that sole Privilege of teaching me to know my-self, and what belongs to me.  
She gives to every inferior Science its just rank; leaves some to measure Sounds; 
others to scan Syllables; others to weigh Vacuums, and define Spaces, and 
Extensions: but reserves to her-self her due Authority, and Majesty; keeps her 
State, and antient Title, of Guide of life, investigator of virtue, and the rest of 
those just Appellations which of old belong'd to her.
158 
 
In following Socrates and the method of soliloquy, Shaftesbury directs his reader 
to begin his inquiry into nature with the opinions he finds around him, those opinions 
"which are accepted by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of 
them."
159
  It is by comparing contrary opinions and criticizing them in turn that dialectic 
hopes to move from false views to gain a better understanding of nature.  For this reason, 
Shaftesbury undertakes a consideration of the most notable opinions of his day, and he 
undertakes the inquiry with the most reputable men of his day. 
  Part  III ,  §  2:   Gentlemen of  Fashion 
We have seen that Shaftesbury began the last treatise of Volume I with the "home 
method" of the soliloquy.  The importance of this as an inlet to the overall design of the 
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work cannot be overstated.  In fact, its importance is indicated by the epigraph 
Shaftesbury sets at the head of Soliloquy: 
And you need not have looked beyond yourself.
160
 
 
While this is our beginning point, however, we have also learned that it is not a sufficient 
account of the method of soliloquy for Shaftesbury.  Soliloquy is more than a kind of 
solipsism and in fact in its literary form it is more akin to dialogue with another person.  
The Critic suggested that the proper practice of soliloquy presupposed a "previous 
commerce with the world."  The Critic remarks that "to support this Design of his, 
[Shaftesbury] seems intent chiefly on this single Point; 'To discover, how we may, to best 
advantage, form within our-selves what in the polite World is call'd a Relish, or Good 
Taste.'"
161
 
The Critic is emphatic about the important role the concept of taste plays in the 
philosophical design of the Characteristicks and he invites us to begin our reflections in 
"the polite World."  This is of a piece with the general concern Shaftesbury shows for 
morally serious gentlemen, that is, those "gentlemen of fashion...to whom a natural good 
genius, or force of good education, has given a sense of what is naturally graceful or 
becoming."
162
  We met one such character briefly in our treatment of raillery in Sensus 
Communis, and we will have to renew our acquaintance momentarily.  According to the 
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Critic, gentlemen of fashion have a familiarity with the world such that they have the 
resources within themselves to practice the "improving Art of Self-correspondence."
163
 
In taking up the subject of taste, the Critic directs our attention first to the polite 
world.  The distinguished members of this world are not themselves philosophers, or at 
least not generally so, and Shaftesbury has a special name for them: "VIRTUOSI, or 
refin'd Wits of the Age."  In this "general Denomination" are included: 
the real fine Gentlemen, the Lovers of Art and Ingenuity; such as have seen the 
World, and inform'd themselves of the Manners and Customs of the several 
Nations of Europe, search'd into their Antiquitys, and Records; consider'd their 
Police, Laws, and Constitutions; observ'd the Situation, Strength, and Ornaments 
of their Citys, their principal Arts, Studys, and Amusements; their Architecture, 
Sculpture, Painting, Musick, and their Taste in Poetry, Learning, Language, and 
Conversation.
164 
 
Why would such men need the method of soliloquy at all?  Here we should recall 
the friend of the virtuous prince who assumed that "they who are honest and just, can 
admire and love whatever is beautiful; without offering at anything beyond what is 
allowed."
165
  Through philosophy, the gentleman comes to see that the self, while 
seemingly unified in its will and consequently free, is in fact governed by a bundle of 
fancies and opinions.  It is the work of philosophy to establish an auditor within the breast 
of man to distinguish unhealthy "Idol-Notions" from sound and healthy opinions. 
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In Sensus Communis, Shaftesbury is at pains to defend the natural sociability of 
man and the virtues which attend society because of the corrupting power of philosophy.  
The noble gentleman to whom he writes the letter has himself been fortunate enough to 
avoid a philosophic education at the hands of the modern projectors.  At the close of 
Sensus Communis, Shaftesbury congratulates his friend on the fact that his education 
involved little of the "philosophers of our days."
166
  There was a time when the best youth 
could safely be entrusted to philosophy with the confidence that he would learn "right 
practice of the world" and "a just knowledge of men and things," but it is no longer so.  
Had Shaftesbury's friend learned ethics and politics from modern philosophers, he writes, 
"I shou'd never have thought of writing a word to you upon common sense or the love of 
mankind."  The gentleman loves virtue for its own sake rather than for some further 
reward or fear of reprisal.  As we will see in the next two chapters, Shaftesbury takes 
both Christianity and modern philosophy to attack this natural perspective of the 
gentleman.  A modern gentleman is likely to understand his passions in light of self-
interest, and yet according to Shaftsbury a gentleman who asks "why should I not be 
nasty in private?" is no gentleman.  Shaftesbury thinks that this question is more likely to 
arise for the person educated by modern philosophy than for a person guided by common 
sense.  He proposes that 
the truth is: as notions stand now in the world, with respect to morals, honesty is 
like to gain little by philosophy, or deep speculations of any kind.  In the main, 
řtis best to stick to common sense, and go no further.  Mens first thoughts, in this 
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matter, are generally better than their second: their natural notions better than 
those refined by study, or consultation with casuists.  According to common 
speech, as well as common sense, honesty is the best policy: but according to 
refin'd sense, the only well-advised persons, as to this world, are errant knaves.
167 
 
Shaftesbury's recommends the sober use of raillery to counterbalance the confusion found 
in common life, for "řtis in reality a serious study, to learn to temper and regulate that 
humour which nature has given us, as a more lenitive remedy against vice, and a kind of 
specific against superstition and melancholy delusion.  There is a great difference 
between seeking how to raise a laugh from every thing; and seeking, in every thing, what 
justly may be laughed at.  For nothing is ridiculous except what is deformed."
168
  Having 
heard a defense for balanced raillery, the gentleman of fashion will be more likely to 
begin the hard work of thinking critically about the most important matters. 
  Part  III ,  §  3:   Truth in Beauty 
Shaftesbury tells us near the close of the Characteristicks that "it has been the 
main scope and principle end of these volumes, 'To assert the reality of a beauty and 
charm in moral as well as natural subjects; and to demonstrate the reasonableness of a 
proportionate taste, and determinate choice, in life and manners.'"
169
  He seems to believe 
that it is necessary to assert such a reality if the true nature of moral subjects is to come to 
light.  Indeed, should men come to lose their appreciation of the nobility of moral life, 
men would come to resemble animals.  Such a view might "leave us probably no other 
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employment than that of satisfying our coarsest appetites at the cheapest rate; in order to 
the attainment of a supine state of indolence and activity."
170
 
So too is it necessary to assert, at least initially, the reality of a beauty and charm 
in natural subjects, for without such a presupposition of "a coherence, a design, a 
meaning," there is no possibility of knowledge as it was understood in classical 
philosophy.
171
  Modern philosophy denies nature is to be contemplated, for it understood 
as well as Shaftesbury that "where there is nothing like Nature, there is no room for the 
troublesome part of thought and contemplation," and therefore no room for the 
persecution which can arise from the disagreement about such matters.
172
  Modern 
projectors are concerned that "the habit of admiration and contemplative delight, wou'd, 
by over-indulgence, too easily mount into high fanaticism, or degenerate into abject 
superstition."
173
  Ultimately it is the intention of Shaftesbury to show that the cultivation 
of such habits need not run to such extremes. 
Shaftesbury accordingly ends Sensus Communis with an enthusiastic 
consideration of the relationship between beautiful manners and other forms of beauty.  
He directs his speech to those "gentlemen of fashion…to whom a natural good genius, or 
force of good education, has given a sense of what is naturally graceful or becoming."
174
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He introduces this appeal to the most notable and reputable of men in the hopes of 
keeping alive the possibility that the world itself is an ordered whole or cosmos 
(κόζμος).175  Common sense, he believes, has a natural appreciation of "those natural rules 
of proportion and truth" which are necessary for there to be natural knowledge at all.
155
 
He is confident that "even rude nature it-self, in its primitive simplicity, is a better guide 
to judgment, than improv'd sophistry, and pedantick learning."
176
  He therefore turns from 
modern philosophy, with its "wrong ground of education," for "redress, and amendment, 
from that excellent school which we call the world."
177
  So, too, Soliloquy ends by praising 
the beautiful, calling on authors in their private capacity to practice his method of self 
examination: 
resolution enough to criticize ourselves, and call in question our high 
Imaginations, florid Desires, and specious Sentiments, according to the manner of 
Soliloquy above prescrib'd; we shall, by the natural course of things, as we grow 
wiser, prove less conceited; and introduce into our Character that Modesty, 
Condescension, and just Humanity which is essential to the Success of all friendly 
Counsel and Admonition.  An honest Home-PHILOSOPHY must teach us the 
wholesom Practice within ourselves.  Polite Reading, and Converse with Mankind 
of the better sort, will qualify us for what remains.
178 
 
If the Soliloquy has done its work, the reader is now prepared to begin Volume II, which 
raises questions of religion and natural morality directly. 
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We have yet to learn whether or not Shaftesbury has an account of metaphysics 
that will support connecting moral life to nature in general.  This question will receive its 
proper treatment only in chapter 5, "Shaftesbury's 'Principal Performance'--A reading of 
The Moralists."  Before considering the evidence he offers, however, we must first 
consider the two chief obstacles he sees blocking deeper reflection, that is, Christianity 
and modern philosophy.  We will take up these subjects in turn. 
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CHAPTER 3 
"A STORM OF DEVOTION AND ZEAL": 
CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICAL LIFE 
General Introduction 
In the previous chapter we examined Shaftesbury's understanding of philosophy, 
primarily as it comes to light in the treatise Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author.  In this 
chapter we will consider Shaftesbury's treatment of religion.  It would be difficult to 
exaggerate the prominence given to religion in the Characteristicks.  While Shaftesbury 
is frequently (and quite reasonably) identified with eighteenth-century deism,
1
 his own 
treatment of religion is fairly subtle.  To understand his teaching we will need to consider 
his critique of Christianity, his critique of religion as such, and his critique of revelation. 
I contend that Shaftesbury shares the Enlightenment critique of Christianity as it is 
advanced in the works of Hobbes and Locke.  In the opinion of these "modern projectors" 
the consequences of Christianity have been disastrous for human beings.  While I believe 
that aspects of what I am calling the Enlightenment critique can be observed in the 
writings of many philosophers, I focus attention in this chapter on Hobbes and Locke.  I 
consider Hobbes because Shaftesbury identifies him so clearly as a philosophical foe.  I 
will also present what I regard as Locke's iteration of this same critique. 
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While the religious opinions of any one of these important figures generates 
legitimate scholarly controversy, I believe that Hobbes, Locke, and Shaftesbury treat 
Christianity in nearly identical ways.  This can be seen by concentrating on three 
important topics, namely the psychology, rhetoric, and clericism of Christianity.  
Scholarly subtleties aside, I believe that Shaftesbury himself will vouchsafe this 
interpretation. 
Shaftesbury's understanding of religion in general is self-consciously indebted to 
antiquity.  Shaftesbury contrasts two possible policies toward religion, one ancient and one 
modern.  The ancient policy treats religion as an aspect of politics; the modern policy 
treats politics as an aspect of religion.  Shaftesbury's critique of revelation comes to light 
through his treatment of enthusiasm.  Shaftesbury is often credited with having restored a 
positive valence to the term enthusiasm, especially as it gets taken up by poets and literary 
critics.  Here too Shaftesbury seeks advice from classical philosophy.  Just as he turns to 
Socratic dialogue in his attempt to distinguish reason from the passions, so he offers a 
classical account of the soul when considering man's relationship to the divine.  
Shaftesbury and Religion  
  The Quest ion of  Shaftesbury's  Sincerity  
From the beginning scholars have disagreed over Shaftesbury's personal opinions 
about Christianity--in part, I suspect, because they disagree about what constitutes sincere 
adherence to Christianity.  Noted divine William Warburton reports a comment made by 
Alexander Pope about the Characteristicks that puts Shaftesbury's adherence to 
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Christianity into considerable doubt.  He writes, "Mr. Pope told me, that, to his 
knowledge, the Characteristics had done more harm to Revealed Religion in England than 
all the works of Infidelity put together."
2
  One might contend, of course, that Christianity 
can be adequately presented as a natural religion, that is, without recourse to revelation.  It 
would be enough for our purposes, however, to determine whether Shaftesbury himself 
thought this true.  Noted Shaftesbury scholar A. O. Aldridge seems tempted by the 
contention.  He argues that while Shaftesbury undeniably held to a controversial theology, 
much of the controversy surrounding his piety can be traced to his playful demeanor rather 
than the particular opinions he held.
3
  While Aldridge himself offers an impressive 
catalogue of these controversial opinions, which includes a denial of miracles, the 
mockery of scripture, and an admiration for the apostate Emperor Julian, he seems to 
believe that much of Shaftesbury's contempt was directed at religious establishment rather 
than religion per se.  An animus against religious establishment is undeniable, as we will 
see in our consideration of priestcraft; yet Shaftesbury's own religious opinions do not 
suggest much in the way of sincere piety even when his criticism of established religion is 
taken into account. 
Shaftesbury was deliberately guarded in his treatment of Christianity.  Aldridge 
himself claims that Shaftesbury's irony infuriated his contemporary critics, according to 
whom Shaftesbury "eludes the arguments of the defenders of Christianity and at the same 
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time artfully enregisters himself among the number of faithful Christians."
4
  There is 
substantial evidence for this opinion.  John Leland, for example, in A View of the Principal 
Deistical Writers, concedes that some have claimed that Shaftesbury was a true friend of 
Christianity.  He writes that  
passages are produced out of some of his writings, in which [Shaftesbury] 
expresseth very favourable sentiments of Christianity. This he doth particularly in 
a preface, which, and I believe justly, is ascribed to his Lordship as the author, 
prefixed to a volume of select sermons of Dr. Benjamin Whichcot, published in 
1698. In that preface he finds fault with those in this profane age that represent 
not only the institution of preaching, but even the gospel itself, and our holy 
religion, to be a fraud. He expresseth his hope, that from some things in these 
sermons, even they that are prejudiced against Christianity may be induced to like 
it the better; and that the vein of goodness which appears throughout these 
discourses will make such as are already Christians prize Christianity the more; 
and the fairness, ingenuity, and impartiality, which they learn from hence, will be 
a security to them against the contrary temper of those other irreconcilable 
enemies to our holy faith. In 1716 some of his letters were published at London, 
under the title of Several Letters written by a noble Lord to a Young Man in the 
University. In these letters, which were written a few years before the Earl of 
Shaftesbury's death, in the years 1707, 1708, 1709, there are excellent sentiments 
and advices, and some which seem to discover a real regard for the Christian 
religion.
5
 
 
Nevertheless, Shaftesbury does not elude the careful eye of John Leland.  Leland 
advances evidence that Characteristicks contains many passages "which seem to have a 
bad aspect on religion, and to be of a dangerous influence and tendency."
6
 Leland quotes 
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several which deny and contemn "the doctrine of future rewards and punishments."
7
  
According to Leland this opinion alone is sufficient evidence of Shaftesbury's hostility to 
Christianity, but there is more.  Shaftesbury 
hath taken occasion to expose the Scripture, as far as in him lay, to ridicule and 
contempt, of which many instances might be produced. Not to mention the 
insinuations he has thrown out relating to particular passages both in the Old 
Testament and the New, he hath endeavoured to expose the spirit of prophecy, 
and made a ludicrous representation of it, and compared it with the extravagancies 
of the maddest enthusiasts. Miracles he will not allow to be any proofs, though 
ever so certain; or that there is any ground to believe their having been done, but 
the authority of our governors, and of those whom the state hath appointed the 
guardians of holy writ.  He speaks with ridicule, as other deistical writers have 
often done, of what he calls the specious pretence of moral certainty, and matter 
of fact, and insinuates, that the facts recorded in the gospels are absolutely 
uncertain, and that, he that relies upon those accounts must be a sceptical 
Christian.  He represents St. Paul as speaking sceptically, and as no way certain or 
positive as to the revelation made to him, though the contrary is manifest from the 
apostle's own most express declarations.
8
 
 
Some apparently have difficulty reconciling the Shaftesbury of the preface to 
Whichcote and the patron of a young theologian with the seemingly deistical author of 
Characteristicks.  Leland himself takes note that on several occasions Shaftesbury 
declares himself an orthodox believer.  "He hath assured us, in his ironical way, of his 
steady orthodoxy, and entire submission to the truly Christian and Catholic doctrines of 
our holy church, as by law established:  and that he faithfully embraces the holy mysteries 
of our religion even in the minutest particulars, notwithstanding their amazing depth."
9
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The confusion is dispelled, however, when we remember what Shaftesbury's "ironical 
way" involves.  As we saw in the previous chapter, Shaftesbury did not believe people 
were equally capable of enlightenment:  "řtis the same with understandings as with eyes: 
to such a certain size and make just so much light is necessary, and no more.  Whatever is 
beyond brings darkness and confusion."
10
  Robert Voitle shows that Shaftesbury carried 
this view into his active life.  Voitle writes that 
for his servants, for his farmers, for the great mass of mankind there is no hope 
except by earnest and continued attention to the moral dictates of religion from 
the earliest age…Even among the better favored who have special opportunities 
or education to help them turn out right, there is always the danger of backsliding-
-witness the letters he was later to write…Only the very few who through 
intensive reading of the ancients have come to love virtue for her own sake may 
not need religion.
11
 
 
While Voitle is correct to observe this distinction in Shaftesbury's opinions, his 
suggestion that  it reflected "paternalism of the system" and moral snobbery fails to take 
note of Shaftesbury's political intention. 
 Here I believe Leland is more persuasive, largely because he relies on 
Shaftesbury's own explanation.  He quotes Shaftesbury, who writes that "where the 
supreme Powers have given their Sanction to any religious Record, or pious writ…it 
becomes immoral and profane in any one, to deny absolutely, or dispute the sacred 
Authority of the least Line or Syllable contained in it."
12
  This is actually one of several 
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statements in the Characteristicks maintaining the importance of obeying the lawfully 
established religion.  The Critic reports of "our Author" that he "on all occasions submits 
most willingly, and with full Confidence and Trust, to the Opinions by Law 
establish’d."13  Elsewhere the Critic remarks, "it is certainly no small Interest or Concern 
with Men, to believe what is by Authority establishřd; since in the Case of Disbelief there 
can be no Choice left but either to live a Hypocrite, or be esteemřd profane."14  Wherever 
the law does not leave men to themselves, only two alternatives are available to those 
who do not believe what the law requires.  They can pretend to believe, in which case 
they are guilty of hypocrisy; or they can make no pretense about their unbelief and be 
regarded as profane.  As the violent experience of the English Civil Wars suggests, such a 
choice is "no small Interest or Concern with Men."   
 The Critic offers proof that he is mindful of his own circumstances as he writes.  
In assessing his own work he claims that 
the only Subject on which we are perfectly secure, and without fear of any just 
Censure or Reproach, is that of FAITH, and Orthodox BELIEF.  For in the first 
place, it will appear, that throř a profound Respect, and religious Veneration, we 
have forborne so much as to name any of the sacred and solemn Mysterys of 
Revelation.  And, in the next place, as we can with confidence declare, that we 
have never in any Writing, publick or private, attempted such high Researches, 
nor have ever in Practice acquitted our-selves otherwise than as just Conformists 
to the lawful Church; so we may, in a proper Sense, be said faithfully and 
dutifully to embrace those holy Mysterys, even in their minutest Particulars, and 
without the least Exception on account of their amazing Depth. And tho we are 
sensible that it wouřd be no small hardship to deprive others of a liberty of 
examining and searching, with due Modesty and Submission, into the nature of 
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those Subjects; yet as for our-selves, who have not the least scruple whatsoever, 
we pray not any such Grace or Favour in our behalf: being fully assurřd of our 
own steddy Orthodoxy, Resignation, and intire Submission to the truly Christian 
and Catholick Doctrines of our Holy Church, as by Law establish’d.15 
 
While the Critic neglects to mention whether he is a believing Christian or not, his tone 
seems overly earnest given his earlier raillery.  Either way, the statement is inconclusive 
evidence because it could as easily be attributed to hypocrisy as sincerity. 
 Leland connects Shaftesbury's lawful adherence to the Church of England with 
his political teaching on religion in general.  He writes: 
that according to [Shaftesbury], Christianity has no other foundation than what 
will serve a false religion as well as the true. And elsewhere, in the person of the 
sceptick, he talks of our visible sovereign's answering for us in matters of religion. 
In this his Lordship exactly agrees with Mr. Hobbes: he is, indeed, far from 
asserting with that writer, that there is nothing good or evil in its own nature, and 
that virtue and vice depend wholly on human authority and laws; this he on all 
occasions strenuously argueth against. But he comes into another part of his 
scheme, the making the magistrate or supreme civil power, the sole judge of 
religious truth and orthodoxy, and resolving all doctrines and opinions in religion, 
and the authority of what shall be accounted holy writ, into the appointment of the 
state, a scheme which absolutely destroyeth the rights of private judgment and 
conscience, and which evidently condemneth the conduct and judgment of Christ 
and his apostles, and the primitive Christians at the first plantation of Christianity, 
and of those excellent men that stood up for the reformation of it since.
16
 
 
Leland accuses Shaftesbury of sharing Hobbes' view that religion is to be 
subordinated to political ends.  As we shall see in Chapter 4, Shaftesbury was undeniably 
familiar with the writings of Hobbes.  A closer look at the Characteristicks, however, 
suggests that Shaftesbury offers a different origin for his policy toward religion.  This 
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alternative, which is identified by Shaftesbury as the "antient policy" toward religion, will 
turn out to be important for understanding Shaftesbury's project as a whole.  To see this, 
however, it is necessary to explain the view Shaftesbury is rejecting. While Shaftesbury 
identifies Hobbes and Locke as a philosophical foes, there is a remarkable amount of 
agreement among these philosophers about the character of Christianity.  I now turn to an 
overview of Hobbes and Locke on Christianity.  This overview allows us to contrast the 
important departure Shaftesbury makes from modern philosophy in his critique of 
religion. 
Religion and the Enlightenment  
  Hobbes’s  Critique of  Christ ianity  
 While there are few subjects treated in the works of Thomas Hobbes that do not 
provoked controversy,  contemporary scholars are especially divided on the question of 
Hobbes' teaching on religion.  According to the prominent Hobbes scholar Howard 
Warrender, for example, Hobbes' Leviathan presents a traditional natural law theory 
which itself presupposes the existence of God.
17
  The claim that Hobbes was a sincere 
Christian has found support more recently in A. P. Martinich's The Two Gods of  
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Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics.
18
  Other scholars--many of whom 
follow the interpretation of Hobbes offered by Leo Strauss-- have challenged this view.
19
  
In my opinion it is difficult to reconcile Hobbes' apparent materialism with the 
view that he is a sincere Christian.  Hobbes scandalized his contemporaries when he 
described "the World" as "Corporeal, that is to say Body…and consequently every part of 
the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe."
20
  
Elsewhere he writes that "the Word Body…signifieth that which filleth, or occupyeth 
some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a 
reall part of that we call the Universe.  For the Universe, being the Aggregate of all 
Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, 
that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe." 
21
  According to 
Hobbes, bodies exist of themselves and are not dependent upon the imagination.  
Contrary to the "sense of common people," there is no part of the universe that is not 
body.  In common speech men falsely lend reality to the supernatural.  This happens in 
part because bodies frequently operate beneath the ability of unaided human senses to 
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detect them.  When men speak of spirits, they actually refer to one of two things:  "either 
a subtile, fluid, and invisible Body, or a Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasme of the 
Imagination."
22
  What seems not to be a possibility, according to Hobbes, is that a 
spiritual being in the sense of something supernatural, that is, something gratuitously 
given to rational beings by God and exempt from the operation of cause and effect, 
appears in the world or directly influences the world.  This is indicated by the sequel to 
this passage. 
Hobbes is quick to observe that there are many metaphorical senses of "spirit."  
As he explains, 
sometimes [spirit] is taken for Disposition or Inclination of the mind; as when for 
the disposition to controwl the sayings of other men, we say, A Spirit 
Contradiction; For A Disposition to Uncleannesse, An Unclean Spirit; for 
Perversenesse, A Froward Spirit; for Sullennesse, A Dumb Spirit, and for 
Inclination To Godlinesse, And Gods Service, the Spirit of God: sometimes for 
any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when 
Great Wisdome is called the Spirit Of Wisdome; and Mad Men are said to be 
Possessed With A Spirit.
23
 
 
Metaphorical speech here presents noticeable phenomena in ghostly language, 
whereas Hobbes suggests that most of these can be explained by reference to the natural 
world.  Common speech reflects the ease with which men will attribute any departure 
from what they take to be the ordinary course of things to a supernatural force; that is, to 
a "phantasme of the imagination."  Wise men are said to be divine; men are said to be 
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possessed when they are actually mad, that is, moved by passion in excess of what is 
normally seen in common life. 
Hobbes' materialism quickly gets us to the essence of his critique of religion.  
Because he rejects the possibility of spiritual agency, Hobbes traces all religious 
experiences to prior physiological facts.  It follows that any revelation is false, for divine 
powers do not--cannot--disclose special knowledge to men.  This means that all claims to 
revelation must reflect delusion or fraudulent intentions on the part of the alleged 
prophet.  It will be useful for our purposes to consider briefly the psychology of religion 
as it is presented by Hobbes.  We will see that Hobbes presents religiosity as a form of 
mental illness.  While it may ultimately have a physical seat, religiosity is for Hobbes a 
social as well as individual phenomenon.  Religiosity is potentially contagious (perhaps 
quite literally in light of the fact that a spirit might betray the action of "a subtile, fluid, 
and invisible Body").  Because many men are vulnerable to the passions of piety, they are 
easily manipulated by others who will use fraudulent appeals to the spiritual world to 
extend their own power.  For Hobbes, ecclesiastical politics emerges from the fact that 
men are prone to superstition.  This becomes apparent in his account of priestcraft.  We 
will also see that Hobbes presents heresy as the rhetorical tool by which Christian 
priestcraft was advanced. 
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  Melancholy and the ps ychological  basis  of  rel igious zeal  in Hobbes  
Hobbesřs explanation of religiosity relies on his account of the passions as forms 
of appetite and aversion.
24
  When a man has an aversion because he expects to be hurt, he 
is said to have the passion of fear; when this aversion is less urgent, he also may be 
experiencing grief.  A common source of grief in men is the opinion of powerlessness.  
This sort of grief is called "dejection of mind."
25
   
Hobbes treats the psychology of religion in a chapter entitled "Of the Vertues commonly 
called INTELLECTUAL; and their contrary DEFECTS."
26
  As it turns out, the passions 
surrounding religion are among the chief contributors to defects of the intellect.  The 
general discussion is presented under a form of "madnesse" known as melancholy.  
According to Hobbes, "stronger and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is 
ordinarily seen in others" is called madness by men.
27
  He explains of madness that 
"sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the evill 
constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and sometimes the hurt, and 
indisposition of the Organs, is caused by vehemence, or continuance of the Passion.  But 
in both cases the Madnesse is of one and the same nature."
28
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Melancholy is a form of madness whereby "dejection, subjects a man to causeless 
fears."
29
  Dejection, we know, is grief arising from an opinion of powerlessness.  One 
prominent symptom of melancholia is superstition.  Sometimes a man will come to hold 
"an opinion of being inspired."  While inspiration is hard to spot in one person, the 
opinion shows itself in groups:  "when many of them conspire together, the Rage of the 
whole multitude is visible enough." In other words, the opinion of inspiration has 
political consequences because it often issues in clamorous, seditious behavior.  While it 
ultimately has a physical seat, then, religiosity is for Hobbes a social as well as individual 
phenomenon.  Religiosity is potentially contagious--perhaps quite literally in light of the 
fact that a spirit might betray the action of "a subtile, fluid, and invisible Body."  Even 
when no action comes of such melancholia, the very opinion of being inspired is for 
Hobbes sufficient evidence of madness.  He proposes that "if some man in Bedlam 
should entertain you with sober discourse, and you desire in taking leave, to know what 
he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were 
God the Father; I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his 
Madnesse."
 30
 
This opinion of being inspired or having "private spirit" often begins when a man 
notices a common error in others but fails to notice how he came to understand the error 
for what it is.  (We should say, rather, for what he thinks it is, because he himself may 
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well be mistaken either about the error or his own preferred account!)  The man attributes 
his purported insight to a special grace from God.  Hobbes identifies such opinions as 
madness because of their similarity to the excess passion seen in drunkards--sober men, 
he remarks, are rarely willing to own to such passions.  To put a finer point on the matter, 
the origin of the idea of inspiration seems to be ignorance.  Indeed, weřll soon see that 
credulity in man is directly connected to his ignorance.  It seems fair to say that Hobbes 
presents religiosity as a phenomenon arising from fear, more specifically that fear known 
as dejection of mind arising from an opinion of powerlessness.  Weakness inclines men 
toward superstition and over time may even drive them mad. 
Hobbes identifies two explanations for madness common both in ancient times 
and later.  Sometimes madness is attributed to the natural workings of the passions; at 
other times madness is attributed to supernatural "Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or 
bad."
31
  Men who are mad by virtue of the passions are simply mad.  The inspired mad 
are known by a variety of names, for example "daemoniacks."
32
   
Ancient peoples, Gentile and Jew, tended to attribute madness to spirits.  The 
Jews, he tells us, called madmen "prophets," even when they could be explained by 
natural passions.  Hobbes remarks that Greeks and Romans naturally blamed all sorts of 
things to spirits, but such an explanation is surprising in the Jews because "neither Moses, 
nor Abraham pretended to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voice of 
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God."  Nor did the laws they gave indicate a belief in "any such Enthusiasme; or any 
Possession."
33
  For that matter, "neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament 
pretend Enthusiasme."   
Hobbes explains the confusion of the Jewish people by their "want of curiosity to 
search naturall causes."  Given their ignorance, when something seemed unusual in the 
operation of a manřs mind, "they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it 
be, but that either God or the Divell is in him?"  (Lest we attribute the opinion of Hobbes 
to anti-Semitism, it should be mentioned that Hobbes points to an exception among the 
Jews:  the Sadducees did not themselves believe in spirits.  According to Hobbes, such 
lack of belief "is very neere to direct Atheism."  One wonders whether this remark 
implies something about his own theism.
 34
) 
Hobbes concedes that the New Testament seems at times to agree with the view 
held by the more vulgar Gentiles and Jews on this matter, but when "our Saviour" speaks 
of unclean spirits, "it is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little 
endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven 
times worse than he was."  Indeed, says Hobbes, "I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that 
requireth a beliefe, that Daemonicks were any other thing but Mad-men."
35
 
Hobbes next reminds his readers of another sort of madness, whereby men speak 
nonsense through the misapplication of words.  Such word-abuse is called "absurdity," 
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which he described earlier in the chapter "Of Reason, and Science."  With absurdity, the 
possibility of making sense of words and the ideas they are supposed to convey is 
"unconceivable."
36
  This sort of madness requires education of a refined sort, and in 
general is the product of "the Schoole-men" and "abstruse Philosophy."  Common men 
do not speak absurdly until they are confused by philosophers.  Some men fall into 
absurdity through "misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by 
rote;" others, however, willingly practice absurdity "from the intention to deceive others 
by obscurity."
37
  What can one say, Hobbes wonders, about theologians who speak of 
"transubstantiation" and "free will"?  "When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are 
they not Mad, or intend to make others so?"  For Hobbes absurd speech is an acquired, 
artificial sort of madness.  Madmen go mad themselves because of a variety of possible 
defects, but some madness is an affliction traceable to the desire of some men to lord it 
over others. 
Hobbes famously defines religion as a "fear of power invisible, or imagined from 
tales publiquely allowed; not allowed, Superstition.  And when the power imagined is 
truly such as we imagine, True Religion.
38
  The psychology of religiosity has prepared us 
to consider religion in its more political manifestation.  To round out our own 
consideration of religion and superstition in Hobbes we must turn to chapter 12, "Of 
Religion."  Here we will begin to see what Hobbes means when he distinguishes 
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publically allowed tales from proscribed tales.  (The question of their truth is not our 
concern at the moment.) 
Hobbes reminds his readers of a point made earlier in the book (again, in the 
chapter on science), that "it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into the 
Causes of Events they see," and especially so when an individualřs own fortune is 
involved.  So powerful is this curiosity, that "when he cannot assure himself of the true 
causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,) 
he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the 
Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself."
39
  
Manřs ability to foresee his own suffering in pain, scarcity, and death, gives him little rest 
from anxiety about the future.  Hobbes speculates that it is for this reason "that some of 
the old Poets said, that the Gods were first created by human feare."  (He may well have 
Lucretius in mind here.
40
)  Monotheism, he suggests, is more philosophic insofar as it is 
born from a persistent desire to know the causes of things.  It leads the mind ever 
backward to some, "first, and an eternall cause of all things, which is that which men 
mean by the name of God:  And all this without thought of their fortune, the solicitude 
whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other 
things."
41
  This cause is so remote it can barely be understood as material.  It is a short 
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intellectual movement from this opinion to the suspicion that man, too, has a cause which 
is not manifest to the senses.  Since invisible causes must, generally speaking, be 
inferred, manřs mind is led to other sorts of invisible causes and the desire to 
prognosticate and predict their effects.  Given that man is primarily interested in his own 
fortunes, he will be led almost naturally to honor and worship "powers invisible." 
Hobbes, then, partly explains religion through his account of its "natural seeds."  
Since the fancies and passions of men vary by place and time, a variety of religions arise, 
such that the ceremonies "used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another."
42
  
Religious rites are most often the conventions of societies, existing "according to their 
own invention," although Hobbes says that some developed "by Gods [sic] 
commandment, and direction."   
Men are not indifferent to the origin of their sacred laws.  According to Hobbes, 
those religions which are due to the invention of men, are part of "humane Politiques," 
handed down to make men "more apt to Obedience, Laws, Peace, Charity, and civill 
Society."
43
  This sort of religion is given by "the founders of Commonwealths, and the 
Law-Givers of the Gentiles."  The latter sort of religion--that given by the command and 
direction of God--is of "Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been 
derived unto us the Lawes of the Kingdom of God."
44
  Among the Gentiles, there are few 
things which have not been worshiped in one place or another, or attributed occult 
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qualities by their poets.  The world taken as a whole was "chaos"; natural forces and 
passions were regularly personified; each man was assumed to have his own "genius."  
The Gentiles "invoked also their own Wit, by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance, 
by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the name of Cupid," and indeed, there was no 
end to their poetic invention.  Such inventions served to explain things about which the 
causes were remote and unseen. 
The Gentiles developed "sciences" of divination such as "necromancy, conjuring, 
and witchcraft," "theomancy," and "judiciary astrology" out of their hopes to discern and 
control the future.  Hoping for such insights they would look for revelations from 
prognosticators of all sorts:  "sometimes in the insignificant speeches of mad-men, 
supposed to be possessed with a divine Spirit; which possession they called 
Enthusiasm."
45
  In short, because of their fear and ignorance, and misled by the poets and 
charlatans, men were led to believe many improbable things. 
Such religious beliefs were not without their utility, of course.  Hobbes observes 
that 
the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst the Gentiles, 
whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, had in all 
places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts 
which they gave concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their 
own device. . .Secondly. . .to make it believed, that the same things were 
displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes.  Thirdly, to 
prescribe Ceremonies.
46
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These prescriptions are clear examples of publically allowed tales.  This usage is 
deceptive but not necessarily coercive.  Hobbes points out that among the Romans, "men 
were not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures 
after this life."  Indeed, men "of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their 
Harangues openly derided" such beliefs about the gods as vulgar superstition.
47
  
Nevertheless, the belief of rewards and punishments in the afterlife was a cherished (and 
of course, useful) view.  Since "the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy," 
they were inclined toward toleration.  Hobbes writes, 
the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known World, made 
no scruple of tolerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of Rome it-self; 
unless it had something in it, that could not consist with their Civill Government; 
nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jewes; who 
(being the peculiar Kingdom of God) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge 
subjection to any mortall King or State whatsoever.
48
 
 
Regarding his natural account of the origin of religion, then, Hobbes offers the 
following summary:  "from the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand the 
causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only an 
opinion of the Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernaturall; that can never be so 
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abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may againe be made to spring out 
of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purposes are in reputation."
49
   
 One might wonder whether or not Hobbes truly regards religion as ineradicable, 
for much of the first part of Leviathan is dedicated to articulating a scientific method 
whereby certain knowledge of cause and effect can be established.
50
  One can imagine 
interest in judicial astrology waning insofar as other accounts of cause and effect come to 
be accepted.  So too, dejection of mind would become less common as nature becomes 
less mysterious--that is, as nature comes to be mastered through careful anticipation of 
effects.  As for the sincere fascination held by some for "the doctrine of Aristotle," 
Hobbes may well hope that his clearer science will offer an attractive and superior 
alternative.  (After all, pure curiosity about the "First, and an Eternall cause of all things" 
has been, according to Hobbes, fruitless and vain:  natural philosophy in the ancient 
schools "was rather a Dream than Science.")
 51
   
In order for a religion to become established, the multitude must have confidence 
that its founder is a man of good will, holiness, and superior wisdom.  These attributes 
are taken by people to be the signs of supernatural grace.  (These attributes seem to fall 
under the metaphorical usage of spirit we encountered earlier.)  Over time, however, the 
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government of religion, which must be administered by men of a more ordinary sort, will 
find its wisdom, sincerity, or love in doubt.  Without the "feare of the Civill Sword" at its 
disposal, a religion will eventually be "contradicted and rejected."
52
  Incoherencies in its 
theology, scandalous behavior of its adherents, and suspicion of motives all contribute to 
the erosion of respect.  This natural decay is not restricted to ancient Gentile religion, for 
it has a common source.  Hobbes remarks, "I may attribute all the changes of Religion in 
the world, to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests; and those not onely 
amongst Catholiques, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of 
Reformation."
53
  The concern over eroding esteem seems to contradict the earlier claim 
that men of authority had been able to deride religion openly "in their Harangues."  If 
magistrates introduce religion to reinforce public order, how could they indulge the few 
in their contemptuous opinions?  If religion can be described as civil religion, how did it 
become such a problem for the political community? 
To answer these questions we must consider the role heresy and priestcraft play 
Hobbesř critique.  We will first look to a work entitled A Dialogue between a 
Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England.
54
  In that dialogue the origin 
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and development of the idea of heresy is explained.  (A very similar account is present in 
Behemoth as well.
55
)  Heresy reveals the possible consequences of absurd speech. 
We have seen Hobbes distinguish religions given by men to other men "according 
to their own invention" from the religions given "by Gods commandment, and direction."  
We have also seen that the Roman magistrate did not tolerate a religion that refuses to 
subject itself "to any mortall King or State whatsoever."  The origin of rivalry between 
the State and religion can be explained by the political history of priesthood.  Hobbes 
presents an historical account of what later thinkers will call "priestcraft" in several 
places.  We will consider a brief catalogue of historical priesthoods presented in 
Behemoth: The History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England, and of the Counsels 
and Artifices by Which They Were Carried on from the Year 1640 to the Year 1660.
56
  
We will be then in a position to see the extent to which Shaftesburyřs account of 
Christianity is harmonious with the general "Enlightenment." 
  Hobbes on the development of  heresy  
In the course of their conversation in A Dialogue, two characters known only as 
the Philosopher and the Lawyer come to discuss heresy.
57
 According to the lawyer, under 
Henry IV the law laid down heresy "as preaching or writing of such doctrine as is 
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contrary to the determination of Holy Church."  The philosopher is quick to point out that 
what is taken for the Church changed considerably between the reigns of Henry IV (when 
the Roman Church was Holy) and Queen Elizabeth (when an independent Church of 
England ruled).  The philosopher comes to his assistance by offering a definition of 
heresy which avoids the problem of historical shifts in the Church:  "I say, heresy is a 
singularity of doctrine or opinion contrary to the doctrine of another man, or men; and the 
word properly signifies the doctrine of a sect, which doctrine is taken upon trust of some 
man of reputation for wisdom, that was the first author of the same."
58
  The philosopher 
moves from the lawyerřs definition in terms of orthodoxy as understood by the magistrate 
to a definition in terms of opinion.  Opinions vary from man to man and from group to 
group.  Indeed, we see in the course of the dialogue that the philosopher hopes to show 
the political consequences of this insight.  The philosopherřs definition is agnostic on 
whether a particular opinion is true--it may or may not be right (ortho— ) ).  Either way, 
orthodoxy remains an opinion (that is, doxa) rather than knowledge.  The philosopher 
immediately indicates that the acceptance of an opinion rests on the trust in one "of 
reputation for wisdom" who, as it happens, is "the first author of the same."  What, then, 
is the basis of this trust?  As we shall see, trust is connected to authority. 
The philosopher explains to the lawyer that the word heresy originally belonged 
to the ancient Greeks.
59
  In the days before Alexander, Greece was home to "many 
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excellent wits, that employed their time in search of the truth in all manner of sciences 
worthy of their honour."
60
  These classical "authors" and "wits"--namely "Pythagoras, 
Plato, Zeno, Epicurus and Aristotle"-- did not pursue philosophy for the sake of material 
gain.  We learn that they "did not get their bread by their philosophy, but were able to 
live of their own."  Still, the philosopher slyly suggests that their "deep and laborious 
meditation" was not without its rewards.  As a consequence of their work these authors 
were "in honour with princes and other great personages."  Indeed, they published their 
writings "to great honour and applause."  While these great philosophers were free from 
necessity, the philosopher consistently calls attention to their attachment to honor.  (One 
wonders whether Hobbes believes that there is even such a thing as the disinterested love 
of truth.)  As wise as philosophers were, they disagreed with each other in "their 
doctrine."  Over time, the men who followed various philosophical doctrines came to be 
known as Pythagoreans, Academics, Epicureans, or Peripatetics.  These are examples of 
"heresy" for the Greeks, "which signifies no more but taking of an opinion."
61
 
Since philosophy was "so much in fashion," men of wealth and repute sought out 
philosophers to educate their children.  The trade of educator was soon recognized to be 
very profitable, and it "suggested to many idle and needy fellows an easy and 
compendious way of maintenance, which was to teach the philosophy, some of Plato, 
some of Aristotle, &c:  whose books to that end they read over, but without capacity or 
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much endeavor to examine the reasons of their doctrines, taking only the conclusions, as 
they lay."
62
  We can see from this account that the reasoned opinions of philosophers 
were soon transmitted to others by foolish professors of philosophy.  Since the opinions 
were not accompanied by understanding they must have been accepted on trust.  The 
competition for students and gainful employment encouraged nastiness in these 
philosophy professors, yet as each was a "chooser" of a particular doctrine, the word 
"haereticus" was not regarded as a term of reproach. 
 The various schools maintained themselves in Greece and eventually made their 
way to Rome.  As luck would have it, the disagreement between schools reached its 
height "in the times of the apostles and in the primitive Church."
63
  While the doctrines of 
Plato and Aristotle were still esteemed, other schools found themselves in lesser demand. 
After the death of "our Saviour," the Apostles carried the Gospel around the 
world, "especially in Asia the Less, in Greece, and Italy, where they constituted many 
Churches."  The Apostles left behind bishops to "teach and direct" converts "by setting 
forth the life and miracles of our Saviour, as they had received them from the writings of 
the apostles and evangelists."  The bishops were neither expected nor asked to instruct the 
converts in philosophy, yet former heathens entered the priesthood of the Church from 
"all professions and dispositions," including the academic life.  As the philosopher 
explains, 
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some that had never thought of philosophy at all, but were intent upon their 
fortunes or their pleasures; and some that had a greater, some a less use of reason; 
and some that had studied philosophy, but professed it not, which were commonly 
the men of the better rank; and some had professed it only for their better 
abstinence, and had it not farther than readily to talk and wrangle; and some were 
Christians in good earnest, and others but counterfeit, intending to make use of 
the charity of those that were sincere Christians, which in those times was very 
great.
64
 
 
The philosopher draws our attention to the variety of motives and abilities among the 
converts.  Fortune and pleasure were common motives; and while some men had a 
sincere belief (perhaps those with "a less use of reason," in Hobbesřs view?) others a had 
nothing more than a desire to milk sincere Christians for charitable support. 
Those who were able to "make the best use of Aristotleřs rhetoric and logic" 
became priests and bishops.  Those who were proudest of their knowledge of Plato and 
Aristotle were "prone to innovation" because they wanted to advance their reputation by 
bending scripture to their philosophical doctrines.  It is here that "heresy, amongst the 
Christians, first came to be a reproach."
65
  Men eventually became so quarrelsome that 
Councils of local bishops would meet to resolve disputes.  They would issue authoritative 
decrees, calling themselves "Catholic" and those who refused to abandon their 
philosophic sects "heretics." 
The Catholic Church was now officially declaring which doctrines were orthodox 
and which heresy but as their decrees lacked the force of law disputes continued.  This 
changed under "the first Christian Emperor," Constantine.  A theological dispute arose 
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among the bishops around the opinions of Arius of Alexandria that provoked "sedition 
and much bloodshed both of citizens and soldiers of that city."
66
  In order to restore order 
and prevent future sedition, Constantine himself called a council of bishops, promising 
that "whatsoever they agreed on he would cause to be observed."  The council 
temporarily succeeded in having Arius banished.  While he was restored to grace by the 
Emperor by promising future obedience, Arius "died before he could repossess his 
benefice."
67
  The philosopher seems to suggest that it is easier to recover state of spiritual 
grace than it is to recover property; both seem to be the purview of the magistrate.  
Clearly Hobbes intends for us to investigate the worldly motives of the Church in 
identifying heretics.  As for the motives of Constantine we learn that "the Emperor 
caused this confession to be made, not for the regard of truth of doctrine, but for the 
preserving of the peace, especially among his Christian soldiers, by whose valour he had 
gotten the empire, and by the same was to preserve it."
68
 
Over time, the relatively mild punishment of banishment was stiffened and heresy 
became a capital crime under imperial law.  We learn that that the papacy grew in power 
such that it eventually commanded obedience from emperors.  "The Popes from time to 
time made heresies of many other points of doctrine (as they saw it conduce to the setting 
up of the chair above the throne)."  While the magistrate first used the Church for his 
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purposes, soon the Church was using him for its own.  Apparently this precedent 
continued for some time, for the conversation abruptly returns to the subject of common 
law under Henry IV.  Under Henry, the law added the penalty of "forfeiture of lands and 
goods" to the burning of heretics by the magistrate.  The monarchs of England were wont 
to shift and modify the laws concerning religion and by the time of Edward VI "not only 
all punishments of heresy were taken away, but also the nature of it was changed to what 
it originally was, a private opinion."
69
   
Hobbes makes it clear in Behemoth that problems persisted into the English 
Revolutions.  Even though the monarchs of England, beginning with Henry VIII, are able 
to reassert the sovereignty of the magistrate over that of the Church, Christianity 
remained the source of political conflict.  The problem of seditious opinions which 
seemed to have been corrected once the Church of Rome had ascendency, reemerge with 
the Protestant Reformation.  To see this we must turn to consider the account of 
priestcraft as Hobbes presents it in Behemoth. 
  Priests  and Presbyterians  
In Part 1 of Behemoth, Speaker ŘAř offers an epitome of the English Civil wars.  
In 1640, England was governed under the monarchy of Charles I, whose rule might have 
been expected to be stable as he was king by a 600 year old lineage.  But Charles  
inherited a kingdom of people who had been corrupted by a variety of seducers.  ŘAř 
identifies seven groups of seducers but we will only consider the first four. 
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The first three sorts of seducers were religious sects.  First and most numerous 
were the Presbyterian ministers:  "ministers, as they called themselves, of Christ; and 
sometimes, in their sermons to the people, Godřs ambassadors; pretending to have a right 
from God to govern every one his parish, and their assembly the whole nation."
70
  Second 
but still substantial were "Papists," this "notwithstanding that the Popeřs power in 
England, both temporal and ecclesiastical, had been by Act of Parliament abolished."  
Third were a collection of other sects, born partly in the wake of the troubles between the 
first two sorts:  Independents, Anabaptists, Fifth-monarchy-men, Quakers, Adamites, and 
others too numerous for ŘAř to recall the doctrinal differences.  As ŘAř summarizes, 
"these were the enemies which arose against his Majesty from the private interpretation 
of the Scripture, exposed to every manřs scanning in his mother-tongue."71  The fourth 
sort are not inspired by religious motives.  They are glory-lovers and seekers of honor 
who have received a classical education:  Ŗthere were an exceeding great number of men 
of the better sort, that had been so educated, as that in their youth having read the books 
written by famous men of the ancient Grecian and Roman commonwealths concerning 
their polity and great actions; in which books the popular government was extolled by 
that glorious name of liberty, and monarchy disgraced by the name of tyranny; they 
became thereby in love with their forms of government.ŗ72 
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We can see in these four kinds of seducers the two overriding political concerns 
which led Hobbes to construct his political theory, that is, religious factionalism and the 
love of glory.  Both of these problems are manifestations of pride as he defines it in 
Leviathan and they are consequences of pernicious but authoritative opinions.  Later in 
the conversation presented by in Behemoth, Hobbes explores the way in which 
philosophy, political ambition, and pretentions to divine inspiration have colluded in the 
past.  In the course of the account of the revolt of the Presbyterians, ŘAř remarks that the 
ministers envisioned a constitution where they could "have the delight of sharing the 
government, and consequently of being able to be revenged on them that do not admire 
their learning and help to fill their purses, and win to their service them that do."
73
  
In the course of the conversation ŘBř expresses worry about a commonwealth 
divided between two factions, wherein "their quarrels should be only about opinions, that 
is, about who has the most learning; as if their learning ought to be the rule of governing 
all the world."  While they call it learning in divine matters, ŘBř sees only philosophical 
disputes at work.  ŘAř replies that some of them do in fact "give themselves out for 
prophets by extraordinary inspiration."  Most, however, boast of their greater skill in 
reading and interpreting Scripture "by reason of their breeding in the Universities, and 
knowledge there gotten of the Latin tongue, and some also of the Greek and Hebrew 
tongues, wherein the Scripture was written; besides their knowledge of natural 
philosophy, which is their publically taught."  Philosophy and the divine studies have 
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"conduced to the advancement of the professors thereof to places of the greatest 
authority, next to the authority of kings themselves, in most of the ancient kingdoms of 
the world."
74
  
In the account that follows, ŘAř offers historical evidence for this claim, citing the 
historians of antiquity.  The Druids of Brittany and France, he reports, had among them 
"philosophers and theologians, that [were] exceedingly honoured, whom they also [used] 
as prophets."  These men had the multitude obedient to them because of their skills at 
augury.  The Magi of Persia were philosophers and astrologers, and were taken by 
Christians to be kings.
75
  In Egypt, perhaps the oldest nation, "priests had the greatest 
power in civil affairs, that any subjects ever had in any nation."  Their priesthood 
employed many priests at the sacrifices to the Gods, and they would "leave the same 
employment to their posterity, which, next to the King, have the greatest power and 
authority."
76
  The power of the Egyptian priesthood extended to the courts, and the 
"chief-justice" would wear a necklace with a jewel called "truth."  Such was the 
"power…acquired in civil matters by the conjecture of philosophy and divinity."77 
ŘAř remarks that just as the Egyptians, so too the Jews established a priesthood by 
family right.  Among the Assyrians and Chaldeans, the priests were also a political sect, 
and their priesthood was also heritable.  Quoting Diodorus Siculus, ŘAř says of the 
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Chaldeans that they were "like to that of the Egyptian priests; for being ordained for the 
service of the Gods, they spend the whole time of their life in philosophy; being of 
exceeding great reputation in astrology, and pretending much also to prophesy..and to 
find out by certain incantations the preventing of harm, and the bringing to pass of good."  
Similar observations are made about India and Æthiopia.
78
  
We learn that in the earlier days, Kings did not obey priests "as mastered by force 
and arms, but as having their reason mastered by superstition."
79
  Yet in this history, one 
example stands out.  'A' relates that "in the time of Ptolemy II, Ergamenes, King of the 
Æthiopians, having had his breeding in philosophy after the manner of the Greeks, being 
the first that durst dispute their power, took heart as befitted a King; came with soldiers to 
a place called Abaton, where was then the golden temple of the Æthiopians; killed all the 
priests, abolished the custom, and rectified the kingdom according to his will."
80
   
 The account of priestcraft in Hobbes is meant to show the dire political 
consequences of religious sectarianism.  In light of the fact that priests wield their power 
not through strength of arms but through the power of superstition, it is significant that 
Ergamenes had studied Greek philosophy.  Ergamenes evidently does not hold the 
priesthood of the Æthiopians as sacred; presumably philosophy has freed him from such 
superstition and allowed him to restore the sovereignty of the state.  Yet Hobbes takes 
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Greek philosophy to be a problem in itself, especially insofar as it encourages young men 
to undertake violent actions in the name of liberty.  He does not himself look to restore 
the ancient policy of religion by recommitting to the classical understanding of 
philosophy. 
 A consideration of Locke's critique of Christianity is necessary in order to 
evaluate Shaftesbury's claim that modernity is to be understood as a project undertaken 
by philosophers.  As it turns out, the account of Christianity offered by Hobbes finds a 
striking parallel in the writings of John Locke.  Lockeřs account is complicated in itself 
and a proper evaluation would consider his entire work; yet one can see in Locke the 
three concerns identified above.  A psychological account of religiosity can be seen 
clearly in the account "Of Enthusiasm," which Locke added to the fourth edition of his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
81
  On the basis of this psychological account 
of enthusiasm, Locke is able to present a largely political account of Christianity.  A 
close analysis of his Letter concerning Toleration and Reasonableness of Christianity, 
not to mention the whole of Part IV of the Essay, is beyond the scope of this chapter.  For 
our purposes it is enough to consider also two essays from Lockeřs common-place books 
which were unpublished during his lifetime.  The concern over heresy can be seen in a 
little essay entitled "Error."  The concern over priestcraft can be seen in an essay entitled 
"Sacerdos."   
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  Enthusiasm and the psychological  basis  of  zeal  in Locke  
As the groundbreaking studies of Ronald Knox and Susie Tucker have shown, 
enthusiasm enters English as a theological term of art but by Lockeřs day becomes a term 
of abuse.
82
  In the words of Jan Goldstein, "Řenthusiasmř functioned in the eighteenth 
century as a powerful term of opprobrium.  It conjured up everything antithetical to, and 
rejected by, enlightened rationality."
83
 
From the pen of a believer the term tried to distinguish false claims of divine 
revelation from true revelation; in the hands of a non-believer it was a term of scorn for 
revelation as such; either way, it had become a term with a negative valence.  While 
Shaftesbury played an important role in shifting the meaning closer to our contemporary 
understanding (a word with a generally positive valence suggesting eagerness), Lockeřs 
account in the Essay concerning Human Understanding clearly shows that he shares the 
pejorative use. 
When considering what constitutes genuine evidence in support of an opinion, 
Locke writes that "whatsoever credit or authority we give to any proposition more than it 
receives from the principles and proofs it supports itself upon, is owing to our 
inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation from the love of truth as such; which, as 
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it can receive no evidence from our passions or interests, so it should receive no tincture 
from them."
84
 
With this in mind, Locke considers a "ground of assent" called enthusiasm, which 
some men would claim has the authority of (genuine) faith or reason; and which, "laying 
by reason, would set up revelation without it."  The consequence of enthusiasm is that it 
"substitutes in the room of [reason and revelation] the ungrounded fancies of a manřs 
own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct."
85
 
According to Locke, it is much harder for a person to reason about something, or 
strive for authentic revelation--which is also a sort of reasoning as he defines it, that is, 
"natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God 
immediately"--than it is "to pretend to revelation."  Such pretentions to revelation have 
been found in all ages in men "whom melancholy has mixed with devotion, or those 
whose conceit of themselves has raised them into an opinion of a greater familiarity with 
God, and nearer admittance to his favour, than is afforded to others."
86
 
Such melancholic spirits are ripe to accept whatever opinion is offered to their 
fancies.  Enthusiasm is a sort of delusion which comes to men apart from reason, "rising 
from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain."  It is an especially tenacious weed 
in a manřs soul, because it is "freed from all restraint of reason and check of revelation," 
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and worse, "it is heightened into a divine authority, in concurrence with our own temper 
and inclination."
87
  Locke writes that enthusiasm "is nothing but an ignis fatuus, that 
leads them constantly round in this circle; It is a revelation because they firmly believe it; 
and they believe it, because it is a revelation."
88
 
It is against this formulation that Shaftesbury's own account of enthusiasm takes 
shape.  Locke's psychological account of enthusiasm prepares the way for a more specific 
critique of Christianity. 
  Heresy in Locke 
In his essay "Error," Locke writes that "the great division among Christians is 
about opinions.  Every sect has its set of them, and that is called Orthodoxy; and he who 
professes his assent to them, though with an implicit faith, and without examining, he is 
orthodox and in the way to salvation."
89
  Unfortunately, however, this concern for right 
opinion is inseparable from a disdain for wrong opinion.  Locke continues:  "but if he 
examines, and thereupon questions any of them, he is presently suspected of heresy, and 
if he oppose them or hold the contrary, he is presently condemned as in a damnable error, 
and in the sure way to perdition."   
Like Hobbes before him, Locke denies that this demand to adhere to orthodoxy is 
a requirement of Christ; it is rather a later innovation made by the Church.  So attached to 
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the particular dogma and articles of faith are the various sects in Christendom that Locke 
remarks, "opinions are preferred to life, and orthodoxy is that which they are concerned 
for, not morals."
90
 
A similar account of heresy can be found in Of the Conduct of the 
Understanding.
91
 In section 34, entitled "Indifferency," Locke argues that menřs opinions 
should always follow clear evidence.  "In any other way but this," he writes, 
all the world are born to orthodoxy; they imbibe at first the allowed opinions of 
their country and party, and so never questioning their truth, not one of an 
hundred ever examines. They are applauded for presuming they are in the right. 
He that considers is a foe to orthodoxy, because possibly he may deviate from 
some of the received doctrines there. And thus men, without any industry or 
acquisition of their own, inherit local truths (for it is not the same every where) 
and are inured to assent without evidence. This influences farther than is thought; 
for what one of an hundred of the zealous bigots in all parties, ever examined the 
tenets he is so stiff in; or ever thought it his business or duty so to do?
92
 
 
Unfortunately for political life, however, men are not likely to examine the evidence for 
and the sources of their opinions.  This leaves men vulnerable to those who would 
manipulate opinions for their own advantage. 
In Christendom, Locke argues, the priesthood did just that.  In The 
Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke writes that priests have conspired to keep men 
from gaining true knowledge of God. 
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in this state of darkness and ignorance of the true God, vice and superstition held 
the world. Nor could any help be had, or hoped for, from reason; which could not 
be heard, and was judged to have nothing to do in the case; priests, everywhere, to 
secure their empire, having excluded reason from having any thing to do in 
religion…The rational and thinking part of mankind, it is true, when they sought 
after him, they found the one supreme, invisible God; but if they acknowledged 
and worshipped him, it was only in their own minds. They kept this truth locked 
up in their own breasts as a secret, nor ever durst venture it amongst the people; 
much less amongst the priests, those wary guardians, of their own creeds and 
profitable inventions. Hence we see, that reason, speaking ever so clearly to the 
wise and virtuous, had never authority enough to prevail on the multitude.
93
 
 
Concealing oneřs true thoughts on such matters became necessary as a result of 
the persecution which followed the demand for orthodoxy.  As this passage suggests, 
Locke tends to trace the promulgation of such pernicious opinion to the power of the 
priesthood.  Locke explains these views at greater length in an essay entitled "Sacerdos." 
  Priestcraft  in Locke  
We have already remarked that in the enlightenment account, heresy is not an 
original concern of what might be called "primitive" Christianity; it is, rather, a later 
innovation of the Church, articulated with the intention of exerting control over the lives 
of men.  As Locke explains it in his essay "Sacerdos," there were in antiquity two sorts of 
teachers:  priests and philosophers.  Priests were responsible for "the arts of propitiation 
and atonement;" they were the official mediators between men and the gods and they 
concerned themselves with the traditional religious ceremonies and rites.  Philosophers, on 
the other hand, "meddled not with the public religion, worship, or ceremonies, but left 
them entirely to the priests, as priests left the instruction of men in natural and moral 
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knowledge wholly to the philosophers."94  These two sorts of teachers appealed to 
different authorities, philosophers to reason and priests to revelation, and neither sort 
showed much interest in the authorities of the other.  Locke draws here a division between 
piety and true morality, which may or may not be found among the pious. 
According to Locke, pagan religion was concerned not with right opinion but with 
right action.  He writes in Reasonableness of Christianity that in antiquity "all men, 
indeed, under pain of displeasing the gods, were to frequent the temples: every one went 
to their sacrifices and services: but the priests made it not their business to teach them 
virtue. If they were diligent in their observations and ceremonies; punctual in their feasts 
and solemnities, and the tricks of religion; the holy tribe assured them the gods were 
pleased, and they looked no farther."95 
Such practices were less demanding than the practice of virtue; a quick sacrifice 
would suffice to clear a guilty conscience.96  Contrary to the understanding which 
developed in the wake of Christianity, "religion was everywhere distinguished from, and 
preferred to virtue; and…it was dangerous heresy and profaneness to think the contrary."  
Pagan religion was interested only in practice, and the magistrate took a special interest 
in religion for political reasons: 
                                                 
94
 Locke, King's Life and Letters of Locke, 286. 
95
 John Locke, "The Reasonableness of Christianity," in The Works of John Locke, in Nine Volumes 
(London,: Printed for C. and J. Rivington [etc.], 1824), 6:138-39. 
96
 (Perhaps.  I suspect Platořs account of Cephalus is closer to the truth here.) 
  138 
 
 
 
 
so much virtue as was necessary to hold societies together, and to contribute to 
the quiet of governments, the civil laws of commonwealths taught, and forced 
upon men that lived under magistrates. But these laws being for the most part 
made by such, who had no other aims but their own power, reached no farther 
than those things that would serve to tie men together in subjection; or at most 
were directly to conduce to the prosperity and temporal happiness of any 
people.97 
 
Little by little, this policy changed with the spread and growing influence of 
Christianity.  According to Locke, Jesus Christ himself "reunited these two again, religion 
and morality, as inseparable parts of the worship of God."98  This is not the good news 
one might have suspected.  In the wake of this reunion, 
the ministers of it, who also called themselves priests, have assumed to 
themselves the parts both of the heathen priests and philosophers, and claim a 
right not only to perform all the outward acts of the Christian religion in public, 
and to regulate the ceremonies to be used there, but also to teach men their duties 
of morality towards one another and towards themselves, and to prescribe to them 
in the conduct of their lives.99 
 
Locke famously argues that the magistrate should not interfere in those religious 
matters "indifferent in the commonwealth under his jurisdiction," where he is not himself 
a professor.100  He may, of course, "forbid such things as may tend to the disturbance of 
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the peace of the commonwealth to be done by any of his people, whether they esteem 
them civil or religious.  This is his proper business."  It is not proper, however, to enforce 
a set of opinions without such disruptive consequences.  Absent such a concern, it would 
be a matter of "the greatest tyranny, to prescribe him a way of worship."  So unreasonable 
and tyrannical was this practice that "we find scarce any attempt toward it by the 
magistrates in the several societies of mankind till Christianity was well grown up in the 
world, and was become a national religion."  After that, Locke writes, "it hath been the 
cause of more disorders, tumults, and bloodshed, than all other causes put together."101 
This is a remarkably strong claim for the usually temperate Locke and one might 
mistake it as powerful evidence against Christianity itself.  The blame for such disorder, 
however, cannot be laid at the foot of the Cross per se: 
Antichrist has sown those tares in the field of the Church, the rise whereof hath 
been only hence, that the clergy, by degrees, as Christianity spread, affecting 
dominion, laid claim to a priesthood, derived by succession from Christ, and so 
independent of civil power, receiving (as they pretend) by the imposition of 
hands, and some other ceremonies agreed (but only variously) by the priesthoods 
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of several factions, an indelible character, particular sanctity, and a power 
immediately from Heaven to do several things which are not lawful to be done by 
other men.102 
 
Locke goes on to identify three aspects of the political character and consequences of this 
priestcraft:  "1
st
, To teach opinions concerning God, a future state, and ways of worship.  
2
nd
, To do and perform themselves certain rites exclusive of others.  3
rd
, To punish 
dissenters from their doctrines and rules."103  These privileges obviously provided the 
priesthood immense influence over the political affairs of men.  While not generally 
claiming for themselves the right of theocracy, the priesthood nevertheless "pressed, as a 
duty on the magistrate, to punish and persecute those whom they disliked and declared 
against."
104
  In short, the priest would excommunicate and the magistrate would be 
expected to execute the heretic.  The practical fruit of such an arrangement was 
instability, persecution, and warfare.  Locke writes, "that ordination, that begins in 
priesthood, if it be let alone, will certainly grow up to absolute empire." 
Lest one think that the Protestant Reformation solved this difficulty, however, 
Locke ends with this observation:  "The Popedom hath been a large and lasting instance 
of this.  And what Presbytery could do, even in its infancy when it had a little humbled 
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the magistrates, let Scotland show."
105
  This is parallel, of course, to the influence of 
Presbyterian ministers in Hobbesřs Behemoth. 
 According to Shaftesbury, both Hobbes and Locke undertake a radical project to 
rid common life of superstitious opinions by adopting a radical skepticism toward 
opinion as such.  Shaftesbury regarded this attack on common opinion as an attack on 
philosophy itself, as I will try to show in Chapter 4.  He will propose what neither 
Hobbes nor Locke do, a restoration of classical philosophy as an antidote to religious 
sectarianism. 
 Shaftesbury's preference for the ancient policy toward religion does not arise from 
a different understanding of Christianity.  To see this we now turn to Shaftesbury's 
critique of Christianity in Characteristicks.  A full understanding of his preference for 
antiquity must look beyond his critique of Christianity to his understanding of religion 
per se.  As I have suggested, it is in his account of religion that Shaftesbury presents what 
might be regarded as the essence of human life, eros. 
Religion in the Characteristicks  
 Beginning with the frontispiece of Volume I, religion recurs as a sort of leitmotiv 
throughout the Characteristicks. While each of the treatises could be cited extensively to 
demonstrate the importance of religious subjects to Shaftesbury's project, the following 
observations are important for our purposes.  The first treatise of Volume I, A Letter 
concerning Enthusiasm opens with a discussion of revelation and takes prophetic 
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inspiration as its general theme.  In this way it seems fair to say that the Characteristicks 
as a whole opens by reflecting on religious subjects.  In his private correspondence 
Shaftesbury indicates that the second treatise, Sensus Communis, belongs with the first:  
indeed as Robert Voitle shows, Sensus Communis was initially undertaken as a defense of 
A Letter.
106
  As we have seen, Sensus Communis offers a defense of raillery--that is, 
Socratic irony--in the service of the philosophical treatment of controversial subjects.  
The first part of An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit also treats religion extensively.  
There he presents a systematic taxonomy of theological opinion.  The treatise as a whole 
takes the relationship between religion and virtue as its primary concern.  The Moralists 
contains extensive conversations about religion among Theocles (whose name itself 
suggests a religious concern) and the other characters.  Finally, the aforementioned 
treatises find commentary in Miscellaneous Reflections, where the Critic defends, 
sharpens, and elaborates Shaftesbury's opinions on religious matters.  Indeed, Volume III 
and therefore the Characteristicks as a whole comes to an abrupt end as the Critic offers 
the apology of an unnamed controversial author.  This author seems to lack a "sufficient 
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caution and reserve in religious matters," despite his awareness that such a reserve is 
desirable.
107
 
 Soliloquy might at first seem to be an exception to this running treatment of 
religion.  Yet while religious questions are less prominent in Soliloquy, Shaftesbury 
himself points out that this is exceptional: 
IT MAY here perhaps be thought, that notwithstanding the particular Advice we 
have given, in relation to the forming of a Taste in natural Characters and 
Manners; we are still defective in our Performance, whilst we are silent on super-
natural Cases, and bring not into our consideration the Manners and Characters 
deliverřd us in Holy Writ. But this Objection will soon vanish, when we consider, 
that there can be no Rules given by human Wit, to that which was never humanly 
conceivřd, but divinely dictated, and inspirřd.108 
 
I have argued that Soliloquy offers readers a model of thinking appropriate to the 
philosopher as understood by Shaftesbury.  According to Shaftesbury, the philosopher at 
thought treats questions both of morality and the cosmos as natural rather than 
supernatural phenomena.  Insofar as Shaftesbury's philosopher thinks about religion, it is 
from a naturalistic perspective.  Apparently soliloquy as a method has little to say about 
the matter.  By calling attention to his silence on scriptural criticism, however, 
Shaftesbury subtly plants the question of how one does approach those writings which 
trace their origin to revelation.  All men would approach writings believed to be "divinely 
dictated" with reverence, but as we shall see, Shaftesbury regards many such writings as 
deceitful "impostures."  
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 Even in Soliloquy, however, Shaftesbury cannot resist offering a peek at what the 
art of criticism might imply for sacred writings.  One page after calling his attention to 
the silence on "supernatural cases," Shaftesbury writes that "the Christian Theology; the 
Birth, Procedure, Generation, and personal Distinction of the DIVINITY, are Mysterys 
only to be determinřd by the initiated, or ordain’d; to whom the State has assignřd the 
Guardianship and Promulgation of the Divine Oracles.  It becomes not those who are un-
inspirřd from Heaven, and un-commissionřd from Earth, to search with Curiosity into the 
Original of those holy Rites and Records, by Law establish’d." 109  This is likely to be an 
acceptable view to an orthodox Church of England Christian, and again we see his 
emphasis on following the legal custom on religion.  Yet in the sequel Shaftsbury points 
to a problem that would arise for anyone practicing his art of criticism: 
should we make such an Attempt, we should in probability find the less 
Satisfaction, the further we presumřd to carry our Speculations.  Having darřd 
once to quit the Authority and Direction of the Law, we shouřd easily be subject 
to Heterodoxy and Error, when we had no better Warrant left us for the Authority 
of our sacred Symbols, than the Integrity, Candour, and Disinterestedness of their 
Compilers, and Registers. How great that Candour and Disinterestedness may 
have been, we have no other Historys to inform us, than those of their own 
licensing or composing.
110
 
 
Without a reliable authority to vouch for the authenticity of the "holy rites and records" of 
Christianity, an individual believer would have to make his own investigation into the 
transmission of rites and scripture.  This would entail asking about the character and 
trustworthiness not only of the tradition but also of the authors of the scriptures 
                                                 
109
 Ibid., 1.221. 
110
 Ibid., 1.221-22. 
  145 
 
 
 
 
themselves.  Such an inquiry would leave most believers vulnerable to unscrupulous men 
and unable to distinguish genuine revelation from pretenders.  Shaftesbury writes that, 
"busy Persons, who officiously search into these Records, are ready even from hence to 
draw Proofs very disadvantageous to the Fame and Character of this Succession of Men. 
And Persons moderately read in these Historys, are apt to judg no otherwise of the 
Temper of antient Councils, than by that of later Synods and modern Convocations."
111
 
 If Soliloquy generally avoids discussing the "manners and characters" discussed 
by scripture, the same cannot be said about Miscellaneous Reflections.  Shortly after 
introducing A Letter concerning Enthusiasm, the Critic turns to the topic of "controversial 
writing."
112
  The Critic compares the popular contemporary practice of "Controversy, or 
the Method of Answer and Refutation" with the practice of ancient authors.  According to 
the Critic, authors were evaluated in antiquity on the basis of their artistic and intellectual 
merits:  "if Authors writ ill, they were despisřd: If well, they were by some Party or other 
espousřd."113  Given the tendency of human beings to disagree, it seems likely that in 
antiquity, as well as in modernity, "partys there wouřd necessarily be, and Sects of every 
kind, in Learning and Philosophy."  Yet the Critic observes the curious fact that ancient 
authors did not develop a written art of controversial disputation.  Since Shaftesbury was 
a careful student of Socratic dialogue it is likely he knew that antiquity had sophists and 
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that Socrates himself practiced an art of refutation.
114
  The Critic nevertheless claims of 
ancient sectarianism, "every one sided with whom he likřd; and having the liberty of 
hearing each side speak for it-self, stood in no need of express Warning-Pieces against 
pretended Sophistry, or dangerous Reasoning."
115
   
 Such tolerance finds sharp contrast with the Critic's portrait of modern 
sectarianism, which betrays a strong "zeal of Party-causes."  He writes: 
let a zealous Divine and flaming Champion of our Faith, when inclinřd to shew 
himself in Print, make choice of some tremendous Mystery of Religion, opposřd 
heretofore by some damnable Heresiarch; whom having vehemently refuted, he 
turns himself towards the orthodox Opinion, and supports the true Belief, with the 
highest Eloquence and profoundest Erudition; he shall, notwithstanding this, 
remain perhaps in deep Obscurity, to the great affliction of his Bookseller, and the 
regret of all who bear a just Veneration for Church-history, and the antient Purity 
of the Christian Faith. But let it so happen that in this Prosecution of his deceasřd 
Adversary, our Doctor raises up some living Antagonist; who, on the same foot of 
Orthodoxy with himself, pretends to arraign his Expositions, and refute the 
Refuter upon every Article he has advancřd; from this moment the Writing 
gathers Life, the Publick listens, the Bookseller takes heart; and when Issue is 
well joinřd, the Repartees grown smart, and the Contention vigorous between the 
learned Partys, a Ring is made, and Readers gather in abundance.
116
 
 
As the Critic's satire makes clear, this modern mode of polemical writing is, according to 
Shaftesbury, connected to Christianity. 
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 The Critic's account might seem self-serving, given the controversial reception of 
Shaftesbury's own A Letter concerning Enthusiasm.
117
  Yet the refusal to engage the 
dispute directly is consistent with Shaftesbury's overall strategy.  I would argue that for 
Shaftesbury, a public dispute would be an occasion for scandal in sense of "perplexity of 
conscience occasioned by the conduct of one who is looked up to as an example."
118
  As 
the quotation from Voitle (on page 102) suggests, Shaftesbury's opinions on religion and 
politics are not egalitarian.  His account of the ancient policy presupposes a natural 
heterogeneity of intellect among men.  According to the ancients, this natural 
heterogeneity has consequences both for political life and for the activity of philosophy. 
 This concern is brought to the forefront of the Characteristicks by the frontispiece 
to Volume I.  Since the content and placement of the illustrations are themselves part of 
Shaftesbury's plan for the revised edition of his work, it is instructive to consider them as 
they relate to Shaftesbury's thematic concerns.
 119
  Taken together, the frontispieces for 
Volumes I and III point to the importance of religion and politics for understanding the 
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Characteristicks; together they provide an interpretive context for the dominant themes 
of Volume II. 
 The frontispieces for the "framing" volumes present what Shaftesbury identifies 
in his correspondence as the ancient and modern models for religion and politics.  
Shaftesbury writes of these rivals approaches: 
The FEL. TEM. of the first volume-plate (which is all happiness from the right 
balance, liberty, and ancient model of religion) is a noted medal-inscription for 
felicitas temporum or felicia tempora. 
 
The EN QUO of the last volume-plate (which on the other side is all misery and 
the modern model) is a poetical ejaculation, as much as to say, "Behold ! whither 
we are brought ? to what state reduced ?"
120
 
 
 The frontispiece for volume first, then, portrays what Shaftesbury elsewhere calls 
the "ancient policy" of magistrates.
121
  According to Shaftesbury, it was the wise policy 
of ancient magistrates to indulge superstition by permitting subjects the freedom to 
practice a wide variety of religions.  At the feet of a magistrate reclines a woman with 
crown and scepter, holding a balance.  On one side of the balance rests "the Egyptian 
systrum, the mitre, the lituus or augurřs instrument."  On the other rests a lyre, a 
caduceus,  and the breastplate of Minerva.  Here we are reminded that Shaftesbury 
associates liberty with the "rise and progress of the arts."  It is Shaftesburyřs 
recommendation to the magistrate to indulge superstition while also allowing philosophy 
the freedom to pursue its own activities in private.  Two scenes reflect this happy 
                                                 
120
 Shaftesbury, Philosophical Regimen, 530. 
121
 A Letter concerning Enthusiasm, 1.11. 
  149 
 
 
 
 
situation.  To the left we see four figures representing "religionists, supplicants, votaries, 
prophets."  One seems to be an enraptured Sibyl; one holds a "thyrsus"; one pleads to the 
sky; and the last, as Shaftesbury describes it, performs a rite over a "dark pit or chasm in 
the earth."  In the background there are busts of gods surrounded by a stormy sky.  On the 
right side of the engraving a very different scene unfolds.  There are poets and 
philosophers, men contemplating both ideas and actions.  Behind them stands Mount 
Olympus (suggested by the Pegasus).  The boarder of the frontispiece shows the many 
fruits and blessings of a society where the arts and sciences flourish.  In the words of 
Felix Paknadel, "freedom, maintained by a wise ruler, breeds social harmony and fosters 
the development of civilization."
122
 
 The plate for volume third portrays the consequences of allowing religion to rule 
the magistrate.  The second motto is drawn from Virgil's Eclogues.  "En, quo discordia 
civis/ produxit miseros!"  See where strife has brought our citizens!
 123
  Shaftesbury's 
account of the origin and development of Christianity, including the political devastation 
arising from Christian sectarianism, is presented most forcefully by the Critic in his 
Miscellaneous Reflections, and the plate matches the Critic's manner.  This frontispiece is 
appropriately wanting for clear order, but when read from left to right the viewer can 
discern three episodes in the history of religion.  To the left we see that Egypt provides a 
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model of priestly rule.  Such an arrangement is presented as wasteful by spilled baskets 
and an upset cornucopia.  In the second scene naked diminutive men skirmish before 
classical temples, now obscured by dark copse; one barbarian marches with trophies from 
despoiled classical Rome.  The scene suggests that sectarianism following the fall of 
Rome leads to barbarism.  In the background to the right stands a Gothic Church.  A 
figure kneels in the foreground to the Bishop of Rome (suggested by Mitre and key) and 
offers up what appears to be a globe.  A monarch watches, with hands raised as if to 
suggest powerlessness to intervene.
124
  At the foot of the Successor of Peter lies the 
symbol of old Roman power, the fasces.  .  There are two references in the text to fasces, 
each in the context of exhorting the magistrate to a policy of tolerance.
125
  Roman 
strength through unity, seen in the bundled birch rods, has given way to the uniformity of 
dogma and the suppression of heresy. 
 Taken together the frontispieces for Volumes I and III present the alternatives as 
Shaftesbury understands them:  either political life will tolerate a variety of religions or 
one understanding of religion will determine political life.  According to Shaftesbury, it 
was the policy of ancient governments to establish a "public leading in religion."  This 
established religion seldom came into conflict with private opinions, whether philosophic 
or religious in character, for ancient piety was concerned with proper conduct 
(orthopraxy) rather than the holding of certain opinions (orthodoxy).  Since heathen 
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religion was polytheistic, the magistrate did not take additional practices of piety to be a 
threat to the publicly established order.  "Why shouřd there not be public walks, as well 
as private gardens?" Shaftesbury asks.  Since superstitious fears were thought to be 
natural to men, magistrates following the "polite" views of the ancients would enter into 
the enthusiastic concern of the people with "a kind sympathy…and taking, as it were, 
their passion upon him…endeavour, by chearful ways, to divert and heal it."  The ancient 
magistrate was inclined to tolerate "visionaries and enthusiast of all kinds," and allowed 
philosophy a free course "as a balance against superstition."  This is not to say that the 
magistrate was indifferent to religious practice, for open atheism was not tolerated.  
Nevertheless, the polite heathen magistrate was tolerant and gentle in his treatment of 
religion. 
 This seems to have changed over time, however, due in part to the "unnatural 
union of religion and philosophy" which emerged during the Roman Empire.  Among the 
"polite heathens of the ancient world," the refined thoughts of the philosopher were kept 
separate from the observance of religious customs.  Philosophy was a private activity of 
the few, and difficult matters of "profound speculation and inquiry" were carefully 
concealed from public view.
126
  Over time, those matters which were once understood by 
philosophers to be merely probable accounts of the nature of things became in the hands 
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of decayed ancient schools the source of contentious and dogmatic opinion.
127
  According 
to Shaftesbury, early Christianity did not share the concern for orthodoxy that eventually 
developed.  This only emerges as a result of the influence of philosophy.  "There is 
nothing more evident," he writes in the Miscellanies, "than that our Holy Religion, in its 
original constitution, was set so far apart from philosophy or refinřd speculation, that it 
seemřd in a manner diametrically opposřd to it.  A man might have been not only a 
sceptick in all the controverted points of the academys, or schools of learning, but even a 
perfect stranger to all of this kind; and yet compleat in his religion, faith, and worship."  
After the mixture of religion and philosophy, however, "mysteries, which were heretofore 
treated with profound respect, and lay unexposřd to vulgar eyes, became public and 
prostitute; being enforcřd with terrors, and urgřd with compulsion and violence, on the 
unfitted capacities and apprehension of mankind."
128
  In this combination, questionable 
matters for inquiry became "the necessary subject of a strict and absolute assent."   
 Shaftesbury obviously intends this comingling of philosophy and religion to 
describe the Christianity of his day.  In the course of time, the magistrate himself adopted 
a "new sort of policy."  This modern policy, "which extends itself to another world, and 
considers the future lives and happiness of men rather than the present, has made us leap 
the bounds of natural humanity; and out of a supernatural charity, has taught us the way 
of plaguing one another most devoutly.  It has raisřd an antipathy which no temporal 
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interest couřd ever do; and entailřd upon us a mutual hatred to all eternity."129  The 
"saving of souls" is considered a most heroic passion by the modern world, and this 
passion has "become in a manner the chief care of the magistrate, and the very end of 
government itself."
130
  Shaftesbury writes that "in the process of time it was thought 
decent to mend men's countenances, and render their intellectual complexions uniform 
and of a sort."
131
  The magistrate became "a dresser, and in his turn was dressřd" by "tire-
men," (that is, theologians or priests).  While all priests agreed that "there was only one 
certain and true dress. . . to which all people shouřd conform," neither the magistrate nor 
the attire-men knew which of the thousands of possible modes of dress was "the exact 
true one."  Men were pressed from every side to adjust their mien according to the 
"fashion and the humour of the times," with the result that human nature itself became 
obscured by Christian mores.
132
   
 As we shall see in Chapter 4, modern philosophy responds to this hiding of nature 
by recommending the distrust of all convention.  For Shaftesbury, the customs of men 
while perhaps conventional are not simply contrary to nature; some customs may in fact 
be the precondition of the perfection of human nature.  Shaftesbury offers a fable to 
illustrate how one might begin to think about the complicated relationship between nature 
and convention. 
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 Imagine an Ethiopian visitor who arrives in Paris or Venice at the time of 
Carnival, when almost everyone is wearing a mask.  Taking the strange way of the 
Europeans to be their natural way, the visitor would for a while regard the festivities with 
a serious eye.  It would not occur to him that "a whole people couřd be so fantastical, as 
upon Agreement, at an appointed time, to transform themselves by a variety of habits, 
and make it a solemn practice to impose on one another, by this universal confusion of 
characters and person."
133
  Eventually, however, he would discover "the cheat," and while 
the Europeans might laugh at his simplicity for being fooled, the Ethiopian would have 
still better reason to laugh--after all, the revelers are indeed ridiculous in their costumes.  
But were the Ethiopian, now on the lookout for masks, to conclude that the pale 
complexion of Europeans was also part of their costume, he would become ridiculous 
himself.  "By a silly presumption he took nature for mere art, and mistook perhaps a man 
of sobriety and sense for one of those ridiculous mummers."  This, according to 
Shaftesbury, is an example of immoderate skepticism, a case of "carrying the jest too 
far." 
 The Ethiopian is right to laugh when he discovers that the Europeans wear masks, 
but wrong to conclude that all countenances are therefore masks.  Shaftesbury suggests 
that there is something ridiculous about the fact that menřs opinions are usually the 
product of art or convention.  It is because of this insight that opinions must be 
investigated.  When taken to an extreme, however, this insight will mislead judgment.  
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Some opinions may actually be in harmony with nature.  We should also notice that the 
Ethiopian comes by his original misunderstanding honestly.  The Ethiopian did not have 
any reason to expect the deception of Carnival because he bore a naïve trust of the world 
as it appeared to him.  It is indeed surprising that a whole people would adopt a 
transformation of their characters, and even more so that they would do so universally 
and solemnly.  This insight--a moment of wonder--might lead men to ask whether one set 
of customs is superior to others.  In anticipation of excessive passion here, Shaftesbury 
suggests that there is less disagreement among men than the modern skeptic might claim.  
Also, the discovery of the cheat presupposes that the Ethiopian had some prior 
understanding that men have faces, whatever their exact complexion may be.  
Shaftesbury will insist that the possibility of human knowledge presupposes an initial 
insight that there is something to be known about the nature of the thing in question.  We 
have already seen in Chapter 2 that Shaftesbury introduces his Socratic method of 
soliloquy as a tool for distinguishing natural from unnatural opinions. 
 Shaftesbury, then, presents two possible policies regarding politics and religion.  
The ancient policy distinguishes the superstitious religion of the people from the sublime 
inquiries of the philosopher.  The magistrate is able to pursue a policy of tolerance toward 
a great variety of religious rites because religion concerns itself not with right opinion 
(that is, orthodoxy) but practice.  It is the philosopher who is most serious about seeking 
the truth.  Ancient philosophers, he suggests, pursued their inquiries with discretion, 
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being careful not to confuse or corrupt the people.  Philosophers assisted the magistrates 
as well by offering them an education in virtue. 
If Shaftesbury's account is to be credible, he must explain why this ancient policy 
eventually failed.  We have already seen that Shaftesbury, like Hobbes before him, 
regarded Christianity as an unfortunate mixture of philosophy and vulgar religion.  What 
does it mean that philosophy "became public and prostitute; being enforcřd with terrors, 
and urgřd with compulsion and violence, on the unfitted capacities and apprehension of 
mankind?"  To answer this question we must consider his account priestcraft, which 
appears in the Miscellaneous Reflections.  There the Critic pursues a long digression on 
the establishment and growth of religion in Egypt; in it one can see a thinly veiled portrait 
of the growth of Christendom. 
  Shaftesbury and Priestcraf t  
 It is characteristic of Shaftesburyřs ancient sympathies that he does not regard 
Christianity as a singular religious phenomenon.  In treating priestcraft in general, he 
seems to prefer a "sociological" approach to the question of religion.
134
   
 The Egyptian religion, as opposed to religions in the classical age, was shrouded 
in mysteries and secret rites.  Egypt is the "Mother-Land of Superstition," partly because 
of natural conditions of climate and partly as a result of foolish policies set by the 
magistracy.  According to the Critic, the government of Egypt overregulated the trade of 
priestcraft and changed the proportion between the supply of priests and the natural 
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demand for superstition.  What is worse, the government made the office of Priest 
heritable, so that the children of priests themselves became priests.  The Egyptians had 
many Gods and Temples, and each temple was allowed more than one priest.  The 
Egyptian priesthood was allowed to maintain itself without restriction through donatives, 
and these donatives became the entailed property of the religious.  By Law the property 
of the religious was protected such that "they might retain what they couřd get; and that it 
might be lawful for their Order to receive such Estates by voluntary Contribution, as 
couřd never afterwards be converted to other Uses."135  Over time, of course, the priests 
accumulated considerable wealth for they were able to exploit the superstitious part of 
mankind for considerable profit.  In addition to making the priesthood heritable, the 
magistrate also allowed people to become priests voluntarily, which combined with the 
expanding wealth and power of the priesthood, acted as a powerful incentive for growth. 
 These policies flourished in a climate especially conducive to "Prodigy in 
Nature."  The heat of the African Sun combined with the fertile Nile river valley brings 
forth endless creatures and phenomena to be explained.  Since the Egyptians needed ways 
to measure the land, predict floods, and navigate the rivers, they gave birth to astronomy 
and other sciences.  The priesthood, however, turned these sciences to their advantage 
and to the "immense Growth of Superstition" and further growth of the priesthood.  The 
Critic sums the effect of policy and conditions in the following principle of "political 
Arithmetic:  "in every nation whatsoever; "That the Quantity of Superstition (if I may so 
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speak) will, in proportion, nearly always answer the Number of Priests, Diviners, 
Soothsayers, Prophets, or such who gain their Livelihood, or receive Advantages by 
officiating in Religious Affairs."  For if these Dealers are numerous, they will force a 
Trade."
136
  Once the priesthood grows powerful, a magistrate will have to be cautious in 
his attempts to institute reform.  The power of the priesthood does not depend on force of 
arms.
137
  As we will see in chapter 4, its power is derived chiefly from its ability to shape 
the opinions and characters of men.  There are professions which depend on the 
"infirmitys and defects of mankind, (as for instance. . .law and physick)" that with the 
least bit of help from the magistrate will proliferate by creating new problems demanding 
new solutions which in turn create problems.  
 Shaftesburyřs formulation of the problem of priestcraft is striking, for it suggests 
that it is possible to describe the growth of social phenomena according to natural laws.  
Thanks to such political arithmetic, one may gather "what, in the process of time, must 
therefore naturally have happenřd in the case of Religion, among the Egyptians."138  The 
Egyptians form a striking contrast to the "rise and progress of the arts" among the 
Greeks.
139
  As we saw in Chapter 2, Shaftesbury drew on Aristotle's account of the 
"Lineage and SUCCESSION of Wit"
140
 to dampen the modern emphasis on "Genius 
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alone."
141
  The Greeks enjoyed a "fortunate Constitution" which contributed to their 
originality in the Arts. 
 The plague of priests was visited on nations beyond Egypt.  The Critic says that 
the Syrians, the Ethiopians, the Persians, the Babylonians, and Chaldeans each followed 
this model.  While each nation developed peculiar rites and mysteries, each followed a 
natural pattern.  Shaftesbury does not seem to recommend a simplistic social science in 
his natural history of religion, though.  It is unclear, for example, whether the Egyptians 
imitated the Ethiopians or vice versa.  Some of the kingdoms (Chaldea, say) are 
influenced by Egypt directly; others (the Persians) seem to develop independently.  These 
"Asiatick Priesthoods" do have certain identifiable conditions for their flourishing, 
however.  The priestly hierarchy seems to rely on a strong monarchy to take root.  The 
Magi, for example, gain control of Persia at a moment when it is poised to establish 
"Universal Empire."
142
  Their control grows when the magistrate allows the priesthood to 
secure its own property.  As the Critic remarks, monarchy cannot long resist for 
"dominion must naturally follow property."  Because of human weakness, there is an 
inexhaustible fund of credulity among the "ignorant and vulgar," just waiting to be 
exploited by the crafty and unscrupulous.  Shown a little favor, the priesthood will 
multiply the number of rites, gods, objects of worship, and priests beyond counting.  In 
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the case of Egypt, it was almost inevitable that it would seek to export its model of 
religion: 
no wonder if by a Nation so abounding in religious Orders, spiritual Conquests 
were sought in foreign Countrys, Colonys led abroad, and Missionarys detachřd, 
on Expeditions, in this prosperous Service.  ŘTwas thus a Zealot-People, 
influencřd of old by their very Region and Climate, and who throř a long Tract of 
Time, under a peculiar Policy, had been raisřd both by Art and Nature to an 
immense Growth in religious Science and Mystery; came by degrees to spred 
their variety of Rites and Ceremonys, their dinstinguishing marks of separate 
Worships and secret Communitys, throř the distant World; but chiefly throř their 
neighbouring and dependent Countrys.
143
 
 
While the priesthood lacks force of arms, it is not without material consequences.  
According to the Critic, strangers are especially vulnerable to priestcraft because they 
often depend on others for their "maintenance and bread."  While the account of 
priestcraft was removed from Christendom by nation and time, the natural history 
becomes more proximate in the discussion of the "Hebrew Race," which is presented as 
something of a digression from the main argument about priestcraft.
144
  According to the 
Critic, ancient historians indicate that many important Jewish rites have their origin in the 
long captivity in Egypt.  Circumcision, for example, was a religious rite instituted by the 
Egyptians.  While he is unwilling to go so far as to say that Abraham picks this custom 
up because he wants to emulate the Egyptians, his qualification is so thin that it is 
unlikely to be sincere:  
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Řtis certain that if this holy Patriarch, who first instituted the sacred Rite of 
Circumcision within his own Family or Tribe, had no regard to any Policy or 
Religion of the Egyptians; yet he had formerly been a Guest and Inhabitant in 
Egypt (where Historians mention this to have been a natural Rite); long ere he had 
receivřd any divine Notice or Revelation, concerning this Affair.145 
 
Nor is circumcision the most interesting thing Abraham learned in Egypt.  According to 
the Critic, Abraham also learned occult sciences such as a "judicial Astrology"
146
 more 
proper to the Magi, just as his successors did.  In the history presented by the Critic, the 
exodus of the Jews was hardly an act of liberation by God.  Twice the Egyptians tried to 
expel the Jews; probably, he adds in a footnote, because they were leprous, at least "from 
what appears in Holy Writ."
147
  
 The Criticřs authoritative guide to scripture seems to be the Emperor Julian II, or 
as he was known to Christendom, Julian the Apostate, a convert (revert?) to neo-
Platonism.  As Julian and the Critic interpret Scripture, "Moses stole the sacred objects of 
the Egyptians; and when the Egyptians tried to recapture these, they were driven home by 
storms."  To be fair, however, the Critic notes that the expulsion from Egypt was in fact 
due to a divine command:  the oracle of Hammon bid the Egyptian king to purge the 
lepers because they were offensive to the Gods.
148
  Among the sacred things carried out 
of Egypt by the Jews were strong influences on the "manners, the Religion, Rites, Diet, 
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Customs, Laws, and Constitution of their tyrannical Masters."  Not surprisingly, after 400 
years of living among the Egyptians, the "manners, Opinions, Rites and Customs" of the 
Egyptians "gainřd a powerful Ascendency over their Natures."149  While Moses 
attempted to institute reforms, the habits ran so deep that "it was almost necessary to God 
(it is right to say humane) to indulge them. . .and adapt his laws to their habit and 
standard."  Moses, as the Scripture indicates, received a strong and privileged education 
at the hands of the Egyptians.  The Critic cites the Acts of the Apostles (translated 
loosely) to say that Moses was educated in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, which "as is 
well known," was the bailiwick of the priesthood.  In other words, Moses himself was 
exposed to philosophy. 
 From the Egyptians, the "religious Profession" spread widely through the East.  
As the number of priests waxed, so the number of laymen waned, and soon the 
magistrates lost all power to govern or check the spread of priestcraft.  According to the 
Critic, the glut of priests led to a scarcity of worshipers; and priests responded by 
elevating the dignity their own worship by asserting its singularity, and thereby moving 
political life toward "religious antipathy and mutual discord."
150
 
 Shaftesbury's account of priestcraft betrays considerable agreement with Hobbes 
as to the pernicious consequences of religion governing magistrates.  Yet Shaftesbury, 
unlike Hobbes, prefers to restore the classical solution to the challenge of religion.  From 
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a political point of view his project recommends a return to the "antient policy" on 
religion.  As John Leland rightly observes, Shaftesbury advocates subordinating religion 
to political ends; but his reason is not Hobbes's.  For Shaftesbury, the relationship 
between religion and political life flows from the fact that the concerns of the philosopher 
point beyond the moral life.  This perspective finds its political consequences in the 
ancient policy. 
 Shaftesbury's account presents, then, three modes of religion.  The people are 
inclined to the practice of superstitious rites which they regard as proper worship of the 
gods.  The magistrate, on the other hand, establishes a "public leading in religion" for his 
polity-- that is, a civil religion--which works to mitigate the excessive passions of the 
people and thereby improve their morals.  Finally, the philosopher pursues a religion of 
"profound speculation and inquiry" into nature.  This natural religion can be said to 
balance superstition in part because philosophy rightly understood can introduce more a 
more reasonable understanding of the divine.
151
  This distinction, which can be seen in 
the writings of Cicero
152
 and is made explicit in the writings of Varro, would have been 
familiar to Shaftesbury at least through Cudworth's True Intellectual System of the 
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Universe.
153
  In that work, which Shaftesbury references a number of times in the 
Characteristicks, we read that 
not only the Egyptians, but also the Syrians, Persians, Indians, and other barbarian  
Pagans, had, beside their vulgar theology, another more arcane and recondite one, 
amongst their priests and learned men; and that the same was true concerning the 
Greeks and Latins also, is unquestionably evident from that account, that hath 
been given by us of philosophic theology; where, by the vulgar theology of the 
Pagans, we understand not only their mythical or fabulous, but also their political 
or civil theology, it being truly affirmed by St. Austin [that is, Augustine]…that 
both the fabulous theology of the Pagans was in part their civil, and their civil was 
fabulous.--And by their more arcane and recondite theology, is doubtless meant 
that, which they conceived to be the natural and true theology.  Which distinction 
of the natural and true theology, from the civil and political, as it was 
acknowledged by all the ancient Greek philosophers, but more expressly by 
Antistines, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; so it was owned and much insisted 
upon, both by Scaevola, that famous Roman Pontifex, and by Varro, that most 
learned antiquary.
154
 
 
According to the account offered by St. Augustine, Seneca and other prominent Romans 
also subscribed to this three-fold distinction.
155
 
 Shaftesbury's own account of the origin and dissemination of quasi-philosophic 
religion confronts us with an important question:  how can philosophy, which for 
Shaftesbury is an elevated love of wisdom, become a pernicious force in political life?  In 
order to answer this important question we first need to consider the way classical 
philosophy regarded the relationship between religion, politics, and philosophy.  
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The Ancient Policy Considered  
  Religion,  Pol i tics ,  and Philosophy according to Socrates 
 According to Fustel de Coulanges, in the earliest times of the polis, no distinction 
was made between religion and politics.  He writes that "the state was closely allied with 
religion; it came from religion, and was confounded with it.  For this reason, in the 
primitive city all political institutions had been religious institutions, the festivals had 
been ceremonies of the worship, the laws had been sacred formulas, and the kings and 
magistrates had been priests."
156
  The claim that religion and politics were inseparable in 
the earliest days of the polis has been confirmed by contemporary scholars as well.
157
  
Weřll see that confirmation can also be found in the treatment that the topic of religion 
and politics receives in Plato. 
 It appears that the speculations of the earliest philosophers were coeval with a 
rejection of the myths of the polis.  Indeed, some have argued that philosophy was born 
when men began to distinguish nature from the laws of men, which from their variety 
appeared to be convention and from the point of view of a science of nature, arbitrary or 
contingent on accident.  Since rites concerning the gods varied considerably from place to 
place, philosophers tended to relegate religion especially to the realm of the conventional 
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rather than the natural.
158
  The political consequences of the distinction between law or 
convention on the one hand and nature on the other were profound, for with it philosophy 
became virtually indistinguishable from atheism, at least in the public mind.  The moral 
authority of the city, however, rested on and drew strength from the belief in the gods.  It 
would not, perhaps, take much sophistication to doubt that Zeus literally hurled 
thunderbolts at sinners, but the myths of the city seem to have been accepted on some 
level by even sophisticated citizens.
159
  Gradually, the influence of philosophy changed 
this: 
philosophy appeared, and overthrew all the rules of the ancient polity. It was 
impossible to touch the opinions of men without also touching the fundamental 
principles of their government. Pythagoras, having a vague conception of the 
Supreme Being, disdained the local worships; and this was sufficient to cause him 
to reject the old modes of government, and to attempt to found a new order of 
society. Anaxagoras comprehended the God-Intelligence which reigns over all 
men and all beings. In rejecting ancient religious notions, he also rejected ancient 
polity. As he did not believe in the gods of the prytaneum, he no longer fulfilled 
all the duties of a citizen; he avoided the assemblies, and would not be a 
magistrate. His doctrine was an attack upon the city; and the Athenians 
condemned him to death.
160
 
 
The essential principle seems to have been the presenting of nature as being opposed to 
the laws and customs of men.
161
  This consequence of such thought, especially as spread 
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through the influence of sophistry, "was to attack the ancient political system at its 
foundation."
162
   
 A famous fragment from Critiasřs play, Sisyphus, will help us see how political 
life came to be viewed by these early philosophers: 
there was a time when the life of men was unordered, bestial and the slave of 
force, when there was no reward for the virtuous and no punishment for the 
wicked.  Then, I think, men devised retributory laws, in order that Justice might 
be dictator and have arrogance as its slave, and if anyone sinned, he was 
punished.  Then, when the laws forbade them to commit open crimes of violence, 
and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the 
gods for mortals, that there might be some means of frightening the wicked, even 
if they do anything or say or think it in secret.
163
 
 
This view seems to have been a commonplace of "pre-Socratic" philosophy, namely that 
the gods were invented by men to reinforce human justice with a fear of divine 
retribution.  Through the influence of philosophy there arose a tension between the city 
and its mythology on the one hand, and philosophy on the other.  
 The portrait of Socrates offered by Aristophanes in the Clouds seems to offer 
further evidence to this effect.  Perhaps earlier in his life, taken by the power of natural 
philosophy, Socrates too found himself indifferent to political matters.  (This portrait, in 
turn, receives confirmation in the intellectual autobiography offered by Socrates at the 
end of Platořs Phaedo.) Aristophanesř Socrates is not especially interested in political 
questions, although his inquiry into natural subjects has inescapable consequences for 
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political life.  In the Clouds, the natural philosopher Socrates (and his unsubsidized 
graduate assistants) disdain the deepest concerns of the average Athenian citizen.  
Socrates appears floating aloft in a basket, looking down on the average citizen, 
Strepsiades.  From the vantage point of Socrates, the concerns of Strepsiades are 
ephemeral (he even greets him as "Ephemeral").
164
  This indifference is shown at once in 
the exchange between the pupil of Socrates and Strepsiades.  The pupils study geometry 
for its own sake, and when pressed for a reason on why it is useful, they mention 
measuring the land.
165
  But as it turns out, they measure the land "in general" rather than 
for allotment, and their maps are not political--the pupil has reckon just were the cities 
are for Strepsiades.
166
 
 The indifference seems to flow from the concern with the abiding natural things 
as opposed to conventional things, which are assumed to be fleeting and relative to place.  
Among the most important conventional things (to Strepsiades, at least) are the Gods.  
Socrates offers a naturalistic account of thunder and rain, but Strepsiades is incapable of 
following it.
167
  He cannot conceive of the possibility that the Olympic gods do not exist.  
When Strepsiades asks who forces the clouds to drift, "Doesnřt Zeus?" Socrates replies, 
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"not at all; itřs the whirl of the upper air."  Strepsiades assumes that Whirl is a new god 
who has supplanted Zeus.
 168
 
 Yet pre-Socratic philosophy did have a teaching on political things.  This teaching 
takes as its starting point a naturalistic perspective on human beings.  Here human beings 
are seen in a continuum with other animals, different in degree but not in kind.  In the 
Clouds this view emerges in the willingness of Phidippides to beat his father.
169
  It is 
natural for the stronger to rule the weaker, and the young are stronger than the old.  As 
Phidippides points out, the treatment of children and parents is customary.  Having been 
convinced that there are no Olympic gods but only natural phenomena, Phidippides 
argues to his father that he is no longer bound to respect his parents.  "Wasnřt it a man 
like you and me who originally proposed this law and persuaded the ancients to adopt it?  
If so, am I any less free to establish in my turn a new law for the sons of tomorrow?"
170
 
 One can see various formulations of this view throughout the dialogues of Plato 
as well.  In book one of the Republic, for example, Thrasymacus claims that "the just is 
nothing other than the advantage of the stronger," or that "in every city the same thing is 
just, the advantage of the ruling body." Adeimantus soon points out that an adequate 
statement of this position (as revised by Glaucon in book two) must take into account the 
promise of divine rewards and punishments for the just--that is, those with at least a 
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reputation for being just.
171
  Presumably a reputation for justice is sufficient "if there are 
not gods, or if they have no care for human beings."  A similar concern could be shown 
to arise in the Gorgias and other dialogues of Plato. 
 Philosophy seems to have become more self-conscious of its political influence in 
the person of Socrates, and in the works of Plato we encounter a very different account of 
the relationship between political life and philosophy, and consequently, between politics 
and religion.  As Cicero remarks in his Tusculan Disputations, "Socrates was the first 
who brought down philosophy from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into 
families, and obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil."
172
  The 
Socratic innovation seem not to lie in his willingness to ask about human beings, but 
rather to bring philosophy from its lofty preoccupation with eternal things and examine 
human life and morality as phenomena which might have a nature of their own.  He had 
to "oblige" philosophy to do so perhaps because philosophyřs natural inclination is not in 
this direction.  This Socratic approach, especially as presented in the works of Plato and 
Xenophon, attempts to darn the rift that philosophy opened between political life and 
religion.  Philosophy as it originally emerged could speak of political life, but only by 
recognizing the conventional character of the divine myths needed to support the laws of 
the city.  Socrates seems to offer a way to think of politics which allows religion to 
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remain a force in political life while keeping open the possibility for philosophers that it 
is somehow less than true. 
 As Thomas Pangle has shown in an important article, "The Political Psychology 
of Religion in Platořs Laws," Plato saw theology as an essential aspect of healthy 
political life.
173
  His theology, however, was not identical to the mythology as presented 
in Homer and the early Greek tragedians.  (This can be seen in Aristophanesř Clouds but 
also in the famous criticism of Homer appearing in the early books of Platořs 
Republic.
174
)  In presenting a defense of the gods from atheism while also presenting a 
philosophical critique of theology, Plato is able to show that a proper theology will 
support the law code of the polis through more salutary myths.  Interestingly, the account 
of theology in book 10 arises in the context of a discussion of the penal code of the city 
being sketched by the Athenian Stranger (in books 9 and 11).  It becomes clear that the 
Cretan legislator Klinias find it almost inconceivable that a serious person would deny 
that the gods exist, given the orderliness of "the earth, the sun, the stars, and all things," 
including seasons, months, and years.
175
  At most, he suspects, it is a pose to allow a 
person to rationalize immoral behavior.  Klinias is sophisticated enough to distinguish the 
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Olympic gods from the orderliness of the cosmos, but much like the more ridiculous 
Strepsiades he does not imagine that the world might be attributed to chance.
176
   
 In the course of his account, the Athenian Stranger first introduces the most 
powerful arguments of atheistic philosophers and then mounts a defense against them.  
While the defense is adequate to the moral demands of the polis by lending persuasive 
support to the claim that the cosmos is orderly and consequently reflective of mind, it 
serves an even more important function.  Platořs theology simultaneously leads 
thoughtful souls to philosophic contemplation of the natural world by asking about the 
truth of the matter.
177
  Since neither Klinias nor Megillus have ever encountered atheistic 
natural philosophy, it is presumably possible to protect a city from the influence of such 
pernicious thought.  Yet the Athenian Stranger explains their arguments at great length.
178
 
Since the conversation of the Laws is itself meant to become the law code of the new city 
being founded by Klinias, the Athenian has himself imported "pre-Socratic" philosophy 
into the polis.  Yet his account also introduces the Platonic account of the soul, and the 
idea that human nature has an affinity through reason with an orderly cosmos.  In the 
words of Pangle, "the city and its gods can become home to the mind to the degree that 
they can become home to philosophy."
179
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 The Platonic solution to the tension which arose between political life and 
philosophy was to show how philosophy could support the city--indeed, as it is presented, 
it is essential if the city is to be just--without compromising on its own concern to 
understand the nature of things.  In short, Plato presents what might have appeared to pre-
Socratics as a contradiction in terms:  a way of constructing a philosophical "civil 
religion."   
 The model for theology offered in Plato moves men away from superstitions he 
found pernicious toward a more rational, natural theology.  It is worse morally, perhaps, 
for a man when he "believes [the gods] are easily persuaded if they are brought sacrifices 
and prayers," than when he denies the existence of gods outright.
180
  These men are "the 
worst," that is, those who believe "that if the gods receive small sacrifices and flatteries 
theyřll aid in robbing great amounts of money and release them from many sorts of great 
penalties." In this view, the outright atheist lacks such an incentive to pursue injustice.
181
  
According to many philosophers, atheism may be morally benign in a way that divinely 
inspired religion often is not. 
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 In his conversation with Euthyphro, Socrates goes so far as to confess his 
irritation with myths, at least in the way they are generally understood.
182
  In that 
dialogue we see Socrates encounter an enthusiastic believer in the gods who is engaged in 
what might be called a morally questionable act:  in an apparent inversion of the charges 
against philosophy presented in the Clouds, Euthyphro has bound his father for 
committing a crime condemned by the gods.  Euthyphro is awaiting word, not from the 
political authorities but from the religious authorities to see what to do with his father.
183
  
It comes to light that Euthyphro himself is an expert in "divine matters," and knows what 
is pious and what impious.  He claims to know these things better than most people do.
184
  
Socrates, who finds the myths hard to accept, might have to accept them simply on 
authority:  "People will say I am wrong.  Now if you, who know so much about such 
things, accept these tales, I suppose I too must give way.  For what am I to say, who 
confess frankly that I know nothing about them."  Presumably, given his knowledge of 
Homer and the tragedians, Socrates does not mean he is unfamiliar with the myths, but 
rather that he doesnřt know that they are the true, and he says as much. 
 While Socrates seems to have made it his project to present philosophy as civic-
minded, he does not accomplish this by accepting the myths of the city at face value.  As 
he remarks in the Phaedrus, "If, like the wise, I distrusted [mythical speech], I would not 
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be out of place."
185
  That said, he is unwilling to say goodbye to myth simply.  In part he 
doesnřt think it is worth his time to "straighten out" all the myths as the "too terribly 
clever, laborious, and not altogether fortunate man" might.  He claims to be too busy 
trying to "know himself," and proves "persuaded by what is conventionally believed 
about them, as I was saying just now I examine not them but myself."  It should also be 
added that he is himself quite a spinner of myth, although Plato embeds his myths in a 
context where, with work, one can indeed straighten things out.  As we saw in the 
previous chapter, Shaftesbury himself wants to distinguish a willingness to pursue daring 
thoughts from a desire to flout common opinion.  Such a temptation shows itself 
throughout the Platonic dialogues (for example in the Gorgias in the person of Callicles) 
and the works of Xenophon. 
 Socrates plays a dangerous game of questioning these myths and offering salutary 
corrections of them, while at the same time obeying the laws set down by the city 
regarding devotions to be offered to the gods.  Concerning the religious attitudes of 
Socrates Xenophon writes, "his deeds and words were clearly in harmony with the 
answers given by the Priestess at Delphi to such questions as, 'What is my duty about 
sacrifice' or about 'cult of ancestors.'  For the answer of the Priestess is, 'Follow the 
customs of the city:  that is the way to act piously.'  And so Socrates acted himself and 
counseled others to act.  To take any other course he considered presumption and folly.
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"186
  In this way we can see what Fusel de Coulanges meant by suggesting that while 
Socrates reproved the abuses of the sophists, he remained one of their school. 
  The Ancient  Pol icy encounters Christ ianity  
 The willingness of philosophy to accommodate itself to political life seems to 
have persisted through the influence of Stoicism and Ciceronian Academic Skepticism.  
This "Platonic humanism" is also apparent, I believe, in the way the Romans first 
encountered Christianity.  That Christianity seems to have brought a new challenge to 
political life can be seen in the consequences of the turn from practice to faith. The 
classical distinction between philosophic pursuits for the few and religious practice for 
the many can be seen in the reaction by contemporary Romans to the early Christians.  
Roman contemporaries drew on the resources of a naturalistic humanism, as we shall see. 
 In the year 64 AD, according to the Annuls of Tacitus, the Emperor Nero diverted 
attention away from the rumor that he had ordered Rome to be burned by blaming the fire 
on a group "abhorred for their crimes" [per fiagitia invisos] and "known to the people as 
Christians," [vulgus Chrestianos appeilabat].  Tacitus goes on to explain that this name 
came from one "Christus" who had been put to death by the Procurator Pontius Pilate.  
Soon, however, this "detestable superstition" [exitiabiiis superstitio] broke out again, not 
just in the backwaters of Judea, but even in the city of Rome herself, where all atrocious 
and shocking things flow and are celebrated, [quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda 
confluunt ceiebranturque]. Tacitus tells us that when men subsequently acknowledged 
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themselves to be Christians they were condemned not so much for arson as for their 
"hatred of the human race," [odio humani generis].  Worthy of punishment as Christians 
may have been, he observes, they were tortured in the cruelest ways.  Consequently, the 
persecution did not serve the public good.  Contrary to Nerořs intentions, such cruelty 
merely aroused pity for the tormented Christians. 
 Suetonius mentions a "Chrestus" who constantly incited the Jews to tumult during 
the reign of Claudius (41-54).
187
  When listing the accomplishments of Nero, Suetonius 
mentions that "punishment was inflicted on the Christians, a class of men given to a new 
and mischievous superstition," [superstitionis nova et maieficæ]. 
 By the year 111, Pliny the Younger, then governor of Bithynia, writes to the 
Emperor Trajan for advice on how to handle Christians.  I quote it at length because it is 
a clear expression of Roman concerns: 
It is with me, sir, an established custom to refer to you all matters on which I am 
in doubt.  .  .I have never been present at trials of Christians, and consequently do 
not know for what reasons, or how far, punishment is usually inflicted or inquiry 
made in their case.  Nor have my hesitations been slight:  as to whether any 
distinction of age should be made or persons however tender in years should be 
viewed as differing in no respect from the full-grown: whether pardon should be 
accorded to repentance, or he who has once been a Christian should gain nothing 
by having ceased to be one: whether the very profession itself if unattended by 
crime, or else the crimes necessarily attaching to the profession, should be made 
the subject of punishment. Meanwhile, in the case of those who have been 
brought before me in the character of Christians, my course has been as follows:  I 
put it to themselves whether they were or were not Christians.  To such as 
professed that they were, I put the inquiry a second and a third time, threatening 
them with the supreme penalty.  Those who persisted, I ordered to execution.  For, 
indeed, I could not doubt, whatever might be the nature of that which they 
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professed, that their pertinacity, at any rate, and inflexible obstinacy, ought to be 
punished.  .  .  An anonymous paper was put forth containing the names of many 
persons.  Those who denied that they either were or had been Christians, upon 
their calling on the gods after me, and upon their offering wine and incense before 
your statue, which for this purpose I had ordered to be introduced in company 
with the images of the gods, moreover upon their reviling Christ--none of which 
things it is said can such as are really and truly Christians be compelled to do--
these I deemed it proper to dismiss.  Others named by the informer admitted that 
they were Christians, and then shortly afterwards denied it, adding that they had 
been Christians, but had ceased to be so, some three years, some many years, 
more than one of them as much as twenty years, before.  All these, too, not only 
honoured your image and the effigies of the gods, but also reviled Christ. 
 
We should notice the "crime" of Christianity is sufficiently well known to ask Trajan how 
to handle it; in fact, it is so widespread that it is of concern even in what is now northern 
Turkey.  Pliny is not especially interested in the details of opinions held by Christians.  If 
they recant, they are set free.  They are punished, however, should they refuse to obey 
their governor because of pervicacia et inflexibilis obstinatio.  Pliny will pardon them if 
they will participate in sacrifices to the gods, which he seems to associate with the 
Emperor (the Emperorřs statue is "introduced in company with the images of the gods.")  
He has heard that Christians would never so honor the Emperor and Roman gods, nor 
would they consent to revile Christ. 
 Pliny has learned through his investigation that Christians have the custom of 
meeting on certain days at dawn and "offering in turns a form of invocation to Christ, as 
to a god; also of binding themselves by an oath, not for any guilty purpose, but not to 
commit thefts, or robberies, or adulteries, not to break their word, not to repudiate 
deposits when called upon."  (He also mentions in an apparent reference to the Eucharist 
that they enjoy a harmless little meal after these prayers!)  They apparently desisted from 
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public assembly at the edict of Pliny, but to be certain he administered torture to two 
slaves said to "officiate" at their rites.  Unfortunately, all he learns is "that these people 
were actuated by an absurd and excessive superstition." Pliny decides to end proceedings 
against the Christians until he can consult the Emperor, "indeed, the matter seemed to me 
a proper one for consultation, chiefly on account of the number of persons imperilled.  
For many of all ages and all ranks, ay, and of both sexes, are being called, and will be 
called, into danger.  Nor are cities only permeated by the contagion of this superstition, 
but villages and country parts as well."  Pliny believes it is not too late to curb this 
superstition, and offers as a hopeful sign of progress that the pagan temples which had 
been practically deserted were beginning to be frequented again.  Plinyřs concern seems 
to be connected to his responsibility to keep civil order.  He reports the moral decency of 
Christian oaths but will not permit the law to be disregarded.  Presumably swearing 
morally decent oaths to a new god would be acceptable as long as it didnřt interfere with 
the public rites associated with the Emperor.  Whatever his own view, however, the 
problem seems to have been widespread and was responsible for keeping people out of 
the Roman temples.  This, we should notice, is a matter of public concern to Pliny, for 
professed Christians would not participate in the religion established by the law.  
 The reply by Trajan is a model of classical humanism, and shows the Emperor to 
have no special animus against Christians.  He confirms that Pliny acted properly and 
says, prudently, that no single rule will cover every circumstance.  He asks that Pliny not 
undertake inquiry as an extension of his office, although certainly the crime must be 
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punished when proven.  Trajan instructs Pliny that any party denying that he is a 
Christian should be released if he can prove it, that is, by "supplicating our Gods," 
[supplicando diis nostris]. Trajan adds that anonymous testimony should not be accepted 
since it is a poor precedent and not in keeping with his reign (that is, I think, with the just 
magistracy he practices as Emperor). 
 According to Tacitus, the Christians were abhorred for their crimes; in particular 
they were reproached for their "hatred of the human race." He calls Christianity a 
detestable superstition and remarks its spread.  Suetonius connects "Chrestus" to sedition 
in Judea and praises Nero for taking action against a new and mischievous superstition.
188
  
Pliny thinks this superstition to be absurd and excessive, but is most concerned about an 
obstinate refusal to worship the gods of Trajan and Rome.  
 Such an attitude toward religion on the part of sophisticated Romans might come 
as a surprise given the famous piety of Rome.  Yet leading Romans were traditionally 
indifferent to the superstitions (as they saw them) of the vulgar and were concerned with 
religion more for its political effects or utility than its truth.  We see this attitude in a 
statement of Gaius Cotta in Cicerořs De Natura Deorum.  In replying to an Epicurean 
account of the gods, Cotta remarks: 
In an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first question that we ask is, do the 
gods exist or do they not?  ŘIt is difficult to deny their existence.ř  No doubt it 
would be if the question were to be asked in a public assembly, but in private 
conversation and in a company like the present it is perfectly easy.  This being so, 
I, who am a high priest, and who hold it to be a duty most solemnly to maintain 
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the rights and doctrines of the established religion, should be glad to be convinced 
of this fundamental tenant of the divine existence, not as an opinion merely 
[opinione solum] but as plain truth [veritatem plane].  For many disturbing 
reflections occur to my mind, which sometimes make me think that there are no 
gods at all.
189
 
 
This remark is especially striking from a pontifex, who was, after all, an official of the 
state.  Cotta very clearly distinguishes his public duty to defend public doctrine and his 
private opinions, which find the existence of gods, let alone any providential care for 
human life, doubtful.  Christianity, from this point of view, is the worst of both worlds--
vulgar superstition without redeeming utility of a civil religion. 
  Transpol i t ical  concerns:   St .  Paul  and Enthusiasm  
 While the Roman pagan reaction shows a practical concern with the spread of 
superstition, the concern that Christianity encouraged excessive enthusiasm can be seen 
even in the testimony of Christians themselves.  As attention shifted away from practice 
toward faith, a new sort of political challenge arose:  that of distinguishing true from false 
revelations.  The ancient policy avoided this concern by treating all revelation as equal--
and equally false, from the sophisticated point of view.  As the enlightenment will come 
to argue, this policy was not equal to the challenge. 
 Even a devout Christian might be concerned about erroneous accounts of 
revelation; indeed, one need only read the New Testament to see evidence for this.  
Excessive "enthusiasm" as it reveals itself in the early Church is reflected in the Pauline 
letters, although I would argue not so much by Paul himself as many late thinkers have 
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argued.  It is, however, seen clearly in the local Churches Paul hopes to instruct.  Many 
examples of what enlightenment thinkers will call "enthusiasm" could be offered, but to 
illustrate this point I will discuss Paulřs First Epistle to the Corinthians.190  According to 
the account found in Acts,
191
  
 Paul visited Corinth on his second mission after a rather unsuccessful visit to 
Athens.  It was at Corinth, during his Second Journey, that Paul conducted a mission 
(from perhaps the winter of the years 49 and 50 to the summer of the year 51), described 
by Luke in Acts 18:1-18. Later, during his Third Journey, he conducted a considerable 
correspondence with the Christian community at Corinth, writing from Ephesus between 
the years 54 and 57, during which time he also paid a brief visit to Corinth.
192
  It should 
be remarked that the people of Corinth were Greeks, some formerly pagan and many still 
pagan; also many of the converts were Gentiles, that is, collectively speaking, non-
Jews.
193
   
 In First Corinthians, Chapter 12, Paul undertakes a discussion of "spiritual gifts."  
Paul begins by claiming "that no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy 
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Ghost."
194
  While Paul traces all professions of faith to the inspiration of God, he also 
seems concerned that such a claim will lead to people to identify all things that they do to 
inspiration by God and, what is more, to make proud claims about the supernatural gifts 
they have received.  He continues, "now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit.  
And there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord . And there are diversities 
of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all.  But the manifestation of 
the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal."
195
  The full diversity of gifts seems not 
to be present at once in every believer.  Some are given wisdom; others knowledge; or 
faith, healing, miracles, prophesy, discernment, or the interpretation of tongues.  "But," 
he writes, "all these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man 
severally as he will."  The full range of these gifts is enjoyed not by the individual 
believer but rather by whole community of believers.  Paul observes that God has set 
some in the church, first with the apostles, secondarily with prophets, thirdly with 
teachers.  "Are all apostles? are all prophets? are all teachers? are all workers of 
miracles? Have all the gifts of healing? do all speak with tongues? do all interpret?"
196
  
Presumably the answer is "no," for he encourages his flock to desire in "a more excellent 
way."   
Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am 
become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of 
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prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all 
faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And 
though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be 
burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Charity suffereth long, and 
is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, Doth not 
behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no 
evil; Rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; Beareth all things, 
believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.  Charity never faileth: 
but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they 
shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away.  For we know in 
part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that 
which is in part shall be done away.
197
 
 
Paul councils that the gift which seems least astonishing from the outside is the truest and 
most valuable to a soul.  Hope for the gift of charity and other gifts may follow; or they 
may not.  He seems to advise the Corinthians not to be disappointed by this, however.  
"Yet in the church I had rather speak five words with my understanding, that by my voice 
I might teach others also, than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue."
198
 
 I take these passages to suggest that as early as 50 years after the death of Jesus of 
Nazareth, some Christians were inclined to a certain "enthusiastic" disposition.  It is a 
very different matter to suggest that the Church taught or encouraged such enthusiasm.  I 
think not, but candor requires noticing that Paul writes of himself that "I thank my God, I 
speak with tongues more than ye all."
199
  Be this as it may, the Enlightenment diagnosis 
of enthusiasm may not do justice to the perennial character of the desire to transcend 
human finitude.  From the classical philosophical perspective, the fact that Christianity 
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draws men away from political life is not altogether bad.  As Shaftesbury himself will 
argue, enthusiasm in the soul of man leads him not only to sectarianism but also to the 
appreciation for "true revelation," including "natural revelations" of order and beauty to 
which the human heart seems to aspire.  The separation of religion and politics might be a 
necessary consequence of the desire of philosophy to transcend political life. 
  Transpol i t ical  concerns:   Just ice human and divine  
 The history of Christian replies to these concerns is itself very complicated, but 
brief mention of perhaps the most influential reply is necessary.  Augustineřs City of God 
against the Pagans undertakes a refutation of the charge that Christians are poor citizens.  
The seriousness of the Roman concern is reflected by the seriousness (not to mention the 
length) of the reply.  In the first ten books, Augustine argues that the political woes of the 
collapsing Roman Empire around 410 AD can be blamed neither on Christianity nor on 
the turning away from the traditional gods of the city.  Rome had always been perverse 
and the pagan gods were hardly good civic role models (books 1-4).  Christianity, in fact, 
could better account for what the traditional notion of fate claimed to explain, and 
anyway, a belief in fate, strictly speaking, would recommend accepting the sack of Rome 
(book 5).  He observes that Rome had always accepted new gods and there was a long 
tradition on the part of the educated class of not believing in the gods anyway (books 6 & 
7).  The best thinkers, that is, Plato and the philosophers, actually held better views than 
the vulgar pagan religion would suggest, and these philosophic views actually are more 
harmonious with Christianity than polytheism (8-10). 
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 Following this, however, Augustine does not quite argue that there are no tensions 
between the duties of a citizen and the duties of a Christian; in fact, he follows Plato, 
Aristotle, Cicero, and others in arguing that the just man and the just citizen are only the 
same in the perfectly just regime.
200
  It is in this claim that Augustine finds his famous 
account of two cities, the City of Man and the City of God (in book 19, especially).  The 
perfectly just city, he claims, is not to be expected on earth.  The City of Man is always 
defective; only the City of God is just.  Augustine claims to recognize the legitimacy of 
both the political community and the Church.  Nevertheless, in calling Christians to be 
loyal to the True City, he might seem to be leading men away from political life just as 
classical philosophy did.  Reflection on the fate of Socrates suggests that there is a long 
precedent for worrying about this sort of "transpolitical" advice.
201
   
 As we shall see in his account of "enthusiasm," Shaftesbury attempts to restore 
just such a transpolitical aim to human life but without an element of "true" revelation.  
Yet given the ability of Christian philosophers to absorb transpolitical ends into their 
account of the highest goals for human beings, one might wonder if Shaftesbury offers a 
reply equal to the theological-political problem.  Shaftesburyřs account of the 
problematic character of Christianity is nearly identical to other enlightenment thinkers.  
He, like Hobbes, regarded Christianity as an unnatural mixture of vulgar religion and 
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philosophy.  Yet unlike Hobbes, Shaftesbury does not propose bringing enlightenment to 
the opinions of people.  To understand why we must consider Shaftesbury's own account 
of religious psychology, especially as it comes to light in his treatment of "enthusiasm." 
Religion in the Characteristicks ,  continued 
  The Psychological Roots  of  Religion: Shaftesbury’s Revival  of  
Enthusiasm 
We have now seen that Shaftesbury shares many elements of the Enlightenment 
account of Christianity.  He agrees especially with the pernicious character of priestcraft 
and he also seems to trace the political trouble with Christianity to a monstrous 
combination of universal philosophic sectarianism and religious practice.  Yet we have 
also seen the beginning of dissent in his desire to distinguish what is natural in opinion 
from what is unnatural.  Like Hobbes, Shaftesbury traces religious zeal to a sort of 
melancholia--what he also calls "ill humour."  Yet it is here that the most profound 
difference in Shaftesbury is found.  Hobbes and Locke see little good in enthusiasm, 
which they do not distinguish from religious zeal; Shaftesbury identifies a noble aspect of 
enthusiasm.  In considering this distinction in types of enthusiasm, we will come to see 
why Shaftesbury prefers the ancient policy to the philosophic solutions of the modern 
projectors Hobbes and Locke.  Shaftesbury is not afraid of being another Renaissance 
because his goals are primarily philosophical rather than political; or rather, they are 
political only because of his understanding of philosophy. 
The engraved plate at the head of A Letter concerning Enthusiasm is a triptych in 
which the central concern of the treatise is anticipated.  We are directed by a page 
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number in the boarder to the opening of section 4, where we read that "the melancholy 
way of treating Religion is that which, according to my apprehension, renders it so 
tragical, and is the occasion of its acting in reality such dismal Tragedys in the World. 
And my Notion is, that provided we treat Religion with good Manners, we can never use 
too much good Humour, or examine it with too much Freedom and Familiarity."
202
 
The center picture of the plate is of a darkened room where two children have 
been imprisoned.  (On the walls are chains and shackles.)  In the background a Greek 
goddess (perhaps Athena) is opening a door to allow light into the room.  The child to the 
left covers his eyes, the other stops his ears.  On each side of this picture are happier 
scenes.  In the left-hand picture, three boys are well-illuminated and at leisure in a 
pastoral scene.  One operates a telescope.  Overhead the sun can be seen shining.  To the 
right, three boys dance to the music of a pan flute.  Overall one can see the different 
consequences of good and ill humor.  Again, taking a cue from the page directions in the 
boarder we learn that "the melancholy way in which we have been taught Religion, 
makes us unapt to think of it in good Humour. řTis in Adversity chiefly, or in ill Health, 
under Affliction, or Disturbance of Mind, or Discomposure of Temper, that we have 
recourse to it. Tho in reality we are never so unfit to think of it as at such a heavy and 
dark hour."
203
  Presumably the imprisoned boys are in just such a circumstance.  
According to Shaftesbury, 
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we can never be fit to contemplate any thing above us, when we are in no 
condition to look into ourselves, and calmly examine the Temper of our Mind and 
Passions.  For then it is we see Wrath, and Fury, and Revenge, and Terrors in the 
Deity; when we are full of Disturbances and Fears within, and have, by 
Sufferance and Anxiety, lost so much of the natural Calm and Easiness of our 
Temper.
204
 
 
As we saw in our consideration of the art of soliloquy, Shaftsbury looks to 
philosophy (and her patroness, Athena) to free men from such terrors and restore their 
natural temper.  Only then can they properly begin to consider "any thing above us."  As 
it turns out, the melancholy way of considering religion is not, according to Shaftesbury, 
the only way.  Once again, the Critic offers several valuable observations regarding the 
alternative as Shaftesbury understands it. 
At the beginning of ŖMiscellany II,ŗ the Critic undertakes a discussion of "our 
Authorřs" review and modification of enthusiasm.  He begins by raising a question about 
the existence of the supernatural.  "WHETHER in fact there be any real Enchantment, any 
Influence of Stars, any Power of Daemons or of foreign Natures over our own Minds, is 
thought questionable by many. Some there are who assert the Negative, and endeavour to 
solve the Appearances of this kind by the natural Operation of our Passions, and the 
common Course of outward Things."
205
 
The Critic playful indicates the Letter concerning Enthusiasm has given him 
pause on this topic.  He confirms in his own experience what Shaftesbury suggests in the 
Letter, namely, "that we all of us know something of this Principle."  The principle in 
                                                 
204
 Ibid., 1.211. 
205
 Miscellaneous Reflections:  Miscellany II, 3.19. 
  190 
 
 
 
 
question is enthusiasm.  According to the Critic, enthusiasm is extremely contagious.  
Merely reading treatises devoted to the examination of melancholy is apt to give rise to 
the passion itself.  For this reason alone, perhaps, the Critic is "led to write on such 
Subjects as these, with Caution, at different Reprises; and not singly, in one breath."
206
  
(One might also consider, however, the indiscrete author discussed in the last part of the 
Miscellaneous Reflections.) 
The Critic is encouraged by another lesson he has learned from Shaftesbury, that 
is, "that there is a Power in Numbers, Harmony, Proportion, and Beauty of every kind, 
which naturally captivates the Heart, and raises the Imagination to an Opinion or Conceit 
of something majestick and divine."
207
  Shaftesbury opens the Letter by recalling 
the ancient tradition of invoking the Muses at the beginning of a great literary endeavor.  
He remarks that this custom has not lost favor in the modern age; still he wonders why 
such an "Air of Enthusiasm, which fits so gracefully with an Ancient, shouřd be so 
spiritless and aukard [sic] in a Modern."
208
  Shaftesbury tells us that ancient poets could 
with greater plausibility "feign an Extasy" here where we cannot.  Since the ancients 
"derivřd both their Religion and Polity from the Muses Art," and actually knew the 
worship of Apollo, such petitions would be received as sincere by their readers, however 
poetic the conceit.  
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Shaftesbury's contemporaries must look for other resources.  Christians, who lack 
generosity when they consider heathen religion, overlook the persistence of a similar 
ecstasy in their own time.  We learn of a Christian prelate who offered "a full account of 
his Belief in Fairys."
209
  A poetřs faith, he remarks, is raised with his imagination.  The 
imagination can still raise genius, although contemporary opinions are an impediment to 
such activity.  Nevertheless, Shaftesbury claims, an author must draw his inspiration from 
somewhere.  Shaftesbury offers the friend to whom he writes as a fit model for 
developing the "better self." 
This prelude sets the stage for Shaftesburyřs discussion of enthusiasm.  After a 
short plea for freedom of raillery and an allusion to the ancient policy toward superstition 
and philosophy, Shaftesbury turns to his own remedy for the "devout melancholy" of 
enthusiasm, good humor:   
Good Humour is not only the best Security against Enthusiasm, but the best 
Foundation of Piety and true Religion: For if right Thoughts and worthy 
Apprehensions of the Supreme Being, are fundamental to all true Worship and 
Adoration; řtis more than probable, that we shall never miscarry in this respect, 
except throř ill Humour only. Nothing beside ill Humour, either natural or forcřd, 
can bring a Man to think seriously that the World is governřd by any devilish or 
malicious Power.
210
 
 
Good humor is the foundation for true religion.  It is ill humor, he argues, that 
leads men to believe "that the World is governřd by any devilish or malicious Power."  
What is more, "I very much question whether any thing, besides ill-humour, can be the 
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Cause of Atheism."  It is good humor, he suggests, that makes a man open to the 
possibility that the world is orderly and beautiful.  Good humor is for Shaftesbury the 
natural disposition of man in the world.  As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
temperament of man is deeply rooted in opinions, whether they be true or fanciful.  
Shaftesbury recommends self-study to separate our natural temper from the acquired and 
often questionable character we form as a result of our contact with society.  He writes, 
it wouřd be well for us, if before we ascended into the higher Regions of Divinity, 
we wouřd vouchsafe to descend a little into our-selves, and bestow some poor 
Thoughts upon plain honest Morals. When we had once lookřd into our-selves, 
and distinguishřd well the nature of our own Affections, we shouřd probably be 
fitter Judges of the Divineness of a Character, and discern better what Affections 
were sutable or unsutable to a perfect Being.
211
 
 
Among other things, the strategy we now recognize as soliloquy would help 
protect men from the contagious character of enthusiasm--what Shaftesbury calls 
"Enthusiasm of second hand."
212
  Resolution of character in the sense discussed in Advice 
to an Author would serve to inoculate a man against the dangers of melancholy "panick."  
In panic, "the evidence of the Senses lost, as in a Dream; and the imagination so inflamřd, 
as in a moment to have burnt up every particle of judgment and reason."
213
  This is 
perfectly harmonious with the account of chapter 2, where we saw that "company is an 
extreme Provocative to Fancy; and, like a hot Bed in Gardening, is apt to make our 
Imaginations sprout too fast. But by this anticipating Remedy of Soliloquy, we may 
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effectually provide against the Inconvenience."
214
  Such ill-humored enthusiasm accounts 
for the horrific description of the Sybil preserved by Virgil as well as other prophets both 
ancient and modern.
215
  Yet Shaftsbury extends the distemper of enthusiasm to include 
more surprising company. 
According to Shaftesbury, Epicurus himself could not do without the imagination 
when attacking superstition.  "It is hard to imagine, that one who had so little religious 
faith as Epicurus, shouřd have so vulgar a credulity, as to believe those accounts of armys 
and castles in the air, and such visionary phaenomena.  Yet he allows them; and then 
thinks to solve Řem by his effluvia, and aerial looking-glasses, and I know not what other 
stuff."
216
  In the case of Lucretius the treatment is more subtle.  Lucretius was convinced 
that "there was a good stock of visionary spirit originally in human nature." While he 
denied that religion was natural, he allowed that men could not be convinced to reject 
supernatural objects outright.  Here, remarks Shaftesbury, "a Divine, methinks, might 
raise a good Argument against him, for the truth as well the usefulness."
217
  Poets--even 
atheistic poets--are as guilty of enthusiasm as the religious.  "Even the cold Lucretius 
makes use of Inspiration, when he writes against it; and is forcřd to raise an Apparition of 
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Nature, in a Divine Form, to animate and conduct him in his very Work of degrading 
Nature, and despoiling her of all her seeming Wisdom and Divinity."
218
 
This observation brings Shaftesbury to a central conclusion: 
enthusiasm is wonderfully powerful and extensive; that it is a matter of nice 
Judgment, and the hardest thing in the world to know fully and distinctly; since 
even Atheism is not exempt from it.  For, as some have well remarkřd, there have 
been Enthusiastical Atheists. Nor can Divine Inspiration, by its outward Marks, be 
easily distinguishřd from it. For Inspiration is a real feeling of the Divine 
Presence, and Enthusiasm a false one. But the Passion they raise is much alike.
219
 
 
According to Shaftesbury, it is characteristic of the human mind to receive the 
world in images through the action of the imagination.  He writes that 
when the Mind is taken up in Vision, and fixes its view either on any real Object, 
or mere Specter of Divinity; when it sees, or thinks it sees any thing prodigious, 
and more than human; its Horror, Delight, Confusion, Fear, Admiration, or 
whatever Passion belongs to it, or is uppermost on this occasion, will have 
something vast, immane, and (as Painters say) beyond Life. And this is what gave 
occasion to the name of Fanaticism, as it was usřd by the Antients in its original 
Sense, for an Apparition transporting the Mind.
220
 
 
Here we find the grave problem Shaftesbury has identified with the "modern 
projectors."  For Shaftesbury compels us to ask whether we rid ourselves of fanaticism 
without doing away with our experience of the fantastic?  This is a serious question.  
When the human mind is too narrow to contain the "ideas or images" it receives, 
"extravagance and fury" is the natural result.  Shaftesbury suggests that this overflowing 
imagination is recognized by men to be something extraordinary.  He writes that 
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inspiration "may be justly callřd Divine Enthusiasm:  For the Word it-self signifies Divine 
Presence, and was made use of by the Philosopher whom the earliest Christian Fathers 
callřd Divine, [that is, Plato] to express whatever was sublime in human Passions."221 
Shaftesbury distinguishes between an enthusiasm born of ill-humor, and a "noble 
enthusiasm," proper to "Heroes, Statesmen, Poets, Orators, Musicians, and even 
Philosophers themselves."
222
  It is here that Shaftesbury remarks that all men know 
something of this principle.  Enthusiasm is known by all human beings, however 
imperfectly.  He nevertheless goes on to caution us against embracing enthusiasm 
naively.  There is only one sure way to distinguish noble and base enthusiasm, and to 
thereby avoid delusion.  "to judg the Spirits whether they are of God, we must 
antecedently judg our own Spirit; whether it be of Reason and sound Sense; whether it be 
fit to judg at all, by being sedate, cool, and impartial; free of every biasing Passion, every 
giddy Vapor, or melancholy Fume."
223
  Self-knowledge as understood by classical 
philosophy--as presented in Soliloquy--is the proper antidote to excessive enthusiasm.  He 
writes that 
this is the first Knowledg and previous Judgment: "To understand our-selves, and 
know what Spirit we are of." Afterwards we may judg the Spirit in others, 
consider what their personal Merit is, and prove the Validity of their Testimony 
by the Solidity of their Brain. By this means we may prepare our-selves with 
some Antidote against Enthusiasm. And this is what I have darřd affirm is best 
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performřd by keeping to Good Humour. For otherwise the Remedy it-self may 
turn to the Disease.
224
 
 
Shaftesburyřs preference for ancient policy is inseparable from his preference for 
Socratic philosophy.  The Critic makes clear that in Shaftesburyřs opinion, the stakes for 
human life are very high: 
Whatever this Subject may be in it-self; we cannot help being transported with the 
thought of it. It inspires us with something more than ordinary, and[31] raises us 
above our-selves. Without this Imagination or Conceit, the World wouřd be but a 
dull Circumstance, and Life a sorry Pass-time. Scarce cou’d we be said to live. 
The animal Functions might in their course be carryřd on; but nothing further 
sought for, or regarded. The gallant Sentiments, the elegant Fancys, the Belle-
passions, which have, all of them, this Beauty in view, wouřd be set aside, and 
leave us probably no other Employment than that of satisfying our coarsest 
Appetites at the cheapest rate; in order to the attainment of a supine State of 
Indolence and Inactivity.
225
 
 
Shaftesbury himself indicates that Plato is the source of his distinction between a 
noble and a base form of enthusiasm, and he points our attention to several dialogues, 
including the Apology, Meno, and Phaedrus.  We can confirm this for ourselves by 
looking briefly at the treatment enthusiasm receives in Plato. 
  Poetry,  Philosophy,  and the Enthusiasm of  Eros  
 Enthusiasm receives treatment in many Platonic dialogues, but its poetic aspects 
are seen most extensively in the Ion and the Phaedrus.  At first these two dialogues seem 
to offer similar perspectives on poetry, especially regarding the divine in the act of 
making a poem.  Poetry is presented again and again as a sort of enthusiasm, literally 
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speaking.  (Enthusiasm coming from the Greek enthousiάzo, meaning literally to be 
inspired or possessed by a god).  In his conversation with Ion, Socrates at one point 
describes the interpretive power of Ion as a mere patient of the Muse.  Unlike other 
artists, the rhapsode seems to not to understand the nature of his own activity.  Ion agrees 
and asks Socrates to explain why this is. Socrates explains: 
as I was saying just now, this is not an art (téchne) in you, whereby you speak 
well on Homer, but a divine power (theía dè dýnamis), which moves you like that 
in the stone which Euripides named a magnet, but most people call "Heraclea 
stone." For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a power 
whereby they in turn are able to do the very same thing as the stone, and attract 
other rings; so that sometimes there is formed quite a long chain of bits of iron 
and rings, suspended one from another; and they all depend for this power on that 
one stone. In the same manner also the Muse inspires men herself, and then by 
means of these inspired persons the inspiration spreads to others (hoúto dè kaì he 
Moûsa enthéous mèn poieî auté, dià dè tôn enthéon toúton állon enthousiazónton 
hormathòs eksartâtai), and holds them in a connected chain. For all the good epic 
poets utter all those fine poems not from art, but as inspired and possessed, and 
the good lyric poets likewise; just as the Corybantian
 
worshippers do not dance 
when in their senses, so the lyric poets do not indite those fine songs in their 
senses, but when they have started on the melody and rhythm they begin to be 
frantic, and it is under possession--as the bacchants are possessed, and not in their 
senses, when they draw honey and milk from the rivers--that the soul of the lyric 
poets does the same thing, by their own report. 
 
The rhapsode does not have a teachable art.  Rather he is moved from the outside, just as 
iron is moved by a magnet.  In this way it is said that a divine power takes possession of 
the rhapsode.  So too with the good epic and lyric poets--they are inspired and possessed.  
Under such possession, men leave their senses and become frantic, much like the 
Corybantian worshipers do, although under such possession they can produce beautiful 
things--draw honey and milk from rivers, as it were. 
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We see the same claim made in the Apology of Socrates, where Socrates remarks 
of the poets "that they do not make what they make by wisdom, but by some sort of 
nature (phusei) and while inspired (enthousiázontes), like the diviners and those who 
deliver oracles."
226
  Poets are able to speak many beautiful things, but they do not really 
know what they are doing.  The reference to nature here is interesting, because Socrates 
seems to suggest that a poetic gift may be natural to the poet; it is unclear how such a gift 
relates to the intellect. 
Near the close of the Meno a similar point is made by Socrates.  There he remarks 
that: 
we would correctly call "divine" all those whom we were speaking of just now, 
soothsayers and prophets and all those skilled at poetry.  And we might assert that 
the political men are, above all these, both divine and inspired, being breathed 
upon and possessed by the god (enthousiázein) when they succeed by speaking 
about many great matters, thought they know nothing of what they say.
227
 
 
In short, one might come away from Plato with the opinion that poets have an ineffable 
gift, perhaps sent by the gods, but one that has little to do with the faculty of reason so 
beloved by a philosopher.  (This view might seem even more tempting given the famous 
"quarrel between poetry and philosophy" at the end of the Republic.
228
)  Poetic 
enthusiasm, from this perspective, might be taken as an inferior experience of the soul 
and without a rational aspect. 
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 At first the Phaedrus too seems to lend credence to this view of poetry.  After 
denigrating the passions, or desire without reason, in a speech he composes on behalf of 
Phaedrus,
229
 Socrates presents as compensation his famous account of love as a sort of 
"divine madness."  The view that madness is divine, that "the greatest of good things 
come into being for us" through it, requires a defense, and Socrates witnesses a variety of 
prophets, including the Sibyl, as examples.  So impressed are the ancients by prophesy, 
he says, that the name for prophesy and madness share in etymology.  (Here it seems 
more important that Socrates is trying to persuade rather than demonstrate, because the 
etymology is a bit questionable.)  Indeed, the ancients testify that "madness coming from 
a god is more beautiful than soundness of mind from a human being." 
 This prophecy, which can reveal to men wisdom otherwise unattainable, is one of 
four sorts of divine madness Socrates mentions.  In addition to prophesy, the gods send 
purification rites, poetry, and love.  The description of inspired poetry here is worth 
considering: 
possession and madness from the Muses, seizing a tender and untried soul, 
arousing it and exiting it to a Bacchic frenzy toward both odes and other poetry, 
adorns ten thousand works of the ancients and so educates posterity; but he who 
comes to poetic doors without the Musesř madness, persuaded that he will then be 
an adequate poet from art, himself fails of his purpose, and the poetry by the man 
of sound mind is obliterated by that of madmen.
230
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This is not such an absurd claim, of course.  Many would-be poets have found that 
merely loving and studying poesy cannot lift a poetaster to greatness.  This seems to fit 
with the other accounts of poetic inspiration weřve mentioned.  And yet we are still at the 
beginning of Socratesř famous account, and this view will have to be modified in light of 
what follows. 
 Socrates warns of the account (namely that madness is divine and a blessing) that 
what he says will be "untrustworthy for the terribly clever, but trustworthy for the wise."  
Here one must grasp the truth about the soul, both divine and human, and such a grasp 
seems to rely on an element of trust (for it to be taken as trustworthy, that is).  After a 
brief argument for the immortality of soul, Socrates introduces his famous image of the 
charioteer.  Regarding the souls of human beings, Socrates describes a condition of 
thwarted ascent by a winged chariot to the realm of true being apart from a cycle of 
coming into being and passing away.  Human beings have had to varying degrees a 
glimpse of true being, but unlike gods, none have spent eternity looking at true things.  
Not all souls fare equally poorly, but "despite their having much toil, all go away 
unfulfilled in respect to the sight of being, and having gone away, they make use of 
opinion for their nourishment."  Human souls, lacking the ability or inclination to follow 
god, become weighed down and lose their wings and fall toward earth and conjoin with 
bestial nature.  Not all souls are equal in their fate:  "the one that has seen the most things 
shall implant in that which will engender a man who will become a philosopher or lover 
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of the beautiful or someone musical and erotic."  Such a soul is most fully human.  As 
Socrates explains, 
a human being must understand that which is said in reference to form, that 
which, going from many perceptions, is gathered together into one by reasoning.  
And this is the recollection of those things that our soul saw once upon a time, 
when it proceeded along with god and looked down upon the things that we now 
assert to be, and lifted up its head into the being that really is. 
 
For this reason, "only the philosopherřs thought is furnished with wings."  The 
philosopher is able to use the glimpses and reminders around him to perfect himself, but 
this activity makes little sense to most people:  "standing back from matters of human 
seriousness and coming to be near the divine, he is rebuked by the many as moved out of 
his senses, but that he is inspired by god (enthousiázon) escaped the notice of many."  It 
is here that we see that love--the fourth sort of madness or enthusiasm--is not only not 
incompatible with the Socratic account of philosophy, but essential to it.  Love furnishes 
wings whenever someone seeing a lower beauty recollects true beauty.  Socrates links the 
philosopher (the lover of wisdom) with the lover of beauty and the musical or erotic 
person.  Most souls recollect very little of true beauty and are less moved that the true 
lover of beauty (that is, the philosopher).  It is interesting to note that the prophet and 
mystic are now demoted to the fifth rank of winged souls, below the king or commander, 
the statesman or businessman, and the lover of gymnastics and doctors.  In the soul of the 
true lover of beauty, the "black horse" of the soulřs chariot, not content to rest with the 
decent opinion of convention (that is, "what is praised by the multitude as virtue"), puts 
the whole soul in motion, moving it toward the beautiful, beloved being.  At its highest, 
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this motion is brought into order through the cooperation of the charioteer and the white 
horse to lead the soul into a "well-arranged way of life and philosophy."  According to 
Socrates, "there is no greater good than this that either human moderation or divine 
madness is capable of providing to a human being." 
 Here Socrates seems to join human moderation and divine madness.  Earlier in the 
Phaedo Socrates playfully describes himself as "a lover of speeches," "one who is sick," 
and as a "Corybantic reveler."  Like all lovers of the beautiful, Socrates is consumed by 
an illness for erotic things.
231
  Socrates has an erotic longing for speeches, which might 
be described as a sort of sickness insofar as it betrays a longing for wisdom or knowledge 
rather than the confident possession of wisdom as a guide to life.  Yet this erotic longing 
is also that which keeps him in motion toward the beautiful, beginning with the beauty 
displayed even in the realm of coming to be, but ascending toward the idea of true beauty 
itself.  In the words of Diotima in the Symposium,  
beginning from these beautiful things here, always to proceed on up for the sake 
of that beauty, using these beautiful things here as steps:  from one to two, and 
from two to all beautiful bodies; and from beautiful bodies to beautiful pursuits; 
and from pursuits to beautiful lessons; and from lessons to end at that lesson, 
which is the lesson of nothing else than the beautiful itself; and at last to know 
what is beauty itself.
232
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 In the account of Socrates, the enthusiasm of eros is a kind of illness potentially 
leading to tyrannical excess.  Yet Socrates would never have us cured, even if it were a 
possibility.  For Socrates it is the task of philosophy to show man what he really desires 
and to indicate the most likely path to obtaining it. 
  
 The connection between eros and what is highest in human beings informs the 
entire project of Shaftesbury's Characteristicks.  For Shaftesbury, the modern projectors 
are correct to suggest that Christianity tends to diminish liberty and stir sectarian 
violence.  He disagrees with Hobbes and Locke about both the possibility and the 
desirability of eradicating the root of religion he locates in enthusiasm.  Enthusiasm lies 
beneath all aspirations to the divine.  Shaftesbury's classical understanding of human 
nature leads him to prefer the "antient policy" of mitigating the harm of religion while 
permitting philosophy the freedom to correct opinions and investigate nature. 
 When we turn to consider the Moralists we will see that Theocles reintroduces a 
hierarchy of beauty as a ladder to the divine.  Just as Socrates is present to disagree with 
Diotima in the Symposium, Philocles is present to disagree with Theocles.  We will see 
that the presence of two credible characters in dialogue acts to preserve two rival 
hypotheses about the cosmos--theism and atheism.  Keeping both of these serious 
hypotheses alive as genuinely plausible accounts seems to be the condition for the 
practice of soliloquy recommended by Shaftesbury.  For this reason above all, 
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Shaftesbury must challenge the threat of the modern projectors.  In Chapter 4 we examine 
Shaftesbury's critique of this threat. 
 
 
205 
 
CHAPTER 4 
ŖTHE ŒCONOMY OF THE PASSIONS":   
MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND THE DIMINUTION OF THE HUMAN 
General Introduction:  Between the Wolf and  the Dog 
Shaftesbury placed the following quotation from Horace as an epigraph to Sensus 
Communis: 
On the one side a wolf attacks, on the other a dog.
1
 
Insofar as Shaftesbury saw his philosophical project as engaging enemies on two 
fronts, the epigraph could serve Shaftesburyřs work as a whole.  The Characteristicks 
might be described as a defense of common sense against radical attacks from two fronts.  
In chapter 3 we considered Shaftesburyřs account of Christianity.  According to 
Shaftesbury, Christianity is particularly prone to theological ire given the doctrinal 
character it developed from the "unnatural Union of Religion and Philosophy."
2
  
Shaftesbury engages his first enemy--Christianity--on the front first fortified by classical 
philosophy.  (We have yet to discover whether or not this front becomes a Maginot line!)  
By distinguishing between two sorts of enthusiasm, Shaftesbury is able to offer a reply to 
religious zealotry without condemning all higher longings in men.  As a practical matter 
he recommends toleration and ridicule as the best weapons to fight zealotry.  He is able to 
                                                 
1
 Sensus Communis, 1.37.  The quotation is from the second satire of book 2. 
2
 Miscellaneous Reflections:  Miscellany II, 3.51. 
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recommend these weapons because of his confidence that they are available to all 
thoughtful men. 
Yet in Shaftesburyřs opinion, it is not just the religious believers who are 
vulnerable to excessive enthusiasm.  As the Critic of Miscellaneous Reflections reminds 
us, "our Author" asserts "that even ATHEISM it-self was not wholly exempt from 
Enthusiasm; That there have been in reality Enthusiastical Atheists; and That even the 
Spirit of Martyrdom couřd, upon occasion, exert it-self as well in this Cause, as in any 
other".
3
 
The Critic quotes Ralph Cudworthřs True Intellectual System of the Universe on 
the enthusiastic atheist, "that they are Fanaticks too; however that word seem to have a 
more peculiar respect to something of a Deity: All Atheists being that blind Goddess-
NATUREřS Fanaticks."4  As we shall see in chapter 5, Shaftesbury himself holds a divine 
notion of nature, although he is ever concerned to avoid fanaticism in his own devotion.  
According to Shaftesbury, the modern philosopher seems to be especially motivated by a 
kind of "pneumatophobia,"--that is, fear of soul--which makes him adverse to any non-
material explanation of the world.  As the Critic explains, 
řtis indeed the Nature of Fear, as of all other Passions, when excessive, to defeat 
its own End, and prevent us in the execution of what we naturally propose to our-
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 3.42. 
4
 The influence of the Cambridge Platonists on Shaftesbury is discussed in Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic 
Renaissance in England, trans. James Pettegrove (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953), Stephen L. 
Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought", 1640-1740 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), John Arthur Passmore, Ralph Cudworth; an Interpretation (Cambridge [Eng.]: 
University Press, 1951), Chapter 8, Ernest Tuveson, "The Importance of Shaftesbury," ELH 20, no. 4 
(1953). 
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selves as our Advantage. SUPERSTITION it-self is but a certain kind of Fear, which 
possessing us strongly with the apprehended Wrath or Displeasure of Divine 
Powers, hinders us from judging what those Powers are in themselves, or what 
Conduct of ours may, with best reason, be thought suitable to such highly rational 
and superior Natures. Now if from the Experience of many gross Delusions of a 
superstitious kind, the Course of this Fear begins to turn; řtis natural for it to run, 
with equal violence, a contrary way. The extreme Passion for religious Objects 
passes into an Aversion. And a certain Horror and Dread of Imposture causes as 
great a Disturbance as even Imposture it-self had done before. In such a Situation 
as this, the Mind may easily be blinded; as well in one respect, as in the other.
5
 
 
Shaftesbury is as critical of the anti-theological ire he finds in modern philosophy 
as he is of religious zealotry, and it is here he opens a second front.  In running to a 
contrary but equally passionate extreme, modern philosophers depart from the good sense 
Shaftesbury thought essential to decent human life.  What is more, such enthusiasm 
obscures the proper beginning place for contemplation of the world and makes 
impartiality in thought unlikely.  Neither the religious nor the anti-religious position is 
reasonable in this sense: 
řtis plain, both these Disorders carry something with them which discover us to be 
in some manner beside our Reason, and out of the right use of Judgment and 
Understanding. For how can we be said to intrust or use our Reason, if in any case 
we fear to be convincřd? How are we Masters of our-selves, when we have 
acquirřd the Habit of bringing Horror, Aversion, Favour, Fondness, or any other 
Temper than that of mere Indifference and Impartiality, into the Judgment of 
Opinions, and Search of Truth?
6
 
 
The chapter epigraph from Horace captures the predicament of modern men, 
caught as they are caught between the lupine teachings of modern philosophers and the 
                                                 
5
 Miscellaneous Reflections:  Miscellany II, 3:42 in footnotes. 
6
 Ibid. 
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tamer writings of contemporary theologians; Shaftesbury writes the Characteristicks to 
present an alternative to the two enthusiasms. 
 
 
It is clear that Shaftesbury had this predicament in mind from his first published 
writing, the "Preface" to his edition of Select Sermons of Benjamin Whichcote.
7
  In that 
brief essay Shaftesbury anticipated the position he would later elaborate in the 
Characteristicks, namely an alternative to the "unwearied Zeal of present Divines" and 
their avowed enemy Thomas Hobbes.  In the "Preface," Shaftesbury writes of Hobbes: 
this is He who reckoning up the Passions or Affections by which Men are held 
together in Society, live in Peace, or have any Correspondence one with another, 
forgot to mention Kindness, Friendship, Sociableness, Love of Company and 
Converse, Natural Affection, or any thing of this kind; I say Forgot, because I can 
scarcely think so ill of any Man, as that he has not by Experience found any of 
these Affections in himself, and consequently, that he believes none of them to be 
in others.  But in place of other Affections, or good Inclinations, of whatever kind, 
this Author has substituted only one Master-Passion, Fear, which has, in effect 
devour'd all the rest, and left Room only for that infinite Passion towards Power 
after Power, Natural (as he affirms) to All Men, and never ceasing but in Death.  
So much less Good Nature has he left with Mankind, than what he allows the 
worst of Beasts:  Having allotted to us, in the way of our Nature, such 
mischievous Passions as are unknown to them; and not so much as allowed us any 
Degree of their good ones, such as they All are known to have, and are never 
wanting to exert towards their own Kind:  By which Excellency of Nature (so 
little reckon'd upon, in the Case of Mankind) their common Interest is duly 
served, and their Species propagated and maintain'd.
8
 
                                                 
7
 Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, "Preface," in Select Sermons of Benjamin Whichcote (Delmar, New 
York: Scholar's Facsimilies & Reprints, Inc., 1977; reprint, Photoreprint of the 1742 ed. published in 
Edinburgh).  While the Preface was published anonymously, there is no dispute among scholars that 
Shaftesbury is the author of it.  For an account of its publication, see Voitle, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury, 
1671-1713, 111-18. 
8
 Shaftesbury, "Preface," xxv-xxvi. 
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Hobbes had indeed been vigorously denounced as an atheist by leading Divines of 
the Church of England,
9
 yet, according to Shaftesbury, "had the same Industry been 
applied to the Correction of his Moral Principles, as has been bestowřd in refuting some 
other of his Errors, it might perhaps have been of more Service to Religion."
10
  
Shaftesbury seems to be less concerned with any strictly Scriptural error Hobbes may 
have advanced, but as we saw in chapter 5, he does recognize a connection between 
religion and morality.  Both the religious and the atheistic zealot make war on virtue by 
teaching that manřs nature is essentially bad.  On the one hand, the Divines were 
suspicious of any claims that human nature is praiseworthy apart from grace.  
Shaftesbury writes in the "Preface," 
some Men, who have meant sincerely well to Religion and Vertue, have been 
afraid, lest by advancing the Principle of good Nature, and laying too great a 
Stress upon it, the apparent Need of Sacred Revelation (a Thing so highly 
important to mankind) should be, in some Measure, taken away.  So that they 
were forced in a manner, to wound VERTUE, and give way to the Imputation of 
being Mercenary, and of Acting in a slavish Spirit, in the ways of Religion, rather 
than admit a sort of Rival (in their Sense to the Faith of Divine Revelation).
11
 
 
                                                 
9
 Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan : Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral 
Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. John Bowle, Hobbes and His Critics : A Study in Seventeenth Century 
Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952). 
10
 Shaftesbury, "Preface," xxv. 
11
 Ibid., xxix.  Consider for example Jean Calvin in Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book 2, Chapter 1, 
on what develops into a doctrine of post-lapsarian total depravity:  "For our nature is not only utterly 
devoid of goodness, but so prolific in all kinds of evil, that it can never be idle.  Those who term it 
concupiscence use a word not very inappropriate, provided it were added (this, however, many will by no 
means concede), that everything which is in man, from the intellect to the will, from the soul even to 
the flesh, is defiled and pervaded with this concupiscence; or, to express it more briefly, that the whole 
man is in himself nothing else than concupiscence."  Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. 
Esq. Henry Beveridge, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1869), 218. 
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On the other hand, opponents of religion had presented a low portrait of human 
nature as part of their strategy to diminish the influence of religion over political life.  By 
presenting man's nature as passionately selfish, modern philosophy hoped to provide 
compelling reasons to obey civil authorities above religious authorities.  In short, 
one Party of Men, fearing the Consequences which may be drawn from the 
Acknowlegment of Moral and Social Principles in Humankind, to the Proof of a 
Deity's Existence, and, another Party fearing as much from thence, to the 
Prejudice of Revelations; each have in their Turns made War (if I may say so) 
even on Vertue itself:  Having exploded the Principle of Good Nature; all 
Enjoyment or Satisfaction in Acts of Kindness and Love; all Notion of Happiness 
in temperate Courses and moderate Desires; and, in short, all Vertue or 
Foundation of Vertue which is left remaining, when all Generosity, free 
Inclination, Publick spiritedness, and every thing else besides private Regard, is 
taken away.
12
 
 
Throughout the Characteristicks, Shaftesbury tries to reestablish the grounds for 
connecting man's nature to life as it is ordinarily lived, that is, within a political 
community.  In this attempt to preserve the sociability of man as a credible philosophical 
idea, he undertakes a critique of modern philosophy, both in its political and its 
epistemological guises.  It is the task of this chapter to explain Shaftesbury's critique and 
the alternative approach he recommends. 
 
 
In discussing Shaftesburyřs response to modern philosophy, it is fair, I believe, to 
gather Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke together under the same totem; in treating them as 
                                                 
12
 Shaftesbury, "Preface," xxx. 
  211 
 
 
 
 
one tribe I follow the lead of Shaftesbury.  While recent scholarship challenges any 
monolithic notion of "the Enlightenment,"
13
 Shaftesbury himself found no fundamental 
differences among the projects of Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke.  It is clear from his 
personal correspondence that by 1694 Shaftesbury had already identified himself with the 
ancients in la querelle des Anciens et des Modernes.
14
  (The first, unauthorized version of 
An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit did not appear until 1699.)  As he explained in a 
letter to his tutor Locke, 
itt [sic; et al.] is not with mee as with an Empirick, one that is studying of 
Curiositys, raising of new Inventions that are to gain credit to the author, starting 
of new Notions that are to amuse the World and serve them for Diversion or for 
tryall of their Accuteness (which is all one as if it were some new Play, a Chess, 
or a Game of cards that were envented.)  Itt is not in my case as with one of the 
men of new Systems, who are to build the credit of their own invented ones upon 
the ruine of Ancienter and the discredit of those Learned Men that went before.  
Descartes, or Mr. Hobbs, or any of their Improvers have the same reason to make 
a-doe, and bee Jealouse about their notions, and Discoveryřs, as they call them; as 
a practizing Apothecary or mountebank has to bee Jealouse about the 
Compositions that are to goe by his name, for if it bee not a Livelyhood is aimřd; 
Řtis a Reputation.15 
 
                                                 
13
 According to J. G. A. Pocock, for example, "we can no longer write satisfactorily of 'The Enlightenment' 
as a unified and universal intellectual movement." J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion: V. 1. The 
Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 12. 
14
 According to Klein, "the relation of "ancient" and "modern" is more complicated and more interesting 
than one of antagonism, as that relation is usually characterized."  Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of 
Politeness, 46-47.Still, as Klein also observes, "though he did not pronounce on the set-piece quarrel of the 
Ancients and the Moderns, it is fair to say that Shaftesbury did value ancient achievement in morals and 
literature more than he valued the modern achievement in natural philosophy and epistemology."  
Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness, 46.  For an argument that the "set-piece" is correct and in fact 
interesting, see Joseph M. Levine, The Battle of the Books : History and Literature in the Augustan Age 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
15
 Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, 151. 
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Shaftesbury, then, rejected the pretense of modern philosophy that it was engaged in a 
radically new project.  Unlike most of his contemporaries, for example, Shaftesbury was 
not interested in the Baconian project to transform nature for the relief of manřs estate; 
nor does he answer Descartes' call for men to become the masters and owners of nature.
16
  
"For my part," he continued, "I am so far from thinking that mankind need any new 
Discoverys, or that they lye in the dark and are unhappy for want of them; that I know not 
what wee could ask of God to know more then wee doe or easily may doe."  Nor was he 
persuaded that man was in his nature asocial:  "If there bee any one who…cannot see that 
hee himself is a Rationall and Sociable Creature by his nature, and has an End to which 
he should refer his slightest actions; Such a one is indeed wanting of knowledge."
17
 
 Clearly Hobbes was one who denied that man was a sociable creature by nature.  
While Hobbes is mentioned only once by name in the Characteristicks,
18
 he certainly is 
to be counted also among those whom Shaftesbury accuses of making "silly 
comparisons" between wolves and men.
19
  So too we must think of Hobbes in the several 
discussions we find of the state of nature doctrine (and which we examine below.)
20
 
                                                 
16
  Benjamin Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon : An Essay on Its Development from 1603 to 
1609, Phoenix Books. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From 
Magic to Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), Jerry Weinberger, Science, Faith, and 
Politics : Francis Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age : A Commentary on Bacon's 
Advancement of Learning (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). 
17
 Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, 151. If he were not a Lord, one might think it impertinent of 
Shaftesbury to take such a tone with his tutor! 
18
 Sensus Communis, 1.56. 
19
 In the Index to the Characteristicks prepared by Shaftesbury himself, we find the following entry:  
"Wolf:  Silly Comparison of Men and Wolves.  i. 88, 93, 118."  These references take us to the mention of 
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 Given the intimate relationship between Shaftesbury and John Locke, it may seem 
strange that Locke is not mentioned by name in the Characteristicks, especially in this 
political context.  One should not conclude from this silence that Shaftesbury was 
impressed with Locke's identification of the state of nature as a condition of peace rather 
than war, as Hobbes would have it.
21
  Unlike some contemporary scholars
22
 who argue 
that Locke substantially modifies or revises Hobbesř state of nature teaching, Shaftesbury 
is more impressed with the effectual conclusion of Locke's state of nature teaching.  
Shaftesbury identifies Locke with Hobbes in a letter to his young friend and protégé 
Michael Ainsworth: 
it was Mr. Locke that struck the home blow: for Mr. Hobbes's character and base 
slavish principles in government took off the poyson of his philosophy. 'Twas Mr. 
Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world, 
and made the very ideas of these (which are the same as those of God) unnatural, 
and without foundation in our minds.
23
 
 
In other words, Shaftesbury thought Locke more pernicious than Hobbes on account of 
the Locke's apparent respectability.  As Jason Aronson suggests in his "Critical Note:  
                                                                                                                                                 
Hobbes.  Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, "'Shaftesbury's Index'," in Characteristicks of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 3.291. 
20
 For the references, which we will explore below, see "Nature, State of Nature, imaginary, 
fantastical…See Society," and "Society (see Tribe, Government)…From the Greatest Opposers of this 
Principle."  Ibid., 3.277; 86. 
21
 John Locke, Political Writings, ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2003), 270. 
22
 Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke : An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two 
Treatises of Government', Chapter 3, James Tully, A Discourse on Property : John Locke and His 
Adversaries (Cambridge, [Eng.] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980).  For an argument against 
this view, see Patrick Coby, "The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian?," The 
Review of Politics 49, no. 1 (1987). 
23
 Shaftesbury, Philosophical Regimen, 403. 
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Shaftesbury on Locke," the silence of the Characteristicks on Locke may be better 
explained by filial piety than acceptance of Locke's account of the state of nature.
24
  In a 
private letter to his confidant General Stanhope, Shaftesbury writes: 
I have ventured to make you the greatest confidence in the world, which is that of 
my philosophy, even against my old tutor and governor, whose name is so 
established in the world, but with whom I ever concealed my differences as much 
as possible.
25
 
 
While he allowed that Lockeřs writings could be useful, especially "against the rubbish of 
the schools in which most of us have been bred up," Shaftesbury had deep reservations 
about Lockeřs philosophical project.  Locke, writes Shaftesbury, was "an ill builder."26  
Shaftesbury professed to Ainsworth respect for Lockeřs treatment of more political 
subjects--"vis., on government, policy trade, coin, education, toleration, &c."--but he 
attacks Locke for his arguments rejecting innate ideas.  "Innate is a word [that Locke] 
poorly plays upon," Shaftesbury wrote to Ainsworth.
27
  Shaftesbury was more candid 
with General Stanhope:  "As for innate principles which you mention, it is, in my 
opinion, one of the childishest disputes that ever was."
28
 
                                                 
24
 Jason Aronson, "Critical Note: Shaftesbury on Locke," The American Political Science Review 53, no. 4 
(1959): 1102. 
25
 Shaftesbury, Philosophical Regimen, 416. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid., 403. 
28
Ibid., 417.  Hume makes a very similar point:  "If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions 
and ideas of  the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, 
whether in opposition to what is uncommon,  artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, contemporary 
to  our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to  enquire at what time thinking 
begins, whether before, at, or after our  birth."  An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, section 2, 
footnote.  
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As some scholars have remarked, Shaftesbury seems to have had Lockeřs Essay 
concerning Human Understanding in mind when he composed parts of the 
Characteristicks, and he seems to be referring to Book I of the Essay here.
29
  Thus 
Shaftesbury dismisses the famous controversy between what come to be called 
"rationalists"
30
 and "empiricists"
31
 over innate ideas.
32
  (As we shall also see, Descartes is 
mentioned by name twice in the Characteristicks and is also a target of concern for 
Shaftesbury.)  He is more impressed that over time human beings in their common life 
form strikingly similar notions about the world.  Shaftesbury looks to classical authors to 
clarify his own opinions here.  For classical authors, the real question was: 
not whether the very philosophical propositions about right and wrong were 
innate; but whether the passion or affection towards society was such; that is to 
say, whether it was natural and came of itself, or was taught by art, and was the 
product of a lucky hit of some first man who inspired and delivered down the 
prejudice.
33
 
 
Again Shaftesbury identifies a kind of fear at work among the detractors of human 
sociability.  Classical authors--even those who, like Epicurus, may have denied that men 
have an innate sociability--were more courageous than modern authors in distinguishing 
                                                 
29
 See John A. Dussinger, "The Lovely System of Lord Shaftesbury: An Answer to Lock in the Aftermath 
of 1688?," Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981).  
30
 See, e.g., Descartesř Rules for the Direction of the mind, Rules 2 & 3. 
31
 See, e.g., Lockeřs Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 1, Chapter 4. 
32
 This is an epistemological dispute, of course.  As we shall see, Shaftesbury is not interested in 
epistemology, at least as it emerges as a branch of modern philosophy.  Shaftesbury is in analytical 
philosophy terms more of an "intuitionist" than an advocate of innate ideas.  His desire to let concerns arise 
from the world may make his appear to modern philosophy as an "empiricist," but it is probably more 
accurate to say that he is a "moral realist" not of the empirical variety. 
33
 Shaftesbury, Philosophical Regimen, 415. 
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nature from convention.  "For the opposers of the social hypothesis in those days were 
not so over frightened with the consequences as to deny every idea to be innate, lest this 
should be proved to be so."  Shaftesbury expresses a similar doubt about the value of the 
innate ideas dispute to Ainsworth, and it is a recurring theme in the Characteristicks as 
well.
34
  To Ainsworth he writes, 
the right word, though less used, is connatural.  For what has birth or progress of 
the foetus out of the womb to do in this case?  The question is not about the time 
the ideas entered, or the moment that one body came out of the other, but whether 
the constitution of man be such that, being adult and grown up, at such or such a 
time, sooner or later (no matter when), the idea and sense of order, administration, 
and a God, will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring up in him.
35
 
 
Both Hobbes and Locke are led astray by their denial that men are sociable by 
nature.  Shaftesbury, following Horace, urges Stanhope to consider species in nature in 
order to see the defect of the state of nature teaching:  "but all of this I must leave to your 
author and you after you have considered him with Locke, whose State of Nature he 
supposes to be chimerical, and less serviceable to Mr. Lockeřs own system than to Mr. 
Hobbes, that is more of a piece, as I believe."
36
  Locke's work is also of a piece with 
Hobbes on the question of liberty and necessity:  "You will be satisfied more in particular 
when you happen to read again what this latter gentleman [that is, Hobbes] has written 
                                                 
34
 For examples:  Inquiry, 25, Enthusiasm, 31, Soliloquy, 218.  Etc. 
35
 Shaftesbury, Philosophical Regimen, 403. 
36
 Ibid., 415. 
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upon the subject of liberty and necessity, and have compared it with Mr. Locke, as well as 
Mr. Locke with himself; I mean his several editions."
37
 
Shaftesbury may have treated the modern projectors as a group in part because of 
an underlying account of philosophy he seems to have held.  In an letter to Pierre Coste 
he writes:  "nor were there, indeed, any more than two real distinct philosophies, the one 
derived from Socrates, and passing into the old Academic, the Peripatetic, and Stoic; the 
other derived in reality from Democritus, and passing into the Cyrenic and Epicurean."
38
  
One philosophy, the Socratic, recommended engagement in political and religious affairs 
because it held that nature was orderly and that human beings have a proper place in the 
cosmos; the other treated society with contempt because it held nature "not so sensible as 
a doting old woman."  The point seems to be more theoretical than historical, for the two 
philosophies are derived from two fundamental alternatives regarding nature.  "The first, 
therefore, of these philosophies is to be called the civil, social, Theistic; the second, the 
contrary," presumably asocial and Atheistic, if not strictly speaking uncivil.
39
  So too, 
then, we shall see that Shaftesbury approaches the modern projectors as a group in the 
Characteristicks, and as revivers of this ancient "contrary" philosophy. 
                                                 
37
 Ibid.  The "several editions" remark probably refers to the fact that the Essay passed through four 
editions in the last fourteen years of Locke's life.  Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, xi. 
38
 Shaftesbury, Philosophical Regimen, 359. 
39
 Ibid.  Shaftesbury argues in An Inquiry that atheism is compatible with virtue:  "As to Atheism, it does 
not seem that it can directly have any effect at all towards the setting up a false Species of Right or Wrong." 
Inquiry, 2.27. 
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Having seen that Shaftesbury holds the political teaching of Hobbes and Locke to 
be essentially the same, we now turn to Shaftesburyřs critique of modern philosophy.  
Taking another cue from our miscellanist-critic, we can learn that Shaftesbury gives an 
extended, if playful, treatment of modern philosophers in his second treatise.  We have 
already examined Sensus Communis for its teaching on raillery; but the ambition of the 
treatise extends beyond the defense of "the freedom of wit and humour."  Shaftesbury, 
the Critic tells us, also "reasons at large in his second Treatise" against certain "over-
frightened anti-superstitious Gentlemen."
40
  Shaftesbury's footnote directs our attention 
to several places in Sensus Communis where the political teaching of Hobbes is 
discussed.  It is the primary work of Sensus Communis to argue against this teaching and 
to recommend to philosophers a more moderate approach. 
The Visible World  
 While Shaftesburyřs criticisms of modern philosophy run throughout the 
Characteristicks, they come to light most clearly in the second treatise. 
41
  As the subtitle 
suggests, the most conspicuous task of the treatise is the defense of raillery, rightly 
understood.  In Chapter 2 I argued that raillery in its highest form is a mode of ironic 
dissembling.  According to Shaftesbury there is a "defensive raillery" which is employed 
by some authors "when the spirit of curiosity wou'd force a discovery of more truth than 
                                                 
40
 Miscellaneous Reflections:  Miscellany II, 3.42 in Shaftesbury's footnotes.  Our attention is directed in 
particular to Sensus Communis, 1.54-57. 
41
 "Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour."   
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can conveniently be told."
42
  This observation, while important, only scratches the 
surface.  Sensus Communis also constitutes a sustained attack on the radical skepticism of 
modern philosophy; both in its style and content, it tries to give modern philosophy a 
taste of its own satirical medicine.  Shaftesbury treats common sense together with 
raillery in order to show his reader that attempts to depart from common sense are 
themselves ridiculous. 
  The Plan and Style of  Sensus Communis  
At the theoretical level, Shaftesburyřs Sensus Communis has the following rough 
structure:  Part I introduces the problem of skepticism through an epistolary dialogue 
with a young friend.  It is in this part that Shaftesbury explains the way an author might 
deploy irony to protect his audience.  Part II, as the Critic indicated to us above, presents 
an extended reflection on the character of modern epistemological and political thought.  
Part III praises the beauties of nature.  This praise is intended to restore our naïve, pre-
philosophical trust that the world is orderly.  According to Shaftesbury such trust is 
naturally present in common opinion when it has not been disrupted by philosophical 
skepticism. 
We learned in chapter 2 that for Shaftesbury it is only the "question and reply" of 
a "free conference" that develops the ability to reason.  For Shaftesbury, as for Plato's 
Socrates, free and good-humored reasoning is a powerful caustic against the "usual stiff 
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adherence to a particular opinion."
43
  As a philosopher, Shaftesbury holds that "the truth 
itself may bear all lights," yet as a friend and tutor he brings a softer light to the 
examination of beloved opinions. 
44
  The humane art of dialogue permits him to take up 
the most serious concerns while protecting his friend, and with him, the reader.  As I have 
already remarked, Sensus Communis is addressed to a morally serious but indignant 
friend.  The friend's indignation arose from the scandal of a confusing philosophic 
conversation, which threatened to tarnish human reason by its failure to reach a certain 
conclusion.  Shaftesbury undertakes his defense of raillery in order to distinguish a 
frivolous sort of ridicule from satire with a serious intent. 
Shaftesbury anticipates that his friend will be skeptical of this praise of raillery.  
He writes:  "you may continue to tell me, I affect to be paradoxical, in commending a 
conversation as advantageous to reason, which ended in such a total uncertainty of what 
reason seemingly so well established."
45
  Shaftesbury notices that his friendřs moral 
qualms arise from his desire to know the truth.  The friend is apparently worried that 
raillery thwarts all attempts to reach solid knowledge by thinking. 
Shaftesbury reminds his friend that in the midst of the many opinions put forward 
and challenged by the gentlemen, each speaker would now and again "take the liberty to 
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appeal to common sense."
46
  Everyone allowed this appeal and each felt confident the 
case in dispute would be decided in his favor.  And while the friends found repeatedly 
that no clear judgment was to be rendered, they nevertheless renewed their appeal to 
common sense on each occasion.  No one thought to challenge the authority of common 
sense until one of the gentlemen asked if someone "wouřd tell him what common sense 
was."  The gentleman observed that, 
if by the word Sense we were to understand Opinion and Judgment, and by the 
word common the Generality or any considerable part of Mankind; řtwouřd be 
hard, he said, to discover where the Subject of common Sense couřd lie. For that 
which was according to the Sense of one part of Mankind, was against the Sense 
of another. And if the Majority were to determine common Sense, it wouřd 
change as often as Men changřd. That which was according to common Sense to 
day, wouřd be the contrary to morrow, or soon after. 47 
 
Now of course disagreement can be found on all serious matters.  In the case of religion, 
"what to one was absurdity, to another was demonstration."
48
  In matters of policy, "if 
plain British or Dutch sense [i.e., republicanism] were right, Turkish and French sense 
[monarchy] must certainly be wrong."  As for morals, there is a great difference of 
"opinions and customs" between barbarian and civilized nations.  Perhaps it is no wonder 
that "some even of our most admirřd modern philosophers had fairly told us, that virtue 
and vice had, after all, no other law or measure, than mere fashion and vogue."
49
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 We can now see that Shaftesburyřs friend may have had good reason for concern.  
The realization that intelligent men disagree with one another about the most important 
matters in life can disturb the confidence we place in our own opinions; one may even be 
tempted to draw the conclusion that all moral opinions are arbitrary or equally false.  
Socratic aporia may be insufficient to address the young gentlemanřs deepest moral 
concerns.  Even the most admired philosophers of his day (those modern projectors) hold 
that virtue and vice are as changeable as fashion.  Here he seems to have Locke, at least, 
in mind.  Drawing again from a letter to Michael Ainsworth, we can see what 
Shaftesbury thought: "virtue, according to Mr. Locke, has no other measure, law, or rule, 
than fashion and custom; morality, justice, equity, depend only on law and will."
50
 
 Shaftesbury himself does not lose his characteristic good humor in the face of this 
challenge.  Instead he praises the friends for their consistent adherence to the liberating 
method of raillery.  They are to be commended, he says, for their willingness to use 
raillery with playful as well as serious matters.  In an attempt to help his friend maintain 
his own good humor, Shaftesbury turns raillieur against the wild application of raillery 
itself.  He will attempt to show that skeptical ridicule of common sense is itself ridiculous 
and thereby restore confidence in the court of common sense.  "The fault is, we carry the 
Laugh but half-way.  The false Earnest is ridiculřd, but the false jest passes secure, and 
becomes as errant deceit as the other…There is nothing so foolish and deluding as a 
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partial Scepticism."
51
  Fortunately the gentlemen proved "more fair in their way of 
questioning receivřd opinions, and exposing the ridicule of things."  Shaftesbury offers to 
follow their example, carrying just raillery throughout and to see "what certain 
Knowledge or Assurance of things may be recoverřd, in that very way, by which all 
Certainty, you thought, was lost, and an endless Scepticism introducřd."  Shaftesbury 
thinks that the modern philosophers--Descartes, Hobbes, Locke--are ridiculous for having 
abandoned a "fair way of questioning receivřd opinions" in favor of a new method, which 
is equally uncertain but far more damaging to the decent opinions of common life. 
  Sensus Communis ,  Part  II:   the Parable of  the Magi  and the Absurdity 
of  Anti-Theological  Ire  
In Part II of Sensus Communis, Shaftesbury asks his correspondent-friend to 
imagine he lived in Persia at the time that the Magi, through "an egregious imposture," 
took control of the Empire.
52
 Carried away by indignation, it would have been easy for 
his friend "to propose the razing all Monuments and Memorials of these Magicians."  But 
suppose that the Magi had collected or written books of philosophy, science, and morals.  
Would the friend have destroyed them, Shaftesbury asks, "and condemnřd every Opinion 
or Doctrine they had espousřd, for no other reason than merely because they had 
espous’d it?"  Not even a barbarian would be so absurd.  As it turns out, the Magi wove 
good and bad opinions together.  What, then, is the sensible response to such a situation?  
"How shouřd we have carryřd our-selves towards this Order of Men, at the time of the 
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Discovery of their Cheat, and Ruin of their Empire? Shouřd we have fallřn to work 
instantly with their Systems, struck at their Opinions and Doctrines without distinction, 
and erected a contrary Philosophy in their teeth?"
53
 
According to Shaftesbury, this is exactly what Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and 
other "modern projectors" have done.  Driven by their pneumatophobia, modern 
philosophers strike indiscriminately in their attempts to destroy all vestiges of 
Christianity.  Since Christendom had woven traditional philosophy into Christian 
doctrine, modern projectors were willing to assail philosophy itself, whereas their real 
quarrel was with Scholastic philosophy alone.  Shaftesbury makes this very point to 
Stanhope: 
well it is for our friend Mr. Locke, and other modern philosophers of his sire [sic], 
that they have so poor a spectre as the ghost of Aristotle to fight with.  A ghost 
indeed! Since it is not in reality the Stagyrite himself nor the original Peripatetic 
hypothesis, but the poor secondary tralatitious system of modern and barbarous 
schoolmen which is the subject of their continual triumph.  Tom Hobbes, whom I 
must confess a genius, and even an original among these latter leaders in 
philosophy, had already gathered laurels enough, and at an easy rate, from this 
field.
54
 
 
As we have seen, while Shaftesbury thought modern philosophers did in fact clear 
away some of the errors of Scholasticism, they carried their attack too far by erecting a 
contrary philosophy.  Shaftesbury identifies "Mr. Hobbes" as one so "overfrightened by 
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the Magi" that "both with respect to Politicks and Morals, he directly acted in this Spirit of 
Massacre."
55
  Having been frightened by abuse of authority in the name of the people, 
Hobbes developed "an Abhorrence of all popular Government, and the very Notion of 
Liberty it-self."  In his one mention of Hobbes by name in the Characteristicks, 
Shaftesbury draws our attention to passages where Hobbes attacks ancient writers for 
praising liberty.
56
  On this point, we can see that Shaftesbury connects Lockeřs modified 
teaching on constitutions, including the balance of powers and rule of law, to Hobbesian 
anthropology.  He writes that 
supposing one another to be by Nature such very Savages, we shall take care to 
come less in one anotherřs power: and apprehending Power to be insatiably 
coveted by all, we shall the better fence against the Evil; not by giving all into one 
Hand (as the Champion of this Cause wouřd have us) but, on the contrary, by a 
right Division and Balance of Power, and by the Restraint of good Laws and 
Limitations, which may secure the publick Liberty.
57
 
 
In the case of religion, Hobbes "had nothing before his Eyes beside the Ravage of 
Enthusiasm, and the Artifice of those who raisřd and conducted that Spirit."58  In moral 
matters, Hobbes portrays "the good sociable Man, as savage and unsociable as he wouřd 
make himself and all Mankind appear by his Philosophy."  In short, Hobbes "did his 
utmost to shew us, 'That both in Religion and Morals we were imposřd on by our 
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Governors; that there was nothing which by Nature inclinřd us either way; nothing which 
naturally drew us to the Love of what was without, or beyond our-selves.'"
59
 
Yet according to Shaftesbury, the practice of the modern skeptic contradicts the 
radical principles he espouses in speculation.  He remarks that Hobbes had humanitarian 
motives for teaching that human beings are naturally selfish; indeed, Hobbes exposed 
himself to considerable personal risk to deliver men from the terrors he saw.
60
  Of the 
"fierce prosecutors of superstition," he writes, "whatever savages they may appear in 
philosophy, they are in their common capacity as civil persons, as one can wish.  Their 
free communicating of their principles may witness for them."
61
  Were the modern 
philosopher actually a thoroughgoing knave, he would keep his teaching secret, all the 
better to prey on his fellow man.
62
  But modern philosophers, "if they have hard thoughts 
of human nature; Řtis a proof still of their humanity, that they give such warning to the 
world."
63
  As we saw in our consideration of the Soliloquy in chapter 2, Shaftesbury will 
not let us forget that the philosopher must justify the activity of philosophy, and that 
justification is impossible without resorting to common life. 
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Shaftesbury is therefore able to suggest that not even the "modern reformer" is 
convinced of the radical skepticism he introduces.  "The Reason, perhaps, why Men of 
Wit delight so much to espouse these paradoxical Systems, is not in truth that they are so 
fully satisfyřd with řem; but in a view the better to oppose some other Systems, which by 
their fair appearance have helpřd, they think, to bring Mankind under Subjection."64  In 
Shaftesburyřs judgment the modern philosopher himself probably does not believe that 
the world is as doubtful as his principles would suggest.  General skepticism is only put 
forward as part of a strategy to combat the "dogmatical spirit" of zealots.  The projectors 
hope to debate more subtly and in safety once men become accustomed to "contradiction 
in the main, and hear the nature of things disputed, at large."
65
 
This strategy may seem sensible enough, and Shaftesbury, qua philosopher, 
would likely have been more sympathetic had such maxims been suggested and received 
without ire.  In playing down the radical character of the modern philosophy Shaftesbury 
seems to be motivated by moral considerations of his own.  He attempts to encourage his 
friend to keep an even temper so that he can judge rationally.  "The only Poison to 
Reason, is Passion. For false Reasoning is soon redressřd, where Passion is removřd.  But 
if the very hearing certain Propositions of Philosophy be sufficient to move our Passion; 
řtis plain, the Poison has already gainřd on us, and we are effectually prevented in the use 
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of our reasoning Faculty."
66
  Yet we have already seen that Shaftesbury distinguishes 
conversations held publically from those held privately.  In public, it seems inevitable 
that such propositions of philosophy would move men to passion.  How is one to react to 
claims such as these: 
that we were the most mistaken Men in the world, to imagine there was any such 
thing as natural Faith or Justice? for that it was only Force and Power which 
constituted Right. That there was no such thing in reality as Virtue; no Principle 
of Order in things above, or below; no secret Charm or Force of Nature, by which 
every-one was made to operate willingly or unwillingly towards publick Good, 
and punishřd and tormented if he did otherwise.67 
 
A scandal is inevitable when modern philosophers openly declare war on virtue.  
Could such "modes of opinions" be vetted in good humor, Shaftesbury would be far less 
concerned.  Given his belief in human nature, it is hard to see where the exact threat of 
such opinions lies.  Indeed, absent imposition by authority and the addling of reason by 
excessive passion, he Ŗcan hardly imagine that in a pleasant way they shouřd ever be 
talkřd out of their Love for Society, or reasonřd out of Humanity and common Sense. A 
mannerly Wit can hurt no Cause or Interest for which I am in the least concernřd: And 
philosophical Speculations, politely managřd, can never surely render Mankind more un-
sociable or un-civilizřd.ŗ68  In the case of morals 
men have not been contented to shew the natural Advantages of Honesty and 
Virtue. They have rather lessenřd these, the better, as they thought, to advance 
another Foundation. They have made Virtue so mercenary a thing, and have talkřd 
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so much of its Rewards, that one can hardly tell what there is in it, after all, which 
can be worth rewarding. For to be bribřd only or terrifyřd into an honest Practice, 
bespeaks little of real Honesty or Worth.
69
 
 
The wolf and the dog show their common ancestry in this mercenary disposition.  
Shaftesbury writes in An Inquiry that a man, 
if in following the Precepts of his supposřd GOD, or doing what he esteems 
necessary towards the satisfying of such his DEITY, he is compelřd only by Fear, 
and, contrary to his Inclination, performs an Act which he secretly detests as 
barbarous and unnatural; then has he an Apprehension or Sense still of Right and 
Wrong, and, according to what has been already observřd, is sensible of Ill in the 
Character of his GOD; however cautious he may be of pronouncing any thing on 
this Subject, or so thinking of it, as to frame any formal or direct Opinion in the 
case. But if by insensible degrees, as he proceeds in his religious Faith and devout 
Exercise, he comes to be more and more reconcilřd to the Malignity, 
Arbitrariness, Pariality, or Revengefulness of his believřd DEITY; his 
Reconciliation with these Qualitys themselves will soon grow in proportion; and 
the most cruel, unjust, and barbarous Acts, will, by the power of this Example, be 
often considerřd by him, not only as just and lawful, but as divine, and worthy of 
imitation.
70
 
 
While Shaftesbury holds that human beings have a nature, it is in their nature to 
develop manners based on their opinions.  Men would, he fears, quickly come to disregard 
virtue should they believe that the only motives to virtue were fear of punishment or hope 
for gain.  Both the modern projector and the religious zealot hold a version of this 
mercenary morality.  (Strangely enough, Shaftesbury seemed to think that Locke held both 
versions of this opinion!) 
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  Sensus Communis ,  Part  III:   the State of  Nature and Man’s Natural  
State 
 "Modern projectors" deny the natural affections which are our universal 
experience.  They would prefer to do away with the natural materials human nature offers 
them so they might "build after a more uniform way."
71
  Shaftesbury observes that "they 
wouřd new-frame the human heart; and have a mighty fancy to reduce all its motions, 
balances and weights, to that one principle and foundation of a cool, deliberate 
selfishness."
72
  All those passions known to a person living in common life to be 
generous in character are presented by modern philosophy in a lower light:  "an honest 
heart is only a more cunning heart: and honesty and good-nature, a more deliberate, or 
better regulated self-love." 
As we saw earlier, Shaftesbury thinks that modern philosophy partly follows in 
the footsteps of Epicurean philosophy.  Epicurus, Lucretius, and the other followers of 
this ancient philosophy of selfishness hoped to improve their happiness by retiring from 
public life altogether.  They held that "the interest of private nature is directly opposite to 
that of the common one, the interest of particulars directly opposite to that of the public 
in general."
73
  Yet they did not go so far as to deny the naturalness of public life--in fact, 
their exhortations suggest quite the opposite:  Epicurus himself "saw well this Power of 
Nature, and understood it so far, that he earnestly exhorted his Followers neither to beget 
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Children, nor serve their Country. There was no dealing with Nature, it seems, while 
these alluring Objects stood in the way."
74
  The modern "revivers of this philosophy," 
however, make no such concession to public affection, and they would deny the word 
natural to social affection.  In this, they are inferior to their ancient forefathers, for "they 
seem to have understood less of this force of Nature, and thought to alter the Thing, by 
shifting a Name."
75
 
As we shall consider at greater length below,
76
 Shaftesbury rejects this 
psychology which tries to reduce all human passions to self-interest, or to fear, or to any 
other "lower" passion, as far too simple to do justice to human experience.  "řTis of too 
complex a kind, to fall under one simple view, or be explainřd thus briefly in a word or 
two.  The studiers of this mechanism must have a very partial eye, to overlook all other 
motions besides those of the lowest and narrowest compass."
77
  Modern philosophy, he 
worries, gives an account of the passions that allows "nothing shouřd be understood to be 
done in kindness, or generosity; nothing in pure of any kind."
78
  This teaching would 
have disastrous effects on virtue. 
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It is this low estimation of man that allows Hobbes to say that "the State of Nature 
was a State of War."
79
  Shaftesbury rejects the contract theory of government because it 
rest on this "ridiculous" notion called "the state of nature."
80
  Contrary to this teaching, 
Shaftesbury claims that man is inclined by nature toward society.  He reports that "in the 
fashionable language of modern philosophy: Society being founded on a compact; the 
surrender made of every manřs private unlimited right, into the hands of the majority, or 
such as the majority shouřd appoint, was of free choice and by a promise."81  But this 
suggests that the promise to respect the civil union is an obligation found in the state of 
nature, that is, prior to the contract itself.  "That which couřd make a Promise obligatory 
in the State of Nature, must make all other Acts of Humanity as much our real Duty, and 
natural Part."
82
  At the very least, it is hard to conceive how such a promise could be 
made by men prior to their living together, for such creatures would not have any of the 
characteristics which accompany social life.  As Shaftesburyřs Theocles observes in The 
Moralists, if it ever were manřs condition to live separately, such creatures would have 
been be "unassociated, unacquainted, and consequently without any language or form of 
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art."
83
  In fact, the "imaginary" creature of man in the state of nature would not be a man 
at all, "for tho his outward Shape were human, his Passions, Appetites, and Organs must 
be wholly different. His whole inward Make must be reversřd, to fit him for such a 
recluse Œconomy, and separate Subsistence."84 
Shaftesbury observes that in speaking of what is natural to man, it seems to make 
more sense to begin by considering the species as a whole--what he calls "the Kind it-
self" rather than the individual creature.
85
  If this is allowed, then insofar as something is 
natural it must also be somehow shared by the kind as a whole.  "If Eating and Drinking 
be natural, Herding is so too. If any Appetite or Sense be natural, the Sense of Fellowship 
is the same. If there be any thing of Nature in that Affection which is between the Sexes, 
the Affection is certainly as natural towards the consequent Offspring; and so again 
between the Offspring themselves, as Kindred and Companions, bred under the same 
Discipline and Œconomy."86  While one can see that there is on occasion a tension 
between what is good for the individual and what is good for the kind,
87
 Shaftesbury does 
not think that they can be separated in a proper account of the human being. 
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  A Return to Common Sense  
 Shaftesbury seems to believe that there is a delicate relationship between the 
natural inclinations toward sociability and their incarnation in the partly conventional 
rules of morality.  This comes to light in his explicit discussion of the term common 
sense, which he presents as a gloss on the remark by Juvenal that "common sense is rare 
in men of high rank."
88
  At first glance, Juvenal seems to threaten the very possibility of 
common sense by suggesting that common sense could be absent among the "nobility and 
court."  According to Shaftesbury, however, "ingenious commentators" take this remark 
in a way that is different from this ordinary reading: 
they make this Common Sense of the Poet, by a Greek Derivation, to signify 
Sense of Publick Weal, and of the Common Interest; Love of the Community or 
Society, natural Affection, Humanity, Obligingness, or that sort of Civility which 
rises from a just Sense of the common Rights of Mankind, and the natural 
Equality there is among those of the same Species.
89
 
 
According to Shaftesbury, Juvenal actually suggests that there is little sense of the 
common good in the court of Nero because there is no real community between a tyrant 
and his courtiers.  The education received by the young at court leads them to have 
"thorow Contempt and Disregard of Mankind, which Mankind in a manner deserves, 
where Arbitrary Power is permitted, and a Tyranny adorřd."90  A public spirit has its origin 
in "a social Feeling or Sense of Partnership with human Kind" which arises only among 
those who live as partners in a community.  It is for this reason that Shaftesbury claims 
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that "Morality and good Government go together."
91
  For Shaftesbury, where there is no 
freedom, there is no authentic community.  Although common sense arises from our 
political experience, and is therefore in a sense learned, its lessons are taught by nature to 
the reason of man.  While such lessons will continually offer themselves to human beings, 
human beings can misunderstand them fairly easily.  It is for this reason, perhaps, that 
Shaftesbury is so concerned about the power of philosophy to confuse men about virtue.  
This is seen in his vigorous response to modern skepticism, but also in his account of 
philosophy offered to Coste:  "As for that mere sceptic, and new Academic" he writes, "it 
had no certain precepts, and so was an exercise of sophistry rather than a philosophy."
92
 
 Shaftesbury claims, then, that human beings are naturally sociable.  So strong is 
the human affection for social relations that even under that worst form of government, 
tyranny, it is natural for men to pay "Allegiance and Duty" to the public order.  
Shaftesbury remarks the good fortune of the Britons, for they had received: 
the Notion of a Publick, and a Constitution; how a Legislative, and how an 
Executive is modelřd. We understand Weight and Measure in this kind, and can 
reason justly on the Balance of Power and Property. The Maxims we draw from 
hence, are as evident as those in Mathematicks. Our increasing Knowledg shews 
us every day, more and more, what Common Sense is in Politicks: And this must 
of necessity lead us to understand a like Sense in Morals; which is the 
Foundation.
93
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Shaftesbury anticipates the more organic notion of the development of the English 
Constitution that Montesquieu and Hume will explore in their work on government.
94
  He 
seems to deny that an abstruse account of the origin of government will make statecraft 
into a clear science. 
Shaftesbury consequently reverses Hobbes by claiming that warfare actually 
arises from manřs natural sociability.  "To cantonize" he writes, "is natural."95  Men are 
naturally inclined to associate, but the good of all human kind in general is too remote a 
"philosophical object" for them to apprehend readily.
96
  While they naturally have a taste 
for a good that is beyond their narrow self-interest, "unless corrected by right reason" 
human beings also tend to associate in bands of smaller scope than a body politic.  "Thus 
the social aim is disturbřd, for want of certain scope."97  Shaftesbury offers as evidence of 
the natural instinct for confederation the fact that "the knot of fellowship is closest 
drawn" in war.  The "associating genius of man" is proven by the very existence of the 
spirit of faction, which Shaftesbury holds to be "the abuse or irregularity of that social 
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love, and common affection, which is natural to man."
98
  One might say that Shaftesbury 
finds here that the apparent exception actually proves the rule of sociability. 
While he was a great admirer of Marcus Aurelius and the Emperor Justin, 
Shaftesbury is skeptical of the ability of philosophy and political power to be joined 
wisely.  He does not seem to think it is the job of philosophy to provide the full 
correction of scope to the body politic, and remains content to turn philosophy toward the 
consideration of morals in the individual soul.  In a discussion of royal authors of the 
past, for example, Shaftesbury remarks, "whatever Crowns or Laurels their renownřd 
Predecessors may have gatherřd in this Field of Honour; I shouřd think that for the future, 
the speculative Province might more properly be committed to private Heads."
99
 
As we have mentioned, Shaftesbury is forced to defend the natural sociability of 
man and the virtues which arise within society because of the corrupting power of 
philosophy.  He congratulates his correspondent-friend on the fact that his own education 
involved little of the "Philosophy, or Philosophers of our days."
100
  There was a time 
when the best youth could safely be entrusted to philosophy with the confidence that they 
would learn "right Practice of the World, or a just Knowledg of Men and Things," but it 
is no longer so.
101
  Had Shaftesburyřs friend learned ethics and politics from modern 
philosophers, he writes, "I shouřd never have thought of writing a word to you upon 
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Common Sense, or the Love of Mankind."
102
  Apparently, those teachings present a 
serious impediment to approaching moral life naturally.  Contrary to the instrumentalist 
or selfish system of morals, the gentleman loves virtue for its own sake rather than for 
some future reward or fear of reprisal.  Shaftesbury, as we have seen, sees both 
Christianity and modern philosophy as threats to this natural perspective of the 
gentleman.  A gentleman who asks "why I wouřd avoid being nasty, when nobody was 
present?" is no gentleman.  Shaftesbury thinks that this cynical question is more likely to 
arise for the person educated by modern philosophy than for a person guided by common 
sense: 
the truth is; as Notions stand now in the world, with respect to Morals, Honesty is 
like to gain little by Philosophy, or deep Speculations of any kind. In the main, 
řtis best to stick to Common Sense, and go no further. Mens first Thoughts, in this 
matter, are generally better than their second: their natural Notions better than 
those refinřd by Study, or Consultation with Casuists. According to common 
Speech, as well as common Sense, Honesty is the best Policy: But according to 
refinřd Sense, the only well-advis’d Persons, as to this World, are errant 
Knaves.
103
 
 
Shaftesbury recommends the sober use of raillery to counterbalance the confusion 
found in common life (both the confusion indigenous to common life and those forms 
bred by Christianity and uncivil philosophy).  In recollection of his discussion of just 
raillery and in anticipation of Soliloquy, he writes: 
řtis in reality a serious Study, to learn to temper and regulate that Humour which 
Nature has given us, as a more lenitive Remedy against Vice, and a kind of 
Specifick against Superstition and melancholy Delusion. There is a great 
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difference between seeking how to raise a Laugh from every thing; and seeking, 
in every thing, what justly may be laughřd at. For nothing is ridiculous except 
what is deformřd: Nor is any thing proof against Raillery, except what is handsom 
and just.
104
 
 
The Critic tells us near the close of the Characteristicks that "IT HAS been the 
main Scope and principal End of these Volumes, 'To assert the Reality of a Beauty and 
Charm in moral as well as natural Subjects; and to demonstrate the Reasonableness of a 
proportionate Taste, and determinate Choice, in Life and Manners.'"
105
  He seems to 
believe that it is necessary to assert such a reality if the true nature of moral subjects is to 
come to light.  Indeed, should men come to lose their appreciation of the nobility of 
human life, men would come to resemble animals.  Such a view, he fears, might "leave us 
probably no other Employment than that of satisfying our coarsest Appetites at the 
cheapest rate; in order to the attainment of a supine State of Indolence and Inactivity."
106
 
So too is it necessary to assert, at least initially, the reality of a beauty and charm 
in natural subjects, for without such a presupposition of  "a Coherence, a Design, a 
Meaning," there is no possibility of knowledge as it was understood by classical 
philosophy.
107
  This is of course part of the very intention of modern philosophy.  They 
too also understand that "where there is nothing like Nature, there is no room for the 
troublesom part of Thought or Contemplation," and, therefore, no room for the 
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persecution which can arise from disagreement over such matters.
108
  Shaftesbury knows 
this but parts company with them over the character of virtue.  Modern projectors are 
more concerned that "the Habit of Admiration and contemplative Delight, wouřd, by 
over-Indulgence, too easily mount into high Fanaticism, or degenerate into abject 
Superstition."
109
  Ultimately it is the intention of Shaftesbury to show that the cultivation 
of such habits need not run to such extremes. 
Shaftesbury accordingly ends Sensus Communis with an enthusiastic 
consideration of the relationship between beautiful manners and other forms of beauty.  
He directs his speech to those "gentlemen of fashion," 
to whom a natural good Genius, or the Force of good Education, has given a 
Sense of what is naturally graceful and becoming. Some by mere Nature, others 
by Art and Practice, are Masters of an Ear in Musick, an Eye in Painting, a Fancy 
in the ordinary things of Ornament and Grace, a Judgment in Proportions of all 
kinds, and a general good Taste in most of those Subjects which make the 
Amusement and Delight of the ingenious People of the World. Let such 
Gentlemen as these be as extravagant as they please, or as irregular in their 
Morals; they must at the same time discover their Inconsistency, live at variance 
with themselves, and in contradiction to that Principle, on which they ground their 
highest Pleasure and Entertainment.
110
 
 
He introduces this appeal to the most notable and reputable men in the hope of 
keeping alive the possibility that the world itself is an ordered whole or cosmos.
111
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Common sense, he believes, has a natural appreciation of "those natural Rules of 
Proportion and Truth" which are necessary for there to be natural knowledge at all.
112
  He 
is confident that "rude Nature it-self, in its primitive Simplicity, is a better Guide to 
Judgment, than improvřd Sophistry, and pedantick Learning."113  He therefore turns our 
attention from modern philosophy, with its "wrong…ground of Education" for "Redress, 
and Amendment, from that excellent School which we call the World."
114
 
Miscellaneous Reflections on Terra Incognita  
In Chapter 2 we examined the soliloquy as Shaftesbury's primary model of 
philosophy.  Shaftesburyřs method of soliloquy is a reassertion of the classical search for 
self-knowledge.  As we saw, this approach takes its bearing from the opinions of 
common life, treating them initially as the fruit of naïve but genuinely concerned 
reflection on the world; and then proceeds to distinguish those opinions most in accord 
with nature from cheats and impostors (that is, opinions which by their authority pretend 
to be natural).  Since Shaftesbury begins his inquiry from the perspective of ordinary life, 
human beings are taken to be inevitable participants in his philosophy.  It is through the 
practice of soliloquy that Shaftesbury restores the classical distinction between reason 
and the passions, and, consequently the view that philosophy provides "Mastership in 
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LIFE and MANNERS."
115
  We have now seen that Shaftesburyřs response to modern 
skepticism in Sensus Communis is undertaken both for the sake of and through an appeal 
to common sense.  Both of these claims stand in contrast to the modern approach, which 
might be said to examine human beings as objects in nature, generally by placing them in 
a system built up from ideas we can grasp clearly and distinctly, but which are remote 
from our daily experience.  Throughout the Characteristicks, Shaftesbury detracts from 
the abstruse method inaugurated by Descartesř Discourse on the Method, Meditations on 
First Philosophy, as well as by Lockeřs Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  He 
writes in Soliloquy that 
the Philosopher, who pretends to be wholly taken up in considering his higher 
Facultys, and examining the Powers and Principles of his Understanding; if in 
reality his Philosophy be foreign to the Matter professřd; if it goes beside the 
mark, and reaches nothing we can truly call our Interest or Concern; it must be 
somewhat worse than mere Ignorance or Idiotism. The most ingenious way of 
becoming foolish, is by a System. And the surest Method to prevent good Sense, 
is to set up something in the room of it. The liker any thing is to Wisdom, if it be 
not plainly the thing it-self, the more directly it becomes its opposite.
116
 
 
Philosophical systems are foolish insofar as they obscure access to the very thing 
they were erected to examine.  When discussing the modern philosophers here, 
Shaftesbury finds little reason to distinguish them from the medieval scholastic 
philosophers they despise. 
According to Shaftesbury, modern philosophers prefer the terra incognita of 
epistemology to what Shaftesbury himself holds to be the plain forms suggested by the 
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visible world.  Since he denies the modern approach will actually reveal human nature--
which, ultimately, must also be understood from the perspective of human beings and 
common sense--Shaftesburyřs reply to modern philosophy will be dialectical rather than 
demonstrative.  He makes it clear, however, that he understands the claims made by the 
projectors.  "What can one do?" he asks, 
or how dispense with these darker Disquisitions and Moon-light Voyages, when 
we have to deal with a sort of Moon-blind Wits, who tho very acute and able in 
their kind, may be said to renounce Day-light, and extinguish, in a manner, the 
bright visible outward World, by allowing us to know nothing beside what we can 
prove, by strict and formal Demonstration?
117
 
 
Motivated by pneumatophobia, modern projectors introduced a method to 
undermine all teachings on soul and form.  Shaftesbury himself admits that certain 
sublime philosophers (Plato, for example) used the superstitious opinions of common life 
in their presentation.
118
  Yet for Shaftesbury, the modern method of self-reflection is itself 
an impediment to genuine self-knowledge. 
We get a glimpse of Shaftesburyřs understanding of the modern epistemological 
project in the Criticřs discussion of An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit.119  In 
ŖMiscellany IVŗ we encounter the radical skepticism of Descartes directly (if not fully).  
Before entering into an examination of what he has called Shaftesburyřs "principal 
performance," namely The Moralist, the Critic playfully laments that Ŗwe have here no 
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other part left us, than to enter into the dry Philosophy, and rigid Manner of our Author; 
without any Excursions into various Literature; without help from the Comick or Tragick 
Muse, or from the Flowers of Poetry or Rhetorick.ŗ120 
So foreboding does the task seem at the moment, however, that the Critic goes so 
far as to suggest that the "more humourous Reader fore-knowing, may immediately, if he 
pleases, turn over; skipping (as is usual in many grave Works) a Chapter or two, as he 
proceeds."
121
  The Critic promises to help clear the palate later with more cheerful fare.  
An Inquiry, apparently, is intended for the more serious reader.  The Critic remarks:  "to 
the patient and grave Reader, therefore, who in order to moralize, can afford to retire into 
his Closet, as to some religious or devout Exercise, we presume thus to offer a few 
Reflections, in the support of our Authorřs profound Inquiry."122 
The Critic begins by summarizing the concern that would have motivated "our 
Author" to undertake the Inquiry of the fourth treatise: 
HOW LITTLE regard soever may be shewn to that moral Speculation or Inquiry, 
which we call the Study of our-selves; it must, in strictness, be yielded, That all 
Knowledg whatsoever depends upon this previous-one: "And that we can in 
reality be assurřd of nothing, till we are first assurřd of What we are Our-selves." 
For by this alone we can know what Certainty and Assurance is. 
 
But what does it mean to study ourselves?  We can see already that our study of 
the Soliloquy; or Advice to an Author is likely to have been necessary preparation for 
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understanding what Shaftesbury means by self-knowledge.  (This is also reflected in the 
remark of the Critic that the "grave reader" will retire to his closet to engage in this sort of 
moral inquiry.)  One reason for the Criticřs warning does not become clear until the 
second chapter of ŖMiscellany IV,ŗ where he suggests that the reader passes back "from 
Terra Incognita to the visible World."
123
  In the first chapter of the miscellany, however, 
the Critic must lead us into the dark internal landscape of the mind and the passions.  We 
stand at the beginning point for modern philosophical inquiry.  Such terra incognita must 
be distinguished from another way of encountering the passions, which Shaftesbury will 
demonstrate in An Inquiry.  First, however, the Criticřs summary considers the 
philosopher taken by many to be the father of "modern projectors," René Descartes. 
  Ego-i ty  and Identity 
The Critic begins his exploration thus: "that there is something undoubtedly which 
thinks, our very Doubt it-self and scrupulous Thought evinces."
124
  Shaftesbury 
presumably refers to Descartes' famous statement, "I think, therefore, I am," which first 
appeared in the Discourse on the Method for Rightly Conducting One's Reason and 
Searching for Truth in the Sciences.
125
  (In fact a footnote soon confirms this when it 
directs our attention to "a famous Modern," namely "Monsieur DES CARTES."
126
) 
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Descartes introduced his famous and radical method of doubting in part four of 
the Discourse on the Method and reaffirmed it in his first Meditation.
127
  He did so, we 
learn, in order to find an unshakable foundation for knowledge.  In part one of the 
Discourse, Descartes writes of the philosophy he learned as a youth, that it had "been 
cultivated for many centuries by the best minds that have ever lived, and nevertheless no 
single thing is to be found in it which is not subject of dispute, and in consequence is not 
dubious."
128
  Descartes compares the status of the sciences under the influence of school-
philosophy to a building with poorly planned additions or a city erected over a long time 
without the benefit of a master plan: 
Thus we see that buildings planned and carried out by one architect alone are 
usually more beautiful and better proportioned than those which many have tried 
to put in order and improve, making use of old walls which were built with other 
ends in view.  In the same way also, those ancient cities, which originally mere 
villages, have become in the process of time great towns, are usually badly 
constructed in comparison with those which are regularly laid out on a plain by a 
surveyor who is free to follow his own ideas.
129
 
 
As for the opinions he had learned from common life, they were filled with errors 
and accidental truths.  "Since it has for long fallen to us to be governed by our appetites 
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and by our teachers…it is almost impossible that our judgments should be so excellent or 
solid as they should have been had we had complete use of our reason since our birth, and 
had we been guided by its means alone."
130
  As a remedy to these problems, Descartes 
resolves "to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be so:  that is to 
say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments, and accepting in them 
nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could 
have no occasion to doubt it."
131
   
Descartes is clearly aware that such a principle would pose a danger to common 
life.  He admits that "we do not find that all the houses in a town are razed to the ground 
for the sole reason that the town is to be rebuilt in another fashion, with streets made 
more beautiful."
132
  This would be an extraordinarily ambitious and dangerous project.  
"In the case of great bodies," he writes, "it is too difficult a task to raise them again when 
they are once thrown down, or even to keep them in their places when once thoroughly 
shaken; and their fall cannot be otherwise than very violent."
133
  Still, there is nothing 
stopping an individual from undertaking such a project in his own life, for we can also 
"see that many people cause their own houses to be knocked down in order to rebuild 
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them, and that sometimes they are forced to do so where there is danger of the houses 
falling of themselves, and when the foundations are not secure."
134
   
Descartes suggests at first that he is content to adhere to common opinion.  For 
example, in section two of the Discourse he writes of the customary opinions of his youth 
that "their imperfections, if they have any (and the mere fact of their diversity suffices to 
assure one that many of them are imperfect), usage has doubtlessly mitigated them and 
has even imperceptibly averted or corrected a great number of them, for which deliberate 
foresight could not have provided so well."
135
  Indeed, he writes, "for a long time I had 
remarked that it is sometimes requisite in common life to follow opinions which one 
knows to be most uncertain, exactly as though they were indisputable."
136
  This is 
especially true in matters of faith and morals.  He consequently formulates for himself a 
"provisional code of morals," which includes the maxim "to obey the laws and the 
customs of my country, firmly holding on to the religion in which, by God's grace, I was 
instructed from childhood, and governing myself in all other things according to the most 
moderate opinions and those furthest from excess that were commonly accepted in 
practice by the most sensible people with whom I would have to live."
137
   
While this is a very sensible course for a person who wants to avoid giving 
offense, it is difficult to reconcile with the principle of radical doubt.  Descartes calls his 
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moral code "provisional," and indeed, he emphasizes the practical utility of his maxims 
rather than their scientific value.  He writes of his moral maxims that they Ŗwere founded 
merely on the plan I had of continuing my self-instruction; for since God has given each 
of us a certain light by which to distinguish the true from the false, I should not believe I 
ought to be content for a single moment with the opinions of others, had I not proposed to 
use my own judgment to examine them when there was time.ŗ138 
For Descartes himself, the moral code he proposes to accompany his method of 
radical doubt is provisional and utilitarian.  His higher duty is to question everything.  
Still, he first presents his project as a private rather than a public matter.  Descartes denies 
that he wants to encourage those "turbulent and unrestful spirits" who are not suited to 
the task of planning grand reforms.
139
  "My design has never extended beyond trying to 
reform my own opinion and to build on a foundation which is entirely my own."
140
  And 
yet why would Descartes publish his Discourse if his ambitions were so private, let alone 
offer it as "the method for rightly conducting one's reason and searching for truth in the 
sciences?"  This is a fair question and one raised by Descartes himself.  In part VI of the 
Discourse, he writes that:  "as long as I had reaped no other fruits from the method which 
I used, aside from my own satisfaction, in regard to certain problems that pertain to the 
speculative sciences or my attempt at governing my moral conduct by means of the 
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reasons which the method taught me, I believed I was under no obligation to write 
anything."
141
  As it turns out, however, Descartes believes his method is especially 
fruitful for the natural sciences, particularly in applied physics: 
As soon as I had acquired some general notions in the area of physics, and, 
beginning to test them on various specific difficulties, I had noticed just how far 
they can lead and how much they differ from the principles that people have used 
up until the present, I believed I could not keep them hidden away without greatly 
sinning against the law that obliges us to procure as best we can the common 
good of all men.  For these general notions show me that it is possible to arrive at 
knowledge that is very useful in life and that in place of the speculative 
philosophy taught in the Schools, one can find a practical one, by which, knowing 
the force and the actions of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens, and all the other 
bodies that surround us, just as we understand the various skills for our craftsmen, 
we could, in the same way, use these objects for the purposes for which they are 
appropriate, and thus make ourselves, as it were, the masters and possessors of 
nature.
142
 
 
As I have mentioned, this Baconian (and Cartesian) project to master nature is 
rejected by Shaftesbury, who as a young man wrote that he was "so far from thinking that 
mankind need any new Discoverys, or that they lye in the dark and are unhappy for want 
of them; that I know not what wee could ask of God to know more then wee doe or easily 
may doe."
143
  Shaftesbury seems to have Descartes' project in mind when the Critic plays 
on the image of an architect to describe Shaftesbury's own project: 
On this account I look upon his Management to have been much after the rate of 
some ambitious Architect; who being callřd perhaps to prop a Roof, redress a 
leaning Wall, or add to some particular Apartment, is not contented with this 
small Specimen of his Mastership: but pretending to demonstrate the Un-
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serviceableness and Inconvenience of the old Fabrick, forms the Design of a new 
Building, and longs to shew his Skill in the principal Parts of Architecture and 
Mechanicks.
144
 
 
It is through this method that Descartes hopes to raze the philosophy of the 
ancients to establish a "firm and permanent structure in the sciences."  (Shaftesbury seems 
to be struck by this claim when he indicates a different way to find "certainty and 
assurance."
145
)  Having established radical doubt as the beginning point of philosophical 
reflection, Descartes too must find a way to reconnect with the world he hopes to explain.  
As he also shows through the movement of thought in his first Meditation--from the 
unreliability of the senses, through the difficulty of distinguishing dreaming from 
wakefulness, to the "thought experiment" of a deceptive, evil genius--Descartes tries to 
bring his reader to a place where he will withhold assent from any view that seems 
dubious.  By the second Meditation, Descartes gives voice to despair that perhaps there is 
nothing which is beyond doubt.  "What then can be esteemed as true?" he writes, "perhaps 
nothing at all, unless that there is nothing in the world that is certain."  It is from this crisis 
that Descartes' famous solution emerges: 
I was persuaded that there was nothing at all in the world, that there was no 
heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies:  was I not then 
likewise persuaded that I did not exist" Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist 
since I persuaded myself of something or merely because I thought of 
something…I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I 
mentally conceive it.
146
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Shaftesburyřs Critic writes on behalf of the Author that this Cartesian claim is 
fine as far as it goes, but that it does not penetrate deeply enough for the person who 
desires genuine self-knowledge.  The Critic writes: 
but in what Subject that Thought resides, and how that Subject is continuřd one 
and the same, so as to answer constantly to the supposřd Train of Thoughts or 
Reflections which seem to run so harmoniously throř a long Course of Life, with 
the same relation still to one single and self-same Person; this is not a Matter so 
easily or hastily decided, by those who are nice Self-Examiners, or Searchers after 
Truth and Certainty.
147
 
 
The Critic expresses contempt for the sophistical circularity of Descartes famous 
"first item of knowledge," the so-called cogito:  I think; I am.  "'What is, is.'--Miraculously 
arguřd! 'If I am; I am.'--Nothing more certain!"148  He then draws attention to the 
philosophic worries that inevitably arise from this method of reflection: 
the Question is, "What constitutes the We or I?" And, "Whether the I of this 
instant, be the same with that of any instant preceding, or to come." For we have 
nothing but Memory to warrant us: and Memory may be false. We may believe 
we have thought and reflected thus or thus: but we may be mistaken. We may be 
conscious of that, as Truth; which perhaps was no more than Dream: and we may 
be conscious of that as a past Dream, which perhaps was never before so much as 
dreamt of.  This is what Metaphysicians mean, when they say, "That Identity can 
be provřd only by Consciousness; but that Consciousness, withal, may be as well 
false as real, in respect of what is past." So that the same successional We or I 
must remain still, on this account, undecided.
 149
 
 
It is here that Shaftesbury seems to turn his attention in part to Locke.  Such 
concerns, now known collectively as the problem of "personal identity," arise from the 
                                                 
147
 Miscellaneous Reflections: Miscellany IV, 3.118. 
148
 Ibid.  
149
 Ibid.  
  253 
 
 
 
 
view that the idea of a person is separable from the idea we have of a human being.
 150
  In 
the words of Locke, a person is: 
a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself 
as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only 
by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, 
essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that 
he does perceive.
151
 
 
By this definition, a parrot might conceivably be a person.  On the other hand, a 
man is merely a sort of animal, "a living organized body; and consequently the same 
animal, as we have observed, is the same continued life communicated to different 
particles of matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organized living 
body."
152
  While common sense might connect or equate the identity of a person with the 
persistence of his "living organized body," Locke insists that personal identity depends 
only on the subjective reflection of a thinking being:  "the same consciousness that makes 
a man be himself to himself."
153
  Known from the outside, man is known corporeally.  In 
other words, only I can have direct knowledge of my personhood.  Also, I can only know 
my own personhood; the personhood of others is merely inferred.  Man, like all corporeal 
substances we identify, is a merely a name for the bundle of sensible (secondary) qualities 
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which customarily hang together because of a characterless, unperceivable substratum.  
Locke writes in a chapter entitled Of Our Complex Ideas of Substances, 
when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, 
stone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or 
collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we used to 
find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet because we cannot conceive how 
they should subsist alone, or one in another, we suppose them existing in and 
supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name 
substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we 
suppose a support.
154
 
 
Our grasp of the substance of "spirit" is no different from this:  "by supposing a 
substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do subsist, 
we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body."
155
 
Leaving aside, with Shaftesbury, the alleged controversy between "rationalists" 
and "empiricists" over innate ideas, we can see that both Descartes and Locke separate 
body and mind, at least conceptually:  body is known first by the perception of extension, 
just as the operations of the mind are known by thinking.  Both philosophers seem to 
separate the inferred form of a thing from whatever "existing" stuff makes it up. 
Shaftesbury portrays the Critic as impatient with such questions.  Both Descartes 
and Locke build up to an acknowledgement that human beings encounter something very 
much like things, and their own thoughts tell them (eventually) that they are themselves 
some sort of thing, albeit a mysterious one.  Indeed, connecting the mind and body 
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inevitably falls back on the recognition of an intuition that mind and body, apart from 
speculation, generally travel together; that is, it leans on our common sense. 
Shaftesbury suggests that unless one is willing to concede that oneřs 
consciousness has some contact with reality, there is no ascending (descending?) from 
the mind to the body or vice versa.  "To the force of this Reasoning I confess I must so 
far submit, as to declare that for my own part, I take my Being upon Trust. Let others 
philosophize as they are able: I shall admire their strength, when, upon this Topick, they 
have refuted what able Metaphysicians object, and Pyrrhonists plead in their own 
behalf."
156
 
 
Shaftesburyřs lack of interest in modern introspection is clear.  His ridicule for 
what he calls "metaphysical" speculation, however, should not be understood as a 
rejection of all philosophy.  As we have seen in chapter two, Shaftesbury presupposes that 
genuine philosophical inquiry properly begins for men where they find themselves, that is, 
in the visible, human world.  As the Critic says here, "for my own part, I take my Being 
upon Trust."  According to Shaftesbury, accepting human beings as they first present 
themselves provides "sufficient Ground for a Moralist.  Nor do I ask more, when I 
undertake to prove the reality of Virtue and Morals."
157 
 We will see when we turn to The 
Moralists in chapter 5 that Shaftesbury by no means suggests that he is abandoning 
                                                 
156
 Miscellaneous Reflections: Miscellany IV. 
157
 Ibid., 3:119. 
  256 
 
 
 
 
philosophy for less noble pursuits; he is, rather, beginning to philosophize at the only 
place available to human beings as such--the realm of common sense. 
  Moral  footing:  Opinions and the passions  
Having glanced at modern epistemology, as he says, "to have a Knowledg in this 
part of Philosophy, sufficient to satisfy him that there is no Knowledg or Wisdom to be 
learnt from it," the Critic turns to modern reflections on the passions or affections.
158
  Just 
as Shaftesbury objects to the reduction of knowledge to a foundation of subjective 
thinking, so he opposes the modern tendency to reduce human passions from the rich 
complexity we encounter in common life to simple drives that are ultimately 
physiological.  The Critic returns his attention to Descartes, this time to the Treatise of 
the Passions. 
In that work, Descartes identifies the primitive passions to which he claims all 
other passions may be reduced.  According to Descartes, this method is very different 
from the approach of traditional philosophy.  As he writes in the 68
th
 article, his own 
Treatise follows: 
the order which seems best to me for reckoning of the passions. Wherein, I know 
very well I digress from the opinion of all who have written before me. But I do it 
not without great cause. For they deduce their numeration thus: they distinguish in 
the sensitive parts of the soul two appetites, the one they call concupiscible, the 
other irascible. And because I understand not any distinction of parts in the soul 
(as I said before), me thinks it signifies nothing, unless that it has two faculties, 
one to desire, another to be angry. And because it has, in the same manner, 
faculties to admire, love, hope, fear, and also to admit into it every one of the 
other passions, or to do the actions whereunto these passions impel them, I see not 
what they meant by attributing them all to desire, or anger. Besides, their 
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catalogue comprehends not all the principal passions, as, I believe, this does. I 
speak here only of the principal, because one might yet distinguish many more 
particular ones, and their number is indefinite.
159
 
 
Contrary to Aristotle's distinction, there are in fact only six primitive passions, "to 
wit, admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness."  All other passions "are 
compounded of some of these six, or are sorts of them." 
There is no question Shaftesbury was familiar with Descartes' Treatise as he cites 
it in Soliloquy; or Advice to an Author.  He writes, 
"the Passion of Fear (as a modern Philosopher informs me) determines the Spirits 
to the Muscles of the Knees, which are instantly ready to perform their Motion; 
by taking up the Legs with incomparable Celerity, in order to remove the Body 
out of harmřs way."--Excellent Mechanism! But whether the knocking together of 
the Knees be any more the cowardly Symptom of Flight, than the chattering of the 
Teeth is the stout Symptom of Resistance, I shall not take upon me to determine. 
In this whole Subject of Inquiry I shall find nothing of the least Self-concernment. 
And I may depend upon it, that by the most refinřd Speculation of this kind, I 
shall neither learn to diminish my Fears, or raise my Courage. This, however, I 
may be assurřd of, that řtis the Nature of Fear, as well as of other Passions, to 
have its Increase and Decrease, as it is fed by Opinion, and influencřd by Custom 
and Practice.
160
 
 
The modern philosopher, we are told, is "Monsieur DES CARTES, in his Treatise of 
the Passions."  For Shaftesbury, human passions do not stand apart from opinion, custom, 
and practice--at least, not without the difficult self-scrutiny recommended in Soliloquy.  
What is more, it is irrelevant to the investigation of the passions as we encounter them in 
common life whether or not they are accompanied by physiological reactions. 
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for instance, if SUPERSTITION be the sort of Fear which most oppresses; řtis not 
very material to inquire, on this occasion, to what Parts or Districts the Blood or 
Spirits are immediately detachřd, or where they are made to rendevouz. For this 
no more imports me to understand, than it depends on me to regulate or change. 
 
Far from distilling the essence of human passions, such an approach neglects the 
thing which makes them human in the first place, namely, opinions.  "But when the 
Grounds of this superstitious Fear are considerřd to be from Opinion, and the Subjects of it 
come to be thorowly searchřd and examinřd; the Passion it-self must necessarily diminish, 
as I discover more and more the Imposture which belongs to it."  Since the passions rest 
on opinions, moral inquiry must ultimately ask about the aims articulated by the opinions 
themselves.  Again, self-knowledge is to be found by taking up the perspective of the 
human world: 
the Examination, therefore, of my Humours, and the Inquiry after my Passions, 
must necessarily draw along with it the Search and Scrutiny of my Opinions, and 
the sincere Consideration of my Scope and End. And thus the Study of human 
Affection cannot fail of leading me towards the Knowledg of human Nature, and 
of My-self.
161
 
 
The Critic, too, moves quickly from what seems to be a parody of Descartesř 
Treatise of the Passions to the importance of opinion.  The Critic writes, "The Affections, 
of which I am conscious, are either GRIEF, or JOY; DESIRE, or AVERSION. For whatever 
mere Sensation I may experience; if it amounts to neither of these, řtis indifferent, and no 
way affects me."  The Critic establishes a sort of formula to parse out happiness:  that joy 
which when present causes grief when absent; and vice versa.  Love, he says is a desire 
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accompanied by hope for the good.  Descartes indicates something similar in his 86
th
 
article, where he finds that: 
the passion of desire is an agitation of the soul caused by the spirits which 
disposes it to will hereafter the things that she represents unto herself convenient. 
So a man not only desires the presence of an absent good, but the conservation of 
a present, and moreover, the absence of an evil, as well of that he now endures as 
that which he believes may befall him hereafter.
162
 
 
Yet mention of the good immediately leads the Critic to opinion.  He argues that 
the good, if absent, cannot but cause the mind regret; something absent which leaves us 
indifferent cannot be called good.  But we have affections toward things we hold to be 
good, whether or not they are so.  He writes, "affection towards it, as suppos’d Good, is an 
ill Affection, and creative only of Disturbance and Disease."  From this observation it is a 
quick movement to the conclusion:  "So that the AFFECTIONS of Love and Hatred, Liking 
and Dislike, on which the Happiness or Prosperity of the Person so much depends, being 
influencřd and governřd by Opinion; the highest Good or Happiness must depend on right 
Opinion, and the highest Misery be derivřd from wrong."163   
Shaftesbury seems to draw on traditional philosophy to call attention to the 
underlying claims of modern philosophy.  In book IV of Tusculan Disputations, for 
example, Cicero and his interlocutors discuss what the Stoics called perturbations or 
disorders of the mind.  The perturbations were considered by Stoics to be appetites or 
passions which removed men from the constancy of reason.  Cicero explains, 
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[Stoics] would have the divisions of perturbations[] to arise from two 
imagined goods, and from two opinions of evils; and thus they became four:  from 
the good proceed desire and joy--joy having reference to some present good, and 
desire to some future good. They suppose fear and grief to proceed from evils:  
fear from something future, grief from something present; for whatever things are 
dreaded as approaching always occasion grief when present.
164
 
 
 Cicero then explains that such passions actually arise from opinions.  He says, 
Joy and desire depend upon the opinion of good; as desire, being inflamed and 
provoked, is carried on eagerly towards what has the appearance of good; and joy 
is transported and exults on obtaining what was desired:  for we naturally pursue 
those things that have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary.
165
 
 
From this it would naturally follow that one would seek to know which of our 
opinions are right and which are wrong.  As we have seen, for Shaftesbury this sort of 
self-knowledge cannot be obtained through a method of reduction. 
Here the Critic returns the "grave Inquirer" to the world with a characteristic 
"fable," the humor of which (he says) makes a moral at the end unnecessary.  He tells of 
two travelling dogs who arrive at the sea shore.  They see offshore the flotsam of a 
shipwreck and convince themselves "by…rhetorical Arguments, after long Reasoning," 
that the wrecked ship contains an unspeakably valuable prize.  Since neither dog is 
practiced at swimming, they decide it would be unwise to go out of their depth to satisfy 
their desire.  Instead they decide to drink the sea that lies between the shore and the 
shipwreck.  The Critic remarks, 
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řtis pretty evident that they who live in the highest Sphere of human Affairs, have 
a very uncertain View of the thing callřd Happiness or Good. It lies out at Sea, far 
distant, in the Offin; where those Gentlemen ken it but very imperfectly: And the 
means they employ in order to come up with it, are very wide of the matter, and 
far short of their proposřd End.166 
 
According to Shaftesbury, it is foolish to try to satisfy desire before thinking 
carefully about the good. 
The Œconomy of the Passions  
  The Plan and Style of  An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit  
The Critic indicates in the second chapter of ŖMiscellany IVŗ that the reader is 
about to make a "passage from Terra Incognita to the visible World."
167
  Even though the 
Critic has "paid sufficient deference" to the "Metaphysical part" of philosophy, he warns 
that hard work still lies ahead.  He writes 
when we are even past these empty Regions and Shadows of Philosophy; řtwill 
still perhaps appear an uncomfortable kind of travelling throř those other invisible 
Ideal Worlds: such as the Study of Morals, we see, engages us to visit. Men must 
acquire a very peculiar and strong Habit of turning their Eye inwards, in order to 
explore the interior Regions and Recesses of the MIND, the hollow Caverns of 
deep Thought, the private Seats of Fancy, and the Wastes and Wildernesses, as 
well as the more fruitful and cultivated Tracts of this obscure Climate.
168
 
 
The Critic suggests that in turning from epistemology to moral questions, 
Shaftesbury is not yet free of the modern projectors.  Having rejected "strict and formal 
demonstration"--that is, the epistemological and moral reduction of the moderns--the 
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Critic draws back to consider morality from a broader perspective.  Heretofore, he says, he 
has tried to proceed on the basis of "our very Perceptions, Fancys, Appearances, 
Affections, and Opinions themselves, without regard to any thing of an exterior World, 
and even on the supposition that there is no such World in being." 
169
 He compares this 
Cartesian approach in philosophy to the Egyptian punishment of the Hebrews: 
Such has been our late dry Task. No wonder if it carrys, indeed, a meagre and raw 
Appearance. It may be lookřd on, in Philosophy, as worse than a mere Egyptian 
Imposition. For to make Brick without Straw or Stubble, is perhaps an easier 
labour, than to prove Morals without a World, and establish a Conduct of Life 
without the Supposition of any thing living or extant besides our immediate 
Fancy, and World of Imagination.
170
 
 
Henceforth, the Critic suggests we should "trust our eyes, and take for real the 
whole Creation, and the fair Forms which lie before us."
171
  This accords with the strategy 
of Sensus Communis, which ends with a praise of moral and visual beauty.  The Critic 
now shifts our attention from the subjective experience of the individual to our common 
experience of human beings in the world. 
In his Soliloquy, Shaftesbury offers his own method for tracing opinions back to 
nature.  Yet an adequate reply to the modern projectors would also involve some account 
of how we can recognize what opinions and passions truly are in accord with nature.  
This concern receives its most extended treatment in An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and 
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Merit, where Shaftesbury explains the context for claiming that the passions should be 
seen as an "oeconomy" or harmonious disposition of parts and the whole.
172
 
Shaftesburyřs Inquiry, then, has the following structure.173  The treatise is divided 
into two books.  Book I, which is itself divided into three parts, compares religion and 
virtue.  After establishing the concerns of the treatise as a whole, part 1 offers a taxonomy 
of possible religious opinions.  Part 2 explains Shaftesburyřs account of the nature of 
virtue.  Naturally enough, part 3 goes on to compare religion and virtue. 
Book II is divided into two parts, and considers what obligation there is for man 
to be virtuous as he has defined it.  To this end, part 1 distinguishes types of affections; 
part 2 examines these types of affections and asks whether they are conducive to 
happiness.  Since the work of this chapter is devoted to Shaftesburyřs reaction to the 
modern projectors, I will only offer an account of Book I here. 
In general one might say that the Inquiry treats the passions (or as Shaftesbury 
usually prefers to call them, the "affections") within the context of the "visible world."  
For reasons we shall see below, he prefers the term affection to passion because it retains 
the presence of mind as a factor in human motivation.
174
  His account of the visible world 
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by necessity arises within that world.  Rather than approaching the world with a posture 
of doubt, however, Shaftesbury offers an account based in common sense, that is, on an 
initial trust in the world as it appears to men in ordinary circumstances. 
  The Visible World:   Systems and Ends  
After a general introduction in Book I, part 1, section 1, of the concerns pursued 
in An Inquiry, Shaftesbury offers a systematic look at religion.  Section 2 has an abstract, 
logical quality.  It sets forth a series of possible opinions about divine matters, divided 
into categories.  The possibilities fall under four main heads, namely:  theism, atheism, 
polytheism, and daemonism.  He begins his inquiry with the broadest horizon imaginable 
to natural reason, the cosmos().  The first distinction to be drawn regarding 
opinions of the divine is whether "in the Whole of things (or in the Universe) either all is 
according to a good Order, and the most agreeable to a general Interest:  or there is that 
which is otherwise, and might possibly have been better constituted, more wisely 
contrivřd and with more advantage to the general Interest of Beings, or of the Whole."175  
If the cosmos accords with order, it seems to follow that "there is no such thing as real 
ILL in the Universe, nothing ILL with respect to the Whole."  Should the world (writ 
large in terms of the "general interest") be orderly, then with respect to the parts of the 
world things are what they seem to be:  orderly.  This opinion would not, of course, 
preclude the possibility that ill would exist with respect to parts of the whole, at least 
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when viewed from the perspective of those parts.  (When seen from the perspective of 
partial interests, we should probably speak of apparent ill.) 
Should there be "real ill" in the world, it would have to come about by either 
design (that is, intelligence) or by chance.  If there is ill by design, one would have to 
conclude that there is "no one good designing Principle."  Either the one designing 
principle is not good, or there is some contrary principle responsible for the existence of 
ill.  Alternatively, if there is real ill as a result of chance, then "a designing Principle or 
Mind, whether Good or Bad, cannot be the Cause of all things."
176
  Presumably chance 
can coexist with mind only if there is room for it to work outside of the control of mind.  
It then follows that either the designing principle is either good but not omnipotent; or if 
omnipotent it is not actually good, for it allowed ill to exist in the cosmos. 
We now have what is necessary for our main categories.  Shaftesbury writes, and 
I quote at length, that: 
Whatsoever is superior in any degree over the World, or rules in Nature with 
Discernment and a Mind, is what, by universal Agreement, Men call GOD. If there 
are several such superior Minds, they are so many Gods: But if that single, or 
those several Superiors are not in their nature necessarily good, they rather take 
the name of DAEMON. 
 
To believe therefore that every thing is governřd, orderřd, or regulated for the 
best, by a designing Principle, or Mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a 
perfect THEIST. 
 
To believe nothing of a designing Principle or Mind, nor any Cause, Measure, or 
Rule of Things, but Chance; so that in Nature neither the Interest of the Whole, 
                                                 
176
 Ibid., 1:6. 
  266 
 
 
 
 
nor of any Particulars, can be said to be in the least designřd, pursuřd, or aimřd 
at; is to be a perfect ATHEIST. 
 
To believe no one supreme designing Principle or Mind, but rather two, three, or 
more, (tho in their nature good) is to be a POLYTHEIST. 
 
To believe the governing Mind, or Minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, 
nor confinřd to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere Will or 
Fancy; is to be a DAEMONIST.
177
 
 
This last category is of special interest in light of what we learned in chapter 2 
about the importance of will and fancy (or opinion).  In his Advice to an Author we heard 
the lesson from the tale of the noble prince:  "let WILL be ever so free, Humour and 
Fancy, we see, govern it."  There, we recall, Shaftsbury offered us a solution to the 
tyranny of fancy in his method of soliloquy: 
By what I can observe of the World, Fancy and Opinion stand pretty much upon 
the same bottom. So that if there be no certain Inspector or Auditor establishřd 
within us, to take account of these Opinions and Fancys in due form, and minutely 
to animadvert upon their several Growths and Habits, we are as little like to 
continue a Day in the same Will, as a Tree, during a Summer, in the same Shape, 
without the Gardřnerřs Assistance, and the vigorous Application of the Sheers and 
Pruning-Knife.
178
 
 
As we saw above, Shaftesbury follows the ancients by connecting fancy to 
opinion.  By setting forth the possible opinions on the divine, An Inquiry is establishing 
the grounds for allowing both religion and moral virtue their proper provenance.  This will 
be accomplished by indicating which opinions are more in accord with human nature, and 
consequently, with moral virtue as Shaftesbury understands it.  The definition of 
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"daemonism," we note, bears a striking resemblance to the Calvinist religious doctrines 
Shaftesbury especially deplored.  (He attributes something like this view to Locke, whose 
sincere if eccentric Christianity he thought made it impossible for him to live or die as a 
philosopher.
179
) 
Since men seldom adhere to their opinions with any constancy, Shaftesbury offers 
a sensible definition for what places men into a category of opinion:  "That alone, 
therefore, is to be callřd a Manřs Opinion, which is of any other the most habitual to him, 
and occurs upon most occasions."
180
  As it turns out, men are seldom pure in their 
opinions, and in fact the opinions concerning the divine may be compounded:  "All these 
both of sorts Daemonism, Polytheism, Atheism, and Theism, may be mixřd.  Religion 
excludes only perfect Atheism."
181
  Constancy may not be a virtue when the opinions held 
are unsound.  Shaftesbury emphasizes that there are indeed perfect Daemonists, who 
offer prayers and offering to a malicious god on account of fear.  His exception here 
indicates how closely connected are melancholia and false enthusiasm for Shaftesbury.  
As we saw in chapter 3, this view is coextensive with religious zealotry. 
Having made it through the "thorny part" of Book I, Shaftesbury turns to the 
subject of An Inquiry proper.  He will ask which of the foregoing opinions is compatible 
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"with an honest or moral Character."  In order to do this, Shaftesbury must first explain 
what virtue is.  This requires Shaftesbury to consider the passions at the level of the 
human species. 
 
Part 2 of Book I opens by identifying the place of human beings within the 
cosmos.
182
  Shaftesburyřs account relies on the identification of kinds or species by 
indicating the end to which nature directs them.  According to Shaftesbury, it may not be 
necessary to have a complete knowledge of "the Whole" for a subordinate part to be 
contemplated.  The Whole seems to be articulated into heterogeneous parts which are 
themselves wholes of a sort.  He writes: 
WHEN we reflect on any ordinary Frame or Constitution either of Art or Nature; 
and consider how hard it is to give the least account of a particular Part, without a 
competent Knowledg of the Whole:  we need not wonder to find our-selves at a 
loss in many things relating to the Constitution and Frame of Nature her-self. For 
to what End in Nature many things, even whole Species of Creatures, refer; or to 
what purpose they serve; will be hard for any-one justly to determine: But to what 
End the many Proportions and various Shapes of Parts in many Creatures actually 
serve; we are able, by the help of Study and Observation, to demonstrate, with 
great exactness.
183
 
 
Each complete part (or "Creature") is known by the fact that it has a "private Good 
and Interest of his own; which Nature has compelřd him to seek, by all the advantages 
afforded him, within the compass of his Make."  Given that each kind has a private good, 
Shaftesbury concludes that "there must be also a certain END, to which every thing in his 
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Constitution must naturally refer."
184
 Based on this claim, Shaftesbury reasons that a 
creatureřs "Appetites, Passions, or Affections" will either accord with its proper end or 
work against it.  It is therefore possible for a creature to be good or ill to others of his 
species and even to be ill himself. 
Now in the constitution of rational creatures, 
the same Irregularitys of Appetite which make him ill to Others, make him ill also 
to Him-self; and if the same Regularity of Affections, which causes him to be 
good in one sense, causes him to be good also in the other; Goodness, then is that 
Goodness by which he is thus useful to others, a real Good and Advantage to 
himself. And thus Virtue and Interest may be found at last to agree.
185
 
 
Why would these irregularities make the rational creature ill to himself as well as 
to others?  Shaftesbury must realize that this claim is controversial, to say the least, for it is 
precisely this that sets the moral teaching of "modern projectors" apart from classical 
political philosophy.  It is the burden of the remainder of An Inquiry to make good on the 
claim that virtue and self-interest can be reconciled. 
Shaftesburyřs first step in this direction is to clarify what he means by goodness 
or virtue.  He begins by imagining a traveler who upon returning from a foreign land 
describes "a certain Creature of a more solitary Disposition than ever was yet heard of; 
one who had neither Mate nor Fellow of any kind; nothing of his own Likeness, towards 
which he stood well-affected or inclinřd; nor any thing without, or beyond himself, for 
which he had the least Passion or Concern."  Common sense would first suspect that 
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happiness would not belong to this creature.  But if the traveler were to insist that the 
creature is, with respect to himself, properly constituted and actually not a monster, we 
would have to concede that insofar as he were a complete but solitary system, he must be 
called good.  But, "shouřd there be any where in Nature a System, of which this living 
Creature was to be considerřd as a Part; then couřd he no-wise be allowřd good; whilst 
he plainly appearřd to be such a Part, as made rather to the harm than good of that 
System or Whole in which he was included."  Shaftesbury indicates here that while 
travelers chronicle the immense variety of kinds to be found in the world, he has yet to 
see evidence requiring a reassessment of the principles of nature he observes at home.  
The Characteristicks makes several references to the travel writings of explorers and 
missionaries so popular among his contemporaries.  In Soliloquy, for example, he 
ridicules the "Incredulity, which fashions the Taste and Judgment of many Gentlemen, 
whom we hear censurřd as Atheists, for attempting to philosophize after a newer manner 
than any known of late."
186
  Shaftesbury finds such gentlemen, who follow the modern 
mode of philosophizing, more credulous than the vulgar.  They have, he writes, "far more 
Pleasure in hearing the monstrous Accounts of monstrous Men, and Manners; than the 
politest and best Narrations of the Affairs, the Governments, and Lives of the wisest and 
most polish’d People."187  He may well have had Locke in mind here.  As he wrote to 
Michael Ainsworth, 
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then comes the credulous Mr. Locke, with his Indian, barbarian stories of wild 
nations, that have no such idea [of God] (as travellers, learned authors! and men 
of truth! and great philosophers! have informed him), not considering that is but a 
negative upon hearsay, and so circumstantiated that the faith of the Indian danger 
may as well be questioned as the veracity or judgment of the relater; who cannot 
be supposed to know sufficiently the mysteries and secrets of those barbarians.
188
 
 
Given the posture of trust, Shaftesbury finds it odd to prefer the exception to the 
rule when reasoning.  Stipulating, then, that nature could produce such a solitary creature, 
Shaftesbury says that the creature would be itself a "private system," and have its own 
proper end in solitude and be good.  Seen as part of a broader system, however, such a 
creature might well be called harmful and ill. 
This insight leads to the interesting conclusion that a whole species of animals can 
contribute to the good of another species.  Such a species would then be "a Part only of 
some other System."
189
  From this broader perspective one can say that predator and prey 
(spider and fly, say) are part of one system:  "The Web and Wing are suted to each 
other."
190
  All life is properly "included in one and the same Order of Beings."  
Shaftesbury describes a system or "Œconomy" of all animals in the way that we now 
casually speak of the "food chain."  He does not say that the fly likes to be eaten by the 
spider; only that their interaction indicates a wider order. 
From here Shaftesbury steps back even further to describe the Earth as a part of 
the solar system or galaxy, until he is able to state that: 
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Therefore if any Being be wholly and really Ill, it must be ill with respect to the 
Universal System; and then the System of the Universe is ill, or imperfect. But if 
the Ill of one private System be the Good of others; if it makes still to the Good of 
the general System, (as when one Creature lives by the Destruction of another; 
one thing is generated from the Corruption of another; or one planetary System or 
Vortex may swallow up another) then is the Ill of that private System no real Ill in 
it-self; any more than the pain of breeding Teeth is ill, in a System or Body which 
is so constituted, that without this occasion of Pain, it wouřd suffer worse, by 
being defective.
191
 
 
Having concluded that the private ill of a system is not sufficient evidence that the 
cosmos as a whole is flawed, Shaftesbury describes the way species of sensible creatures 
are reflective of their "systems" in their internal constitution.
192
  With respect to its 
passions taken as a whole, he calls the posture of a creature to the world its "temper."  
Should there be "an Affection towards Self-Good, as it actually, in its natural degree, 
conducing to his private Interest" while being "at the same time inconsistent with the 
publick Good," this would deserve the name ill.  One would still be saying, however, 
with Hobbes and Locke, that the private good of the creature is incompatible with the 
public good.  This sort of creature he found improbable.  Shaftesbury clearly understands 
that private interests, and therefore the passions, can come into conflict with "the common 
Nature, or System of the Kind."
193
  But having followed Shaftesbury through Volume I, 
though, we are now prepared to approach this apparent problem moderately. 
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Shaftesbury indicates that some self-regarding passions are only a problem when 
they are excessive or immoderate.  Even when a passion is commonly regarded as selfish, 
it may not in fact be incompatible with the public interest; it may actually contribute to 
the public interest.  It would in fact be injurious to the species if individuals wholly 
lacked self-regard.  He writes: 
if the want of such an Affection as that towards Self-preservation, be injurious to 
the Species; a Creature is ill and unnatural as well throř this Defect, as throř the 
want of any other natural Affection. And this no-one wouřd doubt to pronounce, 
if he saw a Man who minded not any Precipices which lay in his way, nor made 
any distinction of Food, Diet, Clothing, or whatever else related to his Health and 
Being. The same wouřd be averřd of one who had a Disposition which renderřd 
him averse to any Commerce with Womankind, and of consequence unfitted him 
throř Illness of Temper (and not merely throř a Defect of Constitution) for the 
propagation of his Species or Kind.
194
 
 
For a sensible creature to be good, it must have a natural temperament such that its 
passions are directed to the general welfare of its species.  "Indeed," he writes, "whatever 
exterior Helps or Succours an ill-disposřd Creature may find, to push him on towards the 
performance of any one good Action; there can no Goodness arise in him, till his Temper 
be so far changřd, that in the issue he comes in earnest to be led by some immediate 
Affection, directly, and not accidentally, to Good, and against Ill."
195
  If the temper of a 
creature is selfish, Shaftesbury calls the creature ill, regardless of whether the temper leads 
to a public or private benefit.  We see once again that, unlike Hobbes and other moderns 
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on the one hand, and certain sectarian Christians on the other, Shaftesbury will not praise 
good behavior when it is coerced or bribed.  He explains: 
for instance; if one of those Creatures supposřd to be by Nature tame, gentle, and 
favourable to Mankind, be, contrary to his natural Constitution, fierce and savage; 
we instantly remark the Breach of Temper, and own the Creature to be unnatural 
and corrupt. If at any time afterwards, the same Creature, by good Fortune or right 
Management, comes to lose his Fierceness, and is made tame, gentle, and 
treatable, like other Creatures of his Kind; řtis acknowledgřd that the Creature 
thus restorřd becomes good and natural. Suppose, now, that the Creature has 
indeed a tame and gentle Carriage; but that it proceeds only from the fear of his 
Keeper; which if set aside, his predominant Passion instantly breaks out: then is 
his Gentleness not his real Temper; but, his true and genuine Nature or natural 
Temper remaining just as it was, the Creature is still as ill as ever. 
 
Seen in the context of his cosmology, Shaftesbury emphasizes the "real temper" as 
opposed to the "breach of temper" in creatures.  A real temper, it seems, can be expected 
to be naturally suited to the place a species finds in the whole.  Not to grant this claim 
would be monstrous. 
Shaftesbury is now ready to consider human beings per se.
196
  It is here that we 
see the introduction of what comes to be called a "moral sense."  Shaftesbury seems to 
mean something relatively modest by this claim. 
  Reason and the Moral  Sense  
Section 3 of Book I, part 2, treats "that which is callřd VIRTUE or MERIT, and is 
allowřd to Man only."197  For Shaftesbury, man's unique sort of goodness is connected to 
his ability to reason.  Shaftesbury writes that "in a Creature capable of forming general 
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Notions of Things, not only the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are 
the Objects of the Affection; but the very Actions themselves, and the Affections of Pity, 
Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought into the Mind by Reflection, 
become Objects."
198
  For Shaftesbury, mental and moral subjects as well as bodies can 
become objects of reflection. Just as objects in the world betray color, shape, and 
proportion to the mind, so in "Behaviour and Actions, when presented to our 
Understanding, there must be found, of necessity, an apparent Difference, according to 
the Regularity or Irregularity of the Subjects."
199
  Through this "reflected sense" there 
arises in men "another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves, 
which have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or 
Dislike."
200
  This second-order affection is, like other human passions, not wholly 
separable from opinion.
201
  In explaining what he means by this, Shaftesbury refers to 
"the Mind," which in this context he calls "Spectator or Auditor of other Minds."  He 
writes: 
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the Mind, which is Spectator or Auditor of other Minds, cannot be without its Eye 
and Ear; so as to discern Proportion, distinguish Sound, and scan each Sentiment 
or Thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its Censure. It feels 
the Soft and Harsh, the Agreeable and Disagreeable, in the Affections; and finds a 
Foul and Fair, a Harmonious and a Dissonant, as really and truly here, as in any 
musical Numbers, or in the outward Forms or Representations of sensible Things. 
Nor can it with-hold its Admiration and Extasy, its Aversion and Scorn, any more 
in what relates to one than to the other of these Subjects. So that to deny the 
common and natural Sense of a Sublime and Beautiful in Things, will appear an 
Affectation merely, to any-one who considers duly of this Affair.
202
 
 
Shaftesbury combines the claim that species have tempers suited to their natural 
"systemic" place in the whole with the claim that fancies and opinions are for men 
generally conjoined to arrive at the claim that man "is capable of having a Sense of Right 
or Wrong; a Sentiment or Judgment of what is done, throř just, equal, and good Affection, 
or the contrary."
203
 
As we mentioned above, the phrase "spectator or auditor" in this context recalls 
terms he used to frame his discussion of firmness-of-will regarding fancies and opinions 
in Soliloquy.
204
  In Soliloquy, Shaftesbury recommends that we establish "within us" an 
"Inspector or Auditor" to judge our fancies.  By dividing the self into two persons, 
Shaftesbury was able to reestablish the classical distinction between reason and the 
passions.  The mention of a spectator is also reminiscent of the language Shaftesbury uses 
to describe the proper work of "Criticism" in Soliloquy.  There, he writes: 
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what is there mortifies the good Painter more, than when amidst his admiring 
Spectators there is not one present, who has been usřd to compare the Hands of 
different Masters, or has an Eye to distinguish the Advantages or Defects of every 
Style? Throř all the inferior Orders of Mechanicks, the Rule is found to hold the 
same. In every Science, every Art, the real Masters, or Proficients, rejoice in 
nothing more, than in the thorow Search and Examination of their Performances, 
by all the Rules of Art and nicest Criticism.
205
 
 
Shaftesbury holds that human beings have a natural tendency to form moral 
judgments based on their "connatural" affections for other creatures, especially those of 
the same species.  Also in Soliloquy Shaftesbury refers to "Criticks by Fashion," who form 
a judgment on mores without having developed his deeper way of considering what is 
natural in opinions.  He offers the following example of this: 
the noble Wits of a Court-Education, who can go no farther back into Antiquity 
than their Pedegree will carry řem, are able however to call to mind the different 
State of Manners in some few Reigns past, when Chivalry was in such repute. The 
Ladys were then Spectators not only of feignřd Combats and martial Exercises, 
but of real Duels and bloody Feats of Arms. They sat as Umpires and Judges of 
the doughty Frays.
206
 
 
For Shaftesbury, our sense of right and wrong is built upon our natural animal 
affections for others of our kind, but susceptible to opinions because of the character of 
reason.  Fashionable opinions are taken up by men from their societies.  "Such is the 
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different Genius of Nations; and of the same Nation in different Times and Seasons," he 
remarks of the fashionable critic in general. 
So too does Shaftesbury draw out the consequences of an "uncertain View of the 
thing callřd Happiness or Good."  Given the relationship of affection to opinions, a 
personřs judgment of right and wrong is vulnerable to "misconception or 
misapprehension."
207
  In thinking about this problem, Shaftesbury draws a distinction 
between mistakes of fact and right, thus: "a Mistake therefore in Fact being no Cause or 
Sign of ill Affection, can be no Cause of Vice. But a Mistake of Right being the Cause of 
unequal Affection, must of necessity be the Cause of vitious Action, in every intelligent or 
rational Being."
208
  Opinions of right are usually informed by the fashionable manners and 
opinions of the times.  An accurate assessment of right and wrong therefore requires "a 
use of Reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the Affections."
209
  As we saw in 
our discussion of Sensus Communis,
210
 Shaftesbury thinks that "Morality and good 
Government go together."
211
 
In section 4 of part 2, then, Shaftesbury draws out the implications of his claim 
that menřs opinions are those they hold habitually and for the most part.  It is significant 
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that according to Shaftesbury, the existence of superstition and pernicious customs or 
opinions, does not per se refute the claim that men have a natural sociability.  He writes: 
thus is Virtue sharřd in different degrees by rational Creatures; such at least as are 
callřd rational; but who come short of that sound and well-establishřd Reason, 
which alone can constitute a just Affection, a uniform and steddy Will and 
Resolution. For it seems evident from our Inquiry, that how ill soever the Temper 
or Passions may stand with respect either to the sensible or the moral Objects; 
however passionate, furious, lustful, or cruel any Creature may become; however 
vitious the Mind be, or whatever ill Rules or Principles it goes by; yet if there be 
any Flexibleness or favourable Inclination towards the least moral Object, the 
least appearance of moral Good (as if there be any such thing as Kindness, 
Gratitude, Bounty, or Compassion), there is still something of Virtue left; and the 
Creature is not wholly vitious and unnatural.
212
 
 
It would therefore be unnecessary to conclude with the modern projectors a radical 
attempt to "new-frame the human heart" is necessary for the restoration of political 
civility. 
Thus Shaftesbury gives a limited endorsement of compassion, which, from a 
classical point of view is considered a vice.  There are indications of Shaftesburyřs 
awareness of this in his personal notebooks.  In light of the classical subordination of 
passion to reason, the etymology is inescapably pejorative to a classical eye.  Yet in this 
context Shaftesbury appeals to the difference between the philosopher and most other 
men that we saw emerge in Sensus Communis.  In the essay Rand entitles "Passions" we 
find the following passage: 
COMPASSION.--To compassionate, i.e., to join with in passion, be passionate with.-
-To commiserate, i.e., to join with in misery, be miserable with.  This in one order 
of life is right and good; nothing more harmonious; and to be without this, or not 
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to feel this, is unnatural, horrid, immane [sic].  How else would the machine 
perform.  For this is meant still of the machine, or what is all one, of the mind, 
nature, or temper, as it is when acting like a machine in the common way of life, 
in animals and men-animals, where there is no better rule than the speciousness of 
the object, nor no other force to act by than that of the  [perturbations] raised 
thence, where the only energy is from pain and pleasure, sorrow and transport.  
Where men are thus light and heavy, airy and clouded, always under the power of 
passion, always passionate, always miserable in their own cases and about their 
own affairs, it would be unequal, unjust, unsocial, and hard not to be so in the 
affairs of others and be wretched too for company.
 
 
This as to one order of life, where this fellow-wretchedness agrees admirably and 
makes so great a part in the order of things, and shows us so fair a side of Nature.  
Hence the union of several species, their mutual relation, sympathy, life.
213
 
 
This order of life stands in distinction to another, higher order.  To that group, "to 
act by temper simply (though ever so good a temper), is in such a one, a loss even of 
simplicity, a quitting of that uniform, self-same, divine, and simple principle, for a 
various, manifold, compound, and changeable one, a composition, mere composition; for 
what else does the word temper signify?"
214
  Most men, it would seem, lack the resolution 
of will and firmness of character so prized by Shaftesbury.  He is content to let men be as 
they are--namely, fairly governed by chance in their passions.  As a practitioner of his own 
art of soliloquy, however, he exhorts himself:  "for thy part remember that Řfor where 
rejoicing is reasonable, there also is congratulation reasonableř" and "in no way 
sympathise, or feel as they feel, when they take either this or the other event (even what is 
unpremeditated) for good or ill."
215
  (Interestingly enough, the allusion seems to be to 
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Epictetusř Discourses Book II, Chapter 5, entitled How magnanimity can be consistent 
with prudence.) 
  Impediments to Virtue:   Rel igion and Virtue Compared  
Shaftesbury now
216
 turns his attention more directly to the overall task of An 
Inquiry, that is, "what Honesty or Virtue is, considerřd by it-self; and in what manner it is 
influencřd by Religion: How far Religion necessarily implies Virtue; and whether it be a 
true Saying, That it is impossible for an Atheist to be virtuous, or share any real degree 
of Honesty, or Merit."
217
 
Having seen that virtue is "a certain just Disposition, or proportionable Affection 
of a rational Creature towards the moral Objects of Right and Wrong," Shaftesbury now 
asks more generally about ways in which religious opinions can interfere with virtue.
218
  
He proposes three possibilities.  First, an opinion could destroy the natural sense of right 
and wrong.  Second, an opinion could pervert this sense.  Third, it can give rise to 
affections contrary to the moral sense. 
In the first case, Shaftesbury finds that the "Sense of Right and Wrong therefore 
being as natural to us as natural Affection itself, and being a first Principle in our 
Constitution and Make; there is no speculative Opinion, Persuasion or Belief, which is 
capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it."
219
  It is a principle of the human 
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constitution that human beings make moral distinctions.  Since this is so, only a powerful 
habit or second nature could counteract the moral sense.  Nature is not so plastic that it 
will be easily opposed by customs.  He writes: 
řTis evident in what relates to the Frame and Order of our Bodys; that no 
particular odd Mein [sic] or Gesture, which is either natural to us, and consequent 
to our Make, or accidental and by Habit acquirřd, can possibly be overcome by 
our immediate Disapprobation, or the contrary Bent of our Will, ever so strongly 
set against it. Such a Change cannot be effected without extraordinary Means, and 
the intervention of Art and Method, a strict Attention, and repeated Check. And 
even thus, Nature, we find, is hardly masterřd; but lies sullen, and ready to revolt, 
on the first occasion. Much more is this the Mind’s Case in respect of that natural 
Affection and anticipating Fancy, which makes the sense of Right and Wrong. 
řTis impossible that this can instantly, or without much Force and Violence, be 
effacřd, or struck out of the natural Temper, even by means of the most 
extravagant Belief or Opinion in the World.
220
 
 
Nature, it seems, "can shift for her-self."
221
  As the Critic remarks in ŖMiscellany 
IV,ŗ Shaftesbury in this holds with Horace that "you may turn out nature with a pitchfork, 
yet back she will keep coming."
222
  Religious opinion, then, cannot destroy the nature of 
man. 
In the second case, however, religion is more efficacious.  Weřve seen that 
customs can oppose nature, and a "Custom or politick Institution" can lead men to 
misapprehend the moral worth of an object.
223
  Shaftesbury says that it is unlikely that 
atheism would erect a "false Species of Right or Wrong," although if it leads men to 
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licentiousness it could lead men to be less attentive to their natural inclinations.  "Corrupt 
Religion, or Superstition," on the other hand, can indeed lead men to praise naturally ugly 
things.
224
 This seems to follow naturally from the strong esteem men have toward their 
notions of God.  He writes in an especially bold passage, 
if there be a Religion which teaches the Adoration and Love of a God, whose 
Character it is to be captious, and of high resentment, subject to Wrath and Anger, 
furious, revengeful; and revenging himself, when offended, on others than those 
who gave the Offence: and if there be added to the Character of this God, a 
fraudulent Disposition, encouraging Deceit and Treachery amongst Men; 
favourable to a few, tho for slight causes, and cruel to the rest: řtis evident that 
such a Religion as this being strongly enforcřd, must of necessity raise even an 
Approbation and Respect towards the Vices of this kind, and breed a sutable 
Disposition, a capricious, partial, revengeful, and deceitful Temper.  For even 
Irregularitys and Enormitys of a heinous kind must in many cases appear 
illustrious to one, who considers them in a Being admirřd and contemplated with 
the highest Honour and Veneration.
225
 
 
This is especially problematic in the case of a voluntaristic notion of the deity, 
such as he attributes to many contemporary Divines as well as his former tutor Locke.  "If 
the mere Will, Decree, or Law of God be said absolutely to constitute Right and Wrong, 
then are these latter words of no significancy at all. For thus if each part of a Contradiction 
were affirmřd for Truth by the supreme Power, they wouřd consequently become true."226 
On the other hand, Shaftesbury claims that "nothing can more highly contribute to 
the fixing of right Apprehensions, and a sound Judgment or Sense of Right and Wrong, 
than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, represented such as to be actually a 
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true Model and Example of the most exact Justice, and highest Goodness and Worth."  We 
have seen in Chapter 2 that Shaftesbury favored the "antient Policy" that there be "a 
Publick Leading in Religion.  For to deny the Magistrate a Worship, or take away a 
National Church, is as mere Enthusiasm as the Notion which sets up Persecution. For why 
shouřd there not be publick Walks, as well as private Gardens? Why not publick Librarys, 
as well as private Education and Home-Tutors?"
227
  This policy recommendation is 
informed by his expectation that people will seldom be "pure atheists."  Given the 
influence of custom and the culture on habitual opinion and the difficulty of true devotion 
to the practice of soliloquy, such a recommendation makes sense.  One must remember, 
however, that Shaftesbury also holds that such a public religion ought to teach without 
coercion. 
Finally Shaftesbury raises the possibility that contrary affections could thwart the 
operation of the natural affections.  Here too Shaftesbury identifies a problem.  While 
some might hold (with Locke at least) that hope of reward and fear of punishment by God 
are the most powerful influences over human passions, Shaftesbury is reluctant to agree.  
Both hope and fear, he argues, teach an excessive self-regard.
228
 
Shaftesbury does think that it is proper for "a civil STATE or PUBLIC" to distribute 
rewards and punishments.
229
  Not only can the magistrate force people to be useful to 
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society, but much more importantly, he can make virtue seem to be in the interest of all, 
"so as to remove all Prejudices against it, create a fair reception for it, and lead Men into 
that path which afterwards they cannot easily quit."
230
  The power of this lies not in 
coercion (although that is certainly present) so much as in the "example which chiefly 
influences Mankind, and forms the Character and Disposition of a people."
231
  As we 
mentioned earlier, Shaftesbury holds good morals to be linked to good government.  He 
continues, 
for a virtuous Administration is in a manner necessarily accompanyřd with Virtue 
in the Magistrate. Otherwise it couřd be of little effect, and of no long duration. 
But where it is sincere and well establishřd, there Virtue and the Laws must 
necessarily be respected and belovřd. So that as to Punishments and Rewards, 
their Efficacy is not so much from the Fear or Expectation which they raise, as 
from a natural Esteem of Virtue, and Detestation of Villany, which is awakenřd 
and excited by these publick Expressions of the Approbation and Hatred of 
Mankind in each Case. For in the publick Executions of the greatest Villains, we 
see generally that the Infamy and Odiousness of their Crime, and the Shame of it 
before Mankind, contribute more to their Misery than all besides; and that it is not 
the immediate Pain, or Death it-self, which raises so much Horror either in the 
Sufferers or Spectators, as that ignominious kind of Death which is inflicted for 
publick Crimes, and Violations of Justice and Humanity.
232
 
 
The power of opinion in these matters makes contrary opinions especially 
dangerous.  The mercenary view of morality suggests that in fact oneřs private happiness 
is in fundamental tension with the public good.  "There is a necessity for the preservation 
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of Virtue, that it shouřd be thought to have no quarrel with true Interest, and Self-
enjoyment."
233
 
The otherworldliness of religion also presents a challenge in the other direction in 
that it leads men to underestimate the value of self-regard.  When confronted with the 
hope of eternal bliss, 
an Expectation and Dependency, so miraculous and great as this, must naturally 
take off from other inferior Dependencys and Encouragements. Where infinite 
Rewards are thus inforcřd, and the Imagination strongly turnřd towards them, the 
other common and natural Motives to Goodness are apt to be neglected, and lose 
much by Dis-use. Other Interests are hardly so much as computed, whilst the 
Mind is thus transported in the pursuit of a high Advantage and Self-Interest, so 
narrowly confinřd within our-selves. On this account, all other Affections towards 
Friends, Relations, or Mankind, are often slightly regarded, as being worldly, and 
of little moment, in respect of the Interest of our Soul.
234
 
 
It is difficult to expect virtue to lead to happiness without having an admiration for 
it on its own terms.  This, in turn, is difficult to sustain without some belief that "the 
WHOLE it-self" is orderly and beautiful.  While atheism does not produce "false 
imaginations of right and wrong,"
235
 it does seem to foster affections contrary to virtue in 
that it fails to present anything "good or lovely" to "Contemplation."
236
  Taken in this 
sense, atheists are far less likely to be happy: 
According to the Hypothesis of those who exclude a general Mind, it must be 
confessřd, there can nothing happen in the Course of things to deserve either our 
Admiration, and Love, or our Anger, and Abhorrence. However, as there can be 
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no Satisfaction at the best in thinking upon what Atoms and Chance produce; so 
upon disasterous Occasions, and under the Circumstances of a calamitous and 
hard Fortune, řtis scarce possible to prevent a natural kind of Abhorrence and 
Spleen, which will be entertainřd and kept alive by the Imagination of so perverse 
an Order of Things.
237
 
 
Given his own admiration for the teachings of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, this 
may not be Shaftesburyřs final word on the matter.  We have already seen, for example, 
that for the philosopher, at least, the passions are firmly governed by reason. 
 
 
General Conclusion:  On the Œconomy of the Passions  
In this chapter we have considered Shaftesburyřs response to modern philosophy.  
In the first section we considered his response to radical skepticism through a return to 
common sense in Sensus Communis.  We then examined the Criticřs rejection of modern 
epistemology (or as he would have it, "metaphysicks") and the reductionism of the 
passions it supports in favor of the classical view that passions must be considered with 
opinions.  Finally, we looked at the way Shaftesbury attempts to articulate an alternative 
approach to the nature of human passions in An Inquiry by restoring man to a place in the 
cosmos.  This allowed Shaftesbury to present the affections as a comprising natural 
"Œconomy of the Passions." 
Still, an essential aspect of Shaftesburyřs classical philosophy remains to be 
considered.  What arguments does he present that nature is in fact an ordered whole or 
cosmos?  His argument relies in large part on his account of the beauty of the world, and 
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for this we must consider the second treatise in Volume II of the Characteristicks.  It is to 
this task we now turn to in chapter 5, "Shaftesburyřs "Principal Performance"--A reading 
of The Moralists. 
 
289 
 
CHAPTER 5 
SHAFTESBURYřS "PRINCIPAL PERFORMANCE":   
A READING OF THE MORALISTS. 
General Introduction 
  The Moralists Criticized 
We have seen in earlier chapters that the Critic of Miscellaneous Reflections 
regards the Characteristicks as having a unity to its structure.  Regarding the arrangement 
of the individual treatises, he writes, "it will appear therefore in this Joint-Edition of our 
Authorřs Five Treatises, that the Three former are preparatory to the Fourth…and the 
Fifth (with which he concludes) a kind of Apology for [the] Treatise concerning Virtue 
and Religion."
1
  In this chapter we will turn our attention to the fifth treatise, which is 
entitled "THE MORALISTS, A Philosophical Rhapsody.  BEING A RECITAL of certain 
Conversations on Natural and Moral Subjects."
2
 
 Before turning to The Moralists itself, however, we should continue our practice 
of consulting Shaftesburyřs own advice for reading the treatise he regarded as his 
"principal performance."
3
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  The Dialogue-Form Revisi ted 
In his fifth "Miscellany",
4
 the Critic invites us to think carefully about the literary 
character of the work we are about to encounter.  He offers Shaftesbury an ironical 
reproach for the literary forms he has chosen for Volume II of his book: 
had the Author of our Subject-Treatises considerřd thorowly of…literate Affairs, 
and found how the Interest of Wit stood at present in our Nation, he wouřd have 
had so much regard surely to his own Interest, as never to have writ unless either 
in the single Capacity of mere CRITICK, or that of AUTHOR in form. If he had 
resolvřd never to produce a regular or legitimate Piece, he might pretty safely 
have writ on still after the rate of his first Volume, and mixt manner. He might 
have been as critical, as satirical, or as full of Raillery as he had pleasřd. But to 
come afterwards as a grave Actor upon the Stage, and expose himself to Criticism 
in his turn, by giving us a Work or two in form, after the regular manner of 
Composition, as we see in his second Volume; this, I think, was no extraordinary 
Proof of his Judgment or Ability, in what related to his own Credit and 
Advantage.
5
 
 
We saw in chapter 4 that our Critic apologized for the unpleasant "methodick" manner of 
An Inquiry; he lamented the "dry Philosophy, and rigid Manner of our Author; without 
any Excursions into various Literature; without help from the Comick or Tragick Muse, 
or from the Flowers of Poetry or Rhetorick."
6
  We have a different challenge facing us in 
reading The Moralists, perhaps precisely because we now have an overabundance of help 
from the Muses.  According to the Critic, the 
next Piece (the MORALISTS, which we have now before us) must, according to his 
own Rules, be reckonřd as an Undertaking of greater weight. řTis not only at the 
bottom, as systematical, didactick and preceptive, as that other Piece of formal 
Structure; but it assumes withal another Garb, and more fashionable Turn of Wit. 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 3.139 ff. 
5
 Ibid., 3.175-76. 
6
 Miscellaneous Reflections: Miscellany IV, 3.117. 
  291 
 
 
 
 
It conceals what is scholastical, under the appearance of a polite Work. It aspires 
to Dialogue, and carrys with it not only those poetick Features of the Pieces 
antiently callřd MIMES; but it attempts to unite the several Personages and 
Characters in One Action, or Story, within a determinate Compass of Time, 
regularly divided, and drawn into different and proportionřd Scenes: And this, 
too, with variety of STYLE; the simple, comick, rhetorical, and even the poetick or 
sublime; such as is the aptest to run into Enthusiasm and Extravagance. So much 
is our Author, by virtue of this Piece, a Poet in due form, and by a more apparent 
claim, than if he had writ a Play, or dramatick Piece, in as regular a manner, at 
least, as any known at present on our Stage.
7
 
 
The Critic leads us to expect a serious teaching to emerge from The Moralists, but our 
task here will be more difficult than the working through of Shaftesburyřs Inquiry.  We 
should expect to find "systematical, didactick and perceptive" structure in The Moralists 
as much as in An Inquiry.  This might be surprising, since formal structure is always more 
difficult to discern in a dialogue than in a philosophic treatise.  What is more, we must 
now draw heavily on the preparation in literary modes that Shaftesbury offered us in 
Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author.  We are told by the Critic that the author will follow 
his "own Rules."  The Moralists is a dialogue; it consequently follows the modes of those 
works "antiently callřd MIMES."  It does this in part by respecting the classical concern to 
integrate a variety of characters into a unified story.  We recall that in Soliloquy, 
Shaftesbury described these ancient mimes thus:  "they were Pieces which, besides their 
force of Style, and hidden Numbers, carryřd a sort of Action and Imitation, the same as 
the Epick and Dramatick kinds. They were either real Dialogues, or Recitals of such 
personated Discourses; where the Persons themselves had their Characters preservřd 
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throřout; their Manners, Humours, and distinct Turns of Temper and Understanding 
maintainřd, according to the most exact poetical Truth."8  Mimes, then, while having a 
certain style and disguised order ("hidden Numbers"), are more than a set of arguments 
set off by tunica distincta alone.  In a genuine dialogue, the speeches are delivered in the 
context of a plot (the "Action and Imitation" found in drama) and by characters who are 
presented with artistic integrity (that is, they are "preservřd throřout").  As we discussed 
in Chapter 2, the dialogic form invites reflection not only on the things said but also on 
the character of the speakers and audience present at a conversation.  Since the author of 
a dialogue recedes from view--Shaftesbury says the author is "annihilated" by the form--
the reader is left with an apparently immediate encounter with characters.  Shaftesbury 
writes: 
the Scene presents it-self, as by chance, and undesignřd. You are not only left to 
judg coolly, and with indifference, of the Sense deliverřd; but of the Character, 
Genius, Elocution, and Manner of the Persons who deliver it. These two are mere 
Strangers, in whose favour you are no way engagřd. Nor is it enough that the 
Persons introducřd speak pertinent and good Sense, at every turn. It must be seen 
from what Bottom they speak; from what Principle, what Stock or Fund of 
Knowledg they draw; and what Kind or Species of Understanding they possess. 
For the Understanding here must have its Mark, its characteristick Note, by which 
it may be distinguishřd. It must be such and such an Understanding; as when we 
say, for instance, such or such a Face: since Nature has characterizřd Tempers 
and Minds as peculiarly as Faces. And for an Artist who draws naturally, řtis not 
enough to shew us merely Faces which may be callřd Men’s: Every Face must be 
a certain Man’s.9 
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We will therefore watch the characters of The Moralists carefully, noticing who is 
speaking, what they are saying and to whom; that is, we must attend to character and plot.  
The Critic also calls our attention to the importance of "a determinate Compass of Time" 
and to the "different and proportionřd Scenes" we encounter.  When and where certain 
speeches occur will deserve our special attention; that is, we must also attend to time and 
place.  Finally, we must not overlook the "variety of STYLE; the simple, comick, 
rhetorical, and even the poetick or sublime."  This last style is especially deceptive 
because it is the "aptest to run into Enthusiasm and Extravagance."   
The Critic calls Shaftesbury qua author of The Moralists, "a Poet in due form."  
Shaftesbury deploys literary styles as he sees fit, following the lessons he learned from 
several disciples of Socrates, including 
his Disciple of noble Birth and lofty Genius, who aspirřd to Poetry and Rhetorick 
[that is, Plato], took the Sublime part, and shone above his other Condisciples. He 
of mean Birth, and poorest Circumstances [Speusippus], whose Constitution as 
well as Condition inclinřd him most to the way we call Satirick,10 took the 
reproving part, which in his better-humourřd and more agreeable Successor 
[Xenocrates], turnřd into the Comick kind, and went upon the Model of that 
antient Comedy which was then prevalent. But another noble Disciple 
[Xenophon, that is], whose Genius was towards Action, and who provřd 
afterwards the greatest Hero of his time took the genteeler Part, and softer 
Manner. He joinřd what was deepest and most solid in Philosophy, with what was 
easiest and most refinřd in Breeding, and in the Character and Manner of a 
Gentleman. Nothing couřd be remoter than his Genius was, from the scholastick, 
the rhetorical, or mere poetick kind. He was as distant, on one hand, from the 
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sonorous, high, and pompous Strain; as, on the other hand, from the ludicrous, 
mimical, or satirick.
11
 
 
We remark in passing that the most conspicuous aspect of Shaftesbury's dialogue, namely 
the long rhapsodic prose-poems, imitate the "sublime" style.  According to Shaftesbury, 
Platořs "dialogues were real POEMS."12  It is for the rhapsodic element above all that the 
Critic calls Shaftesbury "a Poet in due form." 
To return, the Critic elaborates in an extended footnote the importance of 
Shaftesburyřs being a true poet in this dialogue.  We should consider his remarks 
carefully: 
That [Shaftesbury] is conscious of this, we may gather from that Line or two of 
Advertisement, which stands at the beginning of his first Edition. "As for the 
Characters, and Incidents, they are neither wholly feignřd (says he) nor wholly 
true: but according to the Liberty allowřd in the way of DIALOGUE, the principal 
Matters are founded upon Truth; and the rest as near resembling as may be. řTis a 
Sceptick recites: and the Hero of the Piece passes for an Enthusiast. If a perfect 
Character be wanting; řtis the same Case here, as with the Poets in some of their 
best Pieces. And this surely is a sufficient Warrant for the Author of a 
PHILOSOPHICAL ROMANCE."--Thus our Author himself; who to conceal, 
however, his strict Imitation of the antient poetick DIALOGUE, has prefixřd an 
auxiliary Title to his Work, and given it the Sirname of RHAPSODY: As if it 
were merely of that Essay or mix’d kind of Works, which come abroad with an 
affected Air of Negligence and Irregularity. But whatever our Author may have 
affected in his Title-Page, řtwas so little his Intention to write after that Model of 
incoherent Workmanship, that it appears to be sorely against his Will, if this 
Dialogue-Piece of his has not the just Character, and correct Form of those antient 
Poems describřd. He wouřd gladly have constituted ONE single Action and Time, 
sutable to the just Simplicity of those Dramatick Works. And this, one wouřd 
think, was easy enough for him to have done. He needed only to have brought his 
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first Speakers immediately into Action, and savřd the narrative or recitative Part 
of PHILOCLES to PALEMON, by producing them as speaking Personages upon his 
Stage. The Scene all along might have been the Park. From the early Evening to 
the late Hour of Night, that the two Galants withdrew to their Town-Apartments, 
there was sufficient time for the Narrator Philocles, to have recited the whole 
Transaction of the second and third Part; which wouřd have stood throřout as it 
now does: only at the Conclusion, when the narrative or recitative Part had 
ceasřd, the simple and direct DIALOGUE wouřd have again returnřd, to grace the 
Exit. By this means the temporal as well as local Unity of the Piece had been 
preservřd. Nor had our Author been necessitated to commit that Anachronism, of 
making his first Part, in order, to be last in time.
13
 
 
We learn many important things from this passage.  First, our author has constructed his 
dialogue with care--he is "conscious" of his work as a poet.  In fact, while the piece may 
at times seem to be the product of "incoherent Workmanship," we should not believe it.  
The characters and incidents are neither wholly feigned nor wholly true.  The work itself 
is disguised as a "philosophical romance" but is actually an imitation of the classical 
dialogue.  Since a dialogue is more than a collection of reported speeches, we will have to 
ask ourselves in what way the characters and incidents are feigned or true as we proceed.  
We may be sure, however, that the "principal Matters are founded upon Truth."   
 The narrator of the dialogue is "a Sceptick," while "the Hero of the Piece passes 
for an Enthusiast."  What could it mean to "pass" for an Enthusiast?  As we shall see, the 
treatment of enthusiasm is carefully constructed, and Shaftesbury offers us careful clues 
as to how we should understand the enthusiasm of our characters. 
 As for the local and temporal setting of the piece, the Critic calls our attention to 
the fact that they are not straightforward.  This complexity, we learn, could have been 
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easily avoided.  "He needed only to have brought his first Speakers immediately into 
Action, and savřd the narrative or recitative Part of PHILOCLES to PALEMON, by 
producing them as speaking Personages upon his Stage."  Yet he has not done so, and we 
must ask ourselves why not.  Given the care of the workmanship, it can hardly have been 
"sorely against his Will" to have departed from the ancient manner of dialogue-writing.  
The Critic offers us one reason Shaftesbury appears to have so departed.  Shaftesbury 
wanted to conceal his "strict Imitation of the antient poetick DIALOGUE," and he has for 
this reason identified the style and structure of the work a "RHAPSODY."   
 The fact that The Moralists is a narrated dialogue hardly removes Shaftesbury 
from the classical tradition.  Many of Platořs dialogues are narrated, including the 
Symposium and the Theaetetus.  The latter dialogue, in fact, has an odd preliminary 
dialogue between two characters, one of whom shares a manuscript he prepared over time 
and in consultation with the philosophical hero Socrates who is himself portrayed in the 
manuscript.  Socrates himself draws attention to the narrative literary style in the 
Republic.
14
  Both Xenophon and Cicero present their dialogues as narratives.
15
 
 Yet the Critic calls our attention to the irregularities of the time and place of the 
conversations in The Moralists by indicating how they might have been presented 
differently.  He notes that the speakers might have been presented without the narrative 
frame.  Why then do we have the first letter of Philocles to Palemon at all?  Does it really 
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belong in the same work as the account of Philoclesř visit with Theocles or must we 
conclude that the conversation with Palemon is window dressing?  We might carry this 
further by asking why the character Palemon is present in The Moralists at all.  If we 
accept the narrative frame, we still wonder about the location of the conversations.  Why 
not stay in the park?  Why does the account of Theocles occur only after Palemon and 
Philocles retire to their own apartments?  This structure apparently forces an abrupt 
ending to the work:  At the close of a long discourse on philosophy Philocles writes, "BY 
this time we found our-selves insensibly got home.  Our Philosophy ended, and we 
return'd to the common Affairs of life."
16
  If Palemon and Philocles remained together for 
the duration of the narrative, we might have returned to them after Philoclesř narrative in 
parts II and III.  Would this exit not have been more graceful?  Even if we confine our 
attention to the second two parts we encounter a variety of locations--inside and outside--
and a variety of times and occasions. 
 Finally, we are invited to wonder whether the temporal unity of The Moralists has 
been violated.  The narrative is emphatically out of temporal order.  Shaftesbury commits 
an "anachronism" in the narrative by placing the conversation with Theocles, which 
happened earlier, after the later conversation between Palemon and Philocles.  The Critic 
might also have noted that even the exchange of part I is not presented directly.  Instead, 
it, too, is narrated indirectly through letter-writing, albeit still from Philocles to Palemon.  
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(The work is, as the title says, a "recital" of certain conversations.)  Yet Palemon himself 
was present at the conversation of part I and it occurred as recently as yesterday! 
 According to the Critic, Shaftesbury had reasons for failing to imitate the alleged 
simplicity of the ancients.  The Critic writes, "he dares not, in his own Model and 
principal Performance, attempt to unite his Philosophy in one solid and uniform Body, 
nor carry on his Argument in one continuřd Chain or Thred."17  The Critic suggests that it 
was difficult to imagine contemporary characters who would engage in an extended 
conversation on nothing but philosophy and morals.  As we saw in chapter 2, and as the 
Critic now reminds us in a footnoted reference to Volume I, Shaftesbury fears that the 
"coquetry of a modern Author" somehow suits the manners and mores of the modern 
"fashionable world" better than the more salutary practice of dialogue.
18
  Shaftesbury is 
"forcřd therefore to raise particular Machines, and constrain his principal Characters, in 
order to carry a better Face, and bear himself out, against the appearance of Pedantry."
19
  
While these "machines" may help the contemporary reader avoid boredom, they also 
make it more difficult to trace the continuous thread of the argument mentioned above.  It 
will be our job to see whether we can discern a unified argument--one "systematical, 
didactick and perceptive," perhaps--in The Moralists.  As we shall see, Shaftesburyřs 
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dialogue does try to raise the ancient form of dialogue from the dead, since such a style 
appeals to those mimes of early times, "before Philosophy was in vogue."
20
 
  The Characters  
The Critic offers us important clues for thinking about the characters we meet in 
The Moralists by indicating the sorts of "machines" we should notice.  We have seen the 
Critic say that the "hero…passes for an Enthusiast."  The hero is named Theocles, and 
his name suggests the glory of God.
21
  We now learn that Shaftesburyřs "Gentleman-
Philosopher THEOCLES, before he enters into his real Character, becomes a feignřd 
Preacher. And even when his real Character comes on, he hardly dares stand it out; but to 
deal the better with his Sceptick-Friend, he falls again to personating, and takes up the 
Humour of the Poet and Enthusiast."
22
  For now it is enough to notice that when 
considering the "Bottom" from which Theocles speaks, it may not be the preachy 
enthusiasm frequently identified with him.  The Critic forces us to wonder about the real 
character of Theocles. 
The recipient of the letters is named Palemon.  The Critic remarks, "PALEMON the 
Man of Quality, and who is first introducřd as Speaker in the Piece, must, for fashion-
sake, appear in Love, and under a kind of Melancholy, producřd by some Mis-adventures 
                                                 
20
 Soliloquy, 1.121. 
21
 From the Greek theos (θεός) for god and kleos () for fame or glory.  Theocles is an actual classical 
name mentioned by Lemprière.  John Lemprière and F. A. Adams, Lemprière's Classical Dictionary of 
Proper Names Mentioned in Ancient Authors Writ Large : With a Chronological Table, 3rd ed. (London ; 
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in the World. How else shouřd he be supposřd so serious?"23  How else indeed.  While 
this is true, we shall see that Palemon comes by his melancholy honestly.  The name 
Palemon seems to allude to several things, which I will discuss in detail presently. 
The skeptical friend is named Philocles, whose name suggests the friend of 
glory.
24
  The Critic writes that "PHILOCLES his Friend (an airy Gentleman of the World, 
and a thorow Raillier) must have a home Charge upon him, and feel the Anger of his 
grave Friend, before he can be supposřd grave enough to enter into a philosophical 
Discourse."
25
  If this is an accurate description of what is required to stir Philocles, it is 
nevertheless true that he enters the "discourse" artfully and extensively. 
It seems likely that Shaftesbury has chosen the names of his characters with care.  
We can infer this not only from the general remarks on dialogue above, but also from the 
scorn the Critic shows other contemporary attempts at dialogue.  Party authors and 
theologians have tried to imitate this ancient form, but without success.  The Critic 
remarks: 
at present, it must be ownřd, the Characters, or Personages, employřd by our new 
orthodox Dialogists, carry with řem little Proportion or Coherence; and in this 
respect may be said to sute perfectly with that figurative metaphorical Style and 
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rhetorical Manner, in which their Logick and Arguments are generally couchřd. 
Nothing can be more complex or multiform than their moral Draughts or Sketches 
of Humanity. These, indeed, are so far from representing any particular Man, or 
Order of Men, that they scarce resemble any thing of the Kind. řTis by their 
Names only that these Characters are figurřd. Tho they bear different Titles, and 
are set up to maintain contrary Points; they are found, at the bottom, to be all of 
the same side; and, notwithstanding their seeming Variance, to co-operate in the 
most officious manner with the Author, towards the display of his own proper 
Wit, and the establishment of his private Opinion and Maxims. They are indeed 
his very legitimate and obsequious Puppets; as like real Men in Voice, Action, 
and Manners, as those wooden or wire Engines of the lower Stage. PHILOTHEUS 
and PHILATHEUS, PHILAUTUS and PHILALETHES are of one and the same Order: 
Just Tallys to one another: Questioning and Answering in concert, and with such a 
sort of Alternative as is known in a vulgar Play, where one Person lies down 
blindfold, and presents himself, as fair as may be, to another, who by favour of 
the Company, or the assistance of his Good-fortune, deals his Companion many a 
sound Blow, without being once challengřd, or brought into his Turn of lying 
down.
26
 
 
We can expect, then, that Shaftesbury intends to portray real characters rather than 
"obsequious Puppets."  Also, his names are unlikely to have been chosen haphazardly.  
The Critic's list of variations on favorite names for characters--Philotheus, Philatheus, 
Philautus, Philalethes--is interesting in itself, since it suggests names that were not chosen 
by Shaftesbury.  "Philotheus" would have combined the first roots of Philocles and 
Theocles, respectively.  Insofar as there is friendship for god in The Moralists, however, 
it is expressed by characters other than the principal three.  "Philo" and "Theo" are also 
suggestive given the prevalence of philosophy and theology in the Characteristicks.  
Indeed, Shaftesbury's skeptic and enthusiast do provide a continuation of the dispute 
between philosophy and theology.  Finally, names aside, we can expect that the 
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characters will not be straw-men and that disputed opinions will have the full advantage 
of reasonable argument. 
The Moralists ,  Part I  
The general structure of The Moralists is as follows.  The dialogue is divided into 
three parts, and each part into sections.  The whole is cast in the form of a letter (or three 
letters) from Philocles to his friend Palemon.  Part I recounts a conversation held 
"yesterday" between Philocles and Palemon.  Parts II and III recount a series of 
conversations between Philocles and his friend Theocles, with occasional participation 
from additional characters.  The conversations between Philocles and Theocles happen 
over the course of two days. 
Part I is divided into three sections.  As we shall see, section 1 sets out the 
contemporary environment within which philosophers think.  Section 2 examines the 
melancholia of Palemon and connects it to broader philosophical concerns.  Section 3 
acts as a prelude to the rest of the dialogue, setting up the context and indicating the tone 
we can expect. 
  Part  I ,  §  1:   The State of  Philosophy 
Shaftesbury opens The Moralists by providing a character sketch of Palemon 
through the eyes of our narrator, Philocles.  We learn that Palemon is a man of "Rank and 
Credit in the fashionable World" and a man of "Genius fitted for the greatest Affairs," but 
also one who has made a "violent…Turn toward Philosophy and the Schools."27  This 
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makes Palemon an unusual gentleman.  Philocles writes to his friend that "you are the 
only well-bred Man who wouřd have taken the Fancy to talk Philosophy in such a Circle 
of good Company as we had round us yesterday, when we were in your Coach together, 
in the Park."
28
  While Philocles is himself quite conversant with philosophy, his praise of 
Palemonřs "passion for Philosophy" is mixed with irony.  Palemonřs passion leads him to 
initiate an "unseasonable Conversation, so opposite to the reigning Genius of Gallantry 
and Pleasure."  Philocles seems not to share Lawrence Kleinřs sense that the park is an 
appropriate place to have philosophical conversations; indeed, one might call Palemon 
impolite.
29
 
 Philocles remarks that it has "become fashionable in our Nation to talk Politicks 
in every Company, and mix the Discourses of State-affairs with those of Pleasure and 
Entertainment."
30
  It is not surprising to find gentlemen (and perhaps also ladies and more 
ordinary men) discussing politics given the political currents of the age.
31
  But not so 
philosophy. 
 According to Philocles, "we Moderns" have "degraded" philosophy, and "strippřd 
her of her chief Rights."  Philosophy is in disrepute and political matters are no longer 
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considered the concern of philosophers.  While "Philosophy" once influenced affairs of 
the world, 
we have immurřd her (poor Lady!) in Colleges and Cells; and have set her 
servilely to such Works as those in the Mines. Empiricks, and pedantick Sophists 
are her chief Pupils. The School-syllogism, and the Elixir, are the choicest of her 
Products. So far is she from producing Statesmen, as of old, that hardly any Man 
of Note in the publick cares to own the least Obligation to her. If some few 
maintain their Acquaintance, and come now and then to her Recesses, řtis as the 
Disciple of Quality came to his Lord and Master; "secretly, and by night."
32
 
 
 This degradation is contrary to nature, however, for "if Morals be allowřd 
belonging to her, Politicks must undeniably be hers."
33
  Politics and morality are 
inseparable; one cannot think about "Manners and Constitutions of Men in common" 
without first considering who and what men are by nature.  Philocles remarks, "nothing is 
more familiar than to reason concerning Man in his confederate State and national 
Relation; as he stands ingagřd to this or that Society, by Birth or Naturalization: Yet to 
consider him as a Citizen or Commoner of the World, to trace his Pedegree a step higher, 
and view his End and Constitution in Nature it-self, must pass, it seems, for some 
intricate or over-refinřd Speculation."34 
   Philocles blames part of the shameful reputation of philosophy on her academic 
practitioners, whom he describes as "Scholasticks."  It is they who are responsible for the 
stuffy air surrounding philosophy.  The scholastic model consists of over-rehearsed "set-
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places" rather than living ideas.  Such language is foreign to the tastes of good company.  
"The least mention of such matters gives us a disgust, and puts us out of humour.  If 
Learning comes a-cross us, we count it Pedantry; if Morality, řtis Preaching."35  This 
consequence is especially lamentable, given the tendency of gallant conversation to 
become shallow and effete.  Philocles writes that modern conversations have lost "those 
masculine Helps of Learning and sound Reason" to the extent that even women find them 
contemptible.
36
  Witty conversation may still enjoy "an Air of Play and Dalliance," but 
without a foundation in knowledge, serious people dismiss it as mere "colouring and 
drapery."   
Philocles connects the decline in serious conversation to the decline in the 
popularity of the dialogue as a literary form, which "heretofore was found the politest and 
best way of managing even the graver Subjects."
37
  Nor poet nor painter nor philosopher 
can cast their works "against the Appearance of Nature and Truth," and the truth is that a 
philosophic conversation would be unrecognizable to the fashionable world.  A 
philosopher who writes dialogues can expect to be ineffectual.  "If he represents his 
Philosophy as making any figure in Conversation; if he triumphs in the Debate, and gives 
his own Wisdom the advantage over that of the World; he may be liable to sound 
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Raillery, and possibly be made a Fable of."  As we saw in chapter two, the decline of 
conversation and the abandonment of the art of dialogue are mutually influential. 
Philocles offers his own fable to make his point clear.  He observes that statues 
often depict the triumph of heroic men over lions; and indeed, a master sculptor might 
move even a lion with his art.  Yet lions and men both know the truth:  lions are stronger 
than men, beautiful fables to the contrary notwithstanding.  In the case of philosophical 
characters, Philocles asks, "where are the Originals?"
38
  Even should one have the good 
fortune to find a genuine philosopher, can one even imagine a truthful dialogue which 
depicts his philosophical conversation? 
Genuine philosophy, which Philocles, following Cicero, calls "Academick," 
requires open "Questioning and Doubting."  This manner is contrary to the genius of the 
age.  Philocles writes that contemporary "men love to take party instantly. They canřt 
bear being kept in suspence. The Examination torments řem. They want to be rid of it, 
upon the easiest terms."
39
  In this they betray a distrust of the very faculty of reason 
which alone might save them from doubt. 
The philosophy of the age suits such impatience by directing its attention to 
applied rather than purely theoretical matters.  Philocles shares with Shaftesbury a 
disdain for philosophic "improvers."  Philocles calls these contemporary philosophers 
"alchymists." 
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We have a strange Fancy to be Creators, a violent Desire at least to know the 
Knack or Secret by which Nature does all. The rest of our Philosophers only aim 
at that in Speculation, which our Alchymists aspire to in Practice. For with some 
of these it has been actually under deliberation how to make Man, by other 
Mediums than Nature has hitherto provided. Every Sect has a Recipe. When you 
know it, you are Master of Nature: you solve all her Phaenomena: you see all her 
Designs, and can account for all her Operations. If need were, you might, 
perchance too, be of her Laboratory, and work for her. At least one wouřd 
imagine the Partizans of each modern Sect had this Conceit. They are all 
ARCHIMEDESřS in their way, and can make a World upon easier terms than he 
offerřd to move one.40 
 
 Philocles concludes section 1 of part 1 by connecting the vices of the age to 
scholastic and alchemical modern philosophy.  Men no longer "dare to doubt" and "thus 
we will needs know every thing, and be at the pains of examining nothing."  It is no 
surprise then, that "Academick" philosophy, which doesnřt offer firm truths, is unpopular.  
Academic philosophy, he writes, "goes upon no establishřd Hypothesis, nor presents us 
with any flattering Scheme, talks only of Probabilitys, Suspence of Judgment, Inquiry, 
Search, and Caution not to be imposřd on, or deceivřd."41  Young men were once trained 
in this academic philosophy, receiving from it an exercise of the mind analogous to the 
education of the body receives from wrestling; both disciplines presumably lead to 
humane strength and flexibility.  Gentlemen carried this humane education with them 
throughout their lives and into public and domestic affairs. 
So too the art of dialogue, which imitated and taught academic philosophy, is ill 
suited to the modern age.  Sustaining the willingness to treat open questions as genuinely 
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open is a philosophical challenge to which the dialogue is especially well-suited.  We 
have seen that dialogues present more than one character in conversation and thereby 
disguise the opinions of the author.  Philocles professes reluctance to present such a 
conversation, "especially in the Light you have unluckily chosen to set it."
42
  We learn 
that Philocles proceeds only at the request of Palemon--"the Project is your own," he 
writes--and that success will require the assistance of the Muses. 
  Part  I ,  §  2:   Melancholy Palemon and Skeptical  Phi locles  
In section 2 we learn that Palemon has not been improved by his turn to 
philosophy; indeed it seems to have sowed nothing but misanthropy in his soul.  The 
section opens with a lamentation by Palemon: 
O WRETCHED State of Mankind!--Hapless Nature, thus to have errřd in thy 
chief Workmanship!--Whence sprang this fatal Weakness? What Chance or 
Destiny shall we accuse? Or shall we mind the Poets, when they sing thy Tragedy 
(Prometheus!) who with thy stoln celestial Fire, mixřd with vile Clay, didst mock 
Heavenřs Countenance, and in abusive Likeness of the Immortals madřst the 
compound Man; that wretched Mortal, ill to himself, and Cause of Ill to all. --
43
 
 
Philocles calls the lamentation a "rant" and expresses surprise that such an ugly mood 
was possible on such a lovely day in the park.  Palemon quickly concedes that he does in 
fact admire the beauty of nature which surrounds them; he excludes man alone from 
praise.  Insofar as mankind can be said to have beauty at all, Palemon credits art rather 
than nature. 
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This limited concession to art was unavoidable, because, as Philocles observes, 
Palemonřs "Genius" was inclined to "Poetry."  Yet Palemon does not admire all poetry.  
Philocles writes, "you acknowledgřd it to be true indeed, what had been observřd by 
some late Wits, 'That Gallantry was of a modern Growth.' And well it might be so, you 
thought, without dishonour to the Antients; who understood Truth and Nature too well, to 
admit so ridiculous an Invention."
44
  Palemon, it seems, deplores "gallantry" for its 
artificiality and consequently sees gallantry as contrary to his own understanding of 
nature and truth.  He cannot imagine that while opinions are shaped by art, some may be 
judged as more in accord with nature than others.  Clearly, his turn to philosophy had not 
led him to the judicious practice of "soliloquy" we discussed in Chapter 2. 
As Philocles and Palemon spoke, the hour grew late.  Their company at the park 
began to withdraw, perhaps because of the hour and perhaps in part because Palemonřs 
vehement opinions offended them.  "The Beau-monde," says Philocles, "whom you had 
been thus severely censuring, drew off apace."  It is now evening and the heavenly bodies 
can be seen.
45
  The night brings solitude to the two friends, and Philocles jokes that the 
rising moon and planets might be "the only proper Company for a Man in [Palemon's] 
Humour."  There in the moonlight, Palemon finds "much Satisfaction of natural Things, 
and of all Orders of Beautys," with the conspicuous exception of man. 
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Philocles seems to connect both the contempt Palemon feels for the fashionable 
world and the admiration he has for nature to the modern philosophy he has imbibed.  
Philocles writes, "you, who wouřd allow nothing to those fair earthly Luminarys in the 
Circles which just now we movřd in; you, Palemon, who seemřd to overlook the Pride of 
that Theater, began now to look out with Ravishment on this other, and triumph in the 
new philosophical Scene of Worlds unknown."
 46
   
Philocles worries that Palemon, who is so sensible when discussing the heavens, 
has allowed his aversion to human beings to grow into hatred.  While Palemon objects 
that his affection for friends and country remain strong, he cannot ignore the "treacherys" 
and "disorders" hidden in the hearts of men.  Palemon is torn between his own experience 
in common life and the cynical opinions he has learned from modern philosophy.  Men 
may seem to the careless observer to be sociable, he remarks, 
but let him stay a-while. Allow him leisure; till he has gainřd a nearer View, and 
following our dissolvřd Assemblys to their particular Recesses, he has the power 
of seeing řem in this new Aspect.--Here he may behold those great Men of the 
Ministry, who not an hour ago in publick appearřd such Friends, now plotting 
craftily each otherřs Ruin, with the Ruin of the State it-self, a Sacrifice to their 
Ambition. Here he may see too those of a softer kind, who knowing not 
Ambition, follow only Love. Yet (Philocles) who wouřd think it?"-- 
 
This speech provokes laughter in Philocles, who thinks he has glimpsed the true cause of 
Palemonřs ill mood.  Only a man who has been unlucky in love would hold these 
opinions!  Philoclesř joke suggests one possible allusion suggested by Palemonřs name.  
Fashionable society is rooted in gallantry and gothic tales.  In the "Knightřs Tale" of 
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Chaucer's The Canterbury Tales we meet a lovelorn "knyght highte Palamon."
47
  
Chaucerřs Knight himself is also disaffected with gallantry, having himself seen the 
consequences of knight-errantry while serving as a mercenary in the Crusades.  (There is 
also a Palamon in Drydenřs retelling of the tale in his poem "Palamon and Arcite.")  We 
will see another plausible allusion below.  Palemon, like the knight Palamon, may be 
melancholy over an unobtainable love; and like the pilgrim Knight he might be 
melancholy from a loss of faith in gallantry. 
 Philocles has broken the mood of Palemon with his good humor and the friends 
are now able to engage in a more sober discussion--what Shaftesbury commonly calls 
"cool Reasoning."  They inquire into the "nature and Cause of ILL in general: ŘThroř 
what Contingency, what Chance; by what fatal Necessity, what Will, or what Permission 
it came upon the World; or being come once, shouřd still subsist.ř"48 While most 
gentlemen would find "this Inquiry" too difficult, Philocles finds Palemon to be a man of 
"close Judgment and Penetration."
49
  A footnote to the word "Inquiry" refers us to the 
beginning of the fourth treatise, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit.  That 
beginning, as we explained in chapter 4, sets forth the several logical opinions on the 
divine.  That section of An Inquiry was described by Shaftesbury as the "thorny part of 
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our Philosophy," after which the work became "more plain and easy."
50
  This difficult 
inquiry gives Philocles the opportunity to challenge Palemonřs opinion holding that 
nature has erred in making man. 
 Philocles suggests that good and ill are inseparably mixed in the world, but that 
given the right perspective one can find it "agreeable enough, in the main."  Palemon is 
willing to say that even storms lend beauty to nature; but as for men, they are a failed 
mixture of dirt and divine fire much in the way the Prometheus myth suggests.
51
  
Philocles observes that this is not much of a solution to the problem of evil which worried 
Palemon.  It "explains" evil by moving its cause back one step from the initial question, 
but the same question can still be asked. 
 Yet such an account is an answer of sorts.  Philocles points out that most people 
can rest satisfied with such an answer, even if the philosopher would recognize it as a 
"Tale."
52
  Indeed, only a philosopher would be such a nuisance as to press the question of 
"the cause of ill" past the point of easy solutions--at least in mixed company!  Philocles 
recognizes the utility of mythological explanations.  He says, 
in reality…řtis not to be imaginřd how serviceable a Tale is, to amuse others 
besides mere Children; and how much easier the Generality of Men are paid in 
this Paper-coin, than in Sterling Reason. We ought not to laugh so readily at the 
Indian Philosophers, who to satisfy their People how this huge Frame of the 
World is supported, tell řem řtis by an Elephant.--And the Elephant how?--A 
shreud Question! but which by no means shouřd be answerřd. řTis here only that 
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our Indian Philosophers are to blame. They shouřd be contented with the 
Elephant, and go no further. But they have a Tortoise in reverse; whose Back, 
they think, is broad enough. So the Tortoise must bear the new Load: And thus 
the matter stands worse than before.
53
 
 
Matters are made worse by prying too deeply, it seems, because the most fundamental 
questions seem capable of an infinite regress.  "Heathen Mythologists" were wise enough 
not to inquire too deeply into such matters, at least not indiscriminately.  This is 
sufficient, says Philocles, for most peopleŕfor the "Heathen Vulgar," that is--but it is not 
good enough for philosophers.  Shaftesbury shows us that Philocles is aware of the 
ancient policy toward religion and philosophy as articulated by the Critic.  Philosophers 
had their own "allegorical, mythological Account of Sacred Things," but they were 
careful that the "mysteries" of philosophy were "treated with profound respect, and lay 
unexposřd to vulgar eyes."54   
 Philocles suggests that such myths, for philosophers at least, might be understood 
allegorically.  Prometheus, for example, could be a name for "Chance, Destiny, a plastick 
Nature, or an evil Daemon; whatever was designřd by it."55  But until the question is 
traced back to first principles--principles adequate, that is, to answer for the 
"OMNIPOTENCE" of what ultimately happens--the work of philosophy is incomplete.  In 
light of this insight, Palemon is willing to confess that, given imperfect knowledge, he is 
unable to say whether the world would have been better off without certain particular 
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events.  He says that "řtwas impossible…that Heaven shouřd have acted otherwise than 
for the best. So that even from this Misery and Ill of Man, there was undoubtedly some 
Good arising; something which over-balancřd all, and made full amends."56 
 Nevertheless, Palemon is not content with this position, in part because Philocles, 
having suggested it, turns to criticize it.  Why should one suspect that things are for the 
best?  He asks Palemon 
whether it must not be a very strong philosophical Faith which shouřd persuade 
one that those dismal Parts you set to view were only the necessary Shades of a 
fine Piece, to be reckonřd among the Beautys of the Creation: Or whether 
possibly you might look upon that Maxim as very fit for Heaven, which I was 
sure you did not approve at all in Mankind; "To do ILL that GOOD might follow."
57
 
 
Such a view sounds perverse, of course, to the Christian ears of Palemon, who seems to 
be attached to the idea of "Creation"
58
 and is concerned to avoid "Profaneness."
59
  Before 
Philocles can develop this view of ill with examples drawn from Homer,
60
 he is stopped 
short by the disapproving visage of Palemon.  Palemon has come to see clearly that 
Philocles is inclined toward "SCEPTICISM," and consequently he fears that Philocles 
"adherř[s] to nothing."61  Palemon is troubled that in debate Philocles seems to be "as 
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well pleasřd with the Reason on one side, as on the other," and therefore indifferent to the 
"Success of the Argument."
62
 
 Philocles confesses this criticism is fair.  He has what seem to be Epicurean 
reasons for his philosophical stance, claiming that 
above all things I lovřd Ease; and of all Philosophers those who reasonřd most at 
their ease, and were never angry or disturbřd; as those callřd SCEPTICKS, you 
ownřd, never were. I lookřd upon this kind of Philosophy as the prettiest, 
agreeablest, roving Exercise of the Mind, possible to be imaginřd. The other kind, 
I thought, was painful and laborious; "To keep always in the Limits of one Path; 
to drive always at a Point; and hold precisely to what Men, at a venture, callřd 
THE TRUTH: A Point, in all appearance, very unfixřd, and hard to ascertain."63 
 
While one might wonder whether the truth is unfixed, few serious men would deny that 
the truth is hard to ascertain.  Palemon suggests that his skepticism harms no one, and 
makes him agreeable to all more "dogmatical" men, especially on questions of faith.  
Philoclesř skepticism makes him suspicious of his "own Understanding" and adverse to 
rationalism in general.
64
  In short, his skepticism makes him agreeable in political life.  
He says, "you who are Rationalists, and walk by Reason in every thing, pretend to know 
all things, whilst you believe little or nothing: We for our parts know nothing, and believe 
all."
65
  This remark is clearly ironical.  Philocles suggests that his rationalist skepticism 
makes remaining silent in the face of questionable opinions easier than it is for the 
morally grounded--and opinionated--gentleman. 
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 Palemon is offended by this glib posture of Philocles.  He worries that these 
skeptical arguments result in a moral nihilism.  Betraying his irritation with a cold voice, 
he asks Philocles, "whether with that fine Scepticism… [he] made no more distinction 
between Sincerity and Insincerity in Actions, than…between Truth and Falsehood, Right 
and Wrong, in Arguments?"
66
  Philocles sees the concern immediately:  does his 
skepticism overthrow all principles, both "Moral and Divine?" 
 Philocles apologizes, confessing that he is guilty of "Sceptical Misbehaviour."  He 
offers to make amends by exercising the "Sceptick Privilege" of taking up any side of an 
argument to defend the cause he had previously attacked.  He claims no ambition to 
discuss or defend Christianity--he professes himself "unworthy of such a task."  This 
amusingly ambiguous remark suggests that Philocles follows the practice of the Criticřs 
Author, who "on all occasions submits most willingly, and with full Confidence and 
Trust, to the Opinions by Law establish’d."67  His concerns are confined to "mere 
Philosophy," and, he says, "my Fancy is only to try what I can muster up thence, to make 
head against the chief Arguments of Atheism, and reestablish what I have offerřd to 
loosen in the System of Theism."
68
 
 This offer is sufficient to reconcile Palemon to Philocles.  A serious concern 
remains for us as readers, however.  We can see that the "Questioning and Doubting" 
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recommended by "Academick Philosophy" lead men to distrust the intentions of 
philosophers.
69
  It is indeed contrary to the genius of the age to postpone answers to 
moral and theological questions.  Yet even in antiquity, philosophical "busy-bodys" were 
seldom welcome in decent company.
70
 
 Be this as it may, Palemon is prepared to hear a defense of "THEISM," despite his 
principled objection to "DEISM" when it is opposed to Christianity.
71
  (It is not clear to me 
whether Shaftesbury takes this to be a genuine distinction but it does serve to distance 
Philocles from what are perhaps more vulgar contemporary skeptics.)  Palemon would 
like to hear Philocles' defense of theism, but only on the condition that he intends to 
advance those opinions fundamental to all religion and not merely to amuse himself with 
the subject.
72
  While Palemon wants to hear theism defended, he also wants something 
else that may or may not be compatible with this desire.  "Whatever your Thoughts are, 
PHILOCLES, I am resolvřd to force řem from you. You can no longer plead the 
Unsutableness of the Time or Place to such grave Subjects. The gaudy Scene is over with 
the Day. Our Company have long since quitted the Field. And the solemn Majesty of 
such a Night as this, may justly sute with the profoundest Meditation, or most serious 
Discourse."
73
  It is now night and the two friends are alone in the park.  Because of the 
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resolution made by Palemon, Philocles finds himself "drawn into the following Vein of 
Philosophical Enthusiasm."
74
   
 
  Part  I ,  §  3:   The Balm of  Phi losophical  Enthusiasm 
 Philocles claims that he now understands the melancholy of Palemon better.  
Palemon is not love-sick in the manner of a gallant pining for an unobtainable girl; he is, 
instead, melancholy because of "a nobler Love than such as common Beautys inspire."
75
  
Philocles, raising his voice and adopting a solemn air, describes an ascent by "knowing" 
up the ladder of order and perfection of form.  This, Philocles suggests, is Palemonřs true 
love and yearning. 
Starting from the claim that Palemon is "well-knowing" of all orders and degrees 
of beauty, Philocles explains to Palemon that he is attempting to move beyond the 
particular forms of beauty he knows to grasp beauty in more general forms; "and with a 
larger Heart, and Mind more comprehensive, you generously seek that which is highest in 
the kind."
76
  A soul such as Palemonřs, longing as it does for larger and deeper beauties, 
cannot rest satisfied with any particular thing.  It seeks broader and more complex 
beauties, first in social relations, in "Communitys, Friendships, Relations, Dutys; and 
considers by what Harmony of particular Minds the general Harmony is composřd, and 
Commonweal establishřd."  Even this is too parochial for his soulřs longing, and soon the 
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soul is contemplating the what might be seen as the best sort of human associations as 
such and the highest human activities.  The soul 
frames it-self a nobler Object, and with enlargřd Affection seeks the Good of 
Mankind. It dwells with Pleasure amidst that Reason, and those Orders on which 
this fair Correspondence and goodly Interest is establishřd. Laws, Constitutions, 
civil and religious Rites; whatever civilizes or polishes rude Mankind; the 
Sciences and Arts, Philosophy, Morals, Virtue; the flourishing State of human 
Affairs, and the Perfection of human Nature; these are its delightful Prospects, 
and this the Charm of Beauty which attracts it.
77
 
 
Still the soul is dissatisfied, however, for in contemplating the things particular to human 
beings it has again realized a partial beauty.  The soul remains "true to its native World 
and higher Country" and so it must continue its quest for "Order and Perfection; wishing 
the best, and hoping still to find a just and wise Administration."
78
  As the marginal 
heading here suggests, the native world and higher country for this soul is "the Whole," 
understood as the entire universe.  Yet since no real order can be attributed to the Whole 
without the existence of Mind, "řtis here the generous Mind labours to discover that 
healing Cause by which the Interest of the Whole is securely establishřd, the Beauty of 
Things, and the universal Order happily sustainřd."79 
 This deepest of longings, says Philocles,  
is the Labour of your Soul:  and This its Melancholy, when unsuccessfully 
pursuing the supreme Beauty, it meets with darkning Clouds which intercept its 
Sight. Monsters arise, not those from Lybian Desarts, but from the Heart of Man 
more fertile; and with their horrid Aspect cast an unseemly Reflection upon 
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NATURE. She, helpless (as she is thought) and working thus absurdly, is 
contemnřd, the Government of the World arraignřd, and DEITY made void.80 
 
Much like the correspondent-friend in Sensus Communis,
81
 Palemon seems to be one of 
those "gentlemen of fashion…to whom a natural good genius, or force of good education, 
has given a sense of what is naturally graceful or becoming."
82
  Palemon is himself a man 
of rank and credit in the fashionable world, "well-knowing and experiencřd in all the 
Degrees and Orders of Beauty, in all the mysterious Charms of the particular Forms."
83
  
Yet he has lost confidence that the world in the truest sense is orderly or that the Whole is 
a kósmos. 
 Palemon seems to have come by his melancholia honestly.  His turn to the 
philosophy of the modern schools was described as a violent one.  To this extent he 
seems less fortunate than Shaftesburyřs friend in Sensus Communis.  There, Shaftesbury 
was able to write, "řTIS well for you (my Friend!) that in your Education you have had 
little to do with the Philosophy, or Philosophers of our days. A good Poet, and an honest 
Historian, may afford Learning enough for a Gentleman. And such a one, whilst he reads 
these Authors as his Diversion, will have a truer relish of their Sense, and understand řem 
better than a Pedant, with all his Labours, and the assistance of his Volumes of 
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Commentators."
84
  In light of this concern, it seems unlikely that the opening 
conversation between Philocles and Palemon, while perhaps out of season in the beau 
monde, took its direction by accident.  While Palemon first raised the topic of philosophy, 
it is Philocles who goes on the offensive against the contemporary state of philosophy in 
the world; it is he who decries the separation of academic philosophy from a gentlemanřs 
education; and he who identifies schoolmen and alchemists as the root of the problem.  
 Upon hearing this criticism made of modern philosophy, Palemon brought forth 
his lamentation against nature.  When pressed, Palemon admitted that his concern is 
primarily moral.  Despite himself, Palemon is troubled by the moral disorder apparently 
natural to mankind.  Indeed, it is likely that his affection for his friends, family, country, 
and humanity, make his fears stand in dark relief.  It is conceivable (although speculative) 
that Philocles turns to the "theological" question because he sees that it is at the heart of 
Palemonřs ill humor.  Having distinguished between myth and philosophy, Philocles then 
shows Palemon that even the academic philosopher is sometimes less than edifying, at 
least insofar as he makes it difficult to settle upon the truth.  This, as we have seen, has 
grave moral implications. 
 The philosophical enthusiasm of Philocles first presents a diagnosis of the illness 
troubling Palemon.  In summarizing his diagnosis, Philocles admits that "much is 
alledgřd in answer, to shew why Nature errs, and how she came thus impotent and erring 
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from an unerring Hand." 
85
  But swept along by his enthusiasm, Philocles boldly offers 
hope. 
I deny she errs; and when she seems most ignorant or perverse in her Productions, 
I assert her even then as wise and provident, as in her goodliest Works. For řtis 
not then that Men complain of the Worldřs Order, or abhor the Face of things, 
when they see various Interests mixřd and interfering; Natures subordinate, of 
different kinds, opposřd one to another, and in their different Operations 
submitted, the higher to the lower. řTis on the contrary, from this Order of inferior 
and superior Things, that we admire the Worldřs Beauty, founded thus on 
Contrarietys: whilst from such various and disagreeing Principles, a universal 
Concord is establishřd.86 
 
One might fear that the apparent diversity we encounter in the world is incompatible with 
the notion of sustained universal order.  Shaftesbury directs us in a footnote to consider 
two passages on "the World" at this point.
87
  The reader is instructed to consult a footnote 
to the Criticřs ŖMiscellany V,ŗ which offers the reader a philosophic pedigree for 
Shaftesburyřs opinion about concord and contraries.  We will glance at these passages 
briefly, before continuing the speech of Philocles to Palemon. 
 The footnote in ŖMiscellany Vŗ cites two passages from Aristotleřs On the 
Heavens (or perí kósmon, appropriately enough).  The passages are combined as follows: 
perhaps Nature wants opposites too, and wants to make harmony out of them, not 
out of similars; as, for instance, she brings the male to the female and not each of 
these to one of his or her own sex; and she made the first concord by means of 
opposites, not similars. Art too seems to do this in imitation of nature. For 
painting, by combining the natures of black and white, yellow and red, makes its 
representations correspond with their types. Music, uniting sharp and grave notes, 
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and long and short syllables, makes one harmony among different sounds. 
Grammar too, bringing together vowels and consonants, builds her whole art upon 
them. This is the very point which was given forth by Heraclitus the Obscure, 
who said, "combine wholes and parts, that which is dispersed and that which is 
united, that which makes discord and that which is in unison, and out of all comes 
one and out of one comes all." . . . There is one harmony arising from all the 
bodies which sound together and circle in the sky, and it springs from one thing 
and ends in one. We might with correct etymology call the universe an order, but 
not a disorder. And, just as in a chorus, when the leader has led off, all the band of 
men (and sometimes women) joins in, making by combination of different voices, 
higher and lower, one harmony in unison, so it is also in the case of the Deity who 
controls the universe.
88
 
 
This passage makes several points useful for our purposes.  Here we see Shaftesbury 
begin to establish an analogy between art and nature.  Earlier Palemon feared that, in the 
case of human beings, art alone contributed whatever was of beauty in human beings.  
The passages of Aristotle suggest, to the contrary, that art, found in music, painting, and 
graceful speaking, imitates nature when it combines contraries into a harmonious whole.  
Aristotle suggests for this reason we can call the universe an order but not a disorder.
89
  
The end of the quotation shifts the analogy, attributing to "the Deity" activity analogous 
to the choral leader. 
 According to Philoclesř speech, Nature achieves order by subordinating its parts 
to the greater Whole; as Aristotle says, "nature wants opposites too, and wants to make 
harmony out of them, not out of similars"--at least "perhaps" it does.  Thus can Philocles 
account for "those Seeming Blemishes cast upon Nature."
90
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 This philosophical enthusiasm draws the admiration of Palemon, who wonders 
how Philocles came to change his character and speak so eloquently; surely such 
thoughts "have some Foundation" in Philocles.  Philocles replies that 
had [it] been my fortune to have met you the other day, just at my Return out of 
the Country from a Friend, whose Conversation had in one day or two made such 
an Impression on me, that I shouřd have suted you to a Miracle. You wouřd have 
thought indeed that I had been curřd of my Scepticism and Levity, so as never to 
have rallyřd more, at that wild rate, on any Subject, much less on these which are 
so serious.
91
 
 
Palemon expresses regret not to have met Philocles before he lost those impressions.  
Philocles denies he has lost them; he remarks "I had not so lost řem neither, as not easily, 
you saw, to revive řem on occasion; were I not afraid."92  Indeed, he has just shown both 
Palemon and the reader that he has philosophical enthusiasm at his ready disposal (and 
for reasons we shall see, he cannot lose it).  This, of course, makes his claim to be afraid 
for both Palemon and himself surprising.  Philocles explains:  "for tho I was like to be 
perfectly curřd of my Scepticism; řtwas by what I thought worse, downright Enthusiasm. 
You never knew a more agreeable Enthusiast!" 
 Philocles seems to be of the opinion that enthusiasm is an antidote which is itself 
easily abused.  The Critic expresses similar concerns when he discusses enthusiasm in the 
second "Miscellany."  He writes: 
as all Affections have their Excess, and require Judgment and Discretion to 
moderate and govern them; so this high and noble Affection, which raises Man to 
Action, and is his Guide in Business as well as Pleasure, requires a steddy Rein 
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and strict Hand over it. All Moralists, worthy of any Name, have recognizřd the 
Passion; tho among these the wisest have prescribřd Restraint, pressřd 
Moderation, and to all Tyrořs in Philosophy forbid the forward Use of 
Admiration, Rapture, or Extasy, even in the Subjects they esteemřd the highest, 
and most divine. They knew very well that the first Motion, Appetite, and Ardour 
of the Youth in general towards Philosophy and Knowledg, depended chiefly on 
this Turn of Temper: Yet were they well apprizřd, withal, That in the Progress of 
this Study, as well as in the affairs of Life, the florid Ideas and exalted Fancy of 
this kind became the Fuel of many incendiary Passions; and that, in religious 
Concerns particularly, the Habit of Admiration and contemplative Delight, wouřd, 
by over-Indulgence, too easily mount into high Fanaticism, or degenerate into 
abject Superstition.
93
 
 
The danger of even philosophical enthusiasm is a recurring theme in "Miscellaneous 
Reflections."  For example, during the discussion of self-sufficiency and its dependence 
on the proper œconomy of the passions in ŖMiscellany IV,ŗ the Critic offers an extended 
footnote elaborating his concern over excessive passions of any sort, including the more 
laudatory, more sublime passions.
94
  The footnotes offer quotations from Epictetus which 
reproach the passions.  The Critic also cites Horaceřs remark that "the wise man must be 
called mad, the fair man unfair, if he seek even virtue too keenly."  Most interestingly for 
our purposes here, we read the following: 
Nor was this Prohibition of the wondering or admiring Habit, in early Students, 
peculiar to one kind of Philosophy alone. It was common to many; however the 
Reason and Account of it might differ, in one Sect from the other. The 
Pythagoreans sufficiently checkřd their Tyrořs, by silencing them so long on their 
first Courtship to Philosophy. And tho Admiration, in the Peripatetick Sense, as 
above-mentionřd, may be justly callřd the inclining Principle or first Motive to 
PHILOSOPHY; yet this Mistress, when once espousřd, teaches us to admire, after 
a different manner from what we did before.
95
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In this passage we see confirmation of our suspicion (discussed in Chapter 2) that 
philosophic discretion protects the philosopher from reproach but also serves an 
important pedagogical purpose.  Once again we Shaftesbury directs our attention away 
from the sublime toward the consideration of natural moral life.  This is the necessary 
prelude to any philosophical progress.  As he writes in A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm,  
methinks, my Lord, it wouřd be well for us, if before we ascended into the higher 
Regions of Divinity, we wouřd vouchsafe to descend a little into our-selves, and 
bestow some poor Thoughts upon plain honest Morals. When we had once lookřd 
into our-selves, and distinguishřd well the nature of our own Affections, we 
shouřd probably be fitter Judges of the Divineness of a Character, and discern 
better what Affections were sutable or unsutable to a perfect Being. We might 
then understand how to love and praise, when we had acquirřd some consistent 
Notion of what was laudable or lovely. Otherwise we might chance to do God 
little Honour, when we intended him the most. For řtis hard to imagine what 
Honour can arise to the DEITY from the Praises of Creatures, who are unable to 
discern what is praise-worthy or excellent in their own kind.
96
 
 
Nevertheless, Palemon reproaches Philocles for speaking of his friend so carelessly.  
"Nor," he adds, "shouřd I, perhaps, judg that to be Enthusiasm which you so freely term 
so. I have a strong suspicion that you injure him. Nor can I be satisfyřd till I hear further 
of that serious Conversation for which you tax him as Enthusiastick."
97
 
 Palemon is now very eager to hear about this friend and he worries that Philocles 
is unfair to call the friend's cure for skepticism "enthusiasm."  Philocles admits that his 
friendřs enthusiasm is not vulgar.  To the contrary,  
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all was serene, soft, and harmonious. The manner of it was more after the pleasing 
Transports of those antient Poets you are often charmřd with, than after the fierce 
unsociable way of modern Zealots; those starchřd gruff Gentlemen, who guard 
Religion as Bullys do a Mistress, and give us the while a very indifferent Opinion 
of their Ladyřs Merit, and their own Wit, by adoring what they neither allow to be 
inspected by others, nor care themselves to examine in a fair light. But here Iřll 
answer for it; there was nothing of Disguise or Paint. All was fair, open, and 
genuine, as Nature herself. řTwas Nature he was in love with: řTwas Nature he 
sung. And if any-one might be said to have a natural Mistress, my Friend 
certainly might, whose Heart was thus ingagřd. But Love, I found, was every-
where the same. And tho the Object here was very fine, and the Passion it created 
very noble; yet Liberty, I thought, was finer than all: And I who never carřd to 
ingage in other Loves of the least continuance, was the more afraid, I told you, of 
this which had such a power with my poor Friend, as to make him appear the 
perfectest Enthusiast in the World, Ill-humour only excepted. For this was 
singular in him, "That tho he had all of the Enthusiast, he had nothing of the 
Bigot. He heard every thing with Mildness and Delight; and bore with me when I 
treated all his Thoughts as visionary; and when, Sceptick-like, I unravelřd all his 
Systems."
98
 
 
Several important things come to light in this speech.  Just as Shaftesbury himself 
appealed to the Muses of the ancient poets at the opening of A Letter Concerning 
Enthusiasm, so Philocles now describes the "transports of those antient Poets" loved by 
Palemon.  This laudable form of enthusiasm is again contrasted with the zealotry of 
modern churchmen.  Philocles then vouches for the love of his friend, saying "here Iřll 
answer for it; there was nothing of Disguise or Paint. All was fair, open, and genuine, as 
Nature herself." 
 Yet it must be remarked that Philocles remains a skeptic despite his marvelous 
friend's powerful charms.  Indeed, Philocles says that "love, I found, was every-where the 
same. And tho the Object here was very fine, and the Passion it created very noble; yet 
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Liberty, I thought, was finer than all."  Philocles prefers the love of liberty to this 
transporting love of nature.  Only the noble object described by his friend could have 
tempted Philocles to reconsider his skepticism, for the friend's strong enthusiasm was not 
bigoted:  he "heard every thing with Mildness and Delight; and bore with me when I 
treated all his Thoughts as visionary; and when, Sceptick-like, I unravelřd all his 
Systems."  Philocles seems to suggest that the counter-arguments he himself presented 
were sufficient to challenge the visionary systems of his friend if not refute them. 
We will have to see whether or not we agree with Philocles, but Palemon is 
enthralled.  He insists that Philocles relate the full two-day conversation.  (Philocles 
equivocates on the length of his visit, saying at one point he spent "one day or two" in the 
country and then asserting "two days," and again, "two philosophical Days."
99
)  Philocles 
reminded Palemon "again and again" that he knew not "the danger of this philosophical 
Passion."  Philocles writes that he moved forward reluctantly, and that Palemon listened 
at his own hazard.
100
  Needless to say, such warnings were ineffective and perhaps they 
incited Palemon's eagerness all the more.  Finally Philocles asks for a respite, offering "to 
turn Writer, and draw up the Memoirs of those two philosophical Days; beginning with 
what had passřd this last Day between our-selves."101 
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  Preliminary Ref lect ions  
However persuasive Philoclesř friend Theocles will seem, he was insufficiently 
persuasive to have convinced Philocles.  This seems to be one reason that Shaftesbury 
committed his literary anachronism.  As readers, we enter the conversation between the 
"academic skeptic" and the "theist" knowing that the skeptic remains skeptical.  We can 
see, however, that Palemon, whose melancholia seems to have been understood by 
Philocles, is open to the possibility of being persuaded by Theocles.  To that extent, at 
least, Philocles seems to have lived up to his name by proving his generous friendship 
toward Palemon. 
 Palemon himself, who may be named in part for the melancholy lover of Arcite, 
has found sufficient hope in the enthusiastic speech presented by Philocles in §1 to ask 
for the whole account of Philoclesř recent trip to the country.  As we shall soon see, 
Palemonřs name may have an additional clue both to his identity and the way to approach 
the remainder of The Moralists. 
The Moralists ,  Part II  
The plot of Part II is as follows.  Section 1 finds Philocles alone in his apartment, 
recollecting his recent visit with Theocles and we are soon transported to that scene.  
After meeting Theocles in the fields, Philocles and his friend converse until they are 
interrupted by the announcement that company has arrived.  In section 2, the friends and 
company share dinner.  Conversation centers on the relationship between civil and moral 
liberty.  Philocles upsets one of the guests, and Theocles is drawn into the conversation to 
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defend his friend.  Section 3 takes up the relationship between religion and virtue, which 
acts as an "Apology" on behalf of Philocles.  At the insistence of two gentleman-guests, 
Theocles offers in Section 4 what he calls a "Philosophical Sermon."  Philocles, 
according to an agreement, then advances objections to the sermon; Theocles and 
Philocles are led to discuss human nature as it presents itself in ordinary life.  This leads 
to a discussion of the state of nature, which draws the older gentleman into the 
conversation.  Theocles then advances the argument that man is by nature social.  The 
two guests dominate the conversation in section 5, which brings Part II to a close; 
Theocles remains silent while Philocles and the two guests discuss matters pertaining to 
revelation and miracles. 
 
  Part  II ,  §  1:   Philocles'  Sol i loquy  
At the end of Part I, Philocles asks Palemon to delay his gratification while 
Philocles turns writer.  Given the extensive attention given by the Characteristicks to 
authorship, writing, self-knowledge, and literary form, it is difficult not to be struck by 
this request.  As we have seen at the opening of this chapter, the Critic of Miscellaneous 
Reflections calls the judgment of Shaftesbury into question when he turns to Volume II of 
the Characteristicks.  Shaftesbury, "by giving us a Work or two in form, after the regular 
manner of Composition," has legitimately opened himself up to the art of Criticism 
explored at length in Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author.  The Critic told us to look for 
"systematical, didactick and perceptive" structure in The Moralists, and we have tried to 
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follow his advice so far.  It is useful at this point to revisit a passage quoted more fully 
above.  In ŖMiscellany Vŗ the Critic makes the following remarks about The Moralists: 
as for the Characters, and Incidents, they are neither wholly feignřd (says he) nor 
wholly true: but according to the Liberty allowřd in the way of DIALOGUE, the 
principal Matters are founded upon Truth; and the rest as near resembling as may 
be. řTis a Sceptick recites: and the Hero of the Piece passes for an Enthusiast. If a 
perfect Character be wanting; řtis the same Case here, as with the Poets in some 
of their best Pieces. And this surely is a sufficient Warrant for the Author of a 
PHILOSOPHICAL ROMANCE."--Thus our Author himself; who to conceal, 
however, his strict Imitation of the antient poetick DIALOGUE, has prefixřd an 
auxiliary Title to his Work, and given it the Sirname of RHAPSODY.
102
 
 
We wondered earlier what it would mean for a dialogue to be "neither wholly 
feignřd…nor wholly true: but according to the Liberty allowřd in the way of 
DIALOGUE, the principal Matters are founded upon Truth."  There is of course an 
obvious way in which the entire Moralists is feigned:  Palemon, Philocles, and Theocles 
are characters.  We know, however, that stories can tell the truth, albeit through fiction.
103
  
In the case of this work, however, it may be more complicated still.  The Critic tells us 
"řtis a Sceptick recites: and the Hero of the Piece passes for an Enthusiast."  This seems 
fairly straightforward, for clearly Philocles recites, and he is a skeptic.  This apparently 
leaves enthusiastic Theocles as the hero; certainly this is the common view.
104
  But are 
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we to think that Theocles only passes for an enthusiast?  We have seen Shaftesbury tell 
us that in good dialogue, we find "characters preservřd throřout."  Yet, strangely enough, 
the Critic also remarks of The Moralists that "if a perfect Character be wanting; řtis the 
same Case here, as with the Poets in some of their best Pieces."
105
 
 How is it that a perfect character could be wanting?  In Soliloquy, Shaftesbury 
explains the "philosophical Hero" of Platořs Socratic "Mimes" or "Dialogues" like this: 
the Philosophical Hero of these Poems, whose Name they carryřd both in their 
Body and Front, and whose Genius and Manner they were made to represent, was 
in himself a perfect Character; yet, in some respects, so veilřd, and in a Cloud, 
that to the unattentive Surveyor he seemřd often to be very different from what he 
really was: and this chiefly by reason of a certain exquisite and refinřd Raillery 
which belongřd to his Manner, and by virtue of which he couřd treat the highest 
Subjects, and those of the commonest Capacity both together, and render řem 
explanatory of each other. So that in this Genius of writing, there appearřd both 
the heroick and the simple, the tragick, and the comick Vein.
106
 
 
Here the work of concern does not bear the name of a particular character; it is called The 
Moralists and not Theocles or Palemon.  Shaftesbury does not leave us in doubt as to 
whether he considered Plato a genuine poet as well as a philosopher; he remarks in a 
footnote to a discussion of Plato that "his Dialogues were real POEMS."   
Socrates is a perfect character despite the fact that he is easily misunderstood.  
The "unattentive Surveyor" of Plato may not understand the significance of Socratic 
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irony and may be confused by the "veilřd" presentation.  So too Theocles is easily 
misunderstood to those readers who are not alert to the deeper meaning of raillery for 
Shaftesbury.  We must continue to read for the full art of dialogue to show itself in The 
Moralists. 
  Part  II ,  §  1:   Philocles’  Sol i loquy and the Fields of  Arcadia  
 Philocles opens the next part of The Moralists with an odd prelude.  He writes to 
Palemon that he awoke the next morning to find himself "under positive Engagements of 
proceeding in the same philosophical way, without intermission, and upon harder terms 
than ever."
107
  His work was harder for want of a companion to converse with.  Palemon 
writes:  "I was now alone; confinřd to my Closet; obligřd to meditate by my-self; and 
reducřd to the hard Circumstances of an Author, and Historian, in the most difficult 
Subject."
108
 
 Fortunately for Philocles, he receives some sort of divine inspiration to begin the 
project.  "But here, methought, propitious Heaven, in some manner, assisted me. For if 
Dreams were, as Homer teaches, sent from the Throne of Jove; I might conclude I had a 
favourable one, of the true sort, towards the Morning-light; which, as I recollected my-
self, gave me a clear and perfect Idea of what I desirřd so earnestly to bring back to my 
Memory."
109
  (Presumably this all happens before he begins to write at all.)   
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 Philocles proceeds to describe the true dream he had.  "I found my-self 
transported to a distant Country, which presented a pompous rural Scene. It was a 
Mountain not far from the Sea, its Brow adornřd with antient Wood, and at its foot a 
River and well-inhabited Plain: beyond which the Sea appearing, closřd the Prospect."  
He recognizes this pastoral scene as the place he talked with his friend Theocles on his 
second day in the country.  So vivid is his recollection that he calls out to his friend, thus 
breaking his reverie.  Nevertheless, writes Philocles, 
so powerful was the Impression of my Dream, and so perfect the Idea raisřd in 
me, of the Person, Words, and Manner of my Friend, that I couřd now fansy 
myself philosophically inspirřd, as that Roman Sage by his AEgeria, and invited, 
on this occasion, to try my Historical Muse. For justly might I hope for such 
Assistance in behalf of Theocles, who so lovřd the Muses, and was, I thought, no 
less belovřd by them.110 
 
Presumably the Roman sage alluded to in this passage is Numa Pompilius, who 
Livy tells us set out to instill a fear of the gods in the Roman people.
111
  "Because he 
could not win them over without some miraculous fiction," we learn, "he pretended that 
he met by night with the goddess Aegeria:  it was at her prompting, he claimed, that he 
was instituting religious rites that would please the gods most."
112
  In comparing himself 
with Numa, Philocles seems to suggest that there is an aspect of deception in his own 
presentation.  Numa, we learn from Livy, continued to visit his goddess alone, in a 
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shaded and private sacred grove fed by an endless fountain.
113
  Indeed, I want to claim 
that Philocles is about to present us with his own miraculous fiction, having conjured for 
himself a visit from the Muses for the sake of Palemon.  Shaftesbury may be following 
the custom of the ancient poet, who, wanting to appear as a favorite of the Muses, "might 
with probability feign an Extasy, tho he really felt none: and supposing it to have been 
mere Affectation, it wouřd look however like something natural, and couřd not fail of 
pleasing."
114
  Certainly the charm would be unsuccessful if Palemon were to take the 
ecstasy to be a contrivance.  We have already seen that Philocles believes that paper-coin 
tales are more serviceable for the "generality of men" than "sterling reason."
115
  He has 
also shown himself capable of telling fables
116
 and of portraying philosophical 
enthusiasm despite his continuing skepticism.
117
 
 A similar point can be drawn from Ovidřs mention of Numa in Fasti, Book III, 
lines 263-4 and 273-6:  "here is a lake in the valley of Aricia, inclosed by a dark wood, 
sanctified by religious awe…With indistinct murmur glides a pebbly stream: ofttimes, but 
in scanty draughts, have I drunk thence. It is Egeria who supplies the water; a Goddess 
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pleasing to the Muses; she was the wife and the counsellor of Numa."
118
  (Similar 
suggestions are found in Plutarchřs Life of Numa.)  Here we see the poet Ovid drinking 
from the same fountain that inspired Numa and was kept flowing by Numařs nymph 
wife.  In the words of Molly Masco-Pranger, both "Plutarch and Ovid…prepare readers 
to see Numa in poetic terms, and particularly encourage them to read Numařs relationship 
with Egeria as akin to divine inspiration evoked by the Hesiodic model."
119
  As Numa is 
inspired by Aegeria, so is Ovid.  So too is Philocles. 
 Philocles, then, offers us a few hints to guide our interpretation of his 
conversation.  He takes us back to the "original rural Scene" and the first morning of his 
visit with Theocles, "that Heroick Genius, the Companion and Guide of my first 
Thoughts in these profounder Subjects."
120
   
Having been prepared by Soliloquy to read The Moralists, it is difficult not to 
recollect the advice we received on the proper way to philosophize.  We recall from 
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vallis Aricinae silva praecinctus opaca 
est lacus, antiqua religione sacer; 
 
*** 
defluit incerto lapidosus murmure rivus: 
saepe, sed exiguis haustibus, inde bibi. 
Egeria est quae praebet aquas, dea grata Camenis: 
illa Numae coniunx consiliumque fuit. 
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Chapter 2 that in Soliloquy, Shaftesbury invoked the image of a "Daemon, Genius, Angel, 
or Guardian-Spirit" whom we could invite into "secret Conferences, by which alone he 
couřd be enabled to become our Advisor and Guide."121  It is by this art of soliloquy that a 
man can come to know himself.  By dividing himself into two persons, a man can "exert 
this generous Faculty, and raise himself a Companion; who being fairly admitted into 
Partnership, wouřd quickly mend his Partner, and set his affairs on a right foot."122  
Shaftesbury has recommended this practice "especially in the case of Authors."  He 
writes: 
I wouřd therefore advise our Probationer, upon his first Exercise, to retire into 
some thick Wood, or rather take the Point of some high Hill; where, besides the 
Advantage of looking about him for Security, he wouřd find the Air perhaps more 
rarefyřd, and sutable to the Perspiration requirřd, especially in the case of a 
Poetical Genius.
 123
 
 
Palemonřs philosophical discourse was out of season in part because he had not practiced 
sufficiently in solitude.  Philocles, however, finds himself transported to a "pompous 
rural Scene," complete with an "antient Wood."  All "great Wits" practice soliloquy and 
are known "for their great Loquacity by themselves, and their profound Taciturnity in 
Company."
124
  In what well may be a clue for thinking about Shaftesburyřs dialogue, 
Soliloquy tells us that in the case of "the Moralists or Philosophers," soliloquy is used in 
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solitude to make their thoughts "speak out distinctly."
125
  Shaftesbury agrees with 
Socrates that thinking is a conversation the soul has with itself.
126
  We can expect that the 
philosophers of The Moralists will follow this rule, especially those philosophers who are 
also authors. 
Contrary to the claim of Philocles to Palemon that he wanted an agreeable 
companion to converse with, Philocles "alone" and "obligřd to meditate" is likely to 
follow the regimen of soliloquy.  The Moralists presents itself emphatically as a written 
work rather than a recorded conversation.  (This seems true even stipulating that we 
know it to be "fictional.")  It is difficult to imagine that Philocles, having turned author, 
would fail to heed the common practice of great wits.  Philocles, too, has a "companion 
and guide" even in his solitude named Theocles. 
 In The Moralists, the philosophical hero of the work follows the method of 
soliloquy and divides himself in two.  We recall that Shaftesbury writes in Soliloquy that: 
this was, among the Antients, that celebrated Delphick Inscription, Recognize 
Your-self: which was as much as to say, Divide your-self, or Be Two. For if the 
Division were rightly made, all within wouřd of course, they thought, be rightly 
understood, and prudently managřd. Such Confidence they had in this Home-
Dialect of Soliloquy. For it was accounted the peculiar of Philosophers and wise 
Men, to be able to hold themselves in Talk. And it was their Boast on this account, 
"That they were never less alone, than when by themselves." A Knave, they 
thought, couřd never be by himself. Not that his Conscience was always sure of 
giving him disturbance; but he had not, they supposřd, so much Interest with 
himself, as to exert this generous Faculty, and raise himself a Companion; who 
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being fairly admitted into Partnership, wouřd quickly mend his Partner, and set 
his Affairs on a right foot.
127
 
 
When he retires to his apartment to write, Philocles too holds himself in talk.  He allows 
Palemon and other readers to eavesdrop on his thought, that is, the internal conversation 
between 'Philo' and 'Theo' through his literary device or "machine."  (He might be said to 
make one into two in the same way he reckons the days.)  Here, then, we can see why the 
Critic offered his strange remark that "if a perfect Character be wanting; řtis the same 
Case here, as with the Poets in some of their best Pieces."  A perfect character in one 
sense is wanting because we are presented with two philosophers rather than one; in 
another sense, the matter is exactly the same as in a Platonic dialogue, where the hero 
was "in himself a perfect Character; yet, in some respects "so veilřd, and in a Cloud, that 
to the unattentive Surveyor he seemřd often to be very different from what he really 
was."
128
  In the case of Philocles' soliloquy, we have one soul having a conversation with 
itself--that is, thinking. 
"The Muses love alternating verses."
129
 
Philocles finds Theocles "with his belovřd Mantuan Muse, roving in the 
Fields."
130
  Seeing Philocles approach, Theoclesř book "vanishřd."  Philocles is naturally 
curious to know what Theocles was reading, asking whether it is "of a secret kind" he 
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was not allowed to see.  Theocles shows him the book, "his Poet," asking whether 
Philocles expected something more mysterious.  
 Oddly enough, Philocles does not tell us exactly what Theocles was reading.  We 
do know it is something by Virgil, the beloved "Mantuan MUSE."  Theocles suggests that 
"diviner poets" are best appreciated by contemplative men, who have retired from the 
world to think.  What is true of books is also true of thought.  Theocles adds, "that not 
only the best Authors, but the best Company, require this seasoning. Society it-self 
cannot be rightly enjoyřd without some Abstinence and separate Thought."131  We are left 
with the impression that Theocles was engaged in his own private devotional, 
communing with Virgil or perhaps a "genius" of his own. 
 I believe that this brief exchange, combined with another allusion later in the 
dialogue, offers us important clues about The Moralists.  The second allusion occurs on 
the second morning of Philoclesř visit to the country.  Theocles again follows his custom 
of taking a solitary morning walk, which Philocles describes as "his Hours and 
Exercises."
132
  Philocles jokes that he might need a nymph to join forces against 
Theocles, "in the manner your belovřd Poet makes the Nymph AEgle join with his two 
Youths, in forcing the God Silenus to sing to řem."133  The allusion is to Virgilřs sixth 
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Eclogue.
134
  In the sixth Eclogue, Silenus sings a cosmological song, tracing the world 
from its origin in void and matter.  Theocles, confirming the reference, remarks, "do you 
expect I shouřd imitate the Poetřs God you mentionřd, and sing  ŘThe Rise of Things 
from Atoms; the Birth of Order from Confusion; and the Origin of Union, Harmony, and 
Concord, from the sole Powers of Chaos, and blind Chance?ř"135  Shaftesbury seems to 
recognize, that Virgil, at least, presents a view where order does indeed arise from chaos. 
Given the pastoral setting of the conversations between Theocles and Philocles, 
the allusions to Virgil in general and to the Eclogues in particular, the reader is invited to 
think more carefully about the relationship between Virgil and The Moralists.  We have 
seen already that Philocles takes us to a pastoral scene that seems more fabulous than 
real.
136
  Many points could be made about this, but for our purposes I note the following.  
In Virgilřs third Eclogue we are presented with a singing contest between two shepherds 
(Menalcas and Damoetas).
137
  While one might be tempted to see the contest as little 
more than comic bickering, at least to the shepherds it concerns "not small things" (res 
est non parva).
138
  After dickering about the appropriate prize for the best singer, the 
shepherds appoint a judge to decide the contest, another shepherd named Palaemon.  
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While Shaftesburyřs Palemon is spelled differently than Virgilřs Palaemon, it is difficult 
to overlook the allusion.  (I am untroubled by the spelling partly because translation from 
classical languages into English involves choices.  For example, in the earliest English 
translation of Ovidřs Metamorphoses, Arthur Golding renders the Latin name Palaemon 
into English as Palemon.
139
)  The shepherds begin their amoebic song with a responsorial 
pair of couplets, each appealing to a very different god: 
DAMOETAS: With Jove my song [or the Muse--Musae] begins; of Jove all 
things are full; He makes the earth fruitful; he cares for my verses. 
 
MENALCAS: And me Phoebus loves; Phoebus always finds with me the 
presents he loves, laurels and sweet-blushing hyacinths. 
 
This exchange is interesting because it seems to anticipate the inclinations of the 
interlocutors in The Moralists.  Damoetas appeals to Jupiter, generally regarded as the 
god of justice and orderly nature.  In identifying Apollo with the name Phoebus, 
Menalcas reminds the reader of the god of light and reason.
140
  So too, Theocles will 
argue for an orderly cosmos, while the skeptical Philocles will present a challenge. 
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These competing perspectives are called Řhypothesesř in The Moralists, and seem 
to refer to fundamental and mutually exclusive opinions about the nature of the Whole.  
In the third Eclogue, the shepherdsř contest ends with Palaemon awarding prizes to both 
shepherds.  Palaemon says to the shepherds, "it is not for me to settle so close a contest 
between you.  You deserve the heifer, and so does he."
141
  As we have already suggested, 
The Moralists ends rather abruptly.  While the reader is left with the initial impression 
that Theocles has persuaded Philocles to accept his enthusiastic appeals for an 
harmonious Whole, the structure of the dialogue leaves considerable doubt.  We do not 
learn how Shaftesburyřs Palemon responds to the dialogue between Theocles and 
Philocles.  The reader is left to decide the dispute for himself, or at least to continue to 
wrestle with the questions that emerge.  Shaftesbury presents his case in such a way that 
the arguments of Theocles appear very attractive and perhaps more likely than the 
alternatives.  Yet Shaftesbury is himself too honest a philosopher to choose either side. 
The remainder of section 1 of Part II concerns the relationship of happiness or the 
good to pleasure.  The conversation arises from a remark by Theocles that "all grows 
insipid, dull, and tiresome, without the help of some Intervals of Retirement."
142
  
Theocles asks whether or not Philocles agrees that even the best lovers seek distance 
from their beloved for periods of solitude.  This is true for lovers, and all the more so for 
the man who must live in "that common World of mix'd and undistinguish'd Company."  
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Theocles seems to suggest that solitude is necessary for restoration when he suffers from 
refractory boredom.  Philocles responds to this argument of Theocles without offering his 
own opinion.  He says:   
by your Rule, said I, Theocles, there shouřd be no such thing as Happiness or 
Good in Life, since every Enjoyment wears out so soon; and growing painful, is 
diverted by some other thing; and that again by some other; and so on. I am sure, 
if Solitude serves as a Remedy or Diversion to any thing in the World, there is 
nothing which may not serve as Diversion to Solitude; which wants it more than 
any thing besides. And thus there can be no Good which is regular or constant. 
Happiness is a thing out of the way, and only to be found in wandring.
143
 
 
Theocles infers from this little speech that Philocles holds that "nothing can be good but 
what is constant," and in Theocles' own opinion this is a just maxim.
144
  Philocles 
responds that, sadly, while the objects of good may remain constant throughout a man's 
life, a man's humor changes with age, temper, passions, thoughts, and conversations.  If 
this notion of the good is true, then Philocles will have to conclude that all things in life 
are changing and vulnerable to "the same common Fate of Satiety and Disgust." 
 Theocles points out that Philocles is not satisfied with "the current Notion…That 
our real Good is PLEASURE."
145
  Philocles assents to this, adding that he would be more 
satisfied if the current defenders of this hedonism could say more about what pleasures 
are.  As it stands, contemporary hedonists fail to distinguish pleasure from the will.  On 
their account, men are little more than animals responding to the immediate stimuli of 
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pleasure.  Such creature-comfort, while arguably a genuine kind of pleasure, hardly 
deserves the name good or happiness.
146
  A footnote to his reply directs our attention to a 
similar concern as it arises in Soliloquy.  There we encounter the claim of some that men 
are governed by "Interest."  This claim, however, amounts to equating will with fancy; it 
is a confession that human life is essentially aimless.
147
  "Can I then be suppos'd to hit," 
Shaftesbury asks, "when I know not, in reality, so much as how to aim?"
148
 
 By following this thread we see that Philocles does not necessarily object to what 
is naturally pleasant.  He believes, rather, that by claiming the good to be whatever 
pleases a man, modern philosophers undermine our ability to connect "the Opinion of the 
Good to the Possessions of the MIND."
149
  In arguing this modern philosophers divide 
men from their nature and teach them to be restless and unhappy.  If he is correct about 
this, then what is most called for is reflection on how we are to distinguish our true 
pleasure from the great variety of false opinions about the good.  Philocles seems to agree 
with the Critic that "the less fanciful I am, in what relates to my Contentment and 
Happiness, the more powerful and absolute I must be, in Self-enjoyment, and the 
Possession of my Good."
150
  As the Critic explains, 
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if it be in the Affections themselves that I place my highest Joy, and in those 
Objects, whatever they are, of inward Worth and Beauty, (such as Honesty, Faith, 
Integrity, Friendship, Honour) řtis evident I can never possibly, in this respect, 
rejoice amiss, or indulge my-self too far in the Enjoyment. The greater my 
Indulgence is, the less I have reason to fear either Reverse or Disappointment.
151
  
 
The Critic here displays his own moderate skepticism by tentatively mentioning possible 
objects of our affections.  While honesty, faith, integrity, etc. are likely contenders for 
"inward Worth and Beauty," we cannot know what is natural before we undertake the 
sort of investigation recommended by Soliloquy. 
 Philocles, then, rejects the hypothesis of his contemporary "dogmatizers on 
Pleasure."
152
  It is more sensible, he says, to consider "how to gain that Point of Sight, 
whence probably we may best discern; and How to place our-selves in that unbiassřd 
State, in which we are fittest to pronounce."
153
 
Theocles is able to praise Philocles for not falling into the dogmatic skepticism of 
modern philosophy.  He remarks, 
O Philocles…if this be unfeignedly your Sentiment; if it be possible you shouřd 
have the Fortitude to with-hold your Assent in this Affair, and go in search of 
what the meanest of Mankind think they already know so certainly: řtis from a 
nobler turn of thought than what you have observřd in any of the modern 
Scepticks you have conversřd with. For if I mistake not, there are hardly anywhere 
at this day a sort of People more peremptory, or who deliberate less on the choice 
of Good. They who pretend to such a Scrutiny of other Evidences, are the readiest 
to take the Evidence of the greatest Deceivers in the World, their own Passions. 
Having gainřd, as they think, a Liberty from some seeming Constraints of 
Religion, they suppose they employ this Liberty to perfection, by following the 
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first Motion of their Will, and assenting to the first Dictate or Report of any 
prepossessing Fancy, any foremost Opinion or Conceit of Good.
154
 
 
The Critic presents a modest version of skepticism which seems to accord with this 
moderate skepticism of Philocles.  The Critic writes: 
to say truth, I have often wonderřd to find such a Disturbance raisřd about the 
simple name of Sceptick. řTis certain that, in its original and plain signification, 
the word imports no more than barely, "That State or Frame of Mind in which 
every one remains, on every Subject of which he is not certain." He who is 
certain, or presumes to say he knows, is in that particular, whether he be mistaken 
or in the right, a Dogmatist. Between these two States or Situations of Mind, there 
can be no medium. For he who says, "That he believes for certain, or is assur’d of 
what he believes"; either speaks ridiculously, or says in effect, "That he believes 
strongly, but is not sure." So that whoever is not conscious of Revelation, nor has 
certain Knowledg of any Miracle or Sign, can be no more than Sceptick in the 
Case.
155
 
 
As we have seen, insofar as Philocles adopts a position at all, it is only temporary:  
Philocles himself remains a skeptic when he later meets Palemon in the park.  His 
position is may be like Shaftesburyřs own, at least insofar as it is "certain that, in its 
original and plain signification, the word [Skeptic] imports no more than barely, ŘThat 
State or Frame of Mind in which every one remains, on every Subject of which he is not 
certain.’" 
  Part  II ,  §  2:   Dinner Company  
 At dinner, Philocles revisits the claim made by Theocles earlier in the day that a 
man might live a life of constancy by enlarging friendship to include all mankind.  
Whatever Theocles means by his claim, we should not mistake it for the Christian virtue 
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of charity.  According to Theocles, "Řto deserve well of the Publick,ř and Řto be justly 
stylřd the Friend of Mankind,ř requires no more than to be good and virtuous; Terms 
which for oneřs own sake one wouřd naturally covet."156  Philocles objects to this claim, 
observing that few pursue virtue for its own sake; they are motivated best by "the Rod 
and Sweetmeat," that is, punishments and rewards.
157
 
Theocles then advances the argument that practicing the virtues is conducive to 
oneřs own health and good.  Following the Epicureans, he is able to show that 
temperance is conducive to health and, consequently, to a longer-term notion of pleasure.  
Philocles has no difficulty in agreeing with this when considering health, but Theocles 
pursues the argument to raise the question of the whole human life.  We learn that 
Philocles is an admirer of free political institutions.  Theocles suggests that civil liberty is 
quite compatible with the moral liberty that emerges from the practice of virtue.  He says 
to Philocles, "you…who are such an Admirer of Civil Liberty, and can represent it to 
your-self with a thousand several Graces and Advantages; can you imagine no Grace or 
Beauty in that original native Liberty, Moral. which sets us free from so many in-born 
Tyrannys, gives us the Privilege of our-selves, and makes us our own, and independent? 
A sort of Property, which, methinks, is as material to us to the full, as that which secures 
us our Lands, or Revenues."
158
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Theocles now advances an image of the relationship between moral and political 
liberty.  This is perhaps the clearest statement of the political consequences of 
Shaftesburyřs philosophical teaching.  So important is this passage that Shaftesbury 
arranged for the frontispiece of the Volume II of the Characteristicks to bear its image.  I 
will now quote it in full: 
I shouřd think, said he (carrying on his Humour) that one might draw the Picture 
of this moral Dame to as much advantage as that of her political Sister; whom 
you admire, as describřd to us "in her Amazon-Dress, with a free manly Air 
becoming her; her Guards the Laws, with their written Tables, like Bucklers, 
surrounding her; Riches, Traffick, and Plenty, with the Cornucopia, serving as her 
Attendents; and in her Train the Arts and Sciences, like Children, playing."--The 
rest of the Piece is easy to imagine: "Her Triumph over Tyranny, and lawless Rule 
of Lust and Passion."--But what a Triumph wouřd her Sisterřs be! What Monsters 
of savage Passions wouřd there appear subduřd! "There fierce Ambition, Lust, 
Uproar, Misrule, with all the Fiends which rage in human Breasts, wouřd be 
securely chainřd. And when Fortune her-self, the Queen of Flatterys, with that 
Prince of Terrors, Death, were at the Chariot-wheels, as Captives; how natural 
wouřd it be to see Fortitude, Magnanimity, Justice, Honour, and all that generous 
Band attend as the Companions of our inmate Lady Liberty! She, like some new-
born Goddess, wouřd grace her Motherřs Chariot, and own her Birth from humble 
Temperance, that nursing Mother of the Virtues; who like the Parent of the Gods, 
old Reverend CYBELE, wouřd properly appear drawn by reinřd Lions, patient of 
the Bit, and on her Head a Turret-like Attire: the Image of defensive Power, and 
Strength of Mind."
159
 
 
 One of the few favorable references to a recent contemporary thinker occurs in 
Shaftesburyřs discussion of the ancient policy of religion.  In A Letter concerning 
Enthusiasm, Shaftesbury recognizes James Harrington, whom he calls "a notable Author 
of our Nation," for his observation that "řtis necessary a People shouřd have a Publick 
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Leading in Religion."
160
  While we have seen that Shaftesbury is committed to religious 
toleration, his toleration is of the ancient variety.  He is unwilling to leave moral 
education to chance, and he consequently advocates moderate religion for most people, 
and moral philosophy for those who are capable.  In this sense one might wonder if the 
Characteristicks cannot be described as the moral education necessary to make 
Harringtonřs Oceana a complete account of human life.  While often identified as a 
"country Whig," one might wonder if Shaftesbury isnřt better identified as a "classical 
republican" of the sort described by Skinner and Pocock. 
 This speculation must be tempered by the reminder that it is Theocles who 
delivers the image; Philocles immediately invites the dinner party to consider the triumph 
of Liberty in reverse, with: "Virtue her-self a Captive in her turn; and by a proud 
Conqueror triumphřd over, degraded, spoilřd of all her Honours, and defacřd; so as to 
retain hardly one single Feature of real Beauty."
161
  The audacity of Philocles leads the 
conversation to the first of two major disputes between Philocles and one particular 
dinner guest.  This guest is described as "a formal sort of Gentleman, somewhat advancřd 
in Years," and as we shall see, he is a religious zealot.
162
   
 The old gentleman (who never receives a name) objects to Philocles in an "angry 
tone," saying:  
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that he had hitherto, indeed, conceivřd some hopes of me; notwithstanding he 
observřd my Freedom of Thought, and heard me quoted for such a passionate 
Lover of Liberty: But he was sorry to find that my Principle of Liberty extended 
in fine to a Liberty from all Principles…and none, he thought, beside a Libertine 
in Principle wouřd approve of such a Picture of Virtue, as only an Atheist couřd 
have the impudence to make.
163
 
 
After a pause, Theocles comes to the defense of Philocles.  He observes that it is not "the 
Atheist alone can lay this load on Virtue, and picture her thus disgracefully."
164
  To the 
surprise of the old gentleman, Theocles suggests that the "revers’d Triumph" described 
by Philocles is a portrait resulting not from atheism but rather from "RELIGION itself!"
165
  
Theocles advances the argument we saw in Chapter 4 that there are those who "magnify 
to the utmost the Corruption of Manřs Heart; and in exposing, as they pretend, the 
Falshood of human Virtue, think to extol Religion."
166
  The old gentleman is forced to 
concede that such a consequence would be no "sign of Tenderness for Religion."   
 Philocles addresses Palemon at this point, recalling for us the narrative frame of 
the dialogue.  He tells Palemon (and the reader) that Theocles will proceed to "disclose 
himself fully upon these Subjects."
167
  Philocles remarks that his remarks served as a 
"Prelude" to the metaphysical argument the two friends would have the next morning.  
Philocles says in anticipation of Theoclesř speeches: "If his Speculations provřd of a 
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rational kind, this previous Discourse, I knew, wouřd help me to comprehend řem; if 
only pleasing Fancys, this wouřd help me however, to please my-self the better with 
řem."168  As readers we must note this interruption of the internal dialogue and wonder 
what Philocles hopes for us to see.  We will have to return to this question later. 
  Part  II ,  §  3:   Theocles'  Apology for Philocles  
 We observed at the beginning of the chapter that the Critic calls The Moralists "a 
kind of Apology for [the] Treatise concerning Virtue and Religion."
169
  The Critic calls 
especial attention to the part of the dialogue we must now consider.
170
  The Critic 
remarks that "as for his [the Authorřs] Apology (particularly in what relates to reveal’d 
Religion, and a World to come) I commit the Reader to the disputant Divines, and 
Gentlemen, whom our Author has introducřd in that concluding Piece of Dialogue-
Writing, or rhapsodical Philosophy."
171
  By the end of the section, Theocles will say, 
THUS…I have made my Friendřs Apology; which may have shewn him to you 
perhaps a good Moralist; and, I hope, no Enemy to Religion. But if you find still 
that the Divine has not appearřd so much in his Character as I promisřd, I can 
never think of satisfying you in any ordinary way of Conversation. Shouřd I offer 
to go further, I might be ingagřd deeply in spiritual Affairs, and be forcřd to make 
some new Model of a Sermon upon his System of Divinity. However, I am in 
hopes, now that in good earnest Matters are come well nigh to Preaching, you 
will acquit me for what I have already performřd.172 
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Section 3 of Part II, then, will employ an "ordinary way of conversation," and appeal 
primarily to reason, while section 4 will present what will be called a "Philosophical 
Sermon."
173
 
 Before Theocles begins, Philocles remarks to Palemon that we are about to hear a 
"Prelude" to the private conversation he and Theocles will have tomorrow morning.  He 
is eager for this prelude whether or not it proves demonstrative.  "If his Speculations 
provřd of a rational kind, this previous Discourse, I knew, wouřd help me to comprehend 
řem; if only pleasing Fancys, this wouřd help me however, to please my-self the better 
with řem."174 This distinction between demonstration and persuasion will prove to be 
essential for the remainder of The Moralists. 
 Theocles, we are told, enters section 3 of Part II with the air of "some grave 
Divinity-Professor, or Teacher of Ethicks, reading an Afternoon Lecture to his Pupils."
175
  
He begins with the claim that we must distinguish between force and reason, which, 
according to Theocles, are mutually exclusive.  He says, "where Force is necessary, 
Reason has nothing to do. But on the other hand, if Reason be needful, Force in the mean 
while must be laid aside: For there is no Enforcement of Reason, but by Reason."
176
 
 This distinction, as we shall see in a moment, has practical consequences.  
Theocles next tells us that the name 'atheist' is used indiscriminately, and that two very 
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different characters are carelessly grouped together as atheists.  There is a distinction, we 
learn, between a person who doubts and a person who absolutely denies religion: 
Now he who doubts, may possibly lament his own Unhappiness, and wish to be 
convincřd. He who denies, is daringly presumptuous, and sets up an Opinion 
against the Interest of Mankind, and Being of Society. řTis easily seen that one of 
these Persons may bear a due respect to the Magistrate and Laws, tho not the 
other; who being obnoxious to them, is therefore punishable. But how the former 
is punishable by Man, will be hard to say; unless the Magistrate had dominion 
over Minds, as well as over Actions and Behaviour; and had power to exercise an 
Inquisition within the inmost Bosoms and secret Thoughts of Men.
177
 
 
The distinction between force and reason finds its implication in the difference between 
one who doubts and one who denies.  The two sorts of distinction are not simply 
coextensive, however.  No amount of force will provoke assent in the mind of a man, 
whether he is an outright denier of religion or a mere doubter.  Theocles seems to suggest 
that by being "daringly presumptuous" and indiscrete in his doubts, the denier risks 
causing scandal that could damage the public good, and that, at the very least, one can 
expect that the magistrate will punish such behavior. 
 Theocles goes on to maintain that philosophical freedom "was never esteemřd 
injurious to Religion, or prejudicial to the vulgar."
178
  Philocles is quick to observe the 
claim we examined in chapter 2, namely that in "Christian Times," circumstances no 
longer permit such "Fair INQUIRY."
179
  While Cudworthřs True Intellectual System of the 
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Universe is mentioned directly here, it is difficult for Shaftesburyřs own An Inquiry 
Concerning Virtue and Merit not to come to mind as well. 
 It is this that provokes Theoclesř "apology" proper.  He remarks, "now indeed you 
have found a way which may, perhaps, force me to discourse at large with you on this 
head; by entering the Lists in defense of a Friend unjustly censurřd for this philosophical 
Liberty."
180
 
 What I have called the apology proper begins on page 149 and continues for the 
remainder of section 3.  Theocles begins his account by observing that most defenders of 
religion occupy themselves in defending "the Truth of the Christian Faith" or in confuting 
heretics.  Far fewer occupy themselves with the more fundamental task of examining "the 
very Grounds and Principles of all Religion."
181
  This task is more important, however, if 
one is to persuade the unbeliever.  According to Theocles, there are those for whom 
"what was never question’d, was never prov’d: and That whatever Subject had not, at 
some time or other, been examinřd with perfect Indifference, was never rightly examin’d, 
nor couřd rightly be believ’d."182  As we have already considered at length, a treatise may 
not be the best method for reaching this audience; an "Essay or Inquiry" generally 
presents one side only, and seldom with a rational indifference.  It is for this reason, 
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according to Theocles, that some writers have found it to advance the arguments of 
unbelievers with vigor and equanimity.  Such a writer 
offers to conclude nothing positive himself, but leaves it to others to draw 
Conclusions from his Principles: having this one chief Aim and Intention; "How, 
in the first place, to reconcile these Persons to the Principles of Virtue; That by 
this means, a Way might be laid open to Religion; by removing those greatest, if 
not only Obstacles to it, which arise from the Vices and Passions of Men."
183
   
 
According to Theocles, the commitment to advance the principles of religion 
independently from religion is necessary to persuade men who do not accept the claims 
of revelation.  Since they do not believe in God, they are hardly likely to worry about 
rewards and punishments found in a "Future State."
184
  Defenders of reason, therefore, 
generally begin from the wrong point.  They try to "prove MERIT by Favour, and ORDER 
by a Deity."
185
  Since the controversial writers so offensive to the older gentleman are 
moral "realists," they try to exploit the natural fact of virtue to show that there is order in 
the world. 
 Theocles extends this argument to the possibility of "DEITY."  He asserts, "That 
whoever sincerely defends Virtue, and is a Realist in MORALITY, must of necessity, in a 
manner, by the same Scheme of Reasoning, prove as very a Realist in DIVINITY."
186
  
This, of course, hardly settles the matter.  We will see in a later section that the old 
gentleman is worried that such a deism does little to affirm the claims of orthodox 
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Christianity.  Theocles himself seems to confess as much by immediately mentioning 
Epicurus, who allowed for nominal deities while offering a wholly rationalistic account 
of the world.
187
 
 Theocles takes his point further when he suggests to Philocles that his skeptical 
philosophy, by asking whether a theology can exist on the basis of reason alone, does 
little more that affirm the reigning authoritative religion.
188
  Yet revelation itself "founded 
on the Acknowledgment of a divine Existence."  Since only philosophy can demonstrate 
what religion presupposes, reason and revelation are mutually dependent.
189
   
 Theocles leaves the question open as to whether the controversial writers he 
describes actually believe their own arguments.  He proposes judging the religious merit 
of an hypothesis on the basis of the practical moral consequences it entails for man. 
Now whether our Friend be unfeignedly and sincerely of this latter sort of real 
Theologists, you will learn best from the Consequences of his Hypothesis. You 
will observe, whether instead of ending in mere Speculation, it leads to Practice: 
And you will then surely be satisfyřd, when you see such a Structure raisřd, as 
with the Generality of the World must pass at least for high Religion, and with 
some, in all likelihood, for no less than ENTHUSIASM.
190
 
 
Our judgment about the sincerity of the opinions, then, requires an examination of their 
underlying "hypothesis."  The moral and civic consequences are apparently inseparable 
from this concern. 
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 Theocles asks Philocles rhetorically whether there is anything more enthusiastic 
than a "notion of Divine LOVE."
191
  It is not sufficient proof that the writer is "far enough 
from Irreligion" for espousing a doctrine of divine love; such claims are familiar even to 
the enemies of religion.
192
  Theocles takes this as an opportunity to advance on his 
friend's behalf the "Hypothesis" we know well from Chapter 4, namely that "tho the 
disinterested Love of God were the most excellent Principle; yet he knew very well, that 
by the indiscreet Zeal of some devout well-meaning People it had been stretchřd too far, 
perhaps even to Extravagance and Enthusiasm; as formerly among the Mysticks of the 
antient Church, whom these of latter days have followřd."193  So, too, have the enemies of 
enthusiasm fallen to their own zeal.  Theoclesř writer-friend is of the opinion that "we 
ought all of us to aspire, so as to endeavour ŘThat the Excellence of the Object, not the 
Reward or Punishment, shouřd be our Motive: But that where throř the Corruption of our 
Nature, the former of these Motives is found insufficient to excite to Virtue, there the 
latter shouřd be brought in aid, Supplemental Motives. and on no account be undervaluřd 
or neglected.ř"194 Theocles does not expect every soul to be moved by "the Excellence of 
the Object" alone.  Theocles sees love of the good is an insufficient to motivate to virtue 
for some men; he therefore retains a role for rewards and punishments to reinforce the 
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lessons of virtue.  For his part, the friend of Theocles finds it sufficient to inquire into the 
existence "in Nature [of] a supreme Mind or Deity."
195
 
 Since the friend has precluded an appeal to revelation his arguments must rely on 
evidence readily available in the observable world.  Theocles says, 
now that there is such a principal Object as this in the World, the World alone (if I 
may say so) by its wise and perfect Order must evince. This Order, if indeed 
perfect, excludes all real ILL. And that it really does so, is what our Author so 
earnestly maintains, by solving the best he can those untoward Phaenomena and 
ill Signs, taken from the Course of Providence in the seemingly unequal Lot of 
Virtue in this World.
196
 
 
For the purposes of defending his friend Theocles asserts that the world is orderly, 
although in fairness we see that he qualifies his statement with an "if."  The author does 
his best to show how "untoward Phaenomena and ill Signs" can be reconciled with 
Providence and the existence of virtue.  Theocles admits that the appearance that vice and 
chaos rule the world poses a genuine problem for the authorřs argument.  It is natural for 
men to infer backward from an apparent effect a presumptive cause.  In the words of 
Theocles, "from so uncomely a Face of things below, they will presume to think 
unfavourably of all above."
197
  Should men become convinced that the world is orderly, 
however, they are much more likely to expect reward and punishment in a future state; at 
least they are more likely to experience the natural reward for virtue and punishment for 
vice suggested in the discussion of temperance above. 
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 Theocles maintains that the evidence in favor of the intrinsic rewards to be found 
in the practice of virtue are more impressive than many recent writers have 
acknowledged.  Even the incomplete victory of virtue among human affairs is some 
evidence, perhaps, "to shew Providence already ingagřd on [Virtue's] side." 198  By 
presupposing the efficacy of virtue Theocles is able to recommend to his interlocutors a 
trust in the supernatural goodness of Providence.  For this reason too, modern defenders 
of religion are foolish to exaggerate the disorder (or fallen condition) of the world.  
Paradoxically, claims Theocles, the hypothesis of chaos embraced by some Divines 
inclines men to accept "the belovřd Atoms, Chance, and Confusion of the Atheists."199 
 Lest he leave the defense of virtue to its own devices, Theocles next considers the 
opinions of the ancients on the matter.  
Thus it was, that among the Antients the great Motive which inclinřd so many of 
the wisest to the Belief of this Doctrine unrevealřd to řem, was purely the Love of 
Virtue in the Persons of those great Men, the Founders and Preservers of 
Societys, the Legislators, Patriots, Deliverers, Heroes, whose Virtues they were 
desirous shouřd live and be immortalizřd.200 
 
The appeal of virtue--an appeal not dependent on revelation--is still available to the 
contemporaries of Theocles in the common human experience of friendship.  "Nor is 
there at this day any thing capable of making this Belief more engaging among the Good 
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and Virtuous than the Love of Friendship."
201
  For the noble soul, friendship creates a 
longing to be joined with virtuous men even after death. 
 In short, according to Theocles his writer-friend hopes to draw men "of looser 
Principles" to divine love through the orderliness in human things to an appreciation of 
beauty in the world.
202
 
 Theocles concludes by saying that further argument would move beyond "any 
ordinary way of Conversation" and into "some new Model of a Sermon upon his system 
of Divinity."
203
  The prospect of setting aside "the way of Dialogue" for "the Law of 
SERMON" is very appealing to the two divine gentlemen.
204
  Theocles agrees to continue 
in that style, but only on the condition that Philocles will mount a challenge to the sermon 
afterwards.  Philocles agrees. 
  Part  II ,  §  4:   The Philosophical  Sermon and the State of  Nature  
 Just as the "philosophical enthusiasm" of Philocles came on in the evening of Part 
I, section 3, the "philosophical sermon" offered by Theocles, takes place in the evening.  
Having embarked on a walk in the fields, the companions observe the pleasant virtues of 
country life.  This leads Theocles into his sermon on "the Order and Frame of 
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NATURE."
205
  Theocles reaffirms the claim that it would be very strange to find order 
within our own souls and miss it in the larger world.  Nothing, he says,  
is more strongly imprinted on our Minds, or more closely interwoven with our 
Souls, than the Idea or Sense of Order and Proportion. Hence all the Force of 
Numbers, and those powerful Arts founded on their Management and Use. What a 
difference there is between Harmony and Discord! Cadency and Convulsion! 
What a difference between composřd and orderly Motion, and that which is 
ungovernřd and accidental! between the regular and uniform Pile of some noble 
Architect, and a Heap of Sand or Stones! between an organizřd Body, and a Mist 
or Cloud driven by the Wind!
206
 
 
According to Theocles, such difference is "immediately perceivřd by plain internal 
Sensation."
207
  Reason concludes from this that every orderly thing has a "Unity of 
Design" which can be taken as a whole in itself or as a part in a larger whole.  If all the 
parts are not united in a broader "UNIVERSE," there can be no claim of design.  From this 
Theocles draws his "main Subject, insisted on," namely 
that neither Man, nor any other Animal, tho ever so compleat a System of Parts, as 
to all within, can be allowřd in the same manner compleat, as to all without; but 
must be considerřd as having a further relation abroad to the System of his Kind. 
So even this System of his Kind to the Animal-System; this to the World (our 
Earth;) and this again to the bigger World, and to the Universe.
208
 
 
All things, claims Theocles, are interdependent, one thing on another.  Such an account of 
the coherence of the world leads him to this conclusion: "know, my ingenious Friend, 
that by this Survey you will be obligřd to own the UNIVERSAL SYSTEM, and coherent 
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Scheme of Things, to be establishřd on abundant Proof, capable of convincing any fair 
and just Contemplator of the Works of Nature."
209
   
 Things are not as simple as they seem at first, however.  We soon learn that "the 
End and Use of Things does not every-where appear."
210
  This should not be surprising, 
however, given the finitude of the human perspective on the world.  For  
in an Infinity of Things thus relative, a Mind which sees not infinitely, can see nothing 
fully: And since each Particular has relation to all in general, it can know no perfect or 
true Relation of any Thing, in a World not perfectly and fully known."
211
  This inability 
of man to know the whole is insufficient proof either for the presence of mind in the 
world or its absence.  Theocles exhorts his listeners to overlook this problem with by 
offering an image of order.  "Think of the many Parts of the vast Machine, in which we 
have so little Insight, and of which it is impossible we shouřd know the Ends and Uses; 
when instead of seeing to the highest Pendants, we see only some lower Deck, and are in 
this dark Case of Flesh, confinřd even to the Hold, and meanest Station of the Vessel."212 
 Presupposing a cosmos, however, Theocles claims that "we must of consequence 
acknowledg a Universal MIND; which no ingenious Man can be tempted to disown, 
except throř the Imagination of Disorder in the Universe, its Seat."213  While few men are 
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tempted to argue that the rest of the world is disordered, they have a hard time not 
wondering about mankind.  Nature seems to have left man among the other animals 
especially vulnerable in the world.  Yet although he lacks claws and fur and horns, man 
has the possibility of gaining "Wisdom and Virtue."
214
  Unlike the beasts, man is able to 
improve himself.  Theocles therefore exhorts us to look to "a liberal Education" to 
improve on our good nature to form in us "a generous Temper and Disposition, well-
regulated Appetites, and worthy Inclinations."
215
   
For those who are willing to inquire "what is according to NATURE" for men, 
happiness is possible.  Few are inclined to do this, however.  Theocles remarks, "were we 
more so, as this Inquiry wouřd make us, we shouřd then see Beauty and Decorum here, as 
well as elsewhere in Nature; and the Order of the Moral World wouřd equal that of the 
Natural. By this the Beauty of Virtue wouřd appear; and hence, as has been shewn, the 
Supreme and Sovereign Beauty, the Original of all which is Good or Amiable."
216
  So 
ends the "Philosophical Sermon" of Theocles.  Where the "Apology" of Theocles offered 
the practical reasons for deniers to become prudent and for the religious to tolerate 
arguments based on reason alone, the "sermon" serves as an exhortation to seek beauty 
and not to grow discouraged.  The sermon draws the praise of the two gentlemen; 
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Philocles himself is about to commend Theocles when he is reminded of his promise to 
criticize the sermon. 
 Philocles begins his criticism by drawing attention to the narrow argument chosen 
by Theocles to defend the existence of God.  Philocles says, "I expected to have heard 
from you, in customary form, of a first Cause, a first Being, and a Beginning of Motion: 
How clear the Idea was of an immaterial Substance: And how plainly it appearřd, that at 
some time or other Matter must have been created. But as to all this, you are silent."
217
  
The argument that unthinking substance could never produce a thinking, immaterial 
substance is acceptable to Philocles on the philosophical principle of "Nothing being ever 
made from Nothing."
218
  This principle cuts both ways, however, and serves both 
dogmatic materialists as well as dogmatic immaterialists. 
 According to Philocles, the argument as stated by Theocles implies that one can 
judge the past by looking at the present.  He holds that if "Deity be now really extant; if 
by any good Token it appears that there is at this present a universal Mind; řtwill easily 
be yielded there ever was one."
219
  While Philocles does neither admits nor denies that 
there is a universal mind, he denies that the conclusion follows the presupposition.  
Philocles argues that Theocles failed to demonstrate his reasons:  "What Demonstration 
have you given? What have you so much as offerřd at, beyond bare Probability?"  Quite 
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to the contrary, in fact. "So far are you from demonstrating any thing," Philocles 
continues,  "that if this uniting Scheme be the chief Argument for Deity, (as you tacitly 
allow) you seem rather to have demonstrated, Řthat the Case it-self is incapable of 
Demonstration.ř"220   
 Theocles has argued that it is impossible for finite man to know the whole.  Even 
if the world as we know it seems orderly, we cannot infer that all things (writ large) are 
orderly.  It is possible that we observe only "a separate By-World," we will say, "of which 
perhaps there are, in the wide Waste, Millions besides, as horrid and deformřd, as this of 
ours is regular and proportionřd."221  Who is to say, given enough time, that this odd 
orderly world isnřt an anomaly in the great swirl of all matter?  "Old Father Chaos (as the 
Poets call him) in these wild Spaces, reigns absolute, and upholds his Realms of 
Darkness. He presses hard upon our Frontier; and one day, belike, shall by a furious 
Inroad recover his lost Right, conquer his Rebel-State, and reunite us to primitive 
Discord and Confusion."
222
  Philocles concludes with an odd compliment for the Divines.  
At least the Divines were more honest in facing the chaotic appearance of the world.  
Their opinion are not refuted should it be demonstrated that the world is indeed without 
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mind.  Theocles, on the other hand, has introduced Nature into the conversation, and it is 
with great reluctance that Philocles questions Her.
223
 
 Theocles tells Philocles not to worry about this.  It is only "my Hypothesis can 
suffer," he says.  Theocles drolly says that the divine gentlemen seem not to be 
vulnerable to such arguments, equipped as they are with "metaphysical Weapons."
224
  
(Indeed, even after the Apology offered by Theocles on the behalf of Philocles, the older 
gentleman is able to remark, "the Part you have proposřd for [Philocles] is so natural and 
sutable, that, I doubt not, he will be able to act it without the least Pain. I couřd wish 
rather, that you had sparřd your-self the trouble of putting him thus in mind of his proper 
Character. He wouřd have been apt enough of his own accord to interrupt your Discourse 
by his perpetual Cavils."
225
) 
 Philocles decides to concentrate on human nature alone.  He raises the question of 
why man among the beasts is alone so vulnerable and without natural defenses; Theocles 
advances counterarguments in defense of manřs excellence.  Since the discussion follows 
closely the matters we explored in Chapter 3, we will move ahead.  Soon, the old 
gentleman reenters the conversation.  The old gentleman is pleased with the conversation 
because, it seems to him, Philocles is being refuted.  In an attempt to flush an atheist out 
of the bushes, the old gentleman remarks to Philocles "that it was better for me [that is, 
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Philocles] to declare my Sentiments openly; for he was sure I had strongly imbibřd that 
Principle, that the State of Nature was a State of War."
226
   
 Philocles instantly sees that the old gentleman is vulnerable on this point.  By 
placing this objection in the mouth of the zealot, Shaftesbury is able to link the milder 
state of nature teaching of Locke to Hobbes.  Philocles asks whether he believes in the 
state of nature and learns that he does.  He does not want to say, however, that the state of 
nature is one of warfare, perhaps because he knows that Hobbes is an atheist and 
consequently to be opposed.  He opts instead for a tolerable condition state of nature prior 
to men forming a compact.  When asked if this means that man is naturally sociable, he 
replies "that Man indeed, from his own natural Inclination, might not, perhaps, have been 
movřd to associate; but rather from some particular Circumstances."227  Philocles is 
easily able to show that this distinction collapses quickly, and "that the State of Nature 
must in all likelihood have been little different from a State of War."
228
 
 It is at this point that Theocles reenters the conversation in order to reconcile the 
men.  Theocles argues (and as we have discussed at length in Chapter 4) that man as we 
know him is indeed naturally social. 
  Part  II ,  §  5:   Monsters and Miracles  
 The two gentlemen direct the conversation in section 5 and Theocles is largely 
silent for the remainder of the evening.  This may not be a coincidence.  Theocles seems 
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to have nothing to say about revelation or miracles.  Since we discussed miracles and 
their origin in Chapter 2, we will give this section shorter shrift. 
 For our purposes, the following points are worth noting.  Just as the older 
gentleman seemed to follow Locke in distinguishing the state of nature from a state of 
war, both of the gentlemen share Lockeřs love of travel tales and the monstrous.  
Philocles writes,  
nothing was so charming with them, as that which was disagreeing and odd: 
nothing so soothing, as that which movřd Horror. In short, whatever was rational, 
plain, and easy, bore no relish; and nothing came amiss which was cross to 
Nature, out of Sort and Order, and in no Proportion or Harmony with the rest of 
Things. Monstrous Births, Prodigys, Inchantments, Elementary Wars, and 
Convulsions, were our chief Entertainment. One wouřd have thought that in a 
kind of Rivalship between Providence and Nature, the latter Lady was made to 
appear as homely as possible; that her Deformitys might recommend and set off 
the Beautys of the former.
229
 
 
Philocles believes that sincere religious motives lie beneath their fascination.  He himself 
has little worry that such tales will turn him "enthusiastick, or superstitious."  It is 
unlikely that Philocles can say of the gentlemen, however, what he said to Palemon 
regarding Theocles, "that tho he had all of the Enthusiast, he had nothing of the Bigot."   
 Philocles, addressing Palemon, confesses that his skepticism made it difficult to 
avoid offending the gentlemen.
230
  The conversation moves from monsters to miracles, 
and thereby the question of the importance of revelation to religion.  Philocles declines to 
judge ancient miracles attested by authority, but he is skeptical about reports of 
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contemporary miracles.  The old gentleman makes a very sensible reply to this 
distinction. 
This is Fancy indeed, (replyřd the grave Gentleman) and a very dangerous one to 
that Scripture you pretend is of it-self so well attested. The Attestation of Men 
dead and gone, in behalf of Miracles past and at an end, can never surely be of 
equal force with Miracles present: And of these, I maintain, there are never 
wanting a Number sufficient in the World to warrant a Divine Existence. If there 
were no Miracles now-a-days, the World wouřd be apt to think there never were 
any. The present must answer for the Credibility of the past. This is "GOD 
witnessing for himself"; not "Men for GOD." For who shall witness for Men, if in 
the Case of Religion they have no Testimony from Heaven in their behalf?
231
 
 
Philocles might well agree that "if there were no Miracles now-a-days, the World wouřd 
be apt to think there never were any," and the older gentleman is not unaware of this.  Yet 
here the zealous old gentleman and his younger companion split.
232
  The younger man 
shows a willingness to be more careful in accepting reports of contemporary miracles, 
and he seems to have adopted Theoclesř preference for a good rather than a severe idea of 
God.  Shaftesbury seems to be suggesting that the young are more likely to be persuaded 
that a rational foundation for religion is necessary.  This of course angers the older 
gentleman, and Philocles borrows the arguments of Theocles to defend the younger man.  
"Thus," he writes, "I took upon me the part of a sound Theist, whilst I endeavourřd to 
refute my Antagonist, and shew that his Principles favourřd Atheism."233  Theocles seems 
to have been successful in persuading the younger gentleman to become more rational in 
                                                 
231
 Ibid., 2.186-87. 
232
 Ibid., 2.185 ff. 
233
 Ibid., 2.190. 
  371 
 
 
 
 
his theology, and to have taught Philocles a more effective defense against religious 
zealotry. 
The Moralists ,  Part III:  Philosophical Rhapsody and Cool 
Reason 
 The final part of The Moralists is divided into three sections.  The conversation 
oscillates between the philosophical rhapsodies of Theocles and cool, reasoned 
arguments with Philocles.  In their first morning conversation, Theocles and Philocles 
discussed human happiness and the existence of a lasting and universal good.  At that 
time, Theocles had tried to convince Philocles that he had experience of lasting good of 
lasting love, for he knew it from his own experience of friendship.  The skeptical 
Philocles had said that he doubted the joy of friendship could be expanded to fill an entire 
life, let alone point to a more universal good: 
Indeed, replyřd I, were it possible for me to stamp upon my Mind such a Figure as 
you speak of, whether it stood for Mankind or Nature, it might probably have its 
effect; and I might become perhaps a Lover after your way: But more especially, 
if you couřd so order it, as to make things reciprocal between us, and bring me to 
fansy of this Genius, that it couřd be "sensible of my Love, and capable of a 
Return." For without this, I shouřd make but an ill Lover, tho of the perfectest 
Beauty in the World.
234
 
 
We have already seen that on this second morning, Philocles rushes to catch Theocles 
and overtakes him in a field.  Theocles recalls his vow to Philocles that "if you promise to 
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love, I will endeavour to shew you that BEAUTY which I count the perfectest, and most 
deserving of LOVE; and which will not fail of a Return."
235
   
 It is in the pastoral setting of the fields that Theocles promises Philocles "we shall 
find our sovereign Genius; if we can charm the Genius of the Place…to inspire us with a 
truer Song of Nature, teach us some celestial Hymn, and make us feel Divinity present in 
these solemn Places of Retreat."
236
 
 Philocles urges his friend to begin, saying "for now I know you are full of those 
Divine Thoughts which meet you ever in this Solitude. Give řem but Voice and Accents: 
You may be still as much alone as you are usřd, and take no more notice of me than if I 
were absent."
237
 
 Theocles turns away to begin his rhapsodic meditation.  As readers we are 
allowed to listen.  The first hymn thanks Nature for providing a solitary retreat, "a happy 
Leisure and Retreat for Man; who, made for Contemplation, and to search his own and 
other Natures, may here best meditate the Cause of Things; and placřd amidst the various 
Scenes of Nature, may nearer view her Works."
238
  Here we are able to listen to a 
surprising line, in light of the earlier rhetorical elements of the dialogue.  Theocles sings 
"O mighty Nature! Wise Substitute of Providence! impowerřd Creatress! Or Thou 
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impowering Deity, supreme Creator! Thee I invoke, and Thee alone adore."
239
  If there 
were any doubt remaining, Theocles offers his reverie without any expectation that 
Nature considers his personal fate. 
 Theocles stops his hymn to address Philocles, asking him whether his transport 
seemed the divine madness of the poet or the ravings of a lunatic.  Philocles wishes 
Theocles had not interrupted himself, for "already I begin to find a thousand Difficultys 
in fansying such a Universal Genius as you describe."
240
 Theocles then pursues the 
concerns raised by his rhapsody through the art of dialogue.  He appeals to the fact that 
trees and other beings seem to have a unified structure of their own--a form.  When 
Philocles objects that he is multiplying nymphs and hamadryads and other "immaterial 
and immortal Substances," Theocles replies that he is unconcerned that such forms be 
proven eternal.
241
   
We injure řem then, replyřd THEOCLES, to say "they belong to these Trees"; and 
not rather "these Trees to them." But as for their Immortality, let them look to it 
themselves. I only know, that both theirs and all other Natures must for their 
Duration depend alone on that Nature on which the World depends: And that 
every Genius else must be subordinate to that One good GENIUS, whom I wouřd 
willingly persuade you to think belonging to this World, according to our present 
way of speaking.
242
 
 
Insofar as trees are trees, they are and remain trees.  Should they stop being trees, it is 
suggested, they would be something else and belong to a different form. 
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 Theocles extends his argument for the unity of being to the question of the self 
and personal identity.  This is a surprising move, given the difficulties we discussed in 
Chapter 3.  Philocles is quick to observe that the self is always shifting:  "I dare affirm, 
that few are so long themselves as half seven Years. řTis good fortune if a Man be one 
and the same only for a day or two: A Year makes more Revolutions than can be 
numberřd." 243  Theocles appeals to Philoclesř common sense.  It is hard to deny that, that 
objection aside, "there is a strange Simplicity in this YOU and ME, that in reality they 
shouřd be still one and the same, when neither one Atom of Body, one Passion, nor one 
Thought remains the same." 
As for the claim that matter is always in motion, Theocles observes that the more 
fundamental thing to notice is that matter is always compounded; he seems to imply with 
Aristotle that we never find some "prime matter" in the world devoid of form.  What we 
have is a range of things which seem to adhere to "Numbers," and these numbers 
themselves seem to be immaterial.
244
  How, wonders Theocles, can Philocles avoid 
recognizing "the universal and sovereign GENIUS" behind this phenomenon? 
Philocles objects that should this hypothesis concerning form be true, Nature 
nevertheless requires no homage or worship.  While the magistrate determines the lawful 
religion, philosophy recognizes no such titles.
245
  Philocles consequently presses to learn 
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what unified substances are and whether they are material or immaterial.  As Theocles 
reminds Philocles, Philocles has already conceded that he knows of at least one genuine 
substance, namely himself.  This is true whether or not Philocles wholly understands 
what this self is.  It is difficult indeed to know whether there is only one mind or many 
particular minds; here, says Theocles, "every one for himself" bears the responsibility of 
understanding their own nature.  While nature writ large is not self-aware per se, human 
beings are capable of understanding "in her behalf."  At the very least, then, nature 
contains mind and understanding in this limited sense.
246
 
 According to Theocles, this observation is sufficient to show that Nature is a self.  
Parts are joined to other parts into a greater system, and no particular mind can believe 
that it exhausts the order found in the whole.   He mentions two rival hypotheses to his 
Theism: 
No (says one of a modern Hypothesis) for the World was from Eternity, as you 
see it; and is no more than barely what you see: "Matter modify’d; a Lump in 
motion, with here and there a Thought, or scatter’d Portion of dissoluble 
Intelligence."--No (says one of an antienter Hypothesis) for the World was once 
without any Intelligence or Thought at all; "Mere Matter, Chaos, and a Play of 
Atoms; till Thought, by chance, came into play, and made up a Harmony which 
was never designřd, or thought of."--Admirable Conceit!--Believe it who can. For 
my own share (thank Providence) I have a MIND in my possession, which serves, 
such as it is, to keep my Body and its Affections, my Passions, Appetites, 
Imaginations, Fancys, and the rest, in tolerable Harmony and Order. But the 
Order of the UNIVERSE, I am persuaded still, is much the better of the two. Let 
EPICURUS, if he please, think his the better; and believing no Genius or Wisdom 
above his own, inform us by what Chance řtwas dealt him, and how Atoms came 
to be so wise.
247
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Theocles suggests here that the atheist also holds an hypothesis which is not in turn 
defended by reason.  This is true of both modern and ancient atheists.  All hypotheses are 
presuppositions, the grounds "lying under" an argument.  According to Theocles, insofar 
as Epicurus and his kin cannot account for our direct awareness of our own minds, the 
atheistic hypothesis itself has not been demonstrated.  This is as much to say that atheism 
too rests on faith and is a matter of belief.  Theism thereby withstands skepticism, at least 
to the extent that the atheist has no better account of his hypothesis than does the theist of 
his.  The fundamental question becomes for us as readers one of probability, and it is 
unclear where the burden of proof lies.  What is clear, however, is that Shaftesburyřs 
defense of the sociable nature of man works to remove the rhetorical trump suit of the 
modern projector. 
 Here Philocles professes that he is tempted toward superstition by the account 
offered by Theocles, and he asks Theocles to continue before his own enthusiasm cools.  
Theocles is unwilling to comply, however, for he does not want to manipulate assent in 
Philocles: 
I wouřd have you know, replyřd he, I scorn to take the advantage of a warm Fit, 
and be beholden to Temper or Imagination for gaining me your Assent. Therefore 
ere I go yet a step farther, I am resolvřd to enter again into cool Reason with you; 
and ask, If you admit for Proof what I advancřd yesterday upon that head, "Of a 
Universal UNION, Coherence, or Sympathizing of Things?
248
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Motivated by his desire that "all shouřd go happily and well," Philocles asked Theocles to 
become the enthusiast again.
249
  Theocles consoles him by observing that each natural 
thing persists unless it is overcome by some contrary principle.  Nature, considered as a 
whole, cannot have a contrary principle, however.  All that is, is good when viewed from 
the broadest perspective.  Philocles is quick to tell Theocles, "your Solutions…of the ill 
Appearances are not perfect enough to pass for Demonstration. And whatever seems 
vitious or imperfect in the Creation, puts a stop to further Conclusions, till the thing be 
solvřd."250  Theocles presses Philocles to admit that if human reason is finite, it is 
possible that ill effects in the world are only apparent rather than real.  Philocles 
reaffirms, however, that the acceptance of Theoclesř "divine hypothesis" presupposes that 
the ill effects "remain Appearances only."
251
  Philocles himself prefers the certainty of 
demonstration to the psychological comfort offered by an hypothesis, however plausible 
it may be. 
 Theocles agrees to offer an argument.  He argues that it is impossible that the 
world would contain contrary principles of equal power.  Eventually one will make the 
other or others subordinate.  The marginal header names the view of nature that allows 
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competing principles "Manichaeism."
252
  According to Theocles, such a view is 
philosophically unsupportable.  He says, 
were there in Nature Two or more Principles, either they must agree, or not. If 
they agree not, all must be Confusion, till one be predominant. If they agree, there 
must be some natural Reason for their Agreement; and this natural Reason cannot 
be from Chance, but from some particular Design, Contrivance, or Thought: 
which brings us up again to One Principle, and makes the other two to be 
subordinate. And thus when we have comparřd each of the Three Opinions, viz. 
"That there is no designing active Principle; Conclusion. That there is more than 
one"; or, "That finally there is but One"; we shall perceive, that the only 
consistent Opinion is the last. And since one or other of these Opinions must of 
necessity be true; what can we determine, other than that the last is, and must be 
so, demonstrably? if it be Demonstration "That in Three Opinions, One of which 
must necessarily be true, Two being plainly absurd, the Third must be the 
Truth."
253
 
 
While this is not incontrovertible, it is a philosophical demonstration.  The argument is 
formal insofar as it does little to clarify just what this one fundamental principle of the 
whole is, but it does allow Philocles to accept Theoclesř claims about apparent ill. 
 Philocles renews his request for Theocles to speak in Rhapsody, confident, he 
says, that "I shall now no longer be in danger of imagining either Magick or Superstition 
in the case; since you invoke no other Power than that single ONE, which seems so 
natural."
254
  The next rhapsody sings of especially abstruse matters; Philocles expresses 
his gratitude that it is particularly short.
255
  The rhapsody itself seems to discourage 
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abstruse meditation, claiming that nature hides her "secret Springs of Action."  While 
human artifice tries to penetrate "that consummate Art exhibited throř all the Works of 
Nature," Nature herself reveals an infinite regress of "Worlds within Worlds."
256
  
Theocles suggests that human reason can know little of certainty about matter, motion, 
time; and turning inward, even of sense and thought.  Still, thought holds the honor of "its 
Eldership of Being. Thus are we in a manner conscious of that original and eternally 
existent Thought, whence we derive our own"
257
  From the order of his own reason, man 
comes to appreciate "Thou who art Original Soul, diffusive, vital in all, inspiriting the 
Whole." 
 Theocles moves his rhapsody "closer to Nature," and sings of matters "upon the 
Borders of our World."
258
  In this rhapsody, Theocles mentions the motion Philocles had 
accused him of omitting earlier in the conversation.  He says in praise, 
O thou who art the Author and Modifier of these various Motions! O sovereign 
and sole Mover, by whose high Art the rolling Spheres are governřd, and these 
stupendous Bodys of our World hold their unrelenting Courses! O wise 
OEconomist, and powerful Chief, whom all the Elements and Powers of Nature 
serve! How hast thou animated these moving Worlds? What Spirit or Soul 
infusřd? What Biass fixřd? Or how encompassřd them in liquid AEther, driving 
them as with the Breath of living Winds, thy active and unwearyřd Ministers in 
this intricate and mighty Work?
259
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The sense of wonder expressed here does not lead Theocles and Philocles to investigate 
the nature of motion as, say Aristotle does in his Physics or Galileo in De Motu.  The 
Moralists itself, while trying to inspire an interest in such questions, does not engage 
directly in such philosophical exploration.  Once again, however, Theocles interrupts his 
own rhapsody.  He reproaches Philocles for his failure to monitor the enthusiasm of the 
rhapsody.  Theocles says, "have you at once given over your scrupulous Philosophy, to 
let me range thus at pleasure throř these aerial Spaces and imaginary Regions, where my 
capricious Fancy or easy Faith has led me? I wouřd have you to consider better, and 
know, my Philocles, that I had never trusted my-self with you in this Vein of Enthusiasm, 
had I not relyřd on you to govern it a little better."260  Here we see the importance of our 
initial reflections on the soliloquy of Philocles in his apartment.  Theocles and Philocles 
are both necessary for the philosopher to remain in philosophic balance.  Without 
Theocles the philosopher lacks the erotic drive to encompass the whole; without 
Philocles, though, the philosopher is hard to distinguish from an intoxicated poet.  It is 
interesting to note, however, that Theocles seems to regulate himself.  It is he who has to 
remind Philocles not to let him get away with extravagant poetry.  This flexibility of role 
is artistically defensible only if Theocles and Philocles are two parts of the same soul 
conversing. 
 Theocles proceeds to sing of the elements (earth, air, water, and fire) but he is 
stopped short by the intervention of Philocles.  Apparently Theocles is carried away to 
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the point where he has divided the world too discreetly, having forgotten to place "the 
Divine Mind" at the forefront.
261
  His song has taken him far from the nature Philocles 
can recognize, and Theocles must return to the "various Map of Nature, and this fair 
visible World."
262
   
Theocles returns to Earth and circles the globe in his rhapsody, taking in the 
seasons and the great variety of forms in the world we more commonly call nature, from 
gems to insects, and from "triumphant Palm down to the humble Moss."
263
  We learn that 
even on Earth there are more forms than man has recognized:  "--Fair Image of that 
fruitful and exuberant Nature, who with a Flood of Bounty blesses all things, and, Parent-
like, out of her many Breasts sends the nutritious Draught in various Streams to her 
rejoicing Offspring!--Innumerable are the dubious Forms and unknown Species which 
drink the slimy Current."
264
  We learn as we fly past that the fertility of Nature has often 
tempted man to superstition.  It is a delicate line Shaftesbury walks between celebrating 
the sublimity of nature and reintroducing a belief that the world is miraculous and 
unintelligible.  Mankind is always tempted to seek out hidden nature rather than rejoice in 
the beauty of the visible world.  "Even we our-selves," says Theocles, "who in plain 
Characters may read Divinity from so many bright Parts of Earth, chuse rather these 
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obscurer Places, to spell out that mysterious Being, which to our weak Eyes appears at 
best under a Veil of Cloud."
265
 
This observation leads Theocles "to take his leave of the Sublime."  Philocles tells 
us that dawn had passed and the day was well into "forenoon."
266
  Shaftesbury has 
brought us to the end of Part III, section one. 
  Philocles’  Rhapsody  
  Theocles decides it is time to leave the "unsociable Places, whither our Fancy has 
transported us," for the familiar climate of "our more conversable Woods."  It soon 
becomes clear that Philocles himself has become attentive to the "mysterious BEAUTY" 
Theocles has described.  Philocles confesses, 
I shall no longer resist the Passion growing in me for Things of a natural kind; 
where neither Art, nor the Conceit or Caprice of Man has spoilřd their genuine 
Order, by breaking in upon that primitive State. Even the rude Rocks, the mossy 
Caverns, the irregular unwrought Grotto’s, and broken Falls of Waters, with all 
the horrid Graces of the Wilderness it-self, as representing Nature more, will be 
the more engaging, and appear with a Magnificence beyond the formal Mockery 
of princely Gardens.
267
 
 
In this comment we see that for Philocles, nature means primarily what romantic poets 
will come to praise--natural scenes unspoiled by the hand of man.  Philocles wonders that 
so few men appreciate the wondrous beauties Theocles has revealed to him. 
 Theocles now begins to correct the account of nature offered by Philocles.  "Say 
not this, replyřd he, of Lovers only. For is it not the same with Poets, and all those other 
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Students in Nature, and the Arts which copy after her? In short, is not this the real Case of 
all who are Lovers either of the Muses or the Graces?"  Nature is present not just to 
refined philosophers, but to all human beings who participate in love.  Philocles observes 
that these inferior lovers are popularly "thought to be plainly out of their wits, or over-run 
with Melancholy and Enthusiasm."
268
 According to Theocles, such lovers deserve the 
name of lover, but fail to reason deeply enough.  The beauty they pursue is only the 
"Shadow of that First Beauty" for it is seen by the senses rather than the mind.  Even this 
beauty points beyond itself, however, and invites men to the "Contemplation of 
Beauty…as it really is in it-self."269  Philocles himself, having learned not to scorn the 
longing for inferior, sensual beauty, is now ready to move closer to the "Original."  
Philocles soon realizes that praising lower beauties is dangerous, for such praising might 
encourage in men  "covetous Fancy," ambition, or sordid luxury.
270
  He fears that most 
men are not moved to contemplation in the face of beauty, and the ironical consequence 
of Theoclesř teaching is "that you, Theocles, for ought I see, are become the Accuser of 
Nature, by condemning a natural Enjoyment."
271
 
Here Theocles reveals himself as a less-than-moralistic moralist.  He is unwilling 
to condemn any "Joy which is from Nature."
272
  When the friends enjoy the woods, 
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however, they are directed by nature toward rational, human pleasures as well as such 
pleasures as "tasteful Food."  As he explains, "we who were rational, and had Minds, 
methought, shouřd place it rather in those Minds; which were indeed abusřd, and cheated 
of their real Good, when drawn to seek absurdly the Enjoyment of it in the Objects of 
Sense, and not in those Objects they might properly call their own: in which kind, as I 
remember, we comprehended all which was truly Fair, Generous, or Good.
273
  Theocles 
advances an argument based on pleasure, albeit one which distinguishes higher pleasures 
from lower pleasures.  This distinction apparently saves pleasure from reproach, for 
Philocles replies:  "BEAUTY, said I, and GOOD, with you, Theocles, I perceive are still one 
and the same."
274
   
Shaftesbury alerts us in a footnote to consult an earlier remark of Theocles.  In 
their conversation of the first morning, Theocles told Philocles: 
HEAR then!...For tho I pretend not to tell you at once the Nature of this which I 
call Good; yet I am content to shew you something of it, in your-self, which 
you will acknowledg to be naturally more fix’d and constant, than any thing 
you have hitherto thought on. Tell me, my Friend! if ever you were weary of 
doing good to those you lovřd? Say when you ever found it unpleasing to serve a 
Friend? Or whether when you first provřd this generous Pleasure, you did not feel 
it less than at this present; after so long Experience? Believe me, Philocles, this 
Pleasure is more debauching than any other. Never did any Soul do good, but it 
came readier to do the same again, with more Enjoyment. Never was Love, or 
Gratitude, or Bounty practisřd but with increasing Joy, which made the Practiser 
still more in love with the fair Act.
275
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We are reminded by this passage that Theocles includes human action under the 
category of the beautiful.  He believes in the noble and relies on its persistence to draw 
men out of more narrow, selfish concerns.  From this perspective, the growth of Philocles 
is incomplete.  For Philocles, natureřs beauty is pristine and untouched by human art.  
Theocles must therefore return us to more sociable places.
276
 
 It is useful here to seek assistance from the Critic, who explores the relationship 
between the beautiful and the good at some length.  In ŖMiscellany III,ŗ the Critic turns 
to consider the question of taste, and the way in which an improper education can corrupt 
the taste of the young.  He writes 
řtis easier, I confess, to give account of this Corruption of Taste in some noble 
Youth of a more sumptuous gay Fancy; supposing him born truly Great, and of 
honourable Descent; with a generous free Mind, as well as ample Fortune. Even 
these Circumstances themselves may be the very Causes perhaps of his being thus 
ensnarřd. The Elegance of his Fancy in outward things, may have made him 
overlook the Worth of inward Character and Proportion: And the Love of 
Grandure and Magnificence, wrong turnřd, may have possessřd his Imagination 
over-strongly with such things as Frontispieces, Parterres, Equipages, trim Valets 
in party-colour’d Clothes; and others in Gentlemens Apparel.--Magnanimous 
Exhibitions of Honour and Generosity!--"In Town, a Palace and sutable 
Furniture! In the Country the same; with the addition of such Edifices and 
Gardens as were unknown to our Ancestors, and are unnatural to such a Climate 
as GREAT BRITAIN!"
277
 
 
The beau monde that educated Palemon may have been corrupt in this way, provoking 
the decent young man to turn to philosophy for assistance.  According to the Critic, 
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contemporary educators lead a youth into corruption, "till he is brought to laugh at 
publick Virtue, and the very Notion of common Good; till he has openly renouncřd all 
Principles of Honour and Honesty, he must in good Policy avoid those to whom he lies so 
much exposřd, and shun that Commerce and Familiarity which was once his chief 
Delight."
278
  As Shaftesbury indicated in Sensus Communis, modern philosophy is largely 
to blame for this situation, having restored Epicureanism through their sophistical way.  
Yet according to the Critic, nature still provides a standard by which true good taste can 
be measured.  He writes 
THAT there is really a STANDARD of this latter kind, will immediately, and on the 
first view, be acknowledgřd. The Contest is only, "Which is right:--Which the un-
affected Carriage, and just Demeanour: And Which the affected and false." Scarce 
is there any-one, who pretends not to know and to decide What is well-bred and 
handsom. There are few so affectedly clownish, as absolutely to disown Good-
breeding, and renounce the Notion of a BEAUTY in outward Manners and 
Deportment. With such as these, wherever they shouřd be found, I must confess, I 
couřd scarce be tempted to bestow the least Pains or Labour, towards convincing 
řem of a Beauty in inward Sentiments and Principles.279 
 
Whatever the defects of gallantry, polite society sustains a belief that there is a difference 
between comely and ugly behavior.  Ultimately it is impossible to sever beauty from truth 
because of the persistence of nature.  It has a stubborn way of reappearing even in human 
customs.  The Critic cites Horace favorably in support of this observation.  He writes, 
"řTis here, above all other places, that we say with strict Justice, You may turn out nature 
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with a pitchfork, yet back she will keep coming.
280
  While the natural is not recognized 
univocally, all artists betray their deep belief that proportion lies in the world rather than 
their own hands.  The Critic writes,  
Beauty and Truth are plainly joinřd with the Notion of Utility and Convenience, 
even in the Apprehension of every ingenious Artist, the Architect, the Statuary, or 
the Painter. řTis the same in the Physician’s way. Natural Health is the just 
Proportion, Truth, and regular Course of things, in a Constitution. řTis the inward 
Beauty of the Body. And when the Harmony and just Measures of the rising 
Pulses, the circulating Humours, and the moving Airs or Spirits are disturbřd or 
lost, Deformity enters, and with it, Calamity and Ruin.
281
 
 
While a man might claim to be a physician, his credibility would suffer were patients die 
from his care.  According to Shaftesbury, it is the same with beauty:  abandon harmony 
and you abandon beauty.  This holds for the fine arts the Critic mentions, but also for the 
art of living well as described by classical philosophy.  Is it not so, wonders the Critic, 
"that what is beautiful is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and 
proportionable, is TRUE; and what is at once both beautiful and true, is, of consequence, 
agreeable and good?"
282
  While the claim is indeed controversial, the Critic supports this 
view in a long footnote.  He writes, "This is the HONESTUM, the PULCHRUM, ò 
ó  [the Beautiful], on which our Author lays the stress of VIRTUE, and the Merits of 
this Cause; as well in his other Treatises, as in this of Soliloquy here commented. This 
Beauty the Roman Orator, in his rhetorical way, and in the Majesty of Style, couřd 
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express no otherwise than as A Mystery."
283
  The Critic quotes Cicero to show that even 
the most eloquent of men finds it difficult to offer a pure definition of beautiful deeds.  It 
takes a noble soul to recognize nobility and it requires an education for a soul to become 
noble; and still, Shaftesbury maintains with the classical philosophers that there is a 
natural standard for human conduct. 
 The Critic elaborates a scale of beauty on behalf of his Author, moving from "the 
IN-ANIMATE," to the animate, to the mixed.  This scale is itself vulnerable to criticism, 
however, for the Critic imagines the Author engaging here in his customary 
"SOLILOQUY or Self-Discourse."
284
  The Critic advances an objection from yet another 
critic to show this.  "ŘAnd what of this?ř (says an airy Spark, no Friend to Meditation or 
deep Thought) ŘWhat means this Catalogue, or Scale, as you are pleasřd to call it?ř"285  
The reply is sensible: 
 "Only, Sir, to satisfy my-self, That I am not alone, or single in a certain Fancy I 
have of a thing callřd BEAUTY; That I have almost the whole World for my 
Companions; and That each of us Admirers and earnest Pursuers of BEAUTY 
(such as in a manner we All are) if peradventure we take not a certain Sagacity 
along with us, we must err widely, range extravagantly, and run ever upon a false 
Scent. We may, in the Sportsmanřs Phrase, have many Hares afoot, but shall stick 
to no real Game, nor be fortunate in any Capture which may content us. 
 
When confronted with skepticism about the existence of beauty, the Critic, Theocles, and 
Shaftesbury himself turn to common sense for defense.  They challenge the reader to ask 
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where the burden of proof for the existence of true beauty lies when a belief in beauty 
enjoys nearly universal consent among mankind.  The Critic shows us that the 
philosopher will accept ordinary opinions of beauty to begin his contemplation but that 
he also pushes himself to question these opinions. 
Thus our MONOLOGIST, or self-discoursing Author, in his usual Strain; when 
incited to the Search of BEAUTY and the DECORUM, by vulgar Admiration, 
and the universal Acknowledgment of the SPECIES in outward Things, and in the 
meaner and subordinate Subjects. By this inferior Species, it seems, our strict 
Inspector disdains to be allurřd: And refusing to be captivated by any thing less 
than the superior, original, and genuine Kind; he walks at leisure, without 
Emotion, in deep philosophical Reserve, throř all these pompous Scenes; passes 
unconcernedly by those Court-Pageants, the illustrious and much-envyřd 
Potentates of the Place; overlooks the Rich, the Great, and even the Fair: feeling 
no other Astonishment than what is accidentally raisřd in him, by the View of 
these Impostures, and of this specious Snare.
286
 
  
Returning to Theocles and Philocles we can see that Philocles initially had not expanded 
his reflection to encompass the noble.  By connecting the beautiful to the good, however, 
Theocles brings Philocles to an enthusiastic embrace of the noble.  Philocles sings:   
"The Transports of Poets, the Sublime of Orators, the Rapture of Musicians, the 
high Strains of the Virtuosi; all mere ENTHUSIASM! Even Learning it-self, the 
Love of Arts and Curiositys, the Spirit of Travellers and Adventurers; Gallantry, 
War, Heroism; All, all ENTHUSIASM!"--řTis enough: I am content to be this new 
Enthusiast, in a way unknown to me before.
287
 
 
This "new enthusiasm" invites Philocles to consider the human things anew.  He 
is now ready to undertake the first steps in a science of beauty.  By connecting art and 
nature, account offered by Theocles is less straight-forward than the naïve enthusiast 
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might hope.  We soon learn that it is art which contributes beauty to an object; matter is 
not beautiful in itself.  It follows from this that "the Beautifying, not the Beautifyřd, is the 
really Beautiful."
288
  More directly, it is mind that is responsible for the beautiful.  We 
can see immediately the importance of Theoclesř defense of the Deity.  If the mind alone 
recognizes the beautiful, makes the beautiful, and ultimately styles "the forming Forms," 
can it be said that nature is responsible for the existence of beauty?
289
  
It is essential that Shaftesbury has laid the foundation for a reply to this question.  
As we have seen, a proper answer resorts to the analogy between moral virtue and natural 
harmony.  If he had left the matter at the analogy between the mind and the world, it 
would be unclear which was the agent and which the patient.  The Characteristicks has 
argued, however, that human beings are sociable and that their instincts and thoughts are 
naturally inclined toward the sociable order.  For this reason, Theocles raises once again 
the issue of moral beauty, and connects it to the generation of offspring.  He argues: "this 
I am certain of; that Life, and the Sensations which accompany Life, come when they 
will, are from mere Nature, and nothing else. Therefore if you dislike the word Innate, let 
us change it, if you will, for Instinct; and call Instinct, that which Nature teaches, 
exclusive of Art, Culture, or Discipline."
290
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It is clear from this why, taken together as Volume II, An Inquiry and The 
Moralists are properly called the heart of Characteristicks.  Only together do they answer 
the question surrounding moral life, "whether the Principles spoken of are from Art, or 
Nature?"
291
  The complexity of Shaftesburyřs reply to this question presupposes the 
proper preparation in reading, a proper understanding of the relationship between reason 
and the passion, and a proper grasp of the good as well as the pernicious effects of 
enthusiasm.  It is only when he has wrestled with these matters, and then pursued the 
encounter with modern philosophy from the point of view of "common life," that a 
person is receptive to the dialectical account offered in The Moralists. 
According to Theocles, even actions have a natural "Fitness and Decency."
292
  
Men may disagree about which action is more beautiful, but they display in their daily 
lives their confidence that there is a natural standard.  Theocles maintains that, 
without controversy, řtis allowřd "There is a BEAUTY of each kind." This no-one 
goes about to teach: nor is it learnt by any; but confess’d by All.  All own the 
Standard, Rule, and Measure: But in applying it to Things, Disorder arises, 
Ignorance prevails, Interest and Passion breed Disturbance. Nor can it otherwise 
happen in the Affairs of Life, whilst that which interests and engages Men as 
Good, is thought different from that which they admire and praise as Honest.
293
 
 
For Shaftesbury, it is inadequate to distinguish art and nature entirely when speaking 
about human nature.  It is the nature of human beings to respond to the world, albeit 
within the boundaries set by nature herself.  The affairs of life suggest to men where 
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happiness lies, but the most beautiful way is often obscured by corrupt philosophical 
principles, religious rules, mores, and laws.  It is the proper work of philosophy to help 
recover the sense of natural happiness for man.  This is not a project to be accomplished 
for all of society, but is the fruit of careful self-examination.  It happens through 
education, soul by soul. 
 The beauty of nature reveals itself only to mind.  As Theocles puts it, "never can 
the Form be of real force where it is uncontemplated, unjudgřd of, unexaminřd, and 
stands only as the accidental Note or Token of what appeases provokřd Sense, and 
satisfies the brutish Part."
294
  While human beings have sociable passions, the moral life 
is emphatically a human thing according to Theocles.  Even so, there are ranks of 
understanding beauty, and the untutored mind is less attentive than the properly educated 
mind.  Through philosophy the mind learns to see.  On its own, the "Mind’s EYE" sees 
dimly; it only reaches its "natural Vigour" in contemplation.
295
  It is here that we see that 
the art of soliloquy is not only a means but an end in itself for Theocles.  Through 
soliloquy (or philosophy) a man becomes a "self-improving Artist" capable of genuine 
moral freedom.  When one learns to recognize the proper models, a man "becomes in 
truth the Architect of his own Life and Fortune; by laying within himself the lasting and 
sure Foundations of Order, Peace, and Concord."
296
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 In section 3, Theocles makes his understanding of philosophy clearer by 
distinguishing it from the modern frauds who borrow its name.  Far from being a 
highfalutinř profession, philosophy is commonplace because it is the thing most 
appropriate to human beings: 
yet, in effect [said Theocles], what else is it we all do in general, than 
philosophize? If PHILOSOPHY be, as we take it, the Study of Happiness; must not 
everyone, in some manner or other, either skilfully or unskilfully philosophize? Is 
not every Deliberation concerning our main Interest, every Correction of our 
Taste, every Choice and Preference in Life to be reckonřd of this kind?297 
 
Philosophy is the study of happiness, for everyone at some point asks of his life, 
"ŘWhere, then, is the Difference? Which Manner is the best?" Here lies the Question. 
This is what I wouřd have you weigh and examine."298  Theocles acknowledges that most 
of us would like to ignore such probing questions.  "But the Examination," say you, "is 
troublesom; and I had better be without it."  It is only the properly educated and 
disciplined reason that can formulate a reply to this lazy but sensible objection.  No 
doubt, suggests Theocles, that the person ignorant of mathematics finds mathematics 
difficult; but is he really a fit judge of the activity?  Theocles replies that "in Morality and 
Life, I ask still…May he not, perhaps, be allowřd the best Judg of Living, who studys 
Life, and endeavours to form it by some Rule? Or is he indeed to be esteemřd most 
knowing in the matter, who slightly examines it, and who accidentally and unknowingly 
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philosophizes?"
299
  The Critic himself offers a summary statement of Shaftesburyřs 
project in the Characteristicks.  In ŖMiscellany Vŗ, he writes: 
IT HAS been the main Scope and principal End of these Volumes, "To assert the 
Reality of a Beauty and Charm in moral as well as natural Subjects; and to 
demonstrate the Reasonableness of a proportionate Taste, and determinate 
CHOICE, in Life and Manners." The Standard of this kind, and the noted Character 
of Moral Truth appear so firmly establishřd in Nature it-self, and so widely 
displayřd throř the intelligent World, that there is no Genius, Mind, or thinking 
Principle, which (if I may say so) is not really conscious in the case. Even the 
most refractory and obstinate Understandings are by certain Reprises or Returns 
of Thought, on every occasion, convincřd of this Existence, and necessitated, in 
common with others, to acknowledg the actual Right and Wrong.
300
 
 
The Moralists ends with a more questioning tone than one might have expected from 
Theocles. Theocles concludes the conversation in the following way:  "thus is Philosophy 
establishřd.  For Every-one, of necessity, must reason concerning his own Happiness; 
'What his Good is, and what his Ill.' The Question is only, 'Who reasons best?' For even 
he who rejects this reasoning or deliberating Part, does it from a certain Reason, and 
from a Persuasion 'That this is best.'"  As for Philocles, he concludes his narrative 
abruptly, as we have already remarked.  He writes to Palemon, "BY this time we found 
our-selves insensibly got home. Our Philosophy ended, and we returnřd to the common 
Affairs of Life."  By returning us to common life at this point we are left with Theoclesř 
important question:  what is the best life, and who reasons best about it. 
 As we have seen, the reader, like Palemon, is left to judge for himself. 
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CONCLUSION 
"CHARTAE SOCRATICAE" 
This dissertation has tried to read Shaftesbury's Characteristicks in light of the 
literary theory presented by the Characteristicks itself.  Shaftesbury offers his reader 
advice through the character of the Critic, who seems to be a practitioner of the subtle art 
of criticism.  When this advice is combined with the self-referential apparatus of 
footnotes and indices, a map of Shaftesbury's philosophical opinions unfolds before the 
patient reader.  Shaftesbury hopes that a reader who follows this map will become 
acquainted with the dialogical way of philosophizing as classical philosophy traditionally 
understood it. 
This "antient" yet perennial philosophy aims at self-knowledge.  In one sense, 
self-knowledge would involve inquiry into the reputable opinions found in common life 
with the intention of separating human nature from the inheritance of convention.  
Shaftesbury offers his reader a way of coming to know the characteristics of men, 
manners, opinions, and times.  Because philosophy is an activity practiced by human 
beings, and because human life is characterized by the common confusion of convention 
and nature, such self-knowledge can be said to be the necessary prelude to any serious 
reflection on the character of the cosmos.  Viewed from this perspective, Shaftesbury's 
Characteristicks is Socratic in the deepest sense of the term. 
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It is also Socratic in a more political way.  Shaftesbury understands political 
liberty to rest on the moral liberty of the individual.  He clearly regards the dominance of 
Christianity to be an impediment to such moral liberty, in part because of its marriage of 
otherworldly hopes and fears, and in part because of its obfuscation of Socratic 
philosophy as he understands it.  Shaftesbury regards modern philosophy as a project 
undertaken to weaken the influence of Christianity on political life; his own account of 
Christianity suggests considerable sympathy for the goals of this project.  Yet 
Shaftesbury repudiates modern philosophy because of its reckless diminishment of the 
noble.  A proper concern for the noble is necessary if man is to become virtuous in the 
most serious sense.  Love of the noble, which Shaftesbury suggests is inseparable from 
the highest aspirations of man, is naturally present in the human soul.  Despite this fact, 
there is no guarantee that men will notice and appreciate the beauty, order, and numbers 
of the world, especially in the absence of the literary arts.  These arts have political 
liberty as a condition for their development and perfection.  The Characteristicks, then, 
mounts a defense of the noble from both Christianity and modern philosophy by 
cultivating the art of criticism in its reader.  Criticism as practiced by the reader in his 
attempt to understand the Characteristicks is ultimately a model for Socratic inquiry. 
The patient reader of Shaftesbury's seldom-understood book can come to see that 
he is being shown CHARTAE SOCRATICAE--philosophical sea-cards for the impetuous soul.  
Shaftesbury's Characteristicks itself might be described as a philosophic poem meant to 
stir eros in the reader for the noble as it is encountered both in art and nature.  This 
  397 
 
 
 
 
extravagant, dangerous passion finds a model for orderly love in Shaftesbury's art of 
criticism.  
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